Foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the 90s. Russia and neighboring countries
Russian foreign policy in the 90s of the XX century
With the collapse of the USSR, the world changed dramatically. The Cold War ended, the ideological confrontation in the world stopped. Dozens of new states have emerged in the post-Soviet space and Europe.
Russia became the legal successor of the USSR and inherited its place in international organizations. Among other things, she became a member of the UN Security Council.
However international situation Russia could not be called favorable. In terms of the level and quantity of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons Russia remained the second power in the world, but its military capabilities were reduced. The country has lost military bases in the former Soviet republics. Due to lack of money, the size of the armed forces and funding for army development had to be reduced. If the USSR was superior to the European NATO countries in the number of conventional weapons, then by the end of the 90s Russia was 20 times inferior to them in military spending.
There was unrest along Russia's borders: military conflicts took place in some former Soviet republics.
The country has lost traditional allies in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
At the same time, foreign policy realities for Russia changed: Western countries were no longer enemies, and Eastern European countries were no longer friends.
Under these conditions, Russia had to develop a new foreign policy concept and build new relations with the world.
Relations with the West.
In 1992, President Yeltsin announced that Russia's nuclear missiles were no longer aimed at the United States and other NATO countries. A declaration on the cessation of " cold war" A course has been taken to establish partnerships and friendly relations with Western countries.
In 1993, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-2) was concluded between Russia and the United States. The two countries pledged to reduce their nuclear capabilities by 66% by 2003.
In 1994, Russia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program, which included the possibility of military cooperation.
In 1996, Russia joined the G7, a group of seven most developed countries. Thus, the “Big Seven” was transformed into the “Big Eight”.
Deep economic and political relations with the West began to be built, Russia entered the world economic system.
In order to establish partnerships with former enemies, Russia often made compromises and unilateral concessions. However, these concessions were often perceived in the West as a sign of weakness. Leading Western countries, declaring allied relations with Russia, increasingly took into account its national interests. In particular, they decided to expand NATO to the East - to include the former socialist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Russia's interests and protests were ignored.
All this led to a cooling of relations with the United States and other Western countries. As a result, in the second half of the 90s, the country's foreign policy changed noticeably.
Since 1996, Russia began to actively oppose the unipolar world led by the United States and for the creation of a multipolar world in which the hegemony of one country is excluded, and security is built not on force, but on law. The turning point in relations between Russia and the West was the Balkan crisis of 1999, when NATO, contrary to the UN decision and Russian protests, launched a military operation against Serbia, which was trying to suppress separatism by force in the Serbian province of Kosovo populated by Albanians. Russia came out sharply against the bombing of Serbian cities by NATO planes. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, Russia and the West took directly opposite positions when solving an acute problem. international problem. The crisis in relations deepened due to the West's position on the Chechen issue. Many Western politicians and international organizations advocated the separation of Chechnya from Russia or tried to impose their mediation in resolving the Chechen problem.
Under these conditions, Russia's foreign policy has undergone major changes, becoming more adequate to existing international realities.
Relations with the East.
In the first half of the 90s, Russia attached secondary importance to relations with the countries of the East. However, the Russian leadership soon realized the error of its eastern policy. Since 1996, after a change in the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry, relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America.
China has become one of Russia's largest foreign trade partners. Cooperation with India, Vietnam, Iran, Japan, and South Korea expanded.
In 1998, Russia was admitted to the organization of the Asia-Pacific countries. This gave new impetus to the development of Russia's economic ties with the countries of the region and strengthened its political position.
The Balkan crisis brought Russia and China closer together. The two countries set a course for strategic partnership and declared the need to build a multipolar world.
Relations with the former republics of the USSR.
The USSR collapsed, but deep economic interdependence remained, the collapse of which would inevitably lead national economies to global upheavals. New economic relations had to be built on the basis of deep integration. In addition, it was necessary to take measures to ensure that territorial and political contradictions did not lead to wars. To solve these problems, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991. The CIS became the platform on which the former Soviet republics resolved emerging contradictions and developed new principles of coexistence and cooperation. Hundreds of joint decisions were adopted - including the Collective Security Treaty (1992-1994), the Economic Union Treaty (1993), the Agreement on the Interstate Economic Committee, etc.
However, the CIS still did not bring the effect that was expected from it. Many decisions made they remained on paper. Trade volumes in the CIS were declining. New economic and political contradictions grew. They were often inflated from abroad: many Western countries did not want the former Soviet republics to reunite into a new powerful state. And they did everything to pull them in different directions, to include them in the orbit of their influence.
As a result, new coalitions of states emerged in the post-Soviet space.
In 1998, with the support of the US and others Western countries GUUAM was formed - a political union of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It was clearly anti-Russian in nature and was aimed at reducing Russia’s role in Eurasia. However, GUUAM did not fulfill its tasks and did not live up to the expectations of its founders and some Western countries behind them.
Russia has successfully resolved the issue of ensuring stability along its borders. With the help of Russian troops and with the active participation of Russian diplomacy, it was possible to extinguish military conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Karabakh, and Transnistria.
In general, thanks to the efforts of Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet region, it was possible to preserve the basic economic and cultural ties between the former Soviet republics, to avoid collapse in the economies of the republics and serious, insoluble conflicts between them.
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Russian foreign policy in the 90s |
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After the collapse of the USSR, the new stage Russian approval foreign policy as the policies of a sovereign great power and successor to the Soviet Union. As of January 1992, Russia was recognized by 131 states. One of the main priorities of Russian foreign policy was the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - new form voluntary and equal cooperation of the republics former USSR. The agreement on the creation of the CIS was signed in Minsk on December 8, 1991. At the meeting of heads of state in January 1993, the Charter of the Commonwealth was adopted. But the euphoric mood of the first months of independence in the republics, the ambition of many new state leaders turned the CIS into an extremely amorphous entity, where the coordinating bodies adopted dozens of very useful documents in content (from issues of economic cooperation to joint environmental protection), but not a single one of them was implemented . The processes of disintegration of previous economic ties, the general strengthening of tendencies towards isolation of new states from Russia, and inflated expectations in them of supposed help from the West or from the East (for the republics) have become especially alarming. Central Asia, Transcaucasia). However, in lately Russian diplomacy managed to significantly improve relations with Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Uzbekistan. Russia, in fact, has become the only state that actually carries out peacekeeping tasks in the “hot spots” of the CIS (this was in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan). The relationship between Russia and Ukraine has become very complex and confusing. Friendship and cooperation, and ideally even allied ties, meet the fundamental interests of the two peoples, but mutual distrust and the ambition of some politicians in both states gradually ultimately led to long-term stagnation in relations between the two sovereign states. The stumbling block was the question of Crimea’s belonging to Ukraine (Crimea, as is known, in 1954 was generously “donated”, in fact, by the sole decision of N.S. Khrushchev to the Ukrainian SSR). Some Russian politicians are quite clear that Crimea, or at least the city of Sevastopol, historically a Russian naval base, should be returned to Russia. Ukrainian nationalists also do not remain in debt, openly instilling in their republic (especially in the western regions of Ukraine) an atmosphere of hostility and distrust towards Russia. In August 1994 Russian troops were withdrawn from the Baltic countries. However, this has not yet led to any significant improvements in relations with these states, since questions about the legal status of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have not been fully resolved. In general, these problems are becoming more and more pressing for the government (especially since some ethnic Russians are seeking to move to Russia, and 2 million refugees have already arrived in the country). The dynamism of events required constant maneuvering from Russian diplomacy, which led not only to gains, but also to unfortunate foreign policy losses, including even those of yesterday’s allies. Thus, our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and some states of Asia and Africa have reached a rather long-term state of stagnation. This led to the loss of some traditional markets for our products and made it impossible to obtain the goods we needed from there. Russia has managed to achieve significant success in developing ties with the leading states of the planet. The key stages in the complete dismantling of the legacy of the Cold War were: the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) in December 1992, which provided for a mutual reduction by Russia and the United States by 2003 of the nuclear potential of the parties by 2/3 compared to the level established by the agreement on START-1, meeting of B.N. Yeltsin with the US President in Vancouver in April 1993 and his visit to the US in September 1994, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany (August 1994). Great progress has been made in developing ties with France, Great Britain, Italy, especially Germany. Russia has become a participant in regular annual meetings of the leaders of the so-called “Big Seven” - the leading developed states of the world, where the most important political and economic issues are discussed (although for obvious reasons it has not yet received the status of a full participant). Relations with Japan have become much more friendly and open (high-level visits, discussion of the problem of the southern islands of the Kuril chain, development of economic ties). Russia is taking an increasingly active part in the structures of pan-European cooperation (for example: in the Council of Europe). The establishment of partnerships with the United States and Western European countries occurred in parallel with Russia’s turn to “face” the East. A milestone on this path was the visit of the Russian President to China and the improvement of relations with India and the countries of Southeast Asia. It is becoming increasingly obvious to the Russian leadership that the largest economic powers on the planet will never commit funds to the development of the Russian economy until Russia itself is able to ensure the rise of its industry and agriculture, and also achieves genuine political stability. Therefore, the euphoria of the first months of independence passed, and the opposition had less reason to blame the Foreign Ministry for “pro-Western” sympathies. Russian diplomacy is increasingly involved in the search for ways to restore largely weakened ties with the countries of Eastern Europe and with the former allies of the USSR in the Third World. Currently, senior management Russian state it is necessary to develop a new foreign policy strategy. Alternatives arose before him, which became the subject of intense political struggle. First of all, it is necessary to resolve the main issue - the place of Russia in the modern world. Who is she? Still a superpower or nothing more than one of the regional powers? Where are her potential allies? Where could the threat to her safety come from? Of course, many politicians at various levels of the Russian leadership pay tribute to the rhetoric of preserving Russia's historical role as a great power. But today it is more than clear that in conditions of the deepest economic and social crisis the country is no longer able to maintain this role. First of all, it deteriorated sharply geopolitical situation Russia in Europe. In 1994-1996 The course of Eastern European countries towards ignoring Russia in economic and political relations was clearly defined. They strive to join Western military-political alliances. The issue of the immediate accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other Eastern European states to NATO has already been resolved. At the same time, the CIS has not created an adequate system for ensuring security and cooperation. Today's Russia is in a unique situation: it has no allies in Europe today. NATO countries, seeing Russia's growing isolation and concern, recently proposed the Partnership for Peace program to Eastern European states (Russia was not initially even invited to join it). But when this accession took place, the Russian leadership asked to conclude a separate agreement between Russia and NATO. But after the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya (December 1994), Eastern European countries intensified their attempts to achieve NATO membership. Already in September 1995, NATO leadership published a document formulating the conditions for the expansion of this bloc. Any country wishing to join NATO must be prepared to deploy tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. It became obvious that the only country in the world laying claim to global intervention was the United States. Today, the international “image” of Russia is determined not by the obvious sympathy of Russians for democratic values, but by the lawlessness in the struggle of the political elite for power, corruption of officials, criminalization of the economy, rampant crime, degradation of the countryside, and human rights violations. The negative perception of what is happening in Russia by the outside world, primarily by Europeans, has approached a critical point. Today Russia is going through one of the most dramatic periods in its more than 1000-year history. Negative economic and political processes lead to the fact that society suffers huge losses. And these dangerous trends have not yet been reversed. The first positive results of the reforms are so far completely incomparable with these losses. So are those who gloomily predict the final collapse and economic collapse of the once mighty power right? Probably not. We have every reason to be hopeful. Russia knew how to revive itself after the most difficult trials. Its great history speaks to this. To those accumulated over decades Soviet power economic and social problems those that were generated by the inept actions of the government of B.N. were added. Yeltsin. Among the undoubted advantages in the behavior of our people in this difficult time is the fact that of two evils - Yeltsin's reformism and the outright demagoguery and populism of the opposition - the people are so far patiently choosing the first. Will he have enough strength and self-control to wait for better times? This will largely depend on the actions of the country's leadership, its ability to update its policies and conduct reforms in a truly professional manner, relying on the best intellectual forces of the country, taking into account its traditions and historical experience. * At one time, in preparation for the 1991 elections, B.N. Yeltsin, reflecting on the candidacy of vice president, settled on A.V. Rutskom. This political duet was not based on unanimity of views, but reflected only political calculations. Yeltsin needed an “Afghan” hero, popular among ordinary members of the CPSU, who sharply and uncompromisingly criticized the Gorbachev leadership for deliberately slowing down reforms. In inviting Rutskoi to become vice-president if he won the elections, Yeltsin acted unerringly. He was assured of the support of millions of voters - members of the CPSU, since he seemed to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with the communist “reformers”. The ambitious Rutskoi was impressed by the invitation to Yeltsin’s “team”. Further developments showed that the vice president was not going to be content with his modest official powers. He accused the President and the Government of “betraying” the interests of the people and corruption. ** A.I. Lebed is another type of Russian populist. He proved himself to be a decisive and courageous politician during the conflict in Transnistria, when, under the conditions of the young Moldovan statehood, oppression of the Russian population began. He managed to stop the armed conflict that broke out here. A.I. criticized him very harshly. Lebed and the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which, in his opinion, brought the army to a literally pitiful state. In the eyes of many voters, he appeared as a determined fighter against corruption, a stern and fearless “soldier”, ready to go to the end for the interests of the people. Political scientists, for the most part, study with curiosity the phenomenon of its popularity, which clearly indicates an increasing desire in society to establish the power of a “strong hand.” General Lebed died in a plane crash. |
Problems of the formation of Russian statehood in the 90s. XX century
The Russian Constitution of 1993 legally established the principles of legality, respect for the rights and fair interests of the individual, and ensuring these rights and interests. But the rule of law can only be realized in reality when all these principles are translated into real life. First of all, this depends on the targeted and effective activities of government authorities.
Early 90s The 20th century marked a new milestone in socio-political development in Russia. From “socialism with a human face,” Russia moved to a market economy, while completely changing the system of public administration. Started in the mid-80s. M. Gorbachev's perestroika did not bring the desired results, but only contributed to the collapse of the once powerful state, which by the end of the 80s. was rapidly approaching an economic and political crisis. One of the possible options for the restoration of the Soviet state system was a parliamentary republic with a strong presidential-executive power, however, such a soft transformation was not implemented largely due to the strategic incompatibility of the Soviet state system and the principles on which the rule of law is built in democratic countries. Subsequently, already in the Russian Federation, the confrontation between the legislative and executive authorities in 1992-1993. it only demonstrated the whole complex of incompatibility of the representative power of the Soviet type - the Supreme Council of the RSFSR with the institution of presidentialism deliberately grafted onto Russian soil.
For a significant part of the population of the USSR, the economic crisis was associated with the socialist Soviet system, and the “guiding” role of the CPSU was attacked. Therefore, the events of August 19 - 21, 1991, which marked the emergence of the State Committee for state of emergency in the USSR (GKChP USSR), the purpose of which was to call for countermeasures to the inconsistent actions of the President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev was perceived extremely negatively by the majority of the population.
The signing of the agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States by B. Yeltsin, S. Shushkevich and L. Kravchuk, which soon followed on December 8, 1991, only legally consolidated the actual situation. Although the legal assessment of these events is far from trivial.
The Law of the RSFSR “On the President of the RSFSR” of April 24, 1991 did not allow the legitimacy of treaties signed on behalf of the President without ratification by the Supreme Council: “The President of the RSFSR: negotiates and signs on behalf of the RSFSR international and inter-republican treaties that come into force after ratification by the Supreme Council RSFSR” (clause 10, article 5). True, the agreement signed by B.N. Yeltsin, the head of the executive branch, was not ratified by the Supreme Council, i.e. legislative power. But, nevertheless, this precedent took place, and partially influenced the dominance of the presidential and executive authorities over the legislative branch.
The collapse of a once great state, which occurred largely as a result of “political dystrophy” and the lack of will of the President Soviet Union, the threat of collapse not only of the USSR, but also of the RSFSR, the severity of the ongoing events of the early 90s - all these factors served to ensure that a weak and weak-willed politician could no longer become the new President of the Russian Federation. The society was shown a picture of what happens when the leader of a country is unable to make a state and political decision, and spends all his political potential on demagoguery and the search for fruitless compromises. It was precisely a strong personality, capable of destroying the old, as it seemed to many, ineffective and outdated system, that society wanted to see in the post of President of Russia. Boris Yeltsin possessed precisely these qualities. It seemed to many that there was no need to build anything, but only to destroy the Soviet regime, and democracy and prosperity of the country would come by themselves. They didn't come.
The profound socio-political transformation that took place in the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991 took on forms quite different from those intended by its authors. Not only the name of power has changed, its essence, formation and people’s understanding of the very mechanism of government have changed. In addition to changing the state system and changing the planned economy to a market economy, the institutions of government at all levels have changed.
Subsequently, the political confrontation between the President of Russia and the Supreme Council, in the absence of the necessary legislative framework, except for the “amended” Soviet Constitution of the RSFSR and the Federative Treaty, led to the conflict from September 21 to October 4, 1993. The existing political dualism between the legislative and executive (in this case, presidential) authorities was due to the lack of a proper legislative framework and the political ambitions of the leaders of the conflicting parties. One of the options for resolving the conflict was holding simultaneous early parliamentary and presidential elections and the adoption of a new Constitution of the country. But the majority of parliamentarians, led by R.I. Khasbulatov was counting on a redistribution of power by impeaching the President and replacing the inflexible B.N. Yeltsin to the more accommodating A.V. Rutskogo.
But ultimately, after the events that took place, Russian President Boris Yeltsin concentrated unlimited power.
Analysis of these events can in many ways serve as the key to understanding the further transformation of the political situation in Russia. The October crisis of 1993 did not arise suddenly or out of nowhere. In fact, Russia in the period 1991-1993. went the way of a republic of mixed, parliamentary-presidential rule; it was during this period that such political problems, most dangerous for Russia, arose as:
Separatism of individual subjects of Russia (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Yakutia, etc.) - a “parade of sovereignties” that lasted until 2000 and consisted mainly in “knocking out” expanded powers from the center, almost equivalent to the powers of sovereign republics in the regions state and economic management, to the detriment of all-Russian federal interests;
Uncontrollability of state power at the vertical level “top-down”, the struggle for supremacy between the federal branches of government at the horizontal level, for superiority and dominance;
Catastrophic corruption in the highest echelons of power;
Legal vacuum.
There is no need to even talk about the effectiveness of leadership in such conditions. Although the principle of separation of powers is generally not a means of effective management as such, and does not mean complete independence of the branches of government, it is aimed, first of all, at equalizing the balance and complementarity of authorities with each other, which should serve as the basis of a civil law-based state.
During the entire existence of the Country of Soviets, society, in fact, for the most part, was not interested in politics, but not because of “defectiveness and lack of will,” but the government itself created a system in which society was separated from power. Even if the Soviets in the form in which they existed had more significant powers, even in this case, the transition of our state to democratic rule, separation of powers and the building of civil society would not have been so protracted and difficult. But in the Soviet state, by and large, all strategic issues were decided by the party nomenklatura at various levels, and not by citizens. This is largely why it is still so difficult to instill in the Russian mentality civic positions and make the authorities work for themselves, make the authorities serve society and the interests of the state.
Only a combination of circumstances, caused mainly by the difficult economic situation, prompted certain social strata of the population to actively participate in political processes in 1990-1991.
The conflict between the authorities in September-October 1993 was clearly of a top-level nature. Although the Supreme Council was supported by 53 regions, this support was of a declarative nature, while the regional elites feared, first of all, for the loss of their positions in the event of the liquidation of the Supreme Council, and not for the preservation of representative legislative power in the country as such. Indeed, not a single region has taken radical protest measures in support of the legislative branch. Not to mention the society, except for a group of deputies and their sympathizers holed up in the White House, as well as a few detachments of militants and marginal elements smashing everything in their path, the people’s representatives did not have any real support. No protest rallies that swept across the country, no strikes, no blocking of highways and railways, because none of this happened. The legislative branch was destroyed with the complete indifference of broad sections of society. This, in general, was the end of Russia’s short-term development along the path of a parliamentary-presidential republic.
It seems that if a similar situation had occurred with the parliament of any European country, it would not have gone unnoticed without the attention and active participation of broad social strata of society. But not in Russia. It was the passive civil position of society in relation to criticism of the authorities, instilled in the population by the Soviet system, that was one of the reasons for the indifference of the masses in relation to the global conflict in the highest echelons of power.
A constitutional meeting, convened shortly after on the initiative of the President of the Russian Federation, hastily developed a new draft Constitution of Russia, although there is doubt that the draft Constitution was developed by this body independently. It seems more realistic that the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, different from the draft that was presented to the Supreme Council, was adjusted under the influence of the Presidential Administration. Thus, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, currently in force, was adopted under the conditions of “presidential absolutism”, and it was adjusted to the specific realities of that time. Let us cite the opinion of ex-President of the USSR M.S. Gorbachev: “Now there really is a stalemate: on the one hand, we, in Russia, have a super-presidential republic, where all power is concentrated in the president, and on the other hand, he is not able to cope with his responsibilities.”
Thus, at the birth of the young democratic Russian state, a certain paradox arose: the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR stated that “The separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers is the most important principle of the functioning of the RSFSR as a rule of law state.” On the other hand, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was adopted in a referendum, in the absence of legislative power, which made it possible to avoid amendments to the bill by the parliamentary institution, and the society was already promoting the social attitude of adopting “no matter what, but a new” Constitution. As a result, after 1993, the presidential-executive vertical of power remained and strengthened, which was also facilitated by the further separation of functions between the President and the government, and the legislative power weakened. This predetermined the development of Russia along the path of a presidential republic. It was after 1993 that the President was allocated to a separate vertical of power, standing above all other government institutions.
A rather important moment in the development of Russian parliamentarism was the elimination of the hierarchical structure of representative power. The system of Soviets was replaced by independent representative bodies at the local and regional levels: the Federal Assembly is the highest bicameral legislative body, with independent chambers having various powers, differentiated by their functions, as well as the method of formation.
Based on the above, the stage of formation and final formation of Russia as a presidential republic can be characterized by the following provisions:
1. The gradual “soft” transformation of the Soviet Union into a parliamentary-presidential confederation, which was initially planned by state leaders, was initially doomed to failure due to the antagonism of the nature and nature of the organization of state power in a socialist Soviet state and in a state where power is subordinated to the real principle of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances;
2. The two-year period of existence of the parliamentary-presidential type of government in Russia was marked by the generation of a mass of political problems, some of which were resolved only after more than ten years;
3. The alternate appeals of the executive and legislative authorities to the regions for political support in 1993 finally weakened the authority and image of the Center, which led to the fact that regional elites openly began to take steps towards sovereignty, turning into state entities not only national regions, but also originally Russian in the ethnic composition of the territories and regions;
4. The inability of the Supreme Council to solve state problems did not give Boris Yeltsin grounds to disperse parliament in such a barbaric way;
5. The President of the Russian Federation ignored the decisions of the Constitutional Court in the October conflict, as well as the position in which its Chairman, V.D., was placed. Zorkin after the events occurred, had a negative impact on the formation of the Constitutional Court; However, a positive aspect in the future was the balanced and state, rather than political, approach of the Constitutional Court when making decisions in disputes between subjects of power;
6. The conflict between the legislative branch and the president was doomed to occur sooner or later, since the Soviet type of formation and functioning of state authorities and the type of state in which the “principle of separation of powers” prevails cannot coexist with each other. Therefore, an attempt to instill elements of the Western type (such as the institution of the presidency) in the Russian Federation, without a radical transformation of the legislative and representative power (preservation of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR) ended in a political disaster;
7. After 1993, the Russian Federation was finally modified into a presidential republic;
8. An important point in the formation of legislative-representative power was the elimination of its vertical structure, expressed in the system of Soviets. This fact served to establish and strengthen federalism in Russia. The highest legislative body became bicameral (the State Duma and the Federation Council), the chambers of which differ in the method of formation and the set of functional powers. Regional legislative assemblies and dumas are no longer a subordinate element of higher authorities. The lowest level of government - municipal bodies of local self-government, are almost as independent and have their own organizational structure and a certain share of rights;
9. Despite the pro-presidential nature of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, its authors separated the functions of the presidential and executive powers.
The institution of party government, characteristic of European states, was never formed in Russia. Although some senior members of the current Russian government and are members of the party, however, their presence in the government is not a consequence of their party affiliation. A consequence of the lack of practice of party government formation, of course, can be considered the incompleteness of the formation of the party system. The formation of the latter is possible, most likely, only in 2007, simultaneously with the 100% election of deputies according to party lists, as well as some other nuances accompanying the new law on the election of deputies of the State Duma. Apparently, then the President of the Russian Federation will no longer be able to ignore the opinion of the parliamentary majority and will be forced to appoint a prime minister from the winning party. With the increasing influence of political parties, it is permissible to transfer the political center of gravity of decision-making from the Presidential Administration and the State Duma to the Political Councils and Executive Committees of party structures. But before 2005, there was no talk of a significant influence of parties on the political process. Unless, of course, you count the efficiency and ease with which government and presidential bills began to pass in the State Duma after the victory in Duma elections in 2003 by the pro-presidential party "United Russia". Apparently, there is a danger that the legislative body will degenerate into a virtually one-party one if administrative resources and other undemocratic forms of elections are used in the 2007 Duma elections.
Division of the USSR and Russia's entry into the international arena. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rupture of the Warsaw Pact (July 1, 1991), the world order that had developed over several decades was disrupted. Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, entered the world stage with the ambition and self-confidence borrowed from its predecessor, although with different tasks. But the main thing is not that our country was often unable to solve its problems in foreign policy, but that it ceased to be that deterrent, a kind of counterweight, for states such as the USA, Great Britain and other countries participating in the NATO bloc , and even more so for the entire North Atlantic Alliance. As already mentioned, the previous world order was disrupted, as a result of which the old “bipolar” order was replaced by the concepts of “unipolarity,” a popular concept in the United States illuminating their “world leadership.” New foreign policy problems and tasks. It was very difficult for Russia to “get used” to the new unipolar world. It was not entirely clear what exactly it would look like new system, which will replace the bipolar world (see the article “The Evolution of the World Economy and Political System in the 1980–90s”). This created difficulties for all states, including Russia, in determining their foreign policy line. On the one hand, it seemed as if the world was moving towards mutual understanding among all countries based on democratic values. On the other hand, opposite trends have also emerged: the emergence of new potential leaders such as China, India and Brazil on the world stage, the growing influence of radical nationalism and religious extremism, and the emergence of global terrorist networks. For Russia, these problems were compounded many times over due to the fact that it was in fact a new state that had never before existed within its current borders. The main objectives of Russian foreign policy in the 90s: maintaining territorial integrity and independence; ensuring favorable conditions for development market economy and inclusion in world community; recognition of Russia as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union; rendering financial assistance Western countries in carrying out market reforms; development of Russian foreign trade with foreign countries(including with the former republics of the USSR); maintaining the status of a Great Power. Unity modern Russia and maintaining its international prestige would have been impossible without the foreign policy maneuvering of the 1990s, which is often considered a failure, weakness or capitulation. The bipolar world has collapsed, one of the leaders has entered a stage of acute crisis. Therefore, Russia objectively could not preserve at first international influence, comparable to the influence of the USSR. History has shown that the retreat, although painful, was not catastrophic. Russia and NATO, signing the Partnership for Peace program. Relations between Russia and NATO were established in 1991. Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, Russia began participating in the Partnership for Peace program. a NATO military cooperation program created in 1994 with European states and the former Soviet republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia that are not members of the organization. Initially it covered 24 states, their number periodically changes with the accession of new states to the program or the accession of states participating in the program to NATO. The Partnership for Peace program involves 22 non-NATO countries. Political dialogue began to actively develop. The main attention began to focus on issues of interaction with the United States in resolving local conflict situations, no longer associated with past Soviet-American rivalry, as well as reducing strategic nuclear arsenals and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, NATO continued to maintain a strict distance from Russia. " Russian factor“Due to poor predictability, it was perceived as a source of possible danger. Russia and the European Community, deepening relations. The community has developed a new policy towards Russia. It should be noted that the Community's policy towards the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (including Russia) was not aimed at such far-reaching goals as the policy of the same Community towards the states of Central Europe. The main reason for this situation was that the CIS countries, including Russia, did not intend to join the Community, and the Communities never intended to conclude agreements with them extending the principles of the internal market of the European Union to parts of the former Soviet Union. As a result, the Community decided, as a follow-up to the 1989 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the USSR, to conclude partnership and cooperation agreements with ten republics of the former Soviet Union. The first partnership and cooperation agreement to enter into force was the agreement with Russia on December 1, 1997. This agreement is mainly based on the forms of cooperation used in the 1989 trade and cooperation agreement with the USSR. In addition, the Agreement contains significantly more ambitious measures aimed at trade liberalization. The initial stage for such measures is the establishment of most favored nation treatment between Russia and the European Union, which could subsequently lead to the creation of a free trade area. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement does not include framework provisions allowing for freedom of movement of workers between the European Union and Russia. On the contrary, Russia is on the list of non-EU states whose citizens are required to have a visa to cross the external borders of the European Union. An innovation contained in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is the chapter on structural political dialogue. Such a dialogue should guarantee the existence of a forum in which Russia and the European Union can discuss issues of interest to both sides. For the most part, these are political and security issues. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not in any way affect the unilateral measures, the positive results of which the USSR enjoyed. On the contrary, they began to be automatically applied to new states that emerged as a result of the collapse. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999, the European Union had a new instrument to strengthen its common foreign and security policy vis-à-vis third countries. This tool is called "Overall Strategy". In June 1999, the European Union adopted its first Common Strategy, which emphasizes the great importance of Russia for the European Union. According to this Common Strategy, closer cooperation between Russia and the European Union is the only way to solve the challenges facing Europe as a continent. Consequently, the European Union hopes that it will be able to make its contribution to strengthening democracy, the rule of law, building the rule of law and supporting the institutions of civil society in Russia, to the integration of Russia into the pan-European economic and social space. The planned cooperation should lead to the most effective resolution of common problems, such as energy and nuclear security, environment and health, as well as the fight against organized crime, money laundering, illegal trafficking in people and drugs. The European Union believes that this is the only possible way strengthening stability and security in Europe and beyond.
Problems of relations with the OSCE.
Overcoming crisis phenomena in the economy and strengthening Russia’s position in the world at the beginning XXI century. In practice, Russian vulgarized pseudo-monetarism led to chaos in the economy, which arose as a result of the shock “liberalization” of prices and subsequent hyperinflation (in January 1992, consumer prices increased by 245%, by the end of 1992 by 26 times, then during 1993 - even more 4 times, in 1995 - 2.3 times). The collapse of the national currency led to the dollarization of the economy. In fact, an inflationary confiscation of the population's savings and an inflationary redistribution of public wealth were carried out, which, in combination with the almost free distribution of state property to new owners (the monetary valuation of enterprise funds turned out to be many times underestimated relative to their real value, sometimes by many thousands of times) and inflationary preferential lending to commercial banks - led to the implementation of a certain historical analogue of the initial accumulation of capital. In 2004, when summing up the results of privatization, it was calculated that the state budget received about $9 billion from the sale of privatized property and facilities; for comparison, it can be noted that in Bolivia, where privatization was also carried out in the 90s, more than 90 billion dollars were received, despite the fact that the scale of the economy of this country is much lower than Russia’s and a significantly smaller share was privatized public sector. The robbery of the population was continued further through the criminal activities of private “funds”, banks and “financial pyramids”. During this period, there was a consolidation of those social forces in whose interests changes in the economy were carried out. These are the nomenklatura bureaucracy, which has doubled in number and carried out the “conversion of power into property”, the administration of enterprises (on average 5% of those employed in enterprises) and criminal circles. By the end of the 90s. There have been certain positive changes in the Russian economy. Basically, saturation of the consumer market was achieved, the degree of computerization increased significantly, the service sector developed, and some elements of the market infrastructure emerged. Opportunities for demonstrating economic initiative and entrepreneurial activity have expanded. However, these positive changes turned out to be devalued by the progressive destruction of the country's production, scientific, technical and, in general, civilizational potential.
The collapse of the USSR changed Russia's position in the international arena and its political and economic ties with the outside world. The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation put forward the priority tasks of preserving territorial integrity and independence, ensuring favorable conditions for the development of a market economy and inclusion in the world community. It was necessary to achieve recognition of Russia as the legal successor of the former Soviet Union at the UN, as well as assistance from Western countries in carrying out a course of reforms. Important role allocated to Russia's foreign trade with foreign countries. Foreign economic relations were considered as one of the means of overcoming the economic crisis in the country.
Russia and foreign countries
After the August 1991 events, diplomatic recognition of Russia began. The head of Bulgaria Zh. Zhelev arrived for negotiations with the Russian president. At the end of the same year, B. N. Yeltsin’s first official visit abroad took place - to Germany. The countries of the European Community declared recognition of the sovereignty of Russia and the transfer to it of the rights and obligations of the former USSR. In 1993-1994 partnership and cooperation agreements were concluded between EU states and the Russian Federation. The Russian government has joined the Partnership for Peace program proposed by NATO. The country was included in the International Monetary Fund. She managed to negotiate with the largest banks in the West to defer payments for the debts of the former USSR. In 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe, whose competence included issues of culture, human rights, and environmental protection[i]. European states supported Russia's actions aimed at its integration into the world economy.
Russia was actively involved in resolving the most important international issues. In October 1997, the State Duma ratified the Geneva Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Use of Chemical Weapons.
In May 1997, an agreement on relations between the Russian Federation and NATO countries was signed in Paris. The document recorded the obligations of the parties to renounce the use of force in relations with each other. It was envisaged to prevent conflicts and resolve possible disputes exclusively by peaceful means. However, very soon the leadership of the NATO countries violated their obligations. The admission to NATO of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic countries testified to the desire of this organization to expand its influence in the East.
The role of foreign trade in the development of the Russian economy has noticeably increased. The destruction of national economic ties between the republics of the former USSR and the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance caused a reorientation of foreign economic relations. After long break Russia was granted most favored nation treatment in trade with the United States. The states of the Middle East and Latin America were permanent economic partners. As in previous years, thermal and hydroelectric power plants were built in developing countries with Russian participation (for example, in Afghanistan and Vietnam). Metallurgical plants and agricultural facilities were built in Pakistan, Egypt and Syria.
Trade contacts have been preserved between Russia and the countries of the former CMEA, through whose territory gas and oil pipelines ran to Western Europe. The energy resources exported through them were also sold to these states. The counter trade items were medicines, food and chemical products. The share of Eastern European countries in the total volume of Russian trade decreased by 1994 to 10%.
Relations with CIS countries
The development of relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States occupied an important place in foreign policy activities government. In 1993, the CIS included, in addition to Russia, eleven more states. At first, the central place in relations between them was occupied by negotiations on issues related to the division of property of the former USSR. Borders were established with those countries that had introduced national currencies. Agreements were signed that determined the conditions for the transportation of Russian goods through their territory abroad.
The collapse of the USSR destroyed traditional economic ties with the former republics. In 1992-1995. Trade turnover with the CIS countries fell. Russia continued to supply them with fuel and energy resources, primarily oil and gas. The structure of import receipts was dominated by consumer goods and food. One of the obstacles to the development of trade relations was the financial debt of Russia from the Commonwealth states that had formed in previous years. In the mid-90s, its size exceeded $6 billion.
The Russian government sought to maintain integration ties between the former republics within the CIS. On his initiative, the Interstate Committee of the Commonwealth Countries was created with its headquarters in Moscow. An agreement on collective security was concluded between six (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, etc.) states, and the CIS Charter was developed and approved (1993). At the same time, the Commonwealth of countries did not represent a single formalized organization. Presidential meetings were held periodically, at which issues of economic and political cooperation were resolved. Agreements were signed on the united Armed Forces of the CIS and on the principles of providing states with weapons and military equipment(1992). The adopted documents confirmed the obligations of the Commonwealth countries to fulfill international obligations arising from the treaties of the former USSR. In particular, the participation of the CIS in the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of missile defense systems (1970) and on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (1987) was confirmed.
Interstate relations between Russia and some former republics of the USSR were not easy. There were heated disputes with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and ownership of the Crimean Peninsula. Conflicts with the governments of the Baltic states were caused by discrimination against the Russian-speaking population living there and the unresolved nature of some territorial issues. Russia's economic and strategic interests in Tajikistan and Moldova were the reasons for its participation in armed clashes in these regions. The relationship between the Russian Federation and Belarus developed most constructively.
The activities of the Russian government within the country and in the international arena testified to its desire to overcome conflicts in relations with states both far and near abroad.
Russia's relations with the countries of the "near abroad". In the 90s, the development of relations between Russia and the CIS countries was of great importance. The development of these relations took place with considerable difficulties.
Of all the CIS member countries, Russia has the closest relations with Belarus. In April 1996, the Treaty establishing the Community of Russia and Belarus was signed. In 1997, the Community became the Union of Russia and Belarus. Citizens of Russia and Belarus can freely move, reside and own property on the territory of both countries. The next stage in the rapprochement of the two countries could be the creation of a single state. At the end of the 90s. this was not possible, since Russia and Belarus have fundamentally different economic systems. Political system modern Belarus is authoritarian, which is why the President of Belarus A.G. Lukashenko was constantly criticized by democratically minded politicians both in Russia and around the world.
Relations with our most important partner, Ukraine, were not easy. These relationships were complicated by the question of the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. As is known, in Soviet times the Black Sea Fleet was an important operational-strategic formation of the USSR Navy on the Black Sea and guarded the southern borders of our country. The main bases of the Black Sea Fleet were located in Sevastopol (Crimea) and Novorossiysk (Krasnodar Territory). The collapse of the USSR had a most painful impact on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet has become one of the stumbling blocks in relations between the two countries. In August 1992, the Black Sea Fleet was withdrawn from the United armed forces CIS and began to exist as a joint fleet of Russia and Ukraine. In 1995 and 1997, new agreements were reached between the two countries on the Black Sea Fleet, according to which, on the basis of the united Black Sea Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and the Ukrainian Navy were created with separate basing on the territory of Ukraine. 87% of the ships of the USSR Black Sea Fleet passed to Russia. Sevastopol, as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, was created over more than 200 years, so 70% of the entire infrastructure of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was at that time located on the territory of Crimea. Russia received the right to lease Sevastopol until 2017. On June 12, 1997, the historical St. Andrew's flag was raised on ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. But the situation surrounding the fate of the Black Sea Fleet remains difficult. Ukraine from time to time raises the question of the need to revise the terms of the lease of Sevastopol in order to seek more and more concessions from Russia, and persistently demonstrates its desire to join NATO. There are ongoing disputes between Russia and Ukraine regarding the status of Sevastopol. Many Russian politicians, in particular Yu.M. Luzhkov, insisted that at the time of the transfer of Crimea from the RSFSR to Ukraine in 1954, Sevastopol was not administratively subordinate to the Crimean region and therefore legally remained Russian city. The Russian leadership has stated that after 2017 it does not intend to renew the lease of Sevastopol. Russia is actively building new naval bases and Black Sea Fleet facilities on its own territory in the city of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Territory.
In the economic field, Russian-Ukrainian relations also remain difficult, since Ukraine has been trying for a long time not to pay for the Russian gas it consumes. Customs offices have been established on the Russian-Ukrainian border, and customs rules are gradually becoming stricter on the Ukrainian side.
In the 90s, relations with the Baltic countries - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - continued to be difficult. The provision of advantages to “titular nations” in these countries was met with great objections in Russia: strict requirements for ownership official languages when granting citizenship and hiring, ousting the Russian language from the sphere of education, etc. Negative reaction in Russia causes persecution in the Baltic countries of veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the activation of veterans who fought on the side of the Nazis. The Baltic countries are also striving to join NATO, but the West is not yet ready to complicate relations with Russia because of the Baltic countries.
Armenia was an important strategic partner of Russia. Azerbaijan has chosen a course towards rapprochement with Iran and Turkey. In many ways, Azerbaijan’s distance from Russia was caused by disputes over the production and transportation of oil from the Caspian Sea shelf.
At the same time, there was a gradual cooling of relations with Georgia. Georgia gradually moved closer to NATO and the United States.
One of the most important partners of Russia was Kazakhstan. Russia cooperated closely with Kazakhstan, in particular in the military-space field, leasing Baikonur. Baikonur, the world's largest cosmodrome, created in the USSR in the 60s, was transferred to Kazakhstan after the collapse of the USSR. In 1994, the cosmodrome complex with the city of Leninsk was leased to Russia until 2050. The annual rental cost is $ 115 million; military and other equipment is supplied to Kazakhstan as payment. Another $50 million is being transferred to maintain the infrastructure. There are other cosmodromes in Russia - Plesetsk and Svobodny, but they are still poorly equipped for launching spacecraft.
In Kazakhstan, there was also pressure on the Russian-speaking population. A particularly difficult situation has developed in the northern regions of the country, inhabited predominantly by Russians and Ukrainians. There were influential people here political movements, advocating separation from Kazakhstan and joining Russia. They found support from certain political forces and the Russian media. In Kazakhstan, this is perceived as an encroachment on the territorial integrity of the country.
In Central Asia, Russia has the closest relations with Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan is increasingly focused on cooperation with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. But Uzbekistan's final distance from Russia is constrained by the growing threat from the Afghan Taliban and the need for Russian military support. In Tajikistan, Russia's influence remains significant. The southern borders of Tajikistan are guarded by Russian troops (201 divisions). Russia is forced and interested in taking upon itself the protection of the southern borders of the former USSR, since it is through the southern borders that Russia receives large number weapons and drugs.
Russia's relations with Western countries in 1992-1998. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation became the legal successor of the USSR in the UN. On December 24, 1991, Russia took a seat at the UN and became a permanent member of the UN Security Council. By the beginning of 1992, the Russian Federation was recognized by 131 states of the world.
An important place in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation during this period was the establishment of partnerships with the United States. In January 1992, during a trip to a meeting of the Security Council, B.N. Yeltsin and US President George W. Bush signed a declaration “On the principles of new relations between Russia and the United States.” The Declaration proclaimed that relations between the two countries would be built on the basis of friendship and partnership.
In March 1992, Russia and the rest of the CIS countries joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This was the beginning of a partnership between the CIS countries and NATO. In 1994, Russia and the CIS countries entered into the Partnership for Peace program, in which the countries of Eastern Europe took part along with them.
In April 1992, Russia was admitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Summer 1992 Russian President participated for the first time in the G7 summit (the G7 refers to the seven largest industrial states in the world: the USA, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada). Since that time, these meetings have become permanent, and the “seven” is gradually turning into the “eight”. But Russia is so far taking part only in political discussions, and not in the economic part of the summit, since its economic potential too insignificant.
Russia and the United States have made significant progress in arms reduction negotiations.
In August 1994, Soviet troops were finally withdrawn from Germany.
In January 1996, Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe.
However, since 1995, Russia's relations with Western countries gradually began to become cooler. This was caused by a number of reasons. In the West, the alliance between Russia and Belarus caused great concern. In turn, the Russian leadership was dissatisfied with the intention to include in NATO former countries Warsaw Pact. Serious disagreements between Russia and the United States were caused by the conflict in the Balkans. Russia had to agree to the introduction economic sanctions against Serbia and to help NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Croatia.
By this time, the foreign policy course pursued by Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev, became overly pro-Western and did not ensure Russia’s national interests.
In January 1996, E.M. became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Primakov. This meant a serious turn in Russian foreign policy. New minister strongly emphasized Russia's status as a great power. The goal of foreign policy was to defend Russia's national interests in all parts of the planet.
The Russian leadership was seriously concerned about the entry into NATO on March 12, 1999 of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The US was dissatisfied with Russia's economic partnership with India and Iran, which Russia helped in construction nuclear power plants and development of rocket technologies.
Since 1997, Russia has intensified its rapprochement with China. Relations between the Russian Federation and Japan have developed, but further rapprochement is hindered controversial issue on the status of the Kuril Islands.
The war in Yugoslavia and Russian policy in the Balkans. In March 1999, there was a sharp cooling in relations between the Russian Federation and Western countries. This was due to the policies of countries in the Balkans.
In 1997, Kosovo Albanians in Serbia created the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which led an armed struggle to secede the region from Yugoslavia. Terror began to be carried out against the Serbian and other non-Albanian population in Kosovo. In 1998, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic gave the order to restore order in the Kosovo region. As a result, KLA fighters were pushed back to the border with Albania. The West announced ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, qualified Milosevic's policy in Kosovo as a "humanitarian catastrophe" and began to persuade S. Milosevic to sit down at the negotiating table with Albanian militants. The main demand of the Kosovo Albanians was the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. But Milosevic did not make concessions, and the United States and other Western countries began to call on the UN Security Council to start a war against Yugoslavia. Russia and China were against it. In the end, the Serbian leadership sat down at the negotiating table with the Serbian Albanians, but the latter only demanded the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. The Serbian leadership considered this unacceptable.
Then, contrary to the will of the UN Security Council and unanimity within NATO (against Greece), on March 24, 1999, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, which lasted 78 days. The NATO leadership demanded that Yugoslavia remove troops from Kosovo and agree to the international occupation of Kosovo. A UN special envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, was sent to persuade Milosevic.
The Russian leadership regarded the bombing of Yugoslavia as aggression. On March 23, 1999, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation E.M. Primakov, flying to the United States, learned about the upcoming bombings and, as a sign of protest, right over the Atlantic, turned his plane back to Russia. Western countries have done everything possible to minimize Russia's participation in resolving the Balkan crisis. Russia's direct participation was expressed in the participation of a limited contingent of Russian armed forces in the Balkans as part of the peacekeeping forces. But the Russian military took a step that demonstrated to the NATO leadership that it was too early to discount Russia: on the night of June 11-12, 1999, a battalion of Russian paratroopers made a lightning-fast 620-kilometer rush from Bosnia to the capital of Kosovo, Pristina, in a few hours, ahead of the tanks. columns of NATO troops, occupied the Slatina airport (the most important strategic facility in the region) and hoisted the Russian flag and the banner of the Airborne Forces. The NATO leadership was stunned, but considered it prudent to act “delicately” towards the Russian paratroopers. After some time, Russian paratroopers were forced to cede Pristina airport to the British.
The actual exclusion of Russia from participation in resolving the crisis in the Balkans, where Russia from time immemorial has been the defender of Slavic Orthodox peoples, brought the Russian Federation to the brink of war with NATO. But such a war was impossible for Russia. Therefore, Russia’s role in resolving the crisis was reduced to mediation functions. The decisive role was played by the visit to Yugoslavia of the special representative of the President B.N. Yeltsin - V.S. Chernomyrdin, who managed to convince S. Milosevic not to count on military assistance Russia and agree to the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo.
As a result, Russia did not receive its zone of responsibility in Kosovo, and Kosovo was divided into American, British, French, German and Italian sectors.
After NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia, Russia sharply reduced the level of partnership relations with NATO. The policies of Western countries have not brought stability to the Balkans, but have created a new “powder keg” in the region.
Russia at the present stage (2000s)
