A sign of elementary intelligence in animals. Intellectual abilities of animals
Background and elements intellectual behavior animals
Intelligent behavior is the pinnacle mental development animals. However, speaking about the intelligence, the “mind” of animals, their thinking, it is necessary first of all to note that it is extremely difficult to accurately indicate which animals can be discussed as having intellectual behavior and which ones cannot. Obviously, we can only talk about higher vertebrates, but clearly not only about primates, as was accepted until recently. At the same time, the intellectual behavior of animals is not something isolated, out of the ordinary, but only one of the manifestations of a single mental activity with its innate and acquired aspects. Intellectual behavior is not only closely related to in different forms instinctive behavior and learning, but also itself consists (on an innate basis) of individually variable components of behavior. It is the highest result and manifestation of individual accumulation of experience, a special category of learning with its inherent qualitative features. Therefore, intellectual behavior gives the greatest adaptive effect, which is what I drew attention to special attention A.N. Severtsov, showing crucial higher mental abilities for the survival of individuals and procreation during sudden, rapidly occurring changes in the environment.
The prerequisite and basis for the development of animal intelligence - at least in the direction leading to human consciousness- is manipulation, primarily with biologically “neutral” objects. Especially, as has already been shown, this applies to monkeys, for whom manipulation serves as a source of the most complete information about the properties and structure of the objective components of the environment, because in the course of manipulation the most profound and comprehensive acquaintance with new objects or new properties of objects already familiar to the animal occurs. During manipulation, especially when performing complex manipulations, the experience of the animal’s activity is generalized, generalized knowledge about the subject components is formed environment, and it is this generalized motor-sensory experience that constitutes the main basis of monkey intelligence.
Pavlov said about the manipulation of apes with “biologically indifferent” objects: “This is the most persistent curiosity. So the absurd assertion that animals do not have it, that we do not have it in the beginning of what we have and what ultimately created science, does not correspond to reality.” As an example, Pavlov referred to the manipulation of objects he observed in chimpanzees, in particular a box in which there were “no oranges or apples.” Still a monkey" for a long time tinkers... over solving mechanical problems, which does not promise her any benefits, no material satisfaction.”
This, according to Pavlov, “pure, disinterested curiosity” forces the monkey to study the object of manipulation during active influence at him. At the same time, and in interaction with each other, they are included in cognitive activity animal has different sensory and effector systems. After all, the manipulating monkey almost continuously monitors the movements of its hands; under close visual control, a wide variety of actions are performed, both without destroying the integrity of the object: turning in different sides, licking, stroking, pressing, rolling, etc., and of a destructive nature: breaking, tearing, isolating individual parts, etc. (Fig. 24).
Destructive actions are of particular cognitive value, since they allow one to obtain information about internal structure items. During manipulation, the animal receives information simultaneously through a number of sensory channels, but in monkeys the combination of skin-muscular sensitivity of the hands with visual sensations is of predominant importance. In addition, the examination of the object of manipulation also involves the sense of smell, taste, tactile sensitivity of the perioral vibrissae, sometimes hearing, etc. These types of sensitivity are combined with musculocutaneous effector sensitivity ( oral apparatus, forelimbs) except monkeys and other mammals when they manipulate objects. As a result, animals receive complex information about the object as a single whole and having different properties. This is precisely the meaning of manipulation as the basis of intellectual behavior.
It is necessary, however, to emphasize that visual perceptions and especially visual generalizations, which were discussed earlier, are of paramount importance for intellectual behavior. The extent to which the ability to form generalized visual images is developed even in rats is shown by the following experiment, in which rats successfully solved a very difficult task: the animal had to choose from three presented figures (vertical and horizontal stripes) one that was dissimilar compared to the other two. The location and design of such a figure is constantly changing, therefore, it will be either vertical or horizontal stripes, located on the left, then on the right, then in the middle (in the wrong sequence). Thus, the experimental animal could navigate only by one, extremely generalized feature - the dissimilarity of one pattern compared to the others. We are thus dealing here with a visual generalization, close to the abstraction characteristic of thought processes.
With another element of intellectual behavior, this time in motor sphere, we met when describing experiments with “problem boxes”. And here we are dealing with complex multiphase skills, since in higher mammals, such as raccoons, it is relatively easy to achieve solutions to problems in which the animal has to a certain sequence open a set of various locking devices. As in the described experiment with a rat pulling up a ladder, a raccoon can solve such a problem only if it follows a strictly defined sequence of actions. But the difference is that, unlike a rat, the raccoon has to find this sequence itself, and this certainly raises its activity to a higher level. True, according to some data, rats are also capable of this.
It is necessary, however, to emphasize that even higher vertebrates solve instrumental problems more difficult than locomotor ones. L. Kardosh noted in this regard that the mental activity of animals is dominated by the cognition of spatial relationships (see Part I, Chapter 3), which they comprehend with the help of locomotor actions. In monkeys, especially anthropoids, locomotor cognition of spatial relationships loses its dominant role due to the strong development of manipulative actions. However, only a person can completely free himself from the directing influence of spatial relations if this is required by the knowledge of temporal-causal connections.
The solution of multiphase instrumental problems in monkeys has been studied by a number of researchers, in particular N. N. Ladygina-Kots. In her monograph, Adaptive Motor Skills of the Macaque under Experimental Conditions, she summarized numerous experiments in which very diverse combinations of locking mechanisms were used. These experiments showed that the lower monkey (rhesus monkey) is able to learn to unlock large series of locking mechanisms, although it copes better with single installations. Numerous and varied groping movements of the hands and “experimentation” were characteristic. Due to its great haste, the most difficult devices for the monkey turned out to be those that could not be unlocked with light, quick movements. The easiest movements to perform were stretching, abduction, pulling, lowering, etc., the hardest ones were moving away and rotating, turning out. In general, in the search for points of delay and ways to overcome obstacles, the predominant role belonged to kinesthetic, rather than visual perceptions. Interestingly, in many of these features, as later studies have shown, the actions of lower apes in experiments with locking mechanisms resemble those of raccoons.
An extremely important prerequisite for intellectual behavior is the ability to widely transfer skills to new situations. This ability is fully developed in higher vertebrates, although it manifests itself in different animals in varying degrees. V. P. Protopopov gives next example transferring acquired experience to a new situation in a dog. Initially, the experimental dog learned to open the latch on the door of the “problem cage” in which the bait was located by pressing its paw. In other experiments, the same dog then learned to pull a piece of meat with its teeth and paws by a rope that lay on the floor in front of it. After this, a third situation was created, containing elements of the first two: on the cage used in the first situation, the latch was raised to such a height that the dog could not reach it with its paw, but a rope was tied to the latch, by pulling which it could be opened. When the dog was brought to the cage, she immediately, without any other tests, grabbed the rope with her teeth and, pulling, opened the latch. Thus, the problem was immediately solved in the new situation, despite the fact that the previous elements were located in a completely different way: the rope hung, and did not lie horizontally on the floor; at the end of it there was not meat tied, but a latch, which, moreover, was in a different place - upstairs. In addition, the latch was unlocked in the first experiments with the movement of the paw, and then with the help of the teeth. “... A new skill,” writes Protopopov on this occasion, “is developed immediately, “suddenly,” but this suddenness... is due to well-defined traces of past experience, which, under the influence of a stimulus, enter through a kind of explosive closure into a new temporary connection, and a new one is created nerve structure and a new reaction, different from the previous two in both the receptor and effector parts... Such skills... can in their own way external manifestation imitate reasonable behavior and, if you do not know the stages of their occurrence, you can come to erroneous anthropomorphic conclusions.”
N. R. F. Mayer, for example, came to similar anthropomorphic conclusions when he recognized rats as capable of “reasoning.” This conclusion was substantiated by the results of his experiments on the development of delayed reactions in rats, during which these animals were able to associate elements of previous experience that had never previously been combined in their behavior. As was shown, this also happened in Protopopov’s experiments with a dog.
So, the abilities of higher vertebrates for various manipulations, for broad sensory (visual) generalization, for solving complex problems and transferring complex skills to new situations, for full orientation and adequate response in a new environment based on previous experience are the most important elements animal intelligence. And yet, by themselves, these qualities are still insufficient to serve as criteria for the intelligence and thinking of animals. Moreover, as indicated, it is impossible to recognize, for example, the highly developed abilities of optical generalization in bees as such criteria.
Criterion of intelligent behavior of animals
Distinctive feature The intelligence of animals lies in the fact that in addition to the reflection of individual things, there is a reflection of their relationships and connections (situations). This partly occurs, of course, with some complex skills, which once again characterizes the latter as a transitional form to the intellectual behavior of animals. This reflection occurs in the process of activity, which, according to Leontiev, is two-phase in structure.
We have already seen that most complex animal skills are multiphasic. However, these phases, be it the rat climbing from platform to platform using a pull-up ladder or the sequential unlocking of the gates of the “problem box”, are essentially only a chain, the sum of unambiguous, equal stages of sequential problem solving. With the development of intellectual forms of behavior, the phases of problem solving acquire a clear difference in quality: the activity, previously merged into a single process, is differentiated into a preparation phase and an implementation phase. It is the preparation phase that constitutes characteristic feature intellectual behavior. As Leontyev points out, intelligence first arises where the process of preparing the opportunity to carry out a particular operation or skill arises.
In specific experimental studies, the two-phase nature of intellectual actions is manifested, for example, in the fact that a monkey first takes out a stick and then uses this stick to knock down a high-hanging fruit, as happened in the well-known experiments of the German psychologist W. Köhler. In other experiments, the monkey could take possession of the bait only if it first pushed it away from itself with a stick to a place where (after a roundabout movement) it could be reached with its hand (Fig. 44).
Many other experiments were carried out in which monkeys had to solve a problem using a tool (most often a stick). Thus, in the experiments of G.Z. Roginsky, chimpanzees who had experience in manipulating sticks immediately used them to get bait. But the lower monkeys, except for one (the chacma baboon), were not immediately capable of this. Nevertheless, Roginsky rejects V. Kohler’s opinion about the existence of a gap between the psyche of apes and lower apes.
Rice. 44. Scheme of a complex problem, to solve which a monkey must, tied to a tree with a stick, push a fruit in a box through a gap to the opposite (lattice) wall, and then go around the box. Complementary food(s) are initially visible both through the grate and through a gap in the wall, but cannot be directly grasped by hand (experienceKoehler)
Soviet zoopsychologist L. S. Novoselova managed through her research to identify the genesis of the use of sticks in solving complex problems in chimpanzees. She showed that using a stick is formed as an individual adaptive action, but is not congenital form behavior. In this case, several stages are outlined - from operating the entire hand as a lever to specialized actions with the hand, which not only holds the stick, but also directs its movements in accordance with the specific properties of the tool.
N. N. Ladygina-Kots studied in detail in chimpanzees the process of preparing and even making tools necessary for solving a technically simple task - pushing bait out of a narrow tube. As the chimpanzees watched, bait was placed into the tube in such a way that it could not be reached simply with your fingers. Simultaneously with the tube, the animal was given various objects suitable for pushing out complementary foods after some “refinement” of them (Fig. 45). The experimental monkey coped with all these tasks quite (though not always immediately).
Rice. 45. Experimental study of tool activity in chimpanzees (experimentsLadygina-Kots).
Some objects presented to the monkey (a branch, a stick wrapped in rope, bent and spirally twisted wire, wire mesh, a piece of wicker basket)
In these experiments, the two-phase nature of intellectual action is also clearly evident: preparing a tool is the first, preparatory phase, getting the bait with the help of a tool is the second phase. The first phase is out of touch with next phase devoid of any biological meaning. The second phase - the phase of carrying out activities - is generally aimed at satisfying a certain biological need of the animal (in the described experiments - food).
According to Leontiev, the first, preparatory phase is stimulated not by the object itself (for example, a stick) at which it is directed, but objective attitude sticks to the bait. The reaction to this attitude is the preparation of the second phase, the phase of implementation, which is aimed at the object (“goal”) that motivates all the activity of the animal. The second phase thus includes specific operation, fixed in the form of a skill.
Great value as one of the criteria of intellectual behavior is the fact that when solving a problem the animal uses not one stereotypically performed method, but tries different ways, which are the result of previously accumulated experience. Consequently, instead of trying various movements, as is the case with non-intellectual actions, with intellectual behavior there are tests various operations, which allows you to solve the same problem in various ways. Transference and testing of various operations when solving a complex problem is expressed in monkeys, in particular, in the fact that they almost never use tools in exactly the same way.
Thus, with intellectual behavior we are dealing with a transfer of an operation, and this transfer does not require that the new task be directly similar to the previous one. An operation, as Leontyev notes, ceases to be rigidly connected with an activity that meets a specific task. And here we can trace the continuity from complex skills.
Since the intellectual behavior of animals is characterized by a reflection not just of the objective components of the environment, but of the relationships between them, here the operation is transferred not only on the principle of the similarity of things (for example, barriers) with which it was associated this operation, but also on the principle of similarity of relationships, connections of things to which it corresponds.
Forms of thinking
Based on many years of experimental research, Ladygina-Kots came to the conclusion that the thinking of animals always has a specific sensory-motor character, that this is thinking in action, and these actions are always subject-related. Such thinking in action, according to Ladygina-Kotes, is a practical analysis and synthesis, which, during instrumental activity, is carried out during direct handling of objects, during their examination, processing and use. But at the same time they are not excluded, but, on the contrary, they play big role those generalized visual representations discussed above.
In accordance with this, Ladygina-Kots considers it possible to distinguish two forms of thinking that are different in complexity and depth (though only in apes).
The first form is characterized by the establishment of connections between stimuli (objects or phenomena) directly perceived by the animal during its activity. This is analysis and synthesis in a clearly visible situation. An example is the choice by a monkey of objects suitable for use as tools, taking into account their size, density, shape, etc.
The second form is characterized by the establishment of connections between directly perceived stimuli and ideas (visual traces). Thus, in the described experiments in which chimpanzees had to push a treat out of a pipe using a tool, mental operations of this type were manifested in the manufacture of a tool, for example, in untangling a ball of wire and straightening it. Particularly convincing evidence of the existence of this highest form thinking is an experiment in which a monkey, along with a pipe, was given a board much wider than the diameter of the pipe. The chimpanzee was able to completely independently separate narrow splinters from the board and use them as a tool to push the bait out of the pipe.
Such behavior of the monkey can only be explained by the fact that, in the course of previous activity, it had formed a generalized visual representation of an object such as a stick (but only in the situation of this task). The decisive role of previous experience in the formation of such visual “representations” appears quite clearly in the same series of experiments. After all, even before solving the described problem, the monkey accumulated experience in “refining” quite various items, among which there were figured tablets (Fig. 46), the transformation of which into tools suitable for solving the problem was no more difficult for chimpanzees than breaking off the side shoots of a branch (Fig. 45). At the same time, making a tool from such a figured plank requires splitting off part of it in the longitudinal direction. Such actions and the experience accumulated at the same time prepared the monkey for solving the problem with a wide board, which was given to him in one of the following experiments.
Based on establishing the connection between the generalized visual representation about a necessary object (such as a stick) with direct perception of a second object (a pipe), also given in a specific situation of experience, the monkey was able to isolate (along an imaginary line!) a part from the whole - a splinter from a board, and in such a way that it turned out to be suitable to serve as a tool to push out the bait.
Rice. 46. Figured boards with extensions at the ends or in the middle, offered to chimpanzees in experiments by Ladygina-Kots.
Thus, chimpanzees are able to mentally decompose entire objects into parts, as well as complex figures into their component parts. As already indicated, the leading role in behavior, and in particular in the intellectual actions of monkeys, is played by their hands and the tactile-kinesthetic sensitivity of the hand. I.P. Pavlov therefore spoke with good reason about the “manual thinking” of monkeys. The combination of tactile-kinesthetic sensitivity with vision gives the monkey great advantages for establishing spatio-temporal connections for practical analysis and synthesis. It was this significant expansion and deepening of the sensory sphere that in monkeys formed the basis of what I. P. Pavlov designated as “capturing a constant connection between things” (or “the normal connection of things”).Biological limitations of animal intelligence
Along with all this, we must clearly imagine the biological limitations of the intellectual behavior of monkeys. Like all other forms of behavior, it is entirely determined by the way of life and purely biological laws, the boundaries of which even the smartest monkey cannot step over. For example, chimpanzees in the wild every evening make themselves skillfully intertwined sleeping nests from branches and leaves, but, according to the English researcher of monkey behavior J. van Lawick-Goodall, they never build canopies and remain completely defenseless in the pouring tropical rain.
Very rarely do monkeys use tools in the wild. True, there are isolated observations of chimpanzees using weapons when obtaining food or attacking. But, like other great apes, chimpanzees get by quite well everyday life without guns. On the other hand, other vertebrates (sea otters, Galapagos woodpecker finches, etc.) systematically use objects as tools. This already indicates that instrumental actions in themselves are not necessarily criteria for highly developed mental activity of animals.
The biological limitations of the intelligence of anthropoids are also revealed by the analysis of experimental data. Thus, Ladygina-Kots showed that visual images and representations of apes are much weaker than those of humans and are always associated with components environment(situational connectedness of ideas).
This limitation of intellectual behavior was repeatedly manifested in Ladygina-Kots’s experiments, when the chimpanzee made “ridiculous” mistakes when using objects provided to him to push bait out of a pipe. So, for example, he tried to push a piece of plywood into the pipe despite the obvious discrepancy in its width and began to nibble it only after a number of such unsuccessful attempts. Sometimes the inadequacy of actions was due to the predominance of destructive manipulation (Fig. 47). In addition, a special series of experiments was carried out in which the monkey was given a pipe, closed at one end, and a hook. If the bait placed in such a pipe was attached to a thread, the chimpanzee easily pulled it out. Despite this, the monkey was unable to adequately use the hook and, moreover, most often broke off its curved part as an interfering element. Ladygina-Kots wrote on this occasion that “the chimpanzee was unable to move from the stereotyped, habitual technique of pushing out the bait with a straight, smooth single tool to the use of the technique of pulling it towards itself with a hook,” and saw in this “the insufficient plasticity of the chimpanzee’s psyche, the limitations of its thinking.”
Chimpanzees, according to Ladygina-Kots, “are not able to grabstraightaway
essential featuresin a new situation
and installnew connections
based onunderstanding directly perceived relationships between objects.”
Rice. 47. Objects offered to chimpanzees, the use of which revealed the limited intellectual behavior of this monkey: sticks are suitable for pushing bait out of a pipe only in a tied form, but the monkey untied them and tried to use them one by one; cross-shaped planks had to be connected together, while those shifted at an angle had to be straightened to a straight line, as shown in the lower part of the picture. Instead, the chimpanzee first separated the bars and tried to apply them separately (experimentsLadyginoy-Kots)
This conclusion of Ladygina-Kots is confirmed by experiments of other researchers. Thus, the chimpanzee showed the situational connectedness of its ideas and the inability to embrace significant change in the previous situation in the following experiment: a chimpanzee is asked to use a stick to roll an apple to a cage around a low wall. After the monkey masters this skill, part of the wall immediately in front of the cage is removed, as a result of which it would be more convenient to directly attract the apple with a stick. Nevertheless, the monkey continues to perform the same complex, difficult action, pushing the apple away from itself and moving it around the wall (experiment of E. G. Vatsuro, Fig. 48).
Rice. 48. Watsuro’s experiment, revealing the limitations and qualitative originality of the intelligence of great apes. See text for explanations.
Even the most complex manifestations of the intelligence of monkeys are ultimately nothing more than the application in new conditions of a phylogenetically developed method of action. After all, it has long been noticed that the similarity of attracting bait with a stick is similar to attracting a fruit growing on a branch. Voitonis and Ladygina-Kots pointed out that developed ability monkeys for practical analysis is related to the characteristics of their nutrition; Fabry explains the highly developed sensorimotor functions of the hand, their combination with vision and, as a consequence, the distinctive cognitive abilities of monkeys functional features their grasping abilities (see Chapter 3), etc. This biological conditioning of all mental activity of monkeys, including anthropoids, is the reason for the noted limitations of their intellectual abilities, the reason for their inability to establish a mental connection between ideas alone and their combination into images. The inability to mentally operate with ideas alone inevitably leads to the inability to understand the results of one’s actions, to understand the true cause-and-effect relationships. This is possible only with the help of concepts, which in monkeys, like in all other animals, for the reasons indicated, are completely absent.
In conclusion, we have to admit that the problem of animal intelligence has not yet been completely studied enough. Essentially, detailed experimental studies have so far been carried out only on monkeys, mainly higher ones, while there is still almost no evidence-based experimental data on the possibility of intellectual actions in other vertebrates. At the same time, as already mentioned, it is doubtful that intelligence is unique to primates.
“...it is extremely difficult to indicate exactly which animals can be considered to have intelligent behavior and which animals cannot. Obviously, we can only talk about higher vertebrates, but clearly not only about primates, as was accepted until recently.”- noted K.E. Fabry.
The intellectual abilities of animals other than humans include the ability to solve non-trivial behavioral problems (thinking). Intellectual behavior is closely related to other forms of behavioral components, such as perception, manipulation, learning and instincts. The complexity of a behavioral act is not a sufficient basis for recognizing the presence of intelligence in an animal. The main difference between intellectual activity is plasticity, which can significantly increase the chances of survival in rapidly changing environmental conditions.
The development of intelligence can be evidenced by both behavior and the structure of the brain. Intelligence tests for primates, similar to those used in widely used intelligence tests for humans, have become increasingly popular.
Intelligence is the pinnacle of animal mental development. Currently, there is evidence of the presence of the rudiments of intellectual activity in a wide number of vertebrates. Nevertheless, intelligence in the animal kingdom is a rather rare phenomenon. Some researchers determine intelligence as a property of complex self-regulating systems.
The presence of elements of intelligence in higher animals is currently beyond doubt among any scientist. At the same time, as L.V. notes. Krushinsky, it is not something out of the ordinary, but only one of the manifestations of complex forms of behavior with their innate and acquired aspects. Intellectual behavior is not only closely connected with various forms of instinctive behavior and learning, but is itself made up of individually variable components of behavior. It provides the greatest adaptive effect and promotes the survival of individuals and procreation during sudden, rapid changes in the environment. At the same time, the intelligence of even the highest animals is undoubtedly at a lower stage of development than human intelligence, therefore it would be more correct to call it elementary thinking, or the rudiments of thinking.
Thinking is the most complex form of human mental activity, the pinnacle of its evolutionary development. A very important apparatus of human thinking, which significantly complicates its structure, is speech, which allows you to encode information using abstract symbols. According to leading Russian psychologists, the following signs may be criteria for the presence of the rudiments of thinking in animals:
"emergency appearance of an answer in the absence of a ready-made solution" (Luria);
"cognitive selection objective conditions, essential for action" (Rubinstein);
"the generalized, indirect nature of the reflection of reality; the search and discovery of something essentially new"(Brushlinsky);
"presence and implementation of intermediate goals" (Leontyev).
Human thinking has a whole series synonyms, such as: “mind”, “intelligence”, “reason”, etc. The most correct is the one proposed by L.V. Krushinsky term rational activityb. It allows us to avoid identifying the thought processes of animals and humans. The most characteristic property of the rational activity of animals is their ability to grasp the simplest empirical laws connecting objects and phenomena of the environment, and the ability to operate with these laws when constructing behavior programs in new situations. According to the definition of L.V. Krushinsky, rational activity is the performance by an animal of an adaptive behavioral act in an emergency situation. This unique way of adapting an organism to its environment is possible in animals with a well-developed nervous system. The rudiments of thinking are present in a fairly wide range of vertebrate species - reptiles, birds, mammals. In the most highly developed mammals - apes - the ability to generalize allows them to acquire and use intermediary languages at the level of 2-year-old children.
In the process of analyzing animal behavior when solving logical problems, it is necessary to adhere to the Lloyd-Morgan canon "(“An action cannot in any case be interpreted as the result of the manifestation of any higher mental function if it can be explained on the basis of the presence in the animal of an ability occupying a lower level on the psychological scale.”). Term "cognitive", or "cognitive", processes are used to designate those types of animal and human behavior that are based not on a conditioned reflex response to the influence of external stimuli, but on the formation of internal (mental) ideas about events and connections between them. Numerous observations of animals in their natural habitat show that they perfectly navigate the terrain using the same methods. Each animal stores in its memory a mental plan of its habitat. Thus, experiments conducted on mice showed that rodents living in a large enclosure, which was a section of forest, knew perfectly well the location of all possible shelters, sources of food, water, etc. An owl released into this enclosure was able to catch only individual young animals. At the same time, when mice and owls were released into the enclosure at the same time for the first time, the owls caught almost all the rodents during the first night. Mice that did not have time to form a cognitive map of the area were unable to find the necessary shelters. Mental maps are of great importance in highly organized animals. Thus, according to J. Goodall (1992), the “mental map” stored in the memory of chimpanzees allows them to easily find food resources scattered over an area of 24 square meters. km within the Gombe Nature Reserve. Monkeys' spatial memory stores more than just the location of large food sources, e.g. large groups abundantly fruiting trees, but also the location of individual such trees and even single termite mounds. For at least a few weeks, they remember where important events, such as conflicts between communities, took place.
V. S. Pazhetnov’s (1991) long-term observations of brown bears in the Tver region made it possible to objectively characterize the role that the mental plan of the area plays in the organization of their behavior. It turned out that bears often use such techniques as “shorting the path” when hunting alone, bypassing the prey many hundreds of meters, etc. This is only possible if an adult bear has clear mental map area of their habitat. Latent learning in animals. According to W. Thorpe's definition, latent learning- this is “... the formation of a connection between indifferent stimuli or situations in the absence of explicit reinforcement.” Under natural conditions, latent learning is possible due to the animal's exploratory activity in a new situation. It is found not only in vertebrates. This or a similar ability for orientation on the ground is used, for example, by many insects. Thus, before flying away from the nest, a bee or wasp makes a “reconnaissance” flight over it, which allows it to record in its memory a “mental plan” of a given area of the area. The presence of such “latent knowledge” is expressed in the fact that an animal that was previously allowed to familiarize itself with the experimental setting learns faster than a control animal that did not have such an opportunity. Under extrapolation understand the animal's ability to perform known function beyond its limits. Extrapolation of the direction of movement of animals in natural conditions can be observed quite often. One of the typical examples is described by the famous American zoologist and writer E. Seton-Thompson in the story “Silver Spot”. One day, a male crow, Silver Speck, dropped a crust of bread he had caught into a stream. She was caught by the current and carried away into a brick chimney. First, the bird peered deep into the pipe for a long time, where the crust had disappeared, and then confidently flew to its opposite end and waited until the crust floated out from there. L.V. has repeatedly encountered similar situations in nature. Krushinsky. Thus, the idea of the possibility of experimental reproduction of the situation led him to observe the behavior of his hunting dog. While hunting in a field, a pointer discovered a young black grouse and began to chase it. The bird quickly disappeared into the dense bushes. The dog ran around the bushes and took a “stand” exactly opposite the place from which the black grouse, moving in a straight line, jumped out. The dog's behavior in this situation turned out to be the most appropriate - chasing a black grouse in the thicket of bushes was completely pointless. Instead, having sensed the bird's direction of movement, the dog intercepted it where it least expected it. Krushinsky commented on the dog’s behavior as follows: “it was a case that fully fit the definition of a reasonable act of behavior.” Observations of animal behavior in natural conditions led L.V. Krushinsky to the conclusion that the ability to extrapolate the direction of movement of a stimulus can be considered as one of the rather elementary manifestations of the rational activity of animals.
The differences between animals in the level of development of their rational activity are extremely large. They are especially large within the class of mammals. Such a large difference in the level of rational activity of animals is obviously determined by the ways in which the adaptation mechanisms of each branch of the phylogenetic tree of animals developed. Generalization and abstraction are important components of the thought process, thanks to which thinking acts as a “generalized and indirect reflection of reality.” These processes provide that side of animal thinking that is not associated with the urgent solution of new problems, but is based on the ability, in the process of learning and gaining experience, to isolate and record relatively stable, invariant properties of objects and their relationships. Generalization- focuses on the mental selection of the most general properties that unite a number of stimuli or events, on the transition from the individual to the general. Thanks to the operation of comparing incoming information with information stored in memory (in in this case with concepts and generalized images) animals can make adequate reactions in new situations. Abstraction reflects another property of the thought process - the independence of the formed generalization from secondary, unimportant features. THEM. Sechenov (1935) figuratively defined this operation as “removal from sensory roots, from the concrete image of an object, from the complex of immediate sensations caused by it.” The generalization operation is closely related to memory functions. Analysis cognitive abilities animals confirms the hypothesis of L.A. Orbeli on the presence of a transitional stage between the first and second signaling systems and allows us to clarify the line between the human and animal psyches. It indicates that the highest cognitive (cognitive) function of a person has biological prerequisites. Nevertheless, even in such highly organized animals as chimpanzees, the level of mastery of the simplest version of human language does not exceed the abilities of a 2-2.5 year old child. Rational activity passed long evolution in the animal ancestors of man, before giving a truly gigantic flash of human intelligence. From this position it inevitably follows that the study of the rational activity of animals as any adaptation of an organism to its habitat should be the subject of biological research.
The criterion is the encephalization coefficient (shown in parentheses next to each animal name).
This tooth-crushing scientific term is intended to approximately characterize the development of the animal’s intelligence.
The encephalization index is used to identify development trends, as well as the potential capabilities of various species.
Sheep (0.7)
In 10th place is a sheep! The animal was domesticated about 8,000 years ago in the Middle East. High intelligence The sheep does not show and it is impossible to communicate with it using sign language. A clear outsider.
Horse (0.8)
Horses have an excellent memory. Also, these animals are excellent at developing and strengthening conditioned reflexes. This is what it is based on practical use horses.
Cat (0.9)
Some researchers believe that the intelligence of cats is close to the intelligence of two-year-old children. Cats are able to adopt some behavior of their owners and adapt to it.
Squirrel (1.0)
The squirrels nestled comfortably between the cats and dogs. Thanks to their intelligence, they have learned to survive well in wild environment. Researchers have discovered that brave eared animals even dry mushrooms for the winter.
Squirrels are real gurus in the field of preserving supplies for the winter. Don't know how to preserve nuts? Share them with the squirrels. It’s not a fact that they will return it, but they will definitely keep it.
Dog (1,2)
Psychological researchers Elliston Reid and John Pillay from Wofford College in Spartanburg were able to train a border collie named Chaser to verbally perceive over 1,000 objects.
The dog can also classify the functions and shapes of objects, which is comparable to the intellectual abilities of a three-year-old child.
African elephant (1.4)
The brain of an African elephant weighs about 5 kg. This is a record. A whale has a smaller brain than an elephant! Scientists believe that elephants can experience grief, joy, and compassion; Cooperation, self-awareness, and playfulness are developed.
Research has shown that elephants are superior to humans at tracking multiple objects in space. There has already been ample evidence of elephant altruism towards other species, such as rescuing dogs.
These massive giants observe funeral rituals, honoring their dead kin.
Gorilla (1.6)
The intelligence of gorillas is an order of magnitude lower than that of chimpanzees. But gorillas have developed primitive communication, which is based on 16 sound combinations. Some gorillas have learned sign language.
Marmoset (1.8)
This animal lives in the forests of the Amazon. Marmosets are quite common and are not endangered. The ratio of brain volume to body volume in primates is one of the largest.
Chimpanzee (2.2)
Chimpanzees have learned to communicate using sign language. They are able to use words in a figurative sense, they can create new concepts by combining known words, for example: “lighter” = “bottle” + “match”.
A distinctive feature of chimpanzees is their sense of humor. These monkeys actively use tools and also recognize themselves in the mirror. In addition to using tools, chimpanzees learned to create primitive tools.
For example, they make special sticks for catching ants.
Large dolphin (5.2)
And now a surprise: it turns out that In humans, the encephalization coefficient is 7.6. People are not that far from dolphins. What can a dolphin do? Much.
The dolphin learned to correlate the image of its body with the structure of the human body using analogies. Able to understand new sequences in artificial language.
Able to generalize rules and construct abstract concepts. Parses symbols for different parts of the body. Understands pointing gestures. Recognizes himself in the mirror.
There is no doubt that there is a huge difference between the human psyche and the animal psyche. The most complex intellectual form of animal behavior is carried out in the process of effective trials, which has the character of reflecting the known complex forms of relationships between objects that the animal perceives, highlighting possible ways decisions, inhibition of side inadequate solutions and development of those behavioral programs that lead to the desired goal.
An animal can not only consume ready-made products, but can be released from the environment necessary funds, moreover, such selection of tools becomes such an independent form of activity that a monkey can spend hours, without distraction, trying to select the necessary tool (for example, break a stick from a very strong disk), so that after the tool is allocated, directly use it as a means of getting bait
Consequently, in this case, the activity of the animal is no longer at all intellectual in nature, not in the nature of simply an elementary conditioned reflex or a habitual skill retained from previous experience - it appears to be a complex orientation activity, in the process of which a certain program is highlighted, the animal obeys this program, this image of the future means which it must extract from the material at its disposal. All this creates a dominant in the animal, sometimes pushing even a specific goal out of its immediate attention, which the animal forgets for a while until it selects a means that allows it to get the bait.
Thus, at the highest stage, higher animals with the development of the cerebral cortex, with powerful zones providing the synthesis of signals from different receptor zones, with developed synthetic activity, can perform very complex shapes behavior, to program one’s behavior using complex images that arose in orientation activities.
All this may give the impression that the boundaries between animals and humans are blurring, and animals can provide such complex forms of intelligent behavior that they begin to look very similar to complex intelligent, intelligent forms of human behavior.
However, this impression, which at first glance may seem very obvious, turns out to be wrong. There are a number of fundamental differences in animal behavior from own behavior person.
The first difference is that the behavior of an animal is always carried out within a certain biological activity, within a certain biological motive.
An animal never does anything that does not serve a certain biological need, that would go beyond a certain biological meaning. Every animal activity is always ultimately either motivated by the preservation of the individual or motivated by the continuation of the species. The activity of an animal either serves the feeding instinct, that is, it does something to get food, or the instinct of self-preservation (it performs an action to save itself from danger), or the instinct of procreation. An animal cannot do anything that would go beyond the limits of biological meaning, while a person devotes 9/10 of his activity to acts that do not have a direct, and sometimes even indirect, biological meaning.
Perhaps there is only one moment at which an animal seems to go beyond this rule: its powerful development of orienting-exploratory activity. Observing the great apes, I.P. Pavlov noted their difference from lower standing animals, dogs, cats, especially from rabbits, guinea pigs. If a dog or cat has nothing to do, it falls asleep; if the monkey has nothing to do, it begins to explore, that is, touch, smell or finger the fur, sort through the leaves, and so on. All this time she is busy with what Pavlov called “disinterested indicative and research activities.” However, this sorting of objects, looking, sniffing can also be interpreted as a certain unconditional orienting-exploratory reflex. If this is so, then fingering and sniffing, which an idle monkey constantly detects, are also biological instinctive activities.
Consequently, the first difference in the behavior of an animal is that all its behavior does not go beyond the limits of instinctive biological activity and is biologically motivated.
The second difference between an animal and a person is somewhat more complicated. We say that an animal can use and even secrete tools. But now we need to make a certain correction or clarification of this fact, which at first glance brings the behavior of a monkey closer to human activity. An animal that uses and secretes tools always does this in a specific visually effective situation and never secures the allocated tool or retains the tool for future use.
It has been repeatedly shown by other studies that even after using a known tool, an animal begins to look for a new tool every time a new task is given.
We can therefore say that animals do not live in a world of permanent things that have permanent meaning. A thing acquires meaning for him only in a given specific situation, in the process of activity. One time the board can be a stand for the monkey, on which it jumps up to get a high-hanging fruit, another time it can play the role of a lever if it needs to get something; the third time - the role of a piece of wood that the monkey will break in order to chew it, and so on. A thing has no permanent meaning for her.
Therefore, we can say that if a person lives in the world of tools, then the monkey lives in the world of means for action.
The third difference is that the animal can only act within the limits of a visually perceived situation. it cannot, unlike a person, abstract from the visual situation and program its actions in accordance with an abstract principle.
If the programming of behavior in an animal is always limited to only two facts, in humans a third factor is added to these factors, which does not exist in animals. Behavior in animals is determined either by hereditarily deposited species programs, or by direct personal experience, in other words, either specific, unconditional, or conditioned reflex resulting from the individual experience of the animal. These two facts determine the behavior of the animal; they are factors in its psychological development. There is no dog yet that, having gained a certain amount of experience in solving a problem, approached another new dog and told her in her ear: “This is how you need to solve the problem.” There is no animal that can transfer its experience to another animal.
In contrast to this psychological activity human beings are characterized by the fact that a person, along with these two forms of behavior (programmed hereditarily and programmed by personal experience), has a third form of behavior, which becomes more and more dominant and begins to occupy a dominant place among us: this form is the transfer of social experience from one person to another person. All learning at school, all the assimilation of knowledge, all the assimilation of work methods is essentially the transfer of generational experience to the individual, in other words, the transfer of social experience from one person to another.
Animal intelligence is different from human intelligence and cannot be measured by conventional IQ tests. In order not to confuse the instinctive behavior of animals with rational behavior, it should be understood that instinct is an innate ability, and intelligence is an ability acquired through everyday experience.
To demonstrate intellectual abilities, an animal needs obstacles on the way to achieving a certain goal. But, if, for example, a dog receives food from its bowl every day throughout its life, then intellectual abilities will not manifest itself in this case. In an animal, intellectual actions can arise only in order to invent new way actions to achieve the goal. Moreover, this method will be individual for each individual animal. There are no universal rules in the animal world.
Although animals have intellectual abilities, they do not play in their lives leading role. They trust instincts more, and use intelligence from time to time, and it is not fixed in their life experience and is not passed on by inheritance.
Examples of intelligent animal behavior
The dog is the very first animal that man tamed. She is considered the smartest among all the pets. One day, a famous surgeon who lived in the last century found a dog with injured limb. He healed the animal and thought that the dog would stay with him as a sign of gratitude. But the animal had a different owner, and the first attachment turned out to be, and the dog left. But what was the surgeon’s surprise when, some time later, on the threshold of his house he found the same dog, who brought another dog with a broken leg to him in the hope that the doctor would help her too.
And what, if not a manifestation of intelligence, can explain the behavior of a pack of dogs that are orderly crossing the road along pedestrian crossing, while people, endowed with intelligence from birth, run across her place.
Not only dogs, but also other animals demonstrate their intelligence. Even ants are capable of deciding very complex tasks in the case when you need to remember and convey information about a rich source of food to your relatives. But their manifestation mental abilities This is limited. In other circumstances, intelligence is not involved.
Swallows have been observed to alert their chicks at the moment of hatching when a human is near the nest. The chick stops tapping the shell with its beak until it understands from the voice of its parents that the danger has passed. This example is evidence that intelligence in animals manifests itself as a result of life experience. Swallows did not learn their fear of humans from their parents; they learned to fear them in the course of their lives.
In the same way, rooks avoid a person with a gun, because... smell gunpowder. But they could not adopt this from their ancestors, because gunpowder was invented later than rooks appeared. Those. their fear is also the result of life experience.
Every owner of a cat, dog, parrot or rat has confirmation that his pet is intelligent. It is clear that animals are not smarter than people, but they have other qualities that are valuable to humans.
