“Succession of states after the collapse of the USSR”

It's no secret that succession after the collapse of the USSR entailed many problems. The existence of the USSR as a subject international law was terminated by the Agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of December 8, 1991, the Protocol to the Agreement of December 21, 1991 and the Alma-Ata Declaration of January 1, 2001. A situation arose of the division of the state, as a result of which its successor states became new subjects of international law - twelve former Soviet republics. By decision of 01/01/01, the Council of Heads of State of the CIS Member States supported Russia in continuing to remain a member of the UN, including permanent membership in the Security Council and other international organizations. At the same time, the Vienna Conventions of 1978 and 1983 on succession of states did not enter into force for the CIS states, and decisions on each aspect of succession were reached through diplomatic procedures. But there are questions for which there are no answers in conventions, agreements and laws; in general, the succession process took place within the framework of the doctrine of international law, what norms guided the CIS member states when resolving certain issues, was this process legal, were these resolved? the most important issues: territory, population, public debts, etc. This remains to be seen.

Since December 24, 1991, the Russian Federation continued the USSR's membership in the United Nations, including membership in the Security Council, UN specialized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations. On January 3, 1992, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by a note, notified all diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow that diplomatic and consular missions former USSR converted into representative offices Russian Federation, and their heads become heads of Russian embassies and consulates. On January 13, 1992, all states were notified by a note that Russia continues to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations arising from international treaties concluded by the USSR and becomes a party to all existing international treaties instead of the USSR.

Russia's mission as a successor state of the USSR did not mean any infringement on the scope of legal succession of other Commonwealth states. By mutual agreement, it was supposed to provide guarantees for the normal course of succession for all interested countries that received international recognition as new states. At the same time, there was no need for recognition for Russia. The complex of aspects of the succession of international obligations arising from treaties of the former USSR, numbering more than 32 thousand acts, is very complex, and to date, not all of them have been resolved.

Particularly difficult was the division of responsibility for fulfilling the military-political obligations of the former USSR. Essentially, for the first time in the history of mankind, the CIS countries divided among themselves the military property of the collapsed USSR, unprecedented in power and price. The weapons alone cost many trillions of dollars.

Commonwealth states proclaimed the right to create their own armies. At first this was enshrined in internal state acts, and on December 30, 1991 it was confirmed by the Agreement on the Armed Forces and Border Troops. On February 14, 1992, the heads of state of the Commonwealth signed a Statement on the property, weapons, equipment and logistics of the Armed Forces, which recognized every right each state to dispose of the material resources of the Armed Forces of the USSR within its territory. But the principle “what is on my land is mine” was not entirely successful. The inheritance of the Soviet Armed Forces was divided very unevenly, which gave rise to mutual claims among the successor states.

In the Memorandum of July 6, 1992, the CIS member states, recognizing the role of multilateral international treaties in the matter of stabilization and further development relations with other states, considered that almost all treaties of the former USSR were of common interest to the Commonwealth states. However, these treaties do not require any decisions or actions by members of the Commonwealth. The issue of participation in treaties is resolved in accordance with the principles and norms of international law by each CIS state independently, depending on the specifics of the case, the nature and content of a particular treaty. For example, in connection with the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1991), Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, where such weapons of the former USSR were stationed, signed the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, together with the USA, according to which, as successor states of the USSR, they assumed the corresponding obligations. Similar decisions on October 9, 1992 were made on agreements between the USSR and the USA on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF), on the limitation of missile defense systems (ABM), etc. With regard to bilateral agreements, Russia has established a negotiation process, decisions have been reached on their modification or termination.

Issues of succession in relation to external public debt and state property of the USSR, primarily foreign, were resolved in accordance with the Vienna Convention (1983), which, although it did not come into force for Russia, was taken into account by the countries of the Commonwealth. In Art. 41 of this convention deals with the situation when a state is divided and ceases to exist, and parts of the territory of the predecessor state form two or more successor states. Unless the successor states agree otherwise, the public debt of the predecessor state passes to the successor states in equitable shares, taking into account the property, rights and interests that pass to the successor state in connection with this public debt.

The Memorandum of Understanding regarding the debt to foreign creditors of the USSR and its successors of October 28, 1991 and the Communiqué of November 24, 1991 established the principle of joint liability, and the parties declared themselves jointly and severally liable for the debt without prejudice to the original contracts.

On December 4, 1991, the Treaty on Succession in relation to the external public debt and assets of the USSR was signed. The treaty was signed by all successor states, with the exception of the Baltic republics and Uzbekistan. The parties to this agreement agreed to participate in the repayment and bear the costs of servicing the state external debt of the USSR in agreed shares. At the same time, the parties unprecedentedly expanded the concept of public debt and assumed all the financial obligations of the USSR to creditors who are not generally accepted subjects of international law (commercial banks, legal entities and individuals).

Determining the assignees' "fair shares" of the debt was extremely difficult. As a result, on December 4, 1991, an Agreement was signed on the mechanism for repayment and servicing of debts (obligations) of the USSR in foreign currency. For the first time in world practice, it provided an “aggregate indicator” of the distribution of the republics’ shares in exports, imports, produced national income and the population of the USSR for 1986–1990. As a result, the shares of debt obligations (in percentage) were distributed as follows: Russia – 61.34; Ukraine – 16.37; Belarus – 4.1Z; Kazakhstan – Z.86; Uzbekistan – Z.27; Azerbaijan – 1.64; Georgia – 1.62; Lithuania – 1.41; Latvia – 1.14; Moldova – 1.29; Kyrgyzstan – 0.95; Armenia – 0.86; Tajikistan – 0.82; Turkmenistan – 0.70; Estonia – 0.62.

On December 30, 1991, an Agreement was concluded on the property of the former USSR abroad, in which the CIS states mutually recognized that each of them has the right to a corresponding fixed fair share in the property of the former USSR abroad and will contribute to the implementation of this right. Since foreign institutions, embassies and consulates of the USSR came under the jurisdiction of Russia, the property that belonged to them, by virtue of jus pavillionis (flag rights), automatically became Russian property. Despite the creation of an interstate commission to develop criteria and principles for the distribution of all property of the former USSR abroad, this issue continues to be disputed by some former Soviet republics.

In accordance with the Agreement of July 6, 1992 on the succession in relation to the state archives of the former USSR (Article 2), the CIS states mutually recognized the transition, carried out in accordance with their national legislation, into their jurisdiction of state archives and other archives of the union level, including state sectoral archival funds of the former USSR located on their territory. By the decision of the CIS states of October 9, 1992, the work of the Commission to consider a set of issues related to succession in relation to treaties of mutual interest, state property, state archives, debts and assets of the former USSR was completed. Thus, succession in Russia in relation to the archives of the USSR was carried out by mutual expression of the will of the CIS states on the basis of regional agreements.

The procedure for the succession of Russia, carried out in relation to the archives of the USSR, is provided for by the Vienna Convention, according to which: the transfer of the state archives of the predecessor state entails the termination of the rights of this state and the emergence of the rights of the successor state to the state archives (Article 21); the transfer of state archives of the predecessor state to the successor state occurs without compensation (Article 23); agreements concluded between the respective successor states in relation to the state archives of the predecessor state should not prejudice the right of the peoples of these states to development, to information, to cultural property (Part 4, Article 31).

So what's the end result? What is the result of “the string of all these events in history”? Russia declared itself the successor of the USSR, which was recognized by almost all other states. The remaining post-Soviet states (with the exception of the Baltic states) became the legal successors of the USSR (in particular, the USSR's obligations under international treaties) and the corresponding union republics. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia declared themselves successors to the respective states that existed in 1918-1940. Georgia declared itself the successor of the Republic of Georgia 1918-1921. Moldova is not a successor to the MSSR, since a law was adopted in which the decree on the creation of the MSSR was called illegal, which is perceived by many as a legal justification for the PMR’s claims to independence. Within the UN, all 15 states are considered successors of the respective union republics, and therefore the territorial claims of these countries against each other are not recognized (including the pre-existing claims of Latvia and Estonia against Russia) and independence is not recognized state entities, which were not among the union republics (including Abkhazia, which had such a status, but lost it).

There are different points of view on legal aspects collapse of the USSR. There is a point of view that the USSR formally still exists, since its dissolution was carried out in violation of legal norms and ignoring the popular opinion expressed in the referendum. This point of view has been repeatedly challenged by supporters of the opinion that it is pointless to demand compliance with formal rules from such significant geopolitical changes.

In other words, international succession is an important institution of international law, where the vital interests of peoples and states are affected. Each case of international succession marks a milestone in world history.

The Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR.

The collapse of the USSR created the problem of its foreign policy legacy: the question of the fate of its rights and responsibilities in the world community. Russia, with the consent of the other republics of the former USSR, recognized itself as its legal successor, which meant accepting full responsibility for compliance with the obligations of the Union and the simultaneous use of its rights and property abroad. Immediately after the ratification of the Bialowieza Agreement on the dissolution of the USSR, from the end of December 1991, Russia took its place in the UN and other international organizations, the post of a permanent member of the Security Council, and pledged to comply with the treaties signed on behalf of the USSR.

Trends in the preservation of national, religious and cultural traditions and “freedom of conscience” in Russia.

The preservation of traditional moral religious values, as well as individual human freedoms, seems very important in our time. National values ​​in the cultural and spiritual spheres represent great wealth, at the same time being an inexhaustible reserve necessary for the reproduction of world-recognized universal human values, as well as the national cultural and moral traditions of peoples.

Today, culture exists in the form of self-expression of peoples. National characteristics individual peoples stem from the specific historical characteristics of life and certain peoples, as well as from their biosocial essence.

The most important features and significance of the national culture of any people lies in its originality, diversity and originality.

The process of developing the cultural characteristics of a nation is facilitated by the creation of unique forms of organizing the cultural life of individual peoples, which helps to avoid imitation and copying of other cultures. The culture of a people, which does not have its own characteristics, is comparable to a faceless person. The culture of peoples is not a frozen phenomenon; its originality increases and is enriched simultaneously with the flourishing of the nation, with growing confidence in its future, with the strengthening of its place in world civilization. Bushmanova A.V. Features of the legal regime of cultural values ​​in the Russian Federation. // News of the Russian State Pedagogical University named after. A.I. Herzen. 2008. No. 74-1 P.91.

Freedom of conscience in Russia.

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ABSTRACT

On the topic: liquidation (disintegration) of the USSR and the formation of the CIS “Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR”

Completed by: Turtseva Svetlana

2nd year student of KMT gr. S-1335

Accepted by: Nesterova N.I.

1. Liquidation (collapse) of the USSR and formation of the CIS. Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR

1.1 Liquidation (collapse) of the USSR and formation of the CIS

On January 10, 1991, USSR President M. S. Gorbachev addressed the Supreme Council of Lithuania with a demand to restore the validity of the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR on the territory of the republic. The next day of division internal troops The USSR took under protection the Press House in Vilnius, the Lithuanian DOSAAF building, and the long-distance telephone exchange. On January 13, the “National Salvation Committee” was created in Lithuania, declaring support for the actions of the central authorities. On January 14, at one in the morning, the television center in Vilnius was occupied by paratroopers. On January 20, Riga riot police seized the building of the Republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs. During a shootout in the center of Riga, four people were killed and about ten were wounded. The center tried to put forceful pressure on the local authorities to return control of the Baltic states.

The actions of the central authorities caused a backlash: the Russian and regional democratic opposition acted as a united front against Gorbachev. Such associates of Gorbachev as A. Yakovlev, E. Primakov, L. Abalkin resigned in protest against the government’s new course. At the referendum held in Lithuania on February 9, over 90% of the residents surveyed were in favor of an independent democratic Republic of Lithuania. In his interview on February 19, 1991 on Central Television, B. N. Yeltsin stated that he dissociated himself from the current policy of the President of the USSR and advocated his resignation. In turn, on February 21, 1991, in the Russian Parliament, a number of Yeltsin’s deputies (including S.P. Goryachev) demanded his resignation from his post.

On March 17, 1991, a referendum was held in the USSR, in which the majority of the country's citizens (76.4%) were in favor of preserving the renewed Union. The majority of Russians supported the decision of the Russian Parliament on the need to introduce the post of President of the RSFSR. In April 1991, direct negotiations between the President of the USSR and the leadership of the republics began on concluding a new Union Treaty at the presidential residence Novo-Ogarevo. On June 12, 1991, the first presidential elections in Russian history took place. It was B. N. Yeltsin, who was far ahead of his rivals: N. I. Ryzhkov, V. V. Zhirinovsky, A. M. Tuleev, A. M. Makashov, V. V. Bakatin. The election of Yeltsin indicated the need for a redistribution of power between the Union and republican centers authorities. By August 1991, it was difficult to prepare a compromise and agreed only in general outline draft Union Treaty, the signing of which was scheduled for August 22. The document provided for the retention of only issues of defense, finance, internal affairs and partly tax and social policy. According to the draft, the main powers of government were assigned to the republics.

It was under these conditions that the events of August 19-21, 1991 took place. In the absence of M. S. Gorbachev, who was on vacation in Crimea at the government dacha "Foros", the State Committee By state of emergency in the country (GKChP). It included Vice President of the USSR G. I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V. S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B. K. Pugo, Chairman of the KGB V. A. Kryuchkov, Chairman of the Peasant Union USSR V. A. Starodubtsev, President of the Association of State Enterprises of the USSR A. I. Tizyakov, Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council O. D. Baklanov. The State Emergency Committee announced the introduction of a state of emergency in a number of regions of the USSR, the dissolution of power structures that contradict the Constitution of the USSR, and the suspension of activities opposition parties, a ban on rallies and demonstrations, and the implementation of economic reforms in the near future. The statements of the State Emergency Committee were supported by the deployment of troops in a row settlements, including to Moscow. On this active actions The State Emergency Committee ceased, and the initiative began to pass to the opposition, which organized numerous rallies in Moscow and Leningrad. Although B. N. Yeltsin’s call for a general political strike did not meet with support in the regions, the Russian leadership managed to gather a 500,000-strong rally in Moscow and enlist the support of individual military units. Neutralize under these conditions Russian leadership, which opposed the State Emergency Committee, failed. The initiative finally passed to Yeltsin’s supporters, and the State Emergency Committee did not decide on the use of force. On August 21, members of the State Emergency Committee flew to Foros to negotiate with Gorbachev, who was isolated there. On August 22 they were arrested, Gorbachev returned to Moscow.

Trying to revive the union treaty, Gorbachev agreed to serious concessions from the center in favor of the republics, recognized the independence of the Baltic states and attempted to create a new democratic union government, where he invited famous democrats E. A. Shevardnadze, V. V. Bakatin and others. In September, the development of a new treaty on the formation of a confederal Union of sovereign states instead of the USSR. However, on December 1, 1991, a referendum took place in Ukraine in favor of the independence of the republic. On December 5, L. Kravchuk, elected president of Ukraine, signed a decree on the republic’s withdrawal from the Union. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia (B. N. Yeltsin), Ukraine (L. Kravchuk) and Belarus (S. S. Shushkevich) announced the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the cessation of the USSR. On December 21, the leaders of eight more republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) joined the CIS. The Baltic republics and Georgia (president 3. Gamsakhurdia), having welcomed the collapse of the USSR, refused to join the CIS. (After the December 1991 coup in Georgia and the coming to power of E. A. Shevardnadze, Georgia joined the CIS.) On December 25, 1991, M. S. Gorbachev resigned from the post of President of the USSR. On December 27, when he appeared in the Kremlin to “pack his things,” he was already sitting in his office Russian President B. N. Yeltsin.

1.2 The role of the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR

Russia's place in modern world. The collapse of the USSR created the problem of its foreign policy legacy: the question of the fate of its rights and responsibilities in the world community. Russia, with the consent of the other republics of the former USSR, recognized itself as its legal successor, which meant accepting full responsibility for compliance with the obligations of the Union and the simultaneous use of its rights and property abroad. Immediately after the ratification of the Bialowieza Agreement on the dissolution of the USSR, from the end of December 1991, Russia took its place in the UN and other international organizations, the post of a permanent member of the Security Council, and pledged to comply with the treaties signed on behalf of the USSR.

Back in 1989 last president USSR M.S. Gorbachev took part in the meetings of the leaders of the leading Western powers of the Seven as an observer (formula 7+1). Since 1992, his place was taken by President B.N. Yeltsin, who persistently sought to transform the “seven” into the “eight”, which was achieved in the summer of 1997 at a meeting in Denver (USA), However, this participation is still incomplete due to Russia’s economic weakness. Now there is again a tendency to return to the “7+1” formula in connection with the war in Chechnya, which is condemned by the West. union collapse state state

The problem of the USSR debts. Russia suffered the debts of the USSR. Sharply worsened economic situation forced her to ask for a deferment of debts, to which Western creditors were forced to agree. The deterioration of relations with Iraq, Cuba, Libya and other traditional allies of the USSR, which began during the years of “perestroika,” made it problematic for them to return old debts. However, in 1997 Russia recognized the almost century-old debt of the Tsarist and Provisional Governments to the French holders of Russian securities, but paid, in fact, symbolic compensation. The amount of debts of the USSR (including interest) amounted to about 130 billion dollars, which are divided into debts government agencies and private owners of securities (their associations are called the Paris and London Clubs).

Debts of Russia. Needing loans, Russia asked for help from the International Monetary Fund and leading Western powers. At a meeting of leaders under the "7+1" formula in Munich in July 1992, B.N. Yeltsin received assurances from Western leaders about their financial support for economic reforms in Russia. The condition for this was Western control over the course of economic and political transformations. Almost all the loans that are being obtained with increasing difficulty from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are immediately used to service the old debt, i.e. to pay interest on it. The country's financial situation sharply deteriorated after the Kiriyenko government announced a "default" on August 17, 1998 - refusal to pay debts and interest on them. In the second half of 1999, the International Monetary Fund, dominated by the United States, refused to provide Russia with the next payment (tranche), which was all supposed to go towards paying off interest.

Nuclear disarmament. Russia inherited from the USSR nuclear missile potential and obligations to limit it and non-proliferate it. Missiles with nuclear warheads are removed and destroyed from the territory of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Russia has 3.5 thousand nuclear warheads left. Retaining previous fears, the United States is partially financing the destruction of the former nuclear potential of the USSR and preventing Russia’s cooperation with non-nuclear powers in the field of energy under the pretext possible violation Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Now the situation with disarmament has become more complicated due to the resumption of work on the program " star wars"in the USA.

The European Union and the UN recognized that Russia is the continuator of the Soviet Union's membership in the UN and, in particular, in the Security Council, as well as in other international organizations. The law on international treaties of the Russian Federation (Article 3) states that it applies to treaties in which Russia participates as a successor to the USSR. If Russia were the legal successor of the USSR, it would not have automatic succession, like Ukraine and Belarus. “inherit” a place in the UN, since the RSFSR was not a member of the UN. Russia would have to be accepted as a member of the UN and, in addition, it would be necessary to amend the UN Charter to provide that Russia, a new subject of international law, should take the place of the USSR on the Security Council. This would create legal difficulties. Russia continued the USSR's membership in the Security Council as the same subject of international law, changing its name, from which, moreover, some parts separated. Thus. it can no longer be considered in any spheres of interstate relations as the legal successor of the USSR. Some international obligations of the former USSR could not remain in force for Russia or underwent changes due to the fact that they related to those parts of its territory that separated. Others could be abandoned, citing fundamental changes in the circumstances to which they were designed to remain unchanged (the so-called doctrine of rebus sic stantibus). But the bulk of the obligations of the subject of international law, called the USSR, retained their force for Russia, since it is the same subject.

Russia rightfully took the place of the USSR in the circle of the most prominent powers and in international organizations. However, with regard to continuity - Russia as the successor of the former USSR - we and the West have different approaches: Russia insists on recognizing it as a full successor to all the rights and obligations of its predecessor, and the Western powers agree to recognize it only as a successor to the USSR.

Literature

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2. Erasov B. S. Social cultural studies. M., 1997. pp. 433-434.

3. Cultural expansion. Problems of modern globalization of culture. Internet resource.

4. O. Leontovich. The danger of asymmetry in Russian-American intercultural communication. http://www.prof.msu.ru/publ/conf/conf43.htm.

5. Sidorov E. Yu. Culture of the world and culture of Russia // Polis. 1998. N 5. P. 106-113.

6. Cultural studies. History of world culture. Markova A.N. M., 2003 Culturology. Ed. G.V. Dracha. Rostov-on-Don, 2000.

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An attempt at a global “set-up”, into which they managed to drag part of the world community, which owes so much voluntary consent Russia to take on the colossal task of minimizing catastrophic consequences collapse of the USSR. Agreement, which became primarily a gesture goodwill and a response to a clearly expressed request from that very “world community”. Surprisingly, the question of “succession of the USSR” turned out to be falsified both in the mass consciousness and in the assessments and comments of specialists. There is a strong opinion that Russia is named the “successor” of the USSR in the text of the “Belovezhskaya Accords”. This is wrong.

The formal legal basis for the demise of the USSR was three documents: - the agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (actually the “Belovezhskaya Agreement”), signed by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on December 8, 1991, in which the three republics “as the founding states of the USSR, signatories Union Treaty 1922", stated, “that the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases to exist,” as well as the protocol to this agreement and the declaration signed in Alma-Ata on December 21, 1991, according to which 11 “union republics” became part of the CIS who became independent states. Later, they were joined by a twelfth state - Georgia - and the Baltic republics refused to participate in post-Soviet integration processes.

In the listed documents.

In the listed documentsthere is not a word about “Russian succession”. Officially, the position of the countries participating in the agreement on the creation of the CIS on the issue of the special role of Russia was first formulated in Almaty, on the day the declaration was signed, in the text of the “decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS”, in the following expressions: “Member states of the Commonwealth, referring to Article 12 of the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, based on the intention of each state to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter and participate in the work of this organization as full members, taking into account thatthe original members of the UN were the Republic of Belarus, the USSR and Ukraine, expressing satisfaction that the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine continue to participate in the UN as sovereign independent states, determined to contribute to the strengthening international peace and security on the basis of the UN Charter in the interests of their peoples and the entire international community, decided:
1. The Commonwealth states support Russia in ensuring that itcontinuedUSSR membership in the UN, including permanent membership in the Security Council, and other international organizations.
2. The Republic of Belarus, the RSFSR, and Ukraine will provide support to other Commonwealth states in resolving issues of their full membership in the UN and other international organizations.”
Thus, a transparent idea of ​​“exchange” was put forward: the former Soviet republics recognize Russia as a state that continues the USSR’s membership in the UN, and in return receive assistance in recognizing them as full subjects of international law.

Immediately after the publication of the documents of the Almaty meeting, the fact of the end of the existence of the USSR, first proclaimed in the “Belovezhskaya Agreement”, caused a wave of official recognition from all the major world states. It was at this moment in international practice came in formulation about Russia as a “continuator state” (and not the legal successor) USSR within the framework of the world order system created in 1945, in which Soviet Union was one of the fundamental participants (permanent member of the UN Security Council), whose simple removal could have shaken or destroyed the entire structure.

This formulation was more an ideological than a legal innovation, put forward for the sole purpose of minimize the international consequences of the collapse of a superpower, simplify the processes of maintaining the validity of fundamental international treaties, eliminate the possibility of armed conflicts in which the legality of the actual liquidation of the internationally recognized geopolitical phenomenon called the USSR would be contested. The promotion and actual legitimation of this formulation - and this is obvious from the content of documents of that time - were the result of an unexplicit consensus between Russia, the UN and post-Soviet republics, and the initiator of the formulation was primarily the states - the “Western” partners of the USSR (especially active position support for the idea of ​​Russian “continuation” - for obvious reasons - was taken by “Western” Japan), keenly interested in avoiding the “blank slate logic” (which some short-sighted representatives of world diplomacy initially tried to insist on).

The consensus implementation looked like this: On December 24, 1991, an official Message from the President of the Russian Federation was sent to the UN Secretary General, in which, with reference to the above-mentioned decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, it was reported that the Russian Federation continued membership of the USSR in the UN. Secretary General sent the text of the message to all members of the UN and, referring to the opinion of the legal department of the UN Secretariat, proposed to consider that this appeal is of a notification nature, stating reality, and does not require formal approval from the UN. All permanent members of the Security Council and other leading countries have indicated agreement with this approach. Thus, from December 24, 1991 Russian Federation continued USSR membership in the UN, including membership in the Security Council.

On January 13, 1992, an official letter from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “On the fulfillment by the Russian Federation of obligations under international treaties concluded by the USSR” appeared addressed to the heads of diplomatic missions accredited in Moscow, which stated: “Russian Federation continues exercise rights and fulfill obligations arising from international treaties concluded by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Accordingly, the Government of the Russian Federation will perform, instead of the Government of the USSR, the functions of depository under the relevant multilateral treaties. In this regard, the Ministry requests that the Russian Federation be considered as a Party to all existing international treaties instead of the USSR.” This also highlighted another important component of “continuity”—the economic one. Russia actually “bought” the preservation of its positions in the UN and USSR property abroad(embassy buildings, etc.) for recognition and assuming obligations on the external debts of the Union.

The last major component of “continuation” and succession was the totality international agreements regarding issuesnuclear safety— issues that worried the West most.These issues affected four post-Soviet states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstanan - on the territory of which it was located nuclear weapons Soviet Armed Forces. And the West, represented by the United States, did everything possible to as soon as possible transfer the entire nuclear potential of the former Union “into one hand” - into the hands of Russia - and at the same time prevent the expansion of the “nuclear club”. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of UkraineAnatoly Zlenkonot without gloating he recalls the hysteria into which the then Secretary of State fell in the last hours of work on the “Lisbon Protocol” (May 23, 1992)James Baker. Attempts by “independent” Ukraine to negotiate special preferences and push for recognition of Ukraine’s nuclear “property” almost led, according to Zlenko, to going beyond the limits of diplomatic etiquette. “Ukraine creates difficulties all the time! She goes against international opinion! She is blocking important negotiations! We will take action!” - this is how, according to the ex-minister, the head of the American foreign policy department shouted, seeking compliance with the principle of maintaining all nuclear potential in the hands of Russia. In the end, it is the “Lisbon Protocol” (officially -Protocol to the Treaty between the USSR and the USA on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991), which was signed by the USA, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus on May 23, 1992, uses the term “successors of the USSR”, and in this context:“The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine as successor states of the former UnionThe Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty, assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty».

It can therefore be stated that for the period from December 21, 1991 to May 23, 1992. world community agreed with the political formulation of Russia as a successor state of the USSR, clearly defining the formal legal framework of “continuation” with four positions (nuclear potential, membership in the UN Security Council, property abroad, external debt of the USSR).
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Over the subsequent decades, Russia did everything possible to ensure that the state successor of the USSR become his only successor. Moreover, in the minds of Russians it already is. Which automatically, as it were, legalizes Russia’s imperial ambitions. Indeed, in this case, it becomes the legal successor not only of the USSR, but also Tsarist Russia, with all the ensuing consequences.
And the current annexation of Crimea is a convincing illustration of this.
In these conditions, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan too (for it is next) needs to withdraw its signature from that Agreement of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan - the successor states of the USSR, in the part that grants Russia the exclusive right to be a member of the UN Security Council with the right veto. Instead, introduce a rotation of successor states of the USSR into the UN Security Council for five years each, with a ban on Russia's representation in this body for 25 years, as it has already used the limit of its participation.
It is worth noting that, regardless of what steps the state of Ukraine takes, the UN Security Council is convinced of the need to reformat relations in the Security Council and the UN in light of recent events.

In December 1991, the Russian Duma denounced the treaty on the creation of the USSR, but they had no right to do so.

But this agreement never appeared - because it was never ratified, therefore the first Soviet constitution was not federal, but unitary - because there was no agreement on the creation of a federation. And they were all unitary.

Therefore, there was nothing to denounce, since no one had ratified it.

Issues of succession arose.

The Russian Federation is not only the legal successor, but also the successor of the USSR. The Russian Federation remained wherever the USSR was, including in the UN and the UN Security Council, the treaties remained, the property remained.

Topic: “Sources of international law.”

A source is a form of a rule of law.

International law has four sources. And there are four forms of legal norms. And they differ from each other in shape.

What they have in common is that this is the source, that these are all rules of law. And the difference is in the form.

A rule of law is a rule of behavior.

The first stage is agreeing on the rules of conduct, the second is giving legal consent. This is what any norm of international law has.

They differ in form - agreement and consent in one source in one form, and in another - in another, these stages are mandatory, but they are expressed differently.

And the source strength is normal, from this we conclude:

One source has nothing to do with the other. Some source is fundamentally not stronger than another, strength depends on the norm, and for the source to be stronger, it needs to be imperative - there are not two, but three stages of creation, it is added that it is written that this imperative norm will have higher rate compared to others.

Therefore, if a source contains a mandatory norm, then the source will be stronger than other sources with similar norms.

Therefore, the sources are not connected with each other in any way, and the strength of the source is normal (it is simple or imperative). This is very important.

There is no list of sources in international law. There are four sources because it happened that way. Their number may increase.

Some textbooks write: “It is said that the list of sources of international law is enshrined in Article 38 of the Statute (Charter) of the International Court of Justice of 1945.”

firstly, international conventions;

secondly, international customs;

thirdly, general principles rights recognized by civilized nations;

fourthly, decisions of international courts and arbitrations, as well as the doctrine of the best qualified specialists.”

So, International Conventions– this is the source, of course.

International customs are a source, we will look at them later.

And then there are some incomprehensible general principles of law. What can law have in common for everyone? For example, a special norm cancels a general one, norms with greater force cancel norms with less force, and a subsequent norm cancels the previous one. These are the general principles of law.

The question arises: is there a rule of law here? A rule of law is a rule of behavior that is legally binding. There is no rule of conduct in the general principles of law, so this is not a source.

General principles of law are the principles of the structure of law. Any law, whatever it may be, is structured according to these principles.

Therefore, general principles of law are not a source.

Next is the decision of international courts and arbitrations. The norm is created by the coordination of the will; with whom does the court coordinate its will when making a decision? He is quietly talking to himself, there is no counterparty - therefore they are not the source of these decisions.

Then - the doctrines of the most qualified specialists. Then, in 1945, there were 3-4 people most competent in the field of international law and they were listened to (now we have all the most qualified ones).

In the specialist’s doctrine there is no rule of law - there is no agreement, and in general, this is an orientation towards the existing rule. Therefore, it is also not a source.

And Article 38 was written not to write a list of sources, but to tell the court what it will be guided by when it begins to consider the case.

Therefore, the opinion that Article 38 contains a list of sources is erroneous.

Other scholars say that there is a list of what helps determine the list of sources of international law.

Some textbooks say that sources are divided into main (these include treaties and customs) and auxiliary (these include acts of international organizations and acts of international conferences).

But this is incorrect - if there is a rule of law, then it is a source, if not, it is not a source. And the strength of the source depends on the norm.

In general, it is impossible to divide into main and auxiliary, this is incorrect, they are all basic.

Now we will begin to consider these sources.