Sinusitis

State Committee for the State of Emergency. GKChP: abbreviation decoding, history

After the failed coup attempt on August 21, 1991, all members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested, with the exception of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo, who committed suicide.

From the point of view of the creators of the State Emergency Committee themselves, their actions were aimed at restoring the rule of law in the USSR and stopping the collapse of the state. Their actions did not receive legal assessment, since all arrested participants of the State Emergency Committee were amnestied even before the trial. Only V.I. Varennikov, who was not a member of the committee, voluntarily appeared before the court and was acquitted.

Formation of the State Emergency Committee

Preparing to create a committee

From the “Conclusion on the materials of the investigation into the role and participation officials KGB of the USSR in the events of August 19-21, 1991":

...in December 1990, the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR V.A. Kryuchkov instructed the former deputy head of the PGU KGB of the USSR V.I. Zhizhin and assistant former first Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Grushko V.F. Egorov A.G. to carry out the study of possible primary measures to stabilize the situation in the country in the event of a state of emergency. From the end of 1990 to the beginning of August 1991, V. A. Kryuchkov, together with other future members of the State Emergency Committee, took possible political and other measures to introduce a state of emergency in the USSR by constitutional means. Having not received the support of the President of the USSR and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, from the beginning of August 1991 they began to implement specific measures to prepare for the introduction of a state of emergency by illegal means.
From August 7 to 15, V. A. Kryuchkov repeatedly held meetings with some members of the future State Emergency Committee at the secret facility of the PGU KGB of the USSR, code-named UABCF. During the same period of time, V.I. Zhizhin and A.G. Egorov, at the direction of Kryuchkov, carried out adjustments to the December documents on the problems of introducing a state of emergency in the country. They, with the participation of the then commander airborne troops Lieutenant General P.S. Grachev prepared data on possible reaction population of the country to introduce a state of emergency in a constitutional form. The content of these documents was later reflected in official decrees, appeals and orders of the State Emergency Committee. On August 17, Zhizhin V.I. participated in the preparation of theses for V.A. Kryuchkov’s speech on television in the event of a state of emergency.

Participants in the conspiracy various stages its implementation assigned the KGB of the USSR a decisive role in:

removing the President of the USSR from power by isolating him;

blocking possible attempts by the President of the RSFSR to resist the activities of the State Emergency Committee;

establishing constant monitoring for the location of the heads of government bodies of the RSFSR, Moscow, people's deputies of the USSR, RSFSR and Moscow City Council, known for their democratic views, and major public figures with a view to their subsequent detention;

implementation together with parts Soviet Army and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stormed the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR with the subsequent internment of those captured there, including the Russian leadership.

from August 17 to 19, some special forces of the KGB of the USSR and special forces of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR were put on heightened combat readiness and redeployed to pre-designated places to participate, together with units of the SA and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in measures to ensure the state of emergency. Using specially created groups, on August 18, USSR President Gorbachev was isolated in a vacation spot in Foros, and RSFSR President Yeltsin and other opposition-minded individuals were placed under surveillance.

Members of the Emergency Committee

Baklanov Oleg Dmitrievich (b. 1932) - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Kryuchkov Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1924-2007) - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Pavlov Valentin Sergeevich (1937-2003) - Prime Minister of the USSR.
Pugo Boris Karlovich (1937-1991) - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Starodubtsev Vasily Aleksandrovich (b. 1931) - Chairman of the Peasant Union of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Tizyakov Alexander Ivanovich (b. 1926) - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communications Facilities of the USSR.
Yazov Dmitry Timofeevich (b. 1923) - Minister of Defense of the USSR, member of the CPSU Central Committee.
Yanaev Gennady Ivanovich (b. 1937) - Vice-President of the USSR, Chairman of the State Emergency Committee, member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Political positions of the State Emergency Committee

In its first appeal, the State Emergency Committee assessed the general mood in the country as very skeptical towards the new political course towards dismantling the highly centralized federal structure of governing the country, one-party political system And government regulation economy, condemned the negative phenomena that the new course, according to the drafters, brought to life, such as speculation and the shadow economy, proclaimed that “the development of the country cannot be built on a decline in the living standards of the population” and promised a strict restoration of order in the country and a solution to the main economic problems, without mentioning, however, specific measures.

Events of August 19-21, 1991

After the August events

"Accomplices" and "sympathizers"

After the failure of the August putsch, in addition to members of the State Emergency Committee, some persons were brought to criminal liability, who, according to the investigation, actively contributed to the State Emergency Committee. All of them were released under an amnesty in 1994. Among the “accomplices” were:

Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov (born 1930) - Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; his address was broadcast on TV and radio along with the main documents of the State Emergency Committee.
Shenin Oleg Semyonovich (1937-2009) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
Prokofiev Yuri Anatolyevich (born 1939) - member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU.
Varennikov Valentin Ivanovich (1923-2009) - army general.
Boldin Valery Ivanovich (1935-2006) - head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee.
Medvedev Vladimir Timofeevich (born 1937) - KGB general, head of Gorbachev’s security.
Ageev Geniy Evgenievich (1929-1994) - Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR.
Generalov Vyacheslav Vladimirovich (b. 1946) - head of security at Gorbachev’s residence in Foros

Trial of the State Emergency Committee

Formally, it turns out that each of these people, except Varennikov, who accepted the amnesty, seemed to agree that he was guilty, and seemed to agree that he was guilty of what he was accused of, including 64 th article. Formally so. But they all accepted the amnesty with the caveat: “I’m innocent. And only because we are tired, we are tired, in the interests of society, in the interests of the state, responding to the decision State Duma about amnesty, that’s the only reason we accept amnesty.”

Notes

Links

Chronicle: ,
Resolutions No. 1 and No. 2 of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR.
Why the State Emergency Committee lost (excerpt from the book by A. Baigushev)
We saved a Great Country / Valentin VARENIKOV
R. G. Apresyan. Popular resistance to the August coup

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

See what “USSR State Emergency Committee” is in other dictionaries:

State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (GKChP USSR)- On the night of August 18-19, 1991, representatives of the top leadership of the USSR, who disagreed with the reform policies of the country’s President Mikhail Gorbachev and the project of a new Union Treaty, the State Committee for state of emergency V … Encyclopedia of Newsmakers

State Emergency Committee: August 19 - 21, 1991- On August 19, 1991, at six o’clock in the morning Moscow time, a “Statement of the Soviet leadership” was broadcast on radio and television, which read: “Due to the impossibility for health reasons of Gorbachev’s execution of Mikhail ... ... Encyclopedia of Newsmakers

During the August putsch, the GKChP (State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR), a self-proclaimed body consisting of a number of senior government officials of the USSR, on the night of August 18-19, 1991, the Committee made an unsuccessful attempt... ... Wikipedia

Chronology

1991, August 19 - 21 Anti-state putsch in Moscow
1991, December 8 Belovezhskaya Agreement between the leaderships of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on the dissolution of the USSR
1991, December 25 Resignation of M.S. Gorbachev from the post of President of the USSR
1992, January Beginning of radical economic reform in Russia

August 1991 State Emergency Committee. August putsch

An acute crisis of confidence in Gorbachev, his inability to effectively lead the country and control the socio-political situation was also manifested in his defeats in the fight against political opponents both “on the right” and “on the left”.

On August 5, 1991, after Gorbachev left for Crimea, conservative leaders began preparing a conspiracy aimed at suppressing reforms and restoring the full power of the center and the CPSU.

Putsch began on August 19 and continued three days. On the first day, documents from the leaders of the coup were read out. Vice President of the USSR G. Yanaev in a decree issued on his behalf, he announced his assumption of “the duties of the President of the USSR” “due to the impossibility for health reasons of Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev to fulfill his duties.” The “Statement of the Soviet Leadership” announced the formation State Committee for the State of Emergency composed of: O.D. Baklanov - First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Defense Council; V.A. Kryuchkov - Chairman of the KGB of the USSR; V.S. Pavlov - Prime Minister of the USSR; B.K. Pugo - Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR; A.I. Tizyakov - President of the Association of State Enterprises and Industrial, Construction, Transport and Communications Facilities of the USSR; G.I. Yanaev - acting President of the USSR. The names of the members of the State Emergency Committee were listed in alphabetical order, its formal leader G. Yanaev was listed at the end of the list.

State Emergency Committee made an appeal to to the Soviet people, which reported that Gorbachev's perestroika failed that, taking advantage of the granted freedoms, extremist forces arose and set a course for liquidation Soviet Union, the collapse of the state and the seizure of power at any cost. Resolution No. 1, adopted by the State Emergency Committee, as measures to overcome the crisis, prohibited the activities of power and management structures that were not legalized by the Constitution of the USSR, and suspended the activities of political parties, movements, associations, opposition to the CPSU, as well as the publication of disloyal newspapers, censorship was restored. Security forces had to maintain the state of emergency.

August 19 by decision State Emergency Committee to Moscow troops were brought in. The center of resistance to the putschists became the Russian leadership, headed by the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin. He made an appeal “To the Citizens of Russia” and issued a decree that spoke of the transfer of all executive authorities of the USSR to the direct subordination of the President of Russia. White House, in which it is located Russian government, was given the opportunity to immediately begin organizing resistance to the putsch.

August 19, 1991 at the White House

The outcome of the confrontation between the State Emergency Committee and the Russian authorities was decided August 20, when B.N. Yeltsin and his entourage were able to turn the tide of events in their favor and took control of the situation in Moscow. On August 21, members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested. M.S. also returned to Moscow. Gorbachev. On August 23, during a meeting with deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, he was demanded to immediately sign a decree on dissolution of the CPSU. The President of the USSR accepted this and other ultimatums. The next day he dissolved union cabinet ministers, resigned Secretary General Central Committee of the CPSU. The CPSU Central Committee announced its dissolution. As a result, not only the communist regime fell, but also the state-party structures cementing the USSR collapsed.

The collapse of all others began government agencies: The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was dissolved, and transition period before the conclusion of a new union treaty between the republics, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR became the highest representative body of power; Instead of a cabinet of ministers, a powerless inter-republican economic committee was created, and most of the union ministries were liquidated. The Baltic republics, which sought independence for two years, received it. Other republics adopted laws that strengthened their sovereignty and made them virtually independent of Moscow.

The August 1991 coup plays a huge role in the collapse of the USSR

The August 1991 coup is considered the cause of the collapse of the USSR, despite the fact that its main goal was precisely an attempt to prevent the collapse of the country.

The reason for the relevance of this topic even today is that the events of that time still cannot find an unambiguous assessment by society. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin are still called today either heroes who liberated the people, or criminals responsible for the collapse of a huge country.

In 2001, a survey was conducted in Russia of 1,600 citizens of the Russian Federation, who were asked to answer the question on whose side their sympathies were during the incidents of August 19-21 in 1991. The survey results are as follows:

Opponents of the State Emergency Committee - 28%.
The State Emergency Committee was supported by 14%.
31% did not have time to orient themselves in the events taking place.
The rest found it difficult to answer the questions posed.

Maybe, the real truth those events will never be revealed to the people, since not all “eyewitness accounts” can be called objective, and some are even deliberately false. And many documents that relate to those events are still classified. However, without a doubt, the August 1991 coup is a truly epoch-making historical event, when three days could change the balance of power throughout the world.

Reasons for the August 1991 coup

After long period The stagnation of the Soviet Union, which led to the height of the political, economic, food and cultural crises, the country's situation was at a critical point. Therefore, it was urgently necessary to take resuscitation actions in the form of introducing new reforms and reorganizing the economy and government administration system.

The country's President Gorbachev took upon himself this responsible task. At first, his reforms received positive assessment and began to be called “perestroika”. However, over time it became clear that reforms did not bring desired results and the country is still plunging into crisis.

This led to condemnation of Gorbachev’s actions, growing discontent among the ruling structures, and the emergence of a crisis of confidence in the president by both his opponents and recent associates. All these circumstances - the reasons for the August 1991 coup - became the reason for the emergence of the idea of a conspiracy to overthrow the ruling government.

And when Mikhail Gorbachev decided to transform the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States (which meant the republics gaining political and economic independence) - this served the last straw all his opponents, including the conservative part of the ruling sector.

After Gorbachev left for negotiations in Foros, on August 5, a conspiracy was organized to overthrow the current president. The purpose of the conspiracy was to prevent the collapse of the country. Thus, the reasons for the August 1991 coup:

The failure of Gorbachev's domestic political activities.
Protest against the republics gaining independence.

Video about the August 1991 coup

Events of three days in August 1991

At 04.00 on the morning of August 19, the Sevastopol regiment of the USSR KGB troops blocked the presidential dacha in Foros while in Moscow members of the new government read out the documents that had been adopted the day before. They pointed out the inability of the current government to fulfill its duties. Among these documents was a decree of Vice-President G. Yanaev, which stated that it was impossible for Gorbachev to govern the state due to his state of health, therefore Yanaev himself would act as his executor.

Another statement read out from the “Soviet leadership” spoke of the proclamation of a new body of state power - the State Emergency Committee.

This was followed by an appeal by members of the State Emergency Committee to the people with a statement that Gorbachev’s actions led to the emergence of political freedoms and anti-Soviet structures seeking to seize power by force, the collapse of the country and its complete destruction. Therefore, to confront these structures, a change of power is necessary.

On the same day, August 19, a decree came into force prohibiting the creation of associations not legalized by the Constitution of the USSR. Many parties and circles in opposition to the CPSU were immediately dissolved, censorship was again introduced, and large number newspapers and other media.

Press conference held in live, showed the country its leaders to be clearly unsure of themselves, hesitant and stuttering. Mass demonstrations in defense of democracy were observed in many cities. The army, in a wait-and-see position, did not take decisive action, and some generals openly expressed disapproving opinions about the actions of the State Emergency Committee. The Republican leaders, as well as the army, took a cautious position, since it was extremely dangerous to openly take sides.

On the night of August 21, tanks appeared near the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, but they did not storm it. However, despite the fact that these events did not involve military action, three defenders of the White House still died as a result of local clashes.

However, the State Emergency Committee's struggle for power was hampered by the opposition of Russian President Yeltsin, who issued a decree on the strict subordination of all executive bodies to the President of Russia. Thus, Yeltsin was able to organize an effective defense to counter the State Emergency Committee, as a result of which Yeltsin won victory on August 20. This was followed by immediate arrests of all members of the State Emergency Committee. To sum up, we can say that the August putsch of the State Emergency Committee was organized unsuccessfully.

Consequences of the August 1991 coup

After Gorbachev returned from Foros on August 21, he received a number of ultimatums expressed by the new government, to which he had to agree. Real power was in the hands of Yeltsin. On August 23, Gorbachev resigned from the post of Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee, signing a decree dissolving the CPSU. Later, in September, a decree was signed to terminate the existence of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union.

As a result of the collapse of the communist regime, the collapse of the USSR followed. Soon after the putsch was crushed, the Baltic states seceded from the Soviet Union. Their exit was followed by the adoption of acts of state independence by other republics. Yeltsin, who enjoyed great authority at that time, played a significant role in these events. For several months the state lived in a state of dual power without a definite status.

Thus, the August 1991 putsch and the collapse of the USSR that followed it led to the cessation of the existence of the once huge and powerful, however, at that time already quite weakened “Communist Empire”. On political map, radically changed after those events, today you will no longer see this huge socialist power.

Today, many view the actions of the three “Belovezhskaya conspirators” with ambivalence. Some believe that they decided to dissolve the Union without any preparation and without calculating the consequences of the transition period. The rupture of economic relations turned out to be so rapid that it led to quite negative consequences in the development of young states. The latter are still making considerable efforts to at least partially restore what was lost in a very short period of time when the August putsch occurred. The consequences of those events influenced the development of each of the new states in different ways.

The remaining republics no longer had to choose, and soon followed their accession to the Belovezhskaya agreements.

Video about the causes and consequences of the August 1991 coup

In 1991, on December 21, in Almaty, the former leaders of the republics of the Soviet Union (with the exception of Georgia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) signed a declaration on the creation of the CIS, which marked the beginning of a new, post-Soviet period in their history.

It is worth noting that our country has undergone the most profound changes not in the political, but in social sphere. Over the years since the collapse of the USSR, Russians have lost many illusions and looked differently at themselves and at their state - the one that lives now and the one that will never exist. And today, finally, the time has come to understand what really happened to Russian society in those three days of the August putsch.

How do you feel about the events that took place during the August 1991 coup? Share your opinion on

Early in the morning of August 19, 1991. Citizens of the USSR learned that the government had changed in the country. Central Television reported that the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) had taken over leadership. It included almost all the country's leaders, except for President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The events, later called the August putsch, changed the course of the history of the huge country. According to many historians, it was the coup organized by the Soviet elite that accelerated the fall of the communist regime and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Let us recall that members of the State Emergency Committee, among whom were Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev, head of the Council of Ministers Valentin Pavlov, head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo, Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov, head of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov, explained their actions by the need to “overcome a deep and comprehensive crisis.” For this purpose, a state of emergency was introduced in the country, the freedom of parties and meetings was limited, and the activities of regional bodies authorities. “To ensure security” troops were sent to Moscow.

The absence of President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was at that moment resting at his residence in Crimea, from the State Emergency Committee was explained by his poor health. As it turned out later, the head of state was in good health, but he was actually blocked in his residence in Foros and left without communication.

However, from the first day it became clear that the actions of the conspirators were ill-considered. In fact, the State Emergency Committee managed to take control of the situation only in the rebellious Baltic republics, where riot police as soon as possible occupied the administration and television buildings. In Moscow, the military not only did not seize the White House, where the leadership of the Russian SFSR was then located, but also did not detain Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who managed to arrive in Moscow from his residence in the Moscow region.

Already on August 19, Boris Yeltsin, in his decrees, called the actions of the State Emergency Committee illegal and called on the regional authorities to obey the orders of the Russian government. Opposition politicians, cultural figures and ordinary Muscovites began to gather near the White House, wanting to defend the legally elected government of the republic. Many residents of the capital went to the center to persuade the soldiers not to use force against the people.

The putschists also failed to organize an information blockade of the opposition. Clandestine newspaper publications appeared in Moscow, and opposition radio stations operated, which could not be silenced. The ballet Swan Lake, broadcast on central television, was not particularly popular.

The press conference organized by the participants of the conspiracy did not benefit the State Emergency Committee either. They were very worried, and Vice President Gennady Yanaev’s hands were shaking. In addition, at the press conference there were extremely awkward questions, in which the events of August 19 were compared to a coup d'état.

As for the regions, in many republics local leaders took a wait-and-see approach, hoping to retain power no matter what the outcome of events.

As General Alexander Lebed, commander of the Airborne Forces, later wrote in his memoirs, he had a forceful plan to resolve the conflict, seize the White House and arrest the leaders of Russia. However, members of the State Emergency Committee did not dare to engage in confrontation, which could result in a large number of casualties. Clashes took place only on the night of August 21. Three people died as a result on the Garden Ring. They were later called heroes.

Realizing the failure of their action, members of the State Emergency Committee first decided to withdraw troops from Moscow, and on the afternoon of August 21 they went to Crimea to negotiate with M. Gorbachev. The president of the country refused to talk to them and removed everyone from their positions. Later, members of the State Emergency Committee were arrested.

Three days after the creation of the State Emergency Committee, this body ceased to exist. The Russian tricolor was raised over the White House on August 22 (this day later became national flag), and on August 23, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree dissolving the Communist Party of the RSFSR. On the same day, the dismantling of the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky near the KGB building became a symbol of the final collapse of the coup.

The events of the August putsch, the creation and inglorious decline of the State Emergency Committee in August 1991, have become a huge amount versions of “what it was” and “why it happened.” Can the actions of the State Emergency Committee be called a coup d'état and what did the putschists actually achieve?

Secrets of the referendum on March 17, 1991 on “the life and death of the USSR”

Despite the subsequent many years trial, numerous public speaking The participants of the putsch and its opponents still have no final clarity. And it will probably never appear.

In fact, the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR was active from August 10 to August 21, 1991. The main stated goal at first was to prevent the collapse of the USSR: the members of the State Emergency Committee saw a way out in the new Union Treaty, which Gorbachev planned to sign. The treaty provided for the transformation of the Union into a confederation, not of 15, but of nine republics. The putschists, not without reason, saw this as the beginning of the end of the Soviet state.

And it is at this point that discrepancies begin. It would seem that the main supporter of the Union Treaty was Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev. The main opponents are members and supporters of the State Emergency Committee. But subsequently, at the trial and further, one of the leaders of the putsch, Vice-President of the USSR Gennady Yanaev, argued that “the documents of the State Emergency Committee were developed on Gorbachev’s instructions,” and other participants in that process generally noted that the prototype of the State Emergency Committee was created on March 28, 1991 at meeting with Gorbachev and with his “blessing”.

The next point is the behavior of the putschists during the events themselves in relation to the then head of the USSR. It is worth recalling that in those days he went on vacation to the Foros dacha in Crimea. Knowing at the same time that everything in the country is completely turbulent, that the people and a huge part of the party and state nomenklatura are dissatisfied with “Perestroika”, and, moreover, knowing the attitude towards the reformatting of the USSR, in which the citizens of the Union saw simply the dismantling of the country. The referendum on preserving the USSR took place on March 17, 1991, and most citizens spoke in favor of the territorial integrity of the state.

By the way, this is precisely why the terms “putsch”, “revolution” and “coup” in the strict sense are in no way suitable for defining the activities of the State Committee. The members of the State Emergency Committee were in favor of preserving the country, its integrity, sovereignty and maintaining the status quo, with the curtailment of the most odious perestroika initiatives.

Moreover, when it finally became clear that the State Emergency Committee’s case was lost, the putschists first of all sent a delegation back to Gorbachev to Foros, and some of them were arrested at the moment when they got off the plane in Moscow on which they were flying with Gorbachev.

The events of the three August days themselves also represent something devoid of logic at first glance. On the one hand, members of the State Emergency Committee declare that Mikhail Gorbachev cannot yet govern the country for health reasons, and so on. O. Yanaev becomes President of the USSR, but Gorbachev’s dacha is disconnected telephone communication only in his office. The connection worked perfectly not only in the security house, but also in the cars of the presidential motorcade. And, moreover, it later turns out that at the dacha “Mikhail Sergeevich was actively working all these days and signing decrees.”

Another goal was to remove Boris Yeltsin, the then president of the RSFSR and, at that time, Gorbachev’s political opponent, from power. But this elimination did not happen either by arrest or by ambush in the forest along the route of the presidential motorcade from the dacha to Moscow.

It didn’t happen in Moscow either, although there were all the possibilities. Troops had already been brought into the capital, but people had not yet begun to gather around the White House, where Yeltsin arrived. Moreover, according to some versions, Yeltsin’s guard, consisting of KGB officers, was ready to “localize the object,” but did not receive the corresponding order, although one of the putschists was the head of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

In general, the very composition of the participants in this State Committee leads to complete bewilderment as to why they did not succeed in their plans. Among the “putschists” were the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Minister of Defense, and, as mentioned above, the head of the KGB, and the Prime Minister and Vice President. But the putsch failed and they all ended up in the dock.

There are, of course, a number of conspiracy theories. One of them was once voiced by Mikhail Poltoranin, the press minister and Yeltsin’s supporter during the putsch. It boils down to the fact that the putsch was Gorbachev’s greatest provocation.

According to this Soviet and Russian official, "Gorbachev used them (GKChP. - Ed.) in the dark. In his characteristic manner, he said or hinted: guys, we are losing power, our country. I myself cannot return the USSR to desired mode functioning, I have an image in the world of a democrat. I'll go on vacation, you tighten the screws here, close the newspapers. I'll come back, unscrew some screws, and the world will calm down. The people who ended up in the State Emergency Committee sincerely wanted to save the country. When everything started spinning, they rushed to him: come back, Mikhail Sergeevich. And he washed his hands: I don’t know anything. The Moors did their job."

This version finds indirect confirmation in Gorbachev’s policy towards the CPSU. The fact is that Mikhail Sergeevich tried with all his might to reduce the influence of the party both on himself and on the state as a whole. And as a result of the suppression of the State Emergency Committee, the CPSU was suspended, and then, literally a few months later, the party was completely dissolved. But the problem is that the presence of the Communist Party did not suit not only Gorbachev, but also Yeltsin, who, in addition to the party, did not suit Gorbachev himself.

And in this regard, there is another version, in which it was Yeltsin who became the main beneficiary of the putsch and it was he who, at a minimum, knew about the impending events, just as he knew that nothing bad would happen to him. Mikhail Vasiliev writes about this in his investigative material.

According to him, “Gorbachev in 1991, as a leader, satisfied only a small group of bureaucrats. Patriots who could not forgive him for his scandalous concessions to the West, and democrats who dreamed of overthrowing the central government, and the rapidly impoverished people dreamed of his departure. But there was still one powerful force without a clear leader, but with enormous capabilities.

Part of the party elite and intelligence services took a clear course towards capitalizing the USSR in order to privatize its immense resources. And they didn’t need the chatterbox Gorby. But who should take his place? Where can one find a leader of “the same blood” who speaks the same language with them, but is popular among the people? After all, otherwise a change in the social system would be impossible.

The answer lies on the surface - this is Boris Yeltsin."

Further, the author concludes that the head of the KGB and one of the putschists, Kryuchkov, was in cahoots with Yeltsin and understood how everything would end in the end. However, this version has one very significant inconsistency, namely Yeltsin’s ardent desire, to the point of exceeding his own powers, to condemn and imprison the putschists.

In general, it’s worth starting with the fact that no one was eager to imprison the putschists. And at the first opportunity, the prisoners were released on their own recognizance. As a result, of course, they spent from a year to a year and a half in “Matrosskaya Tishina”, but upon leaving they were able not only to take part in rallies and demonstrations, but also to run for office and be elected to the Russian parliament. And then to fall under the amnesty, which was also more than interesting. First and most importantly, the amnesty was announced even before completion trial in violation of both procedural norms and formal logic. How can you grant amnesty to people for whom a court verdict has not yet been announced? As a result, an additional meeting had to be held to settle all legal norms.

Secondly, according to the memoirs of the then Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Kazannik, he called and warned Yeltsin that the State Duma would include the amnestied putschists on the lists. To which, according to Kazannik, Yeltsin sharply replied: “They won’t dare!” Nevertheless, they dared, and Yeltsin imposed his own resolution on this decision, which stated “Kazannik, Golushko, Erin. Do not release any of those arrested, but investigate the criminal case in the same manner.” But Kazannik refused to follow the resolution despite telephone conversations, at which Yeltsin again declared: “You don’t dare do this.” By the way, the defenders of the 1993 White House were also released under that amnesty.

Well, and most importantly, one of the members of the State Emergency Committee, Valentin Varennikov, refused the amnesty and eventually won the case in 1994. However, the rest of the putschists, even after agreeing to an amnesty, ultimately did not plead guilty to “high treason,” and in general it is clear why.

As for Yeltsin’s desire for a final investigation and, apparently, a guilty verdict for members of the State Emergency Committee, there was a certain political symbolism in this. It was necessary to show that a return to the USSR is so marginal that it is simply criminal, that there is simply no turning back. Well, demonstrating that he is now the sovereign master of the country was also useful. However, it didn’t work out. And it didn’t work out so well that many high-ranking government officials even at that time called this trial a “farce.”

By the way, the fate of most of the putschists subsequently turned out favorably. They mostly took high positions in government, public and commercial structures. In general, they quickly transformed from the Soviet elite into the new Russian elite. Some of them, even despite their advanced age, continue to work actively to this day.