USSR in the pre-war years. domestic and foreign policy

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PRE-WAR YEARS

USSR at the beginning of World War II. On September 1, 1939, Germany began the war against Poland. On September 17, Soviet troops entered its eastern regions. The secret protocol "worked". The USSR included the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, where 13 million people lived.

On September 28, immediately after the completion of military operations in Poland, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed in Moscow an agreement on friendship and borders and new secret protocols, which clarified the “spheres of interest” of the two countries (in exchange for a number of regions of Eastern Poland, Germany “ceded” to the USSR Lithuania).

Soviet-Finnish war. Success in Poland inspired Stalin to continue his work. Referring to the fact that the Soviet-Finnish border passed only 32 km from Leningrad, the USSR invited Finland to transfer to it part of the Karelian Isthmus and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. In exchange, the Finns were offered undeveloped lands in Karelia. Finland's refusal to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union mutual assistance“(according to which it was planned to create Soviet military bases on Finnish territory) was declared an act “indicating the hostility of the intentions” of the Finnish leadership. In response to this, the USSR announced the denunciation of the non-aggression treaty with Finland.

November 30, the Red Army began fighting against the Finns. However, they put up such vigorous resistance that the Soviet troops suffered huge losses and were stuck for a long time in a deeply echeloned fortification system - the “Mannerheim Line” on the Karelian Isthmus.

The start of the USSR's war against Finland was perceived in the world as an act of aggression. The Soviet Union, as an aggressor state, was expelled from the League of Nations. The provision of economic and military assistance to Finland began. It was even planned to land an expeditionary force of Western countries to fight the Red Army.

Meanwhile, in February 1940, taking into account the lessons of the first offensive, Soviet troops launched a new, more successful offensive at the front. As a result, Finland sued for peace. In March, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow. As a result, all territorial claims of the USSR to Finland were satisfied. The Finnish campaign led to serious losses in the Red Army: about 75 thousand people died, another 175 thousand were wounded or frostbite.

The war not only led to the international isolation of the USSR, but also seriously undermined the prestige of the Red Army. Hitler saw its inability to conduct effective combat operations in modern warfare. But conclusions from the war were also drawn in Moscow. K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and his place was taken by S. K. Timoshenko. Measures were taken to strengthen the country's defense.

USSR and Baltic states. Immediately after the defeat of Poland, the USSR achieved the conclusion of agreements on “mutual assistance” with the Baltic countries: Estonia (September 28), Latvia (October 5) and Lithuania (October 10). The agreements provided for the creation of Soviet naval and air bases on the territory of these countries and the deployment of significant Red Army forces on them. The presence of Soviet troops was used to change the existing system in these states.

In mid-June 1940, the Soviet government, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded the appointment of new governments in the Baltic countries, which were to include communists. Faced with the threat of the immediate establishment of complete Soviet military control over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the authorities of these countries agreed to the demands of the USSR. The formed "people's governments" soon turned to the Soviet Union with a request to join the USSR as union republics.

At the end of June 1940, the USSR also presented an ultimatum to Romania demanding the immediate transfer of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina under its control. Romania, after consultations with Germany, was forced to agree to this demand. The Moldavian SSR was formed in the new territories, which was also accepted into the Soviet Union.

As a result, in less than a year, the western borders of the USSR were pushed back by 200-600 km.

Soviet-German relations. Thus, the agreements between the USSR and Germany on the division of “spheres of influence” were implemented by the fall of 1940. Having received freedom of action in Europe, Hitler by this time had managed to conquer France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway. In the summer of 1940, on behalf of the fascist leader, a plan for war against the USSR (“Barbarossa”) was developed. However, both sides sought to delay the start of the war until they were fully ready for it to begin.

In November 1940, Molotov arrived in Berlin for negotiations with Hitler, having received instructions from Stalin to agree to continue Soviet-German cooperation provided that Bulgaria and the Black Sea Straits were included in the “sphere of interests” of the USSR. Hitler invited the Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) and promised to expand the Soviet “spheres of interest” to the south - at the expense of Persia. But no agreement was reached. In December 1940, Hitler signed the decision to implement the Barbarossa plan.

What you need to know about this topic:

Socio-economic and political development of Russia at the beginning of the 20th century. Nicholas II.

Internal policy of tsarism. Nicholas II. Increased repression. "Police Socialism"

Russo-Japanese War. Reasons, progress, results.

Revolution 1905 - 1907 Character, driving forces and features of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907. stages of the revolution. The reasons for the defeat and the significance of the revolution.

Elections to the State Duma. I State Duma. The agrarian question in the Duma. Dispersal of the Duma. II State Duma. Coup d'etat of June 3, 1907

Third June political system. Electoral law June 3, 1907 III State Duma. The alignment of political forces in the Duma. Activities of the Duma. Government terror. Decline of the labor movement in 1907-1910.

Stolypin agrarian reform.

IV State Duma. Party composition and Duma factions. Activities of the Duma.

Political crisis in Russia on the eve of the war. Labor movement in the summer of 1914. Crisis at the top.

International situation Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.

The beginning of the First World War. Origin and nature of the war. Russia's entry into the war. Attitude to the war of parties and classes.

Progress of military operations. Strategic forces and plans of the parties. Results of the war. The role of the Eastern Front in the First World War.

The Russian economy during the First World War.

Worker and peasant movement in 1915-1916. Revolutionary movement in the army and navy. The growth of anti-war sentiment. Formation of the bourgeois opposition.

Russian culture of the 19th - early 20th centuries.

The aggravation of socio-political contradictions in the country in January-February 1917. The beginning, prerequisites and nature of the revolution. Uprising in Petrograd. Formation of the Petrograd Soviet. Temporary Committee of the State Duma. Order N I. Formation of the Provisional Government. Abdication of Nicholas II. The reasons for the emergence of dual power and its essence. The February revolution in Moscow, at the front, in the provinces.

From February to October. The policy of the Provisional Government regarding war and peace, on agrarian, national, and labor issues. Relations between the Provisional Government and the Soviets. Arrival of V.I. Lenin in Petrograd.

Political parties(Cadets, Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, Bolsheviks): political programs, influence among the masses.

Crises of the Provisional Government. Attempted military coup in the country. Height revolutionary sentiments in the masses. Bolshevization of the capital's Soviets.

Preparation and conduct of an armed uprising in Petrograd.

II All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Decisions about power, peace, land. Formation of public authorities and management. Composition of the first Soviet government.

Victory of the armed uprising in Moscow. Government agreement with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Elections in Constituent Assembly, its convening and dispersal.

The first socio-economic transformations in the fields of industry, agriculture, finance, labor and women's issues. Church and State.

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, its terms and significance.

Economic tasks of the Soviet government in the spring of 1918. Aggravation of the food issue. Introduction of food dictatorship. Working food detachments. Combeds.

The revolt of the left Socialist Revolutionaries and the collapse of the two-party system in Russia.

The first Soviet Constitution.

Causes of intervention and civil war. Progress of military operations. Human and material losses during the civil war and military intervention.

Domestic policy of the Soviet leadership during the war. "War communism". GOELRO plan.

The policy of the new government regarding culture.

Foreign policy. Treaties with border countries. Russia's participation in the Genoa, Hague, Moscow and Lausanne conferences. Diplomatic recognition of the USSR by the main capitalist countries.

Domestic policy. Socio-economic and political crisis of the early 20s. Famine 1921-1922 Transition to a new economic policy. The essence of NEP. NEP in the field of agriculture, trade, industry. Financial reform. Economic recovery. Crises during the NEP period and its collapse.

Projects for the creation of the USSR. I Congress of Soviets of the USSR. The first government and the Constitution of the USSR.

Illness and death of V.I. Lenin. Intra-party struggle. The beginning of the formation of Stalin's regime.

Industrialization and collectivization. Development and implementation of the first five-year plans. Socialist competition - goal, forms, leaders.

Formation and strengthening state system economic management.

The course towards complete collectivization. Dispossession.

Results of industrialization and collectivization.

Political, national-state development in the 30s. Intra-party struggle. Political repression. Formation of the nomenklatura as a layer of managers. Stalin's regime and the USSR Constitution of 1936

Soviet culture in the 20-30s.

Foreign policy of the second half of the 20s - mid-30s.

Domestic policy. Growth of military production. Emergency measures in the field of labor legislation. Measures to solve the grain problem. Armed forces. The growth of the Red Army. Military reform. Repressions against the command cadres of the Red Army and the Red Army.

Foreign policy. Non-aggression pact and treaty of friendship and borders between the USSR and Germany. Entry of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus into the USSR. Soviet-Finnish war. Inclusion of the Baltic republics and other territories into the USSR.

Periodization of the Great Patriotic War. Initial stage war. Turning the country into a military camp. Military defeats 1941-1942 and their reasons. Major military events. Surrender of Nazi Germany. Participation of the USSR in the war with Japan.

Soviet rear during the war.

Deportation of peoples.

Guerrilla warfare.

Human and material losses during the war.

Creation anti-Hitler coalition. Declaration of the United Nations. The problem of the second front. "Big Three" conferences. Problems of post-war peace settlement and comprehensive cooperation. USSR and UN.

The beginning of the Cold War. The USSR's contribution to the creation of the "socialist camp". CMEA education.

Domestic policy of the USSR in the mid-40s - early 50s. Restoration of the national economy.

Social and political life. Policy in the field of science and culture. Continued repression. "Leningrad affair". Campaign against cosmopolitanism. "The Doctors' Case"

Socio-economic development of Soviet society in the mid-50s - the first half of the 60s.

Socio-political development: XX Congress of the CPSU and condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult. Rehabilitation of victims of repression and deportation. Internal party struggle in the second half of the 50s.

Foreign policy: creation of the Department of Internal Affairs. Entry of Soviet troops into Hungary. Exacerbation of Soviet-Chinese relations. Split of the "socialist camp". Soviet-American relations and the Cuban missile crisis. USSR and "third world" countries. Reduction in the size of the armed forces of the USSR. Moscow Treaty on the Limitation of Nuclear Tests.

USSR in the mid-60s - first half of the 80s.

Socio-economic development: economic reform 1965

Increasing difficulties in economic development. Declining rates of socio-economic growth.

Constitution of the USSR 1977

Social and political life of the USSR in the 1970s - early 1980s.

Foreign policy: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Consolidation of post-war borders in Europe. Moscow Treaty with Germany. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Soviet-American treaties of the 70s. Soviet-Chinese relations. Entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Exacerbation of international tension and the USSR. Strengthening Soviet-American confrontation in the early 80s.

USSR in 1985-1991

Domestic policy: an attempt to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country. Attempt at reform political system Soviet society. Congresses of People's Deputies. Election of the President of the USSR. Multi-party system. Exacerbation political crisis.

Exacerbation of the national question. Attempts to reform the national-state structure of the USSR. Declaration of State Sovereignty of the RSFSR. "Novoogaryovsky trial". Collapse of the USSR.

Foreign policy: Soviet-American relations and the problem of disarmament. Agreements with leading capitalist countries. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Changing relations with the countries of the socialist community. Collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Organization.

Russian Federation in 1992-2000

Domestic policy: “Shock therapy” in the economy: price liberalization, stages of privatization of commercial and industrial enterprises. Fall in production. Increased social tension. Growth and slowdown in financial inflation. Intensification of the struggle between the executive and legislative branches. Dissolution of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies. October events 1993 Abolition local authorities Soviet power. Elections to the Federal Assembly. Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993 Formation of a presidential republic. Aggravation and overcoming national conflicts in the North Caucasus.

Parliamentary elections of 1995. Presidential elections of 1996. Power and opposition. An attempt to return to the course of liberal reforms (spring 1997) and its failure. Financial crisis of August 1998: causes, economic and political consequences. "Second Chechen War". Parliamentary elections of 1999 and early presidential elections of 2000. Foreign policy: Russia in the CIS. Participation of Russian troops in “hot spots” of the neighboring countries: Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan. Relations between Russia and foreign countries. Withdrawal of Russian troops from Europe and neighboring countries. Russian-American agreements. Russia and NATO. Russia and the Council of Europe. Yugoslav crises (1999-2000) and Russia’s position.

• Danilov A.A., Kosulina L.G. History of the state and peoples of Russia. XX century.

The years of the Great Patriotic War are receding further into the past. More than sixty years have passed since the time when Nazi Germany treacherously attacked our Motherland. Much has changed in the world since then. But everything connected with the harsh wartime still attracts unflagging interest.

The Great Patriotic War was the most difficult and brutal of all the wars our country has ever experienced. However, it was not only a dramatic, but also a heroic period in the history of the Soviet people. The history of the war is full of facts of courage and dedication of millions of Soviet people who selflessly defended their Motherland. And the further we are from that alarming and heroic time, the more magnificent their exploits seem.

June 22, 1941, marked in calendars and history textbooks as the day of the beginning of Nazi Germany’s aggression against the Soviet Union, also became the beginning of a new stage in the struggle of progressive forces against fascism, the beginning of the end of the “Third Reich.”

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union is an independent and decisive stage of the Second World War, since the fate of not only our country, but also Europe and the whole world was decided on its fronts.

After the conclusion of the Munich Agreement (September 1938), the heads of government of England and France proclaimed the advent of the “Era of Peace” in Europe. The German government thought and acted differently. Taking advantage of the further connivance of the Western powers, Hitler sent troops into Prague on March 15, 1939 and finally liquidated Czechoslovakia as an independent state. But even this seemed to him not enough.

In the spring of 1939, Germany made demands on Poland to annex Danzig, which had the status of a free city, and part of Polish territory into the Reich.

Tough choice.

Hitler, without abandoning a forceful solution to the “Polish question,” also suggested that the USSR begin negotiations on concluding a non-aggression fact. Stalin faced a difficult choice. And the more difficult the negotiations were (... March, August 1939) with the Western powers, the more Stalin was inclined to conclude that it was necessary to sign a peace with Germany, which not only promised him territorial acquisitions and foreign policy advantages, but also provided the opportunity to gain time to strengthen Soviet defense, especially since Japan began large-scale military operations against the Mongolian People's Republic on the eastern borders.

In May 1939, Germany declared its readiness to regulate relations with the USSR, and on August 3, German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop invited the Soviet side to sign the corresponding Soviet-German treaty. On August 20, the USSR agreed to rapprochement with Germany on August 23, 1939 in the Moscow Kremlin V.M. Molotov. and I. Ribbentrop signed a Soviet-German non-aggression pact for a period of 10 years. It provided for the renunciation of both each other’s aggression and support from third countries in the event of an attack on one of the contracting parties. On August 31, the treaty was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Undoubtedly, at that time the agreement was beneficial to both countries. He allowed Hitler to begin capturing the first bastion in the east without unnecessary complications and at the same time convince his generals that Germany would not have to fight on several fronts at once. Stalin, having concluded an agreement with Germany, significantly moved the initial positions of a potential enemy away from the USSR, gaining time to strengthen the country's defense and a real opportunity to restore the Soviet state within the borders of the former Russian Empire. At the same time, we must not forget the fact that the Soviet-British-French negotiations actually reached a dead end due to the fault of the Western powers. Western powers tried to impose unilateral military obligations on the USSR.

Having settled matters in the West, the USSR intensified military operations in the East. In the Far East, Japan, having captured most of China, approached the Soviet borders. In the summer of 1938, a military conflict occurred on the territory of the USSR, since on July 29 of this year Japanese troops invaded Soviet territory in the area of ​​Lake Khasan. Far Eastern Front troops, commander Marshal V.K. Blucher, by August 11, 1938, they had driven back the enemy and restored the state border. In May 1939, Japanese troops invaded Mongolia. Units of the Red Army under the command of G.K. Zhukov defeated them in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River. On September 15, 1939, in Moscow, the USSR, Mongolian People's Republic and Japan signed an agreement to eliminate the conflict near the Khalkhin Gol River. Then, on April 13, 1941, a neutrality pact with Japan was signed in Moscow. The pact with Japan was signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs (who replaced M.M. Litvinov in 1940) V.M. Molotov, on the one hand, and Japanese Foreign Minister E. Matsuoka, on the other. So, the threat of escalation of the war in the Far East was eliminated.

Expansion of the USSR. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland. On September 3, France and England declared war on Germany.

The Second World War began. In a short time, the Polish army was defeated. On September 17, 1939, the Polish government fled the country. On the same day, the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border and by the end of September annexed the western lands of Ukraine and Belarus, captured by Poland in 1920, to the USSR. Poland as an independent state ceased to exist.

From September 28 to October 10, 1939, the Soviet Union concluded a mutual assistance agreement with the Baltic states. At the same time, Vilnius and the Vilnius region, liberated in September 1939, which were torn away from Lithuania by Poland in 1920, were transferred to Lithuania.

The Soviet Union offered Finland to conclude a mutual assistance agreement. Having been refused, in October 1939 he proposed to move the Soviet-Finnish border from Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus, and also to lease part of the territory at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Finland rejected this proposal as well, declaring a general mobilization in the country to protect its borders. Then the USSR government demanded that Finnish troops withdraw 20-25 km. In response, Finland proposed to withdraw Soviet troops to the same distance. This would deprive Leningrad of all cover.

After all this, on November 28, the Soviet government deconstructed the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact of 1932, and on November 30, 1939, ordered troops to go on the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. In February 1940, the Red Army broke through the powerful fortification system “Mannerheim Line” and rushed to the capital of Finland, Helsinki. After this, on March 12, 1940, in Moscow, the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty. Finland refused to participate in anti-Soviet coalitions, moved the border on the Karelian Isthmus 150 km from Leningrad, transferred a number of other territories to the Soviet Union, including islands in the Gulf of Finland, and leased the Hanki Peninsula to it for 30 years.

Part of the annexed territories was merged with the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which was transformed into the Karelian-Finnish SSR and included in the USSR as a union republic. It became the 12th subject of the Union.

The League of Nations condemned the USSR as an aggressor and expelled it from its membership in December 1939. “So much the worse for the League of Nations,” TASS and the Pravda newspaper commented on this decision, calling the League an instrument of the Anglo-French bloc “to support and incite war in Europe.”

In July 1940, the Baltic states proclaimed their republics Soviet and socialist and turned to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a request to include them in the USSR. In August 1940, the seventh session of the USSR Supreme Court granted the request. The Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian republics became part of the USSR as equal union republics.

On June 30, 1940, Bessarabia was annexed to the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, captured by Romania in 1918, which was transformed into the Moldavian SSR and incorporated into the USSR as the 16th union republic. Northern Bukhovina became part of the Ukrainian SSR.

The foreign policy activity of the USSR created conditions for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR on the northwestern, western and southwestern borders. However, by June 1941, the new borders had not yet been fortified, and the fortifications on the old borders had been destroyed.

As a result, large territories with a population of 14 million people were included in the USSR.

The country's border moved to the west in different places at a distance of 300 to 600 km.

Strengthening the country's defense capability.

After the war with Finland, the USSR began work to strengthen the country's defense capability. Extraordinary measures were taken to increase industrial production and, first of all, to increase the production of weapons. Defense budgets have increased sharply. In 1940 they amounted to 56.8 billion rubles compared to 17.5 billion in 1938. Measures against violators of labor discipline have been tightened. Instead of a 6-day workweek with one day off and a 7-hour workday, a 7-day workweek and an 8-hour workday were introduced. The unauthorized departure of workers and employees from enterprises was prohibited. Criminal liability was introduced for being late for work and absenteeism. Demand for the quality of products has increased. Was created new system vocational training for youth.

In 1939, with a general increase in industrial production in the country over the year by 16%, military output increased by 46.5%. In general, in the three and a half years before the war, the output of military products increased 4 times.

Preparing Germany for war against the USSR. Having won fairly easy victories in the West, the German leadership began to seriously prepare for a war against the Soviet Union, without the defeat of which it could not count on gaining world domination. Even before coming to power, Hitler wrote: “If we are talking today about new lands and territories in Europe, We turn our attention primarily to Russia.”

In June 1940, the German General Staff began developing a plan for an attack on the USSR, called “Directive 21” or “Barbaros Plan”, nicknamed the German Emperor Frederick I, one of the initiators of the campaigns to the East. The plan was based on the idea of ​​lightning war - blitzkrieg, which was successfully implemented in the war with Poland and in the West. It was planned to deliver massive enveloping strikes against the main groupings of the Red Army, to occupy the most important political and economic centers in the shortest possible time - Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Donbass, the Caucasus, and in 4-6 weeks to reach the Arkhangelsk-Volga line.

What goals did German imperialism pursue when preparing to start a war against the USSR?

The ultimate goal of the war was the destruction of the USSR as a state, the transformation of the occupied territories into a colonial and raw material appendage of the Reich, and the physical extermination of tens of millions of people. The entire territory up to the Urals was subject to Germanization.

Preparing the so-called “total” war, the Nazis developed plans for monstrous atrocities in the occupied territories. A special place was occupied by the Ost master plan, according to which 120-140 million Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles, and Lithuanians were to be evicted and destroyed.

A week before the attack on the USSR, on June 14, 1941, giving a farewell speech to the generals, Hitler said that in the war with the Soviet Union “we are talking about a struggle for annihilation. If we don’t look at it this way, then even though we defeat the enemy, in 30 years the communist danger will arise again... We are waging war not in order to mothball the enemy, but in order to destroy him.”

By 1941, Nazi Germany had a specific ideological doctrine on the national question. Fascist ideologies hatched plans to create puppet Muslim states in the eastern outskirts of their “empire” called “Turkestan”, “Idel-Ural”1). The German higher intelligence school "Arbeitegemein - Shaft Turkestan" prepared a draft map of the future colony of "Greater Turkestan", which included Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Tataria, Bashkiria, Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus, Crimea, Xinjiang, the Northern part of Afghanistan and Iran1). Spies of this school traveled to prisoner-of-war camps, collecting information about the economy, childbirth, religion, and literature of Turkestan.

The idea of ​​​​creating nationalist puppet states on the territory of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was nurtured at the beginning of the century by pan-Turkists and pan-Islamists. Long before the Second World War, the Pak-Turkists made plans to create a “Great Turkey”. In July

In 1941, the magazine “Bozkurt” (No. 11) published a map of the future “Great Turkey”, which included the Soviet republics of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Kazakhstan. During the Second World War, some of the white emigrants from among the pan-Turkists and pan-Islamists went over to the service of fascism. An espionage and sabotage center was created in Berlin under the guise of the “Turkestan National Committee. The founder and first president of TNK was M. Chokaev, and since 1972 Kayumkhan became the chairman. From the top of TNK, the name of the head of the military department, Baymurza Khait, should also be mentioned. These people were to become proxies of the German fascists to manage the future “Grosturkestan”2).

The leader of the Third Reich assigned an important role in the implementation of occupation policy on the territory of the USSR to the fascist German army. On March 13, 1941, the German government approved the directive “On special jurisdiction in the Barbarossa area and on special military activities.” The directive ordered the army to use “mass violent measures” against the Soviet people and absolved Wehrmacht soldiers and officers of any responsibility for crimes against the population of occupied Soviet territory. The “Memo for a German Soldier,” published for the personnel of the Nazi army, directly stated: “You have no heart and nerves; they are not needed in war. Having destroyed pity and compassion in yourself, kill every Russian, Soviet, don’t stop if in front of you is an old man or a woman, a girl or a boy, kill...”

Thus, the goals of fascism in this war were definite: the destruction of the Soviet state, turning it into a colony, and the peoples into slaves. At the same time, the capture of the USSR, according to the plan of fascism, was the most important step towards world domination.

The beginning and nature of the war.

On June 22, 1941, at dawn, without a declaration of war, treacherously violating the non-aggression treaty, Nazi troops invaded Soviet soil. Thousands of German guns suddenly opened fire on Soviet border outposts, headquarters and troop locations. German aviation carried out bombing and assault strikes on airfields, military and industrial facilities, and on the cities of the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine. Thus began the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against Nazi Germany.

On the part of the fascist states, the war was of an aggressive, aggressive nature. On the part of the Soviet Union, the war was liberation, fair, and patriotic. In this war, the Soviet people defended the honor, freedom and independence of their Motherland. “Everyone knows,” said M.I. Kalinin, “that this war is unusual. In this war, people defend their existence, their lives and freedom, defend the national honor of their people and the independence of their state, their Motherland. Therefore, the fight against the enemy is carried out not only by the army, but also by the entire people. This is, in the full sense of the word, a people’s war.”

On the very first day of the war, general mobilization of those liable for military service was announced, martial law was introduced in western regions countries. On the basis of the departments and troops of the border districts, the Northern, Northwestern, Western, Southwestern and Southern fronts were created. For the operational management of the fronts, on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command was formed, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. On August 8, 1941, it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, headed by Stalin. To manage the activities of all government departments and institutions, on June 30, 1941, the State Committee Defense (GKO) headed by I.V. Stalin. On the same day, the national economic mobilization plan for the third quarter of 1941 was approved, providing for the transfer of all industry to the production of military products.

The workers of Soviet Kazakhstan, as well as the entire country, showed high organization from the very first days of the war. Labor discipline has appeared in enterprises, transport, collective farms, MTS and state farms of the republic. Each team considered it their primary duty to work in a new, military way. The V Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of Kazakhstan, held on June 25-26, 1941, called on the workers of the republic to immediately reorganize all work in order to “subordinate everything to the main task of our Motherland - victory over the enemy”1). The party's call: “Everything for the front, everything to defeat the enemy!” was pronounced in all the languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR and was warmly supported by all the peoples of the country. Already at the end of 1941, there were 1.3 million communists in the ranks of the Armed Forces. From the Kazakh party organization during the war, 82,251 communists joined the army 2).

Formation of military units

The rapid replenishment of the country's Armed Forces and the formation of new formations became one of the main tasks of the day. The 316th Infantry Division was one of the first to be formed in Kazakhstan. Major General I.V. was appointed commander. Panfilov, a participant in the civil war who fought in the ranks of the 25th Chapaev division.

Simultaneously with the 316th division, during the first three months of the war, the 238th, 310th, 312th, 314th, 387th and 391st rifle divisions were formed on the territory of the republic. By the end of 1941, another division and three brigades were formed. In total, more than 20 rifle and cavalry divisions and brigades, several artillery and aviation regiments, and dozens of battalions of various types of troops were created in Kazakhstan 3). The working people of the republic were drafted into units and formations formed both in Kazakhstan and abroad.

Soldiers and commanders of Kazakh formations fought courageously on all sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Current page: 1 (book has 17 pages total) [available reading passage: 12 pages]

Vladimir Pobochny, Lyudmila Antonova
Pre-war years and first days of the war

© Pobochny V. I.,

© Antonova L. A., 2015

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From the authors

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By the mid-30s, Germany, with the help of the monopolies of the USA, England and France, significantly strengthened the military and economic potential of its country. Japan and Italy are achieving the same success. In the context of a military upsurge, these countries create a triple alliance - Germany, Japan and Italy. According to the leader of the Italian fascists B. Mussolini, this union is being created in order to “remake the map of the world” (History of Diplomacy. M., 1965, vol. 3). In conditions of permissiveness, the Triple Alliance has a desire to open a “green light” in fomenting hotbeds of war. One of them appeared in 1931 in the Far East. Japan militarily invades Northeast China (Manchuria). In 1938, the Japanese launched an armed attack on Soviet territory in the lake area. Khasan near Vladivostok. The attack is repulsed with great damage to the Japanese troops. Despite this tragedy, the ruling circles of Japan do not draw any lessons from it, but, on the contrary, set themselves the task of increasing military power and, through it, expanding their “living space.”

The history of the 20th century teaches that German, Japanese, Italian aggression directed against the USSR and other countries might not have happened if Western countries, including the United States, did not show encouragement and hypocrisy towards the actions of fascism, did not allow falsehood, that is, they would not pursue a policy of double standards. Life claims that individual European countries made negative calculations to push the Soviet Union against the Triple Alliance and spark a big war with it. However, as shown real life, German, Italian, Japanese rulers were going to seize not only Europe, but the entire world space. For example, Japan was preparing to seize the Far East, Sakhalin, and Siberia; England was plotting to seize the entire Pacific basin.

The first volume of the chronicle of Victory, “The Pre-War Years and the First Days of the War,” covers life in the pre-war period and the difficult events of the initial period of the war. To the number strengths This publication should include the validity and argumentation (for example, the diplomatic struggle on the eve of the war), its historical and literary character.

In contrast to these military-historical facts, in the United States post-war period A lot of literature has appeared, written mainly by a group of Nazi generals on behalf of the US Department of Defense. The chief historian of the European Theater of Operations, S. L. A. Marshall, frankly admits the purpose of its publication in his preface: “...We Americans must learn from the unsuccessful experiences of others...”.

Your stories German generals lead in the form of memories of participants in the military events they describe. Enthusiasm Hitler's generals their memories of the past war are not explained by the fact that these memories are pleasant to them. Of course not. They are not very pleased to write about how and why they lost individual battles, operations and the war as a whole. Two circumstances, however, force German generals to recall events many years ago. Firstly, the Nazi army not only lost the war, but also lost its national memory - the archives that ended up in the hands of the victors. Secondly - and this is perhaps the most important thing - the former Nazi generals curried favor with the instigators of the new aggression - the bosses of the North Atlantic bloc, and therefore he had to make excuses for the defeats in the last war. The German generals who survived that bloody war looked for, or even simply invented, plausible reasons for the catastrophe that befell Nazi Germany in the Second World War, to shift the blame for the deaths of many millions of people and incalculable destruction onto someone else.

At the same time, they talk about the failure of fascist aggression and try to warn revanchists and applicants for world domination from repeating the miscalculations of Hitler’s high command.

In foreign military historical literature, attention should be paid to one very remarkable fact. Most army, navy and air force officers are convinced that they are preparing for the invasion of England and that as soon as there are a few fine days the operation will begin. The days for the start of the invasion were repeatedly set, but each time the dates were changed, and the day of the landing was postponed, allegedly due to bad weather. Reichsmarschall Goering constantly demanded to intensify raids on the vital centers of Great Britain. In February 1941, he rushed with a large retinue to Paris and created a scandal with Kesselring and Sperrle for the poor effectiveness of air operations against England, which allegedly delayed Operation Sea Lion.

Army officers remained in this misconception for a long time. It was not until March 1941 that some senior officers became aware of the possibility of a clash between Germany and Russia, which was to signal the final abandonment of the Battle of Britain.

In reality, the Imperial Chancellery abandoned Operation Sea Lion a long time ago. After the occupation of France, Hitler had other thoughts; his military advisers Keitel, Jodl, Brauchitsch and Halder were busy with other things. Their eyes were turned to the East.

Massive air raids on England, especially on London (it is known that 65 raids were carried out on London, sometimes involving up to 800 aircraft), were undertaken with the aim of political pressure on England in order to force the British government to abandon the war with Germany. In addition, they served as camouflage for preparations for war against the Soviet Union.

As documents show, in the summer and autumn of 1940, the German General Staff was not busy preparing Operation Sea Lion, but developing a plan for war against the USSR. Already in July 1940, he began to carefully study the Eastern theater of military operations, summarizing information about the grouping and armament of Soviet troops, and the state of the western borders of the Soviet Union. On July 31, 1940, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Halder, made the following preliminary conclusion in his diary: “If Russia is defeated, England will lose its last hope. Then Germany will dominate Europe and the Balkans. Based on this reasoning, Russia must be liquidated. Deadline: spring 1941. The sooner we defeat Russia, the better. The operation will only make sense if we defeat this state with one swift blow.”

The central task, which Hitler's strategists were preparing to solve with a swift blow, was to defeat the Soviet Union before England increased its armed forces. Based on this strategic concept, in the summer and autumn of 1940, preparations of the Nazi army for war against the Soviet Union were launched on a large scale: the number of infantry and tank divisions sharply increased, the production of military equipment and ammunition increased, officer cadres were hastily trained, human and material resources were created. reserves.

Western military historians devote a lot of space to the description of military events in the central - Moscow - direction in the summer months of 1941. These pages are of undoubted interest. They were written using entries from the personal diaries of German generals. But they are not limited to memories. Fascist generals assess events and make political and strategic generalizations. For example, Blumentritt wrote in his article: “...From a political point of view, the most important fatal decision was the decision to attack this country...”.

There are no words, the right conclusion. But one cannot agree with Blumentritt when he places all the blame on Hitler alone, shielding and justifying the German General Staff, the top generals and, above all, Rundstedt, Brauchitsch and Halder.

In West German literature on the history of the Second World War, this is a fairly common technique: to shift all the blame for the defeats of the Nazi army onto Hitler, and to attribute all successes to the generals and the general staff. Some German generals adhere to the advice of the German historian F. Ernst: “Respectful admiration and love for the fatherland command us not to destroy the prestige of some names with which we are accustomed to associate the victories of our army.”

The true purpose of this simple technique is clear. The rehabilitation of the generals of the fascist German army is now needed both for the fascist heirs and for the North Atlantic bloc as a whole. The experience of fighting in Nazi Germany is necessary for the Nazi youths in order to use it in a future war.

In their publications, Hitler’s generals claim that the chief of staff of the Supreme Command ground forces Wehrmacht Colonel General Franz Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia. However, it is enough to familiarize yourself with Halder’s statements to be convinced of the opposite. It was Halder who was one of the initiators of preparations for war against the USSR. He put forward this idea immediately after the occupation of France. In his diary there is an entry dated July 22, 1940: “The Russian problem must be solved by an offensive. A plan should be thought through upcoming surgery" In Halder's subsequent entries, this idea is developed more persistently and confidently with the repeatedly repeated conclusion: “Russia should be defeated as quickly as possible.” And when all the calculations of the plan were already ready and tested at the headquarters games, Halder made the following entry in his diary: “Start in full swing preparation in accordance with the basics of our proposed plan. The estimated start date for the operation is the end of May.”

These are the facts. It is obvious that the German General Staff is fully involved in making fatal decisions and bears full responsibility for the preparation and outbreak of the war, for the grave consequences that it brought.

There were several strategic plans war with the Soviet Union. Hitler believed that first of all it was necessary to achieve economic goals: to capture Ukraine, the Donetsk basin, the North Caucasus and thus obtain bread, coal and oil. Brauchitsch and Halder put the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces at the forefront, hoping that after this it would be easy to achieve political and economic goals.

Rundstedt argued that it was impossible to win the war with one campaign of several months. The war could drag on for a long time, he said, and therefore in 1941 all efforts should be concentrated on one - the northern - direction, to capture Leningrad and its region. The troops of Army Groups "South" and "Center" must reach the line Odessa - Kyiv - Orsha - Lake Ilmen.

Kluge had a different opinion. He believed that the center of application of all forces should be Moscow, “the head and heart of the Soviet system,” since only with its fall would the main political and strategic goals of the war be achieved.

The fascist German generals do not remain silent about the disagreements that arose at the end of July - beginning of August 1941 on the issue of further actions on the Soviet-German front. But they do not provide correct interpretations of the reasons for these disagreements. They do not explain why, after capturing Smolensk, the Nazi command was forced to solve the problem: where to advance next? To Moscow? Or turn a significant part of the forces from the Moscow direction to the south and achieve decisive successes in the Kyiv area?

The growing resistance of the Soviet troops in front of Moscow inclined Hitler to the second path, which, in his opinion, allowed, in his opinion, without stopping the offensive in other directions, to quickly capture the Donetsk basin and the rich agricultural regions of Ukraine.

This idea was reflected in successive directives from the high command. Already on July 23, 1941, Keitel gave Brauchitsch the order: “Concentrate the efforts of the 1st and 2nd tank groups to capture the industrial region of Kharkov, and then advance through the Don to the Caucasus. The main infantry forces should first occupy Ukraine, Crimea and the central regions of Russia to the Don.”

If Keitel still set offensive tasks for the central group of German troops and talked about the capture of Moscow, then Hitler's Directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941 proposed a more radical solution. “The recently changed situation,” the directive says, “the appearance of large enemy forces in front and on the flanks of Army Group Center, the supply situation and the need to provide the 2nd and 3rd Tank Groups with ten days for rest and recruitment forced abandon the tasks and goals specified in Directive No. 33 of 19.7 and in its supplement of 23.7. Based on this, I order... Army Group Center, using favorable terrain, to go on the defensive. The offensive can have limited objectives."

Brauchitsch and Halder were naturally unhappy with this decision. They tried to object to Hitler and in a special report they argued to him that it was necessary to concentrate the main efforts on the central direction and strive for the fastest possible capture of Moscow. Hitler’s response came immediately: “The considerations of the ground forces command regarding the further course of operations in the east on August 18 do not agree with my decisions. I order the following: the main task before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, industrial and coal areas on the Don and depriving the Russians of the opportunity to receive oil from the Caucasus; in the north - the encirclement of Leningrad and the connection with the Finns."

Hitler explained to Brauchitsch that the capture of Crimea was of enormous importance for ensuring oil supplies from Romania, and that only after achieving this goal, as well as the encirclement of Leningrad and joining the Finnish troops, would sufficient forces be freed up and the preconditions would be created for a new offensive on Moscow.

American and Western historians are trying to explain the long pause in the offensive of Nazi troops in the Moscow direction by protracted disputes in the German high command. They see in this almost the only reason for the stop and then the failure of the German offensive on Moscow, keeping silent about the fact that after Smolensk the German offensive stopped not of their own free will, not because of disputes about the highest strategy, but as a result of increasingly growing resistance from Soviet troops.

In the end, Hitler, having failed to achieve the goals set for the troops either on the southern or northern wing of the Soviet-German front, was forced to again organize an attack on Moscow, which began on September 30 in the Bryansk Front (room 41).

...70 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, but many European countries under US pressure, and the United States of America itself, still remain the authors of inciting new armed conflicts. In the “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” dated June 6, 2014, for example, it is noted: “The USA is a den of fascism of the 21st century, it is a locust that attacks countries, unleashes civil wars and devastates them, enslaves and destroys peoples. And they commit all these crimes under peaceful slogans about American-style democracy. The United States has one goal - world domination. At the same time, it is high time for everyone to understand that the UN is a pocket organization of the United States. Therefore, America is allowed to create everything in the world, but Russia is allowed to do nothing.”

Such a cynical attitude towards freedom-loving peoples indicates that the hydra of fascism is crawling today in many countries of the Middle East - Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt. On February 22, 2014, the junta, with the direct support of the United States and European Union countries, removed the legitimate President of Ukraine V.V. Yanukovych and ignited a civil war in the South-East of the country, which led Donbass to a humanitarian catastrophe. On this land, the Nazis use phosphorus and cluster bombs, chemical weapons, and heavy artillery, prohibited by world convention, as a result of which residential buildings, kindergartens, schools, hospitals and other civilian objects were destroyed. Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed. A huge number of people were seriously injured. More than a million people are forced to leave their native land, and those who could not get out of this hell continue to live in inhumane conditions under constant mortar fire.

To hide its bloody atrocities, the fascist regime in Ukraine is trying in every possible way to evade responsibility by joining NATO, which will turn this country into an outpost of the West for a permanent source of instability on the southern borders of Russia and create a serious threat to the national interests and security of the Russian state.

Despite such an alarming situation, in the Russian press one can often find statements such as “the time has come to level the guilty and the innocent, the fooled and the puppet masters” and even “the victims and the executioners...”. The reason for such actions is explained, first of all, by the fact that our country has a very weak state ideology. The word “patriotism” is often combined with other concepts; sometimes it is perceived as an attribute of an innocent joke.

The lack of spiritual and patriotic literature and low-quality television programs cause considerable harm to society and especially the younger generation. “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” dated May 14, 2013 notes: “The zeal of television broadcasting has overcome all common sense. If you sit in front of the screen on Victory Day, you may get the impression that the Great Patriotic War was a great adventure.”

In schools, too little time is devoted to lessons on the history of the Great Patriotic War. Hence the disastrous result. For example, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” dated December 24, 2012 provides data that 13% of Russian graduates have bad marks in history. The matriculation certificate threshold for the Unified State Examination in history is shamefully low: 29 points out of 100! If we compare it with a more understandable five-point rating scale, then this is almost a “two”!

Historical facts indicate that the lessons of war are not only a mirror of the past. The history of the Great Patriotic War is one of the few values ​​that cements our very shaky society. Having deeply known it, you need to learn to draw the right conclusions in order to avoid the mistakes of the past.

The new generation must remember that their ancestors defeated a terrible and insidious enemy, they are the heirs of the Great Victory and they are entrusted with great responsibility for preserving peace.

Remember!
...Through the centuries,
in a year, -
remember!
About those
who won't come anymore
never, -
remember!

Don't cry!
In the throat
hold back your moans
bitter moans.
In memory
fallen
be worthy!
Eternally worthy!

Bread and song
Dreams and poems
life
spacious,
every second
with every breath
be
worthy!

People!
As long as hearts
knocking -
remember!
Which
at the cost
happiness is won -
Please,
remember!..

Robert Rozhdestvensky

Excerpt from the requiem (Eternal glory to the heroes...)

The USSR and its foreign policy strategy

A concrete manifestation of the foreign policy line in the 1920s is the conclusion by the Soviet Union of trade and economic agreements with Germany, England, Sweden, Italy and a number of other countries; USSR participation in various international conferences(Genoa Conference of 1922, Moscow Conference on Arms Reduction of 1922, etc.); establishment of diplomatic relations with the main world powers in 1924-25; joint discussion with them of disarmament problems.

From personal intelligence reports, I.V. Stalin learned about a possible war with Germany in 1928. In this regard, in January-February 1928, he traveled to Siberia to not only resolve the issue related to grain procurements, but most importantly, to assess the situation on the spot in case of war. The country needs to be transformed from an agricultural to an industrial one, to ensure its economic independence and strengthen its defense capability. Modernization of the economy is becoming an urgent need, the main condition of which is the technical improvement (re-equipment) of the entire national economy.

The country's second coal and metallurgical base is being created in the Urals and Western Siberia (in areas beyond the reach of potential enemy aircraft). New metallurgical plants (the basis of military production) that emerged in these areas formed the “Ural-Kuznetsk Combine” and use iron ores from the Urals and coking coal from Kuzbass. The Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works is expanding and modernizing. Aluminum and nickel production is emerging in the country. In addition to the Urals, a powerful copper industry is developing in Kazakhstan, and lead production, in addition, in Altai and Central Asia, zinc plants in the Donbass and Kuzbass.

In the 20s and 30s of the 20th century, a radical reconstruction was carried out in the USSR railway transport. About 12.5 thousand new railway lines were built, which provided more reliable and shorter transport links to Donbass, the central and northwestern regions of the country, and additionally connected the Center, the Urals, Kuzbass, and Central Kazakhstan. Of particular importance is the construction of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway in order to provide a direct route from Siberia to Central Asia. Much work is being done to reconstruct inland waterways. In 1933, the White Sea-Baltic Canal was put into operation, built in record time - in just 20 months. Construction of the Moscow-Volga canal began.

Already in these years, the main regions of the country were connected by airlines.

At the same time, the facilities of industrial giants came into operation: the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant, construction of the first building of the Ural Carriage Works began. Coke, refractory, plastics, cement-slate and other plants were built.

The enormous industrial construction of the 20s and 30s, carried out through the strict centralization of all the country's resources, allowed the USSR to achieve economic independence. The country ranks second in the world in terms of industrial production.

During these same years, the fuel and energy base was developing at an accelerated pace in the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia. Great value has the creation of a “second Baku” - a new oil-producing region between the Volga and the Urals. Although the Donbass remained the main coal mining region, coal production in the Kuzbass and Karaganda basin is growing rapidly, and the development of the Pechora basin, the richest gas resources of the Volga region, is beginning. Based on the GOELRO plans and pre-war five-year plans, a whole system of “district” thermal and hydroelectric power plants is being built (room 90).

Grand opening of the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (1932)

1929 Scout William (Wili) Lehman - agent Breitenbach - among other things, sends a message to Moscow about the first tests of long-range combat missiles invented by one of the future fathers of the atomic bomb, and at that time a young engineer Wernher von Braun.

Wernher von Braun with German officers

January 26, 1934 A Polish-German agreement is concluded in Berlin for 10 years.

The French researcher of the Second World War A. Michel (in 1980) makes a significant clarification: “Large property owners and industrialists provided support to Hitler, thanks to which he was able to seize and maintain power. The Nazis took full advantage of the tendencies of the ruling circles: their social and religious conservatism, fear and hatred of socialism and even liberalism, pan-German chauvinism” (page 82).

July 1936. A rebellion organized by the Spanish reaction breaks out. The fascist regimes of Germany and Italy immediately provide support to the reactionaries. Italy throws a 150,000-strong corps against the legitimate republican government, Germany sends troops of 50,000 people, as well as the best air forces. The Soviet Union provides significant assistance to Republican Spain. At the same time, England, France and the USA are direct accomplices of the interventionists.

The population of Albacete welcomes the fighters of the international brigades. Spain.

September 1936. Hitler begins to rebuild the economy to produce military equipment and weapons. The memorandum he compiled outlined the program for Germany's economic preparation for war.

“We are experiencing overpopulation and cannot feed ourselves relying only on our territory.” - this document says. The memorandum ends with the words:

“In four years, the German economy should be ready for war” (page 79) 1
k – the title of the book in accordance with its list; c – book page.

Alliance between militarism and fascism. President P. Hindenburg, Reich Chancellor A. Hitler, G. Goering

November 25, 1936 . The leaders of the fascist states make it clear to public opinion that their military preparations and aggressive actions are directed not against capitalist countries and their possessions, but against the Soviet Union and the Comintern, that they are strengthening their rear for war with the USSR.

Japanese Ambassador to Nazi Germany Viscount Kintomo Musakoji and Nazi German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop sign the Anti-Comintern Pact

1937 . Secret documents indicate that before the start of the “purges,” Landau created a powerful physics and theory department at the Kharkov Institute. Physicists Vladimir Spinel, Viktor Maslov, Friedrich Lange and a German anti-fascist scientist who fled to the USSR are working for the first time in the world on an atomic bomb at the Kharkov Physics and Technology Institute. They are ahead of all their colleagues: they figure out how to start a chain reaction - cover a uranium charge with ordinary explosives, the pressure from its explosion, and begin the process. This development is not being implemented due to negative expert assessments. Lev Landau later admits the mistake.

Lev Davidovich Landau

At the same time, during the “cleansing” of the Kharkov Physics and Technology Institute, Fritz Houtermans and Alexander Weisberg, two more anti-fascist physicists who fled from the Nazis, were expelled from the USSR to Germany by the decision of a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR as “undesirable foreigners” and handed over to the Gestapo. Both of them work closely with Friedrich Lange's group and know about the first Soviet atomic bomb literally everything. According to Feigin, they did not even need drawings to reproduce the bomb in Germany. After interrogations and stay in a concentration camp, valuable scientists are brought to work.

In many studies by Russian and foreign historians, the myth has taken root that the attack was sudden for the USSR, that Stalin “missed” this strategic moment due to a lack reliable information from intelligence. But is this true? Did the Soviet leadership really lack information about the Wehrmacht’s preparations for war and the date of the invasion of Hitler’s troops? The answers to these and other questions indicate the following historical facts.

February 10, 1937 . It is known about a possible German attack on the USSR that the first version of the aggression plan, bearing the “modest” name “Eastern Campaign,” was developed in Germany. Information about this is reported to Stalin (room 9).

Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin

1937 The “four-year plan” proclaimed by the Hitler government makes it possible to increase the production of military equipment. If in 1934 840 aircraft were built in Germany, then in 1936 their production reached 2530. In general, military production increases tenfold (room 79).

On September 1, 1939, the military forces of Nazi Germany invaded Poland, thereby marking the beginning of the Second World War. Two weeks later, the army of the Soviet Union entered its eastern regions with the goal of regaining the lands of western Ukraine and Belarus.

The secret annex to the non-aggression pact earned the parties actively using their rights that were enshrined in it. After a fleeting military operation in Poland, already at the end of September 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed new agreement about state friendship and borders.

In the secret protocols to this agreement, the USSR and Germany fixed the boundaries of the territories of influence. The governments of the two countries agreed to an “exchange” - Eastern Poland became completely owned by Germany, and Russia received Lithuania instead.

The war between the USSR and Finland

The success that the Soviet army received in Poland inspired I.V. Stalin to new operations that contributed to the expansion of state territory. The Soviet government invited Finland to sign a mutual assistance agreement, the essence of which was the placement of Soviet military bases on Finnish lands.

The Finns responded to Stalin with a decisive refusal, which was predictable for the leader. The Bolsheviks received a reason to start a war with Finland. On November 30, 1939, the Red Army began military operations against Finland. The confrontation did not proceed as quickly and easily as in Poland: the Union suffered enormous human losses.

By February 1940, during the second stage of the offensive, the Red Army managed to defeat the Finns. In exchange for peace, the Soviet Union annexed to its territory the former Finnish lands, part of Karelia and the islands of the Gulf of Finland. The war against Finland was a huge blow to the international image of the country. For its aggression, the Union was expelled from the League of Nations.

Baltic states, Romania and USSR

Between October and November 1939, the Soviet government achieved the opportunity to place its military bases in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. At the same time, the USSR gained the opportunity to directly intervene in the internal politics of the Baltic states.

Already in July 1940, Stalin put forward an ultimatum to these countries: if the current government in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is not replaced by communists in the near future, the USSR will begin hostilities with them.

The Baltic states not only agreed to communist rule, but also turned to Stalin with a request to join the Soviet Union as union republics. This choice is explained by the fact that the Baltic states had neither a professional army nor military base to protect your independence.

At the same time, the USSR also made territorial claims to Romania. Under pressure from the German fascists, the Romanian government was forced to give Northern Bukovna and Bessarabia to the Soviet state. The result of such a violent foreign policy was a significant expansion of the state territory of the USSR.

I also took tests at Moscow State University (law faculty), MTUCI, Moscow Higher Technical School named after. Bauman

FINANCIAL ACADEMY
UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Department of History

Morozov P.N.

First year student

VU groups 1-2

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR IN THE PRE-WAR YEARS

(30s - 40s)

Scientific supervisor

Anokhina S.I., associate professor

Department of History, Candidate of Historical Sciences.

Moscow. 1996

1.International situation on the eve of the Second World War.

2. Participation of the USSR in international events preceding the Second World War.

2.1.The USSR’s struggle to prevent war. Development of relations with leading capitalist countries.

2.1.1. The struggle to prevent war 1933 - 1939

2.1.2. Negotiations and development of relations with the USA, England, France and Germany 1939 - 1941.

2.1.3. Relations with the Baltic states. The entry of the Baltic states into the USSR.

2.2.USSR policy in relations with “small countries”.

2.2.1.Repelling the aggression of Japanese militarists.

2.2.2.War with Finland.

3.Assessment of the foreign policy of the USSR 30 - 40.

4.List of sources and literature used.

1. International situation on the eve of the Second World War.

The development of the Soviet Union in the pre-war years took place in a difficult international situation. The presence of hotbeds of tension in Europe and the Far East, the secret preparation of the countries of the capitalist world for the Second World War, and the rise to power in Germany of a fascist party clearly indicated that the international situation was actively and rapidly approaching a military conflict.

During the period between the end of the First and the beginning of the Second World War, qualitative changes occurred in the balance of power in the world community: the emergence of the first socialist state, the aggravation of contradictions between the world's metropolises and colonies, the restoration and new rapid economic rise of those defeated in the First World War and dissatisfied with their position in the world. state - Germany. The consequence of these changes in the international arena was a change in the nature of the approaching conflict. From the dispute between the imperialist powers over the redivision of the world, which, according to V.I. Lenin, there was the First World War, the approaching war was supposed to turn into an arena of opposition and clashing interests of both the imperialist states among themselves, and the entire bloc with a state of a different socio-economic formation - the Soviet Union. It was this circumstance, in our opinion, that determined the policies of the leading capitalist states and the USSR on the eve of the Second World War.

2. Participation of the USSR in international events preceding the Second World War.

2.1 The struggle of the Soviet Union to prevent war. Development of relations with capitalist states on the eve of the conflict.

Let us now see how events developed in international politics on the eve of the Second World War.

We can begin counting down events from 1933, as the date of the Nazi National Socialist Party, led by A. Hitler, coming to power in Germany, who already in 1934 concentrated in his hands all the power in the country, combining at the same time the posts of Chancellor and Fuhrer. The fascists established a dictatorship in the country, a regime of reaction, annulled the Versailles Peace Treaty, which did not suit this rapidly developing imperialist power, and began active preparations for a war to redistribute the world.

During the same period (the 1930s), there was a significant intensification of Italian foreign policy, in which fascism had been the dominant ideology since 1922, and its influence on the balance of power in the world community increased.

One of the first aggressive acts committed by these states was the seizure in 1935-36. Ethiopia and the establishment of a fascist regime there.

In 1936-37, Germany, Japan and Italy concluded the “Anti-Comintern Pact”, which marked the beginning of the formation of new military blocs, further progress towards military conflict, and also testified to the manifestations of fascism aggression against the USSR.

Thus, in the Center of Europe there was the most dangerous outbreak future war.

At this time, political circles in England, the USA, and France pursued a policy of encouraging Germany, trying to direct its aggression against the Soviet Union. This policy was carried out both on the world stage and within the states themselves. For example, in almost all countries a campaign was waged against the USSR, the idea of ​​a “growing Soviet danger” and the idea of ​​“Russian military preparations” were actively promoted. In foreign policy, British and French leaders, as evidenced by documents, solved the problem of how to ward off the threat of German aggression and defuse the energy of Nazism and expansion to the East.

In this situation, the USSR comes up with proposals to ensure peace and collective security. In response to the policies of capitalist states, our country is taking the following steps:

1933 - establishment of diplomatic relations with the USA.

1934 - The USSR joins the League of Nations, where it makes its proposals regarding the creation of a system of collective security and resistance to conquerors, which, however, do not find support. At the beginning of 1934, the Soviet Union came up with a convention on the definition of the attacking party (aggressor), which emphasized that aggression is an invasion of the territory of another country with or without a declaration of war, as well as bombing the territory of other countries, attacks on ships, blockade coasts or ports. The governments of the leading powers reacted coldly to Soviet project. However, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and later Finland signed this document in the USSR.

1935 - France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union sign a mutual assistance pact. This pact could have played a significant role in preventing Hitler's aggression, but at the insistence of France a clause was included in this treaty. Its essence was that military assistance to Czechoslovakia from the USSR could be provided only if France also provided it. Soon it was this reservation and the indecisiveness of the then Czechoslovak government that facilitated aggression on the part of Germany.

Events began to take on particular urgency in 1938, when Germany occupied Austria and included it in the Third Reich, intervened in the civil war in Spain, where it helped establish a fascist dictatorship, demanded that Czechoslovakia transfer the Sudetenland and annexed it after the approval of this action by the Munich Conference heads of government consisting of England, France, Germany, Italy, who made a decision on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, at which the USSR and Czechoslovakia were not present. This “Munich agreement” encouraged the aggressor and pushed him to further intensify his actions; under its terms, about 20% of its territory was torn away from Czechoslovakia, where a quarter of the country’s population lived and about half of the heavy industry capacity was located.

The leaders of capitalist states, continuing to support fascist aggression, signed a number of non-aggression treaties with Germany (1938 - England and France).

Having untied his hands in this way, Hitler continued his aggression: in March 1939 he completely captured Czechoslovakia and seized the port of Klaipeda from Lithuania in favor of Germany. In April 1939, Italy captured Albania.

The USSR, continuing its peaceful policy, did not recognize the occupation of Czechoslovakia and offered it military assistance, which the government of this country refused. France did not fulfill its obligations under military assistance agreements with this country and did not provide support to it.

Thus, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 1930 (until 1939) can be considered an example of the desire to prevent war and curb the aggressor. Our country was the most implacable and consistent opponent of fascism, exposed it, identified it with war.

However, by the summer of 1939 the situation had changed, and the result of this change was subsequently the signing of the treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939 and secret protocols to them, under the terms of which the USSR became almost a partner of Germany. What caused this turn of events? In our opinion, there were several such reasons.

First of all, it should be noted that the very situation that had developed on the world stage by the spring of 1939 objectively contributed to the fact that the Soviet Union could not continue its activities alone, and it had to take care of its security, since by the spring of 1939 The Second World War in its localized phase was already a reality. In the current military-political situation, the USSR had three alternatives: reach a military agreement with France and England; to be left alone; conclude an agreement with Germany. The most beneficial seemed to be the Anglo-French-Soviet agreement on mutual assistance, directed against Nazi Germany. It would lead to the creation of a unified anti-fascist coalition, would effectively serve to deter fascist aggressors and, perhaps, would prevent the outbreak of a world war.

In the summer of 1939, on the initiative of the Soviet side, negotiations began between the USSR - England - France on concluding a mutual assistance pact and creating an anti-German coalition. At these negotiations, the Soviet Union made radical proposals to resolve the issue of collective security, but for Western states that continued the policies developed at the Munich meeting, these proposals turned out to be unacceptable. By August 20, negotiations had reached a dead end and effectively failed. At the request of the British and French, a break was announced for an indefinite period, although both Moscow and London knew that aggression against Poland was scheduled for the end of August. The USSR failed to reach an agreement with the Western powers. Both sides are to blame for this. But the guilt of the Western powers, especially England, is much greater than that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet side did not have enough restraint, it showed haste, overestimated the degree of hostility of the Western powers towards the USSR and the possibility of their collusion with Nazi Germany. The Western powers did not have a sincere desire to move closer to the USSR, which can be explained, apparently, by various reasons, including fears of possible betrayal, and the inhumane internal policy of the Stalinist leadership, which contradicts his assurances on the world stage, and an underestimation of his strength as a possible ally in the fight against the fascist bloc, and deep hostility towards a country of a different socio-economic formation. The Western powers conducted negotiations with the USSR primarily in order to put pressure on Germany, to force it to make concessions to them; they tried to impose their own conditions on the Soviet Union and neglected its interests. “The blame for the failure to create a broad alliance of England, France and the USSR, capable of containing German ambitions,” admits the English researchers R. Hight, D. Maurice and A. Peters, “should be placed directly on the Western allies. It is precisely those methods "with which they resolved the major international crises of the 1930s, gradually undermined faith in the cause of collective security... French and British leaders consistently preferred to pacify Berlin, Rome and Tokyo rather than attempt to use Soviet power to protect international stability."

Thus, by the beginning of the autumn of 1939, the Soviet Union failed to solve the problem of reaching a military agreement with England and France. It would be appropriate to emphasize the following here. At this time, England and France had already formalized their non-aggression agreements with Germany and, thus, were objectively in an advantageous position over the USSR.

However, despite the failure, the beginning of Anglo-French-Soviet contacts caused alarm among the leadership of Nazi Germany. It realized that an agreement on mutual assistance between the three great powers could pose a serious obstacle to Hitler's expansionist plans, and began to make persistent efforts to prevent such an agreement.

Since May 1939, employees of the German Foreign Ministry, following the instructions of Ribbentrop, repeatedly came into contact with representatives of the USSR in Berlin, various unofficial and official means made it clear that Germany was ready to move closer to the USSR. Until mid-August 1939, while there was hope for concluding an agreement with England and France, the Soviet government left the German side’s probing unanswered, but at the same time closely monitored its actions. For a long time, a major role in countering the German “courtship of Moscow” was played by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, who believed that no concessions could be made to Nazi Germany. However, in May 1939 he was removed from his post, where he was replaced by V.M. Molotov. Such a replacement could not go unnoticed and, probably, it indicated some changes in the orientation of the Soviet leadership. Therefore, the second reason that the union of the USSR and Germany became possible, in our opinion, must be the personal ambitions and expansionist plans nurtured by the Stalinist government. It seems to us that the similarity between these aspirations and Hitler’s plans for the conquest of the world largely contributed to the signing of the illegal secret protocols of 1939.

In continuation of German attempts at rapprochement with Moscow, in early July, the Soviet embassy in Berlin received an anonymous letter proposing the idea of ​​​​rehabilitating the 1926 neutrality treaty or concluding a non-aggression and borders treaty. The German side, the letter said, proceeded from the assumption that both governments had a natural desire to restore their 1914 borders. At the beginning of August 1939, in a conversation with the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin Astakhov, Ribbentrop had already officially stated that the USSR and Germany could agree on all problems related to the territory from the Black Sea to the Baltic. The Soviet side left these attempts at rapprochement unanswered. Apparently, Stalin first wanted to clarify what results could be obtained from the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations.

It should be noted that the Germans had a backup plan in case the Soviet leadership refused to accept Germany's proposals. At secret negotiations in mid-August, London and Berlin agreed on the trip of the second-ranking figure of the “Third Reich” Goering to the British Isles on August 23 for a secret meeting with Chamberlain. Judging by the documents, the two empires were going to work out a “historic compromise,” ignoring the interests of not only the USSR, Poland and a number of other Eastern European countries, but even France.

On August 15, 1939, the German Ambassador in Moscow F. Schulenburg asked for an urgent appointment with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov. The ambassador read out Ribbentrop's statement, which proposed that all existing controversial issues be resolved to the full satisfaction of both sides, for which the German Foreign Minister was ready to arrive in Moscow in the very near future. Although the statement did not openly talk about resolving territorial issues, they were meant. This aspect of Soviet-German relations, along with the non-aggression pact and increased trade with Germany, interested the Soviet government to the greatest extent.

The situation for the Soviet government was very difficult. It began a risky political game. Negotiations with England and France were still ongoing, but reached a dead end. Germany, on the contrary, made concessions to the USSR, expressed its readiness to take into account its state interests, it even promised to influence Japan in order to normalize Soviet-Japanese relations, which was beneficial for the Soviet Union, since at that time there were fierce battles between the Soviet and Japanese troops on the Khalkhin Gol River. In such a situation, Stalin gave permission for Ribbentrop to come to Moscow.

Soviet-German negotiations were carried out under political time pressure. On the night of August 23-24, 1939, in the presence of Stalin, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed hastily agreed upon Soviet-German documents: the Non-Aggression Treaty, under the terms of which the parties pledged not to interfere in armed conflicts against each other for 10 years from the date of signing the document, and the Secret Protocol, according to which Germany assumed a number of unilateral obligations:

In the event of a German-Polish armed conflict, German troops were not to advance beyond the border of the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers and not to invade Finland, Estonia and Latvia;

The question of maintaining a unified Polish state or its dismemberment had to be resolved in the course of the further development of the political situation in the region;

Germany recognized the USSR's interest in Bessarabia.

The non-aggression treaty was published on August 24, 1939. The top leadership of the USSR did not inform either the party or state bodies about the existence of a secret agreement. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 31, 1939, without discussion, ratified only the text of the Non-Aggression Treaty.

The news of the conclusion of a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty came as a complete surprise not only to the world, but also to the Soviet public. It was difficult to comprehend the revolution that had taken place in relations between the USSR and Germany. After the signing of this treaty, London and Paris completely lost interest in the USSR and began to look for ways to obtain from Germany commitments for the future that were stronger than those that it gave during the Munich Conference. Documents show that the day after the signing of the non-aggression pact with Germany, Stalin, being in extreme uncertainty about Hitler's integrity, tried to persuade England and France to continue the Moscow military negotiations. But there was no response to these proposals.

There are different points of view on the question of the need to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany.

Serious researchers - Soviet, Polish, British, West German and others - admit that on August 19-20, 1939, at the moment Stalin agreed to Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow to finally clarify Germany's intentions, the Soviet Union was left with no choice. The USSR alone could not prevent the war. He failed to find allies in England and France. All that remained was to think about how not to fall into the maelstrom of war, for which the USSR was even less prepared in 1939 than in 1941.

True, there is another point of view on this matter. Some historians believe that Germany in 1939 was also not ready for war with the USSR. This may be true, but at the same time it was impossible not to take into account the very obvious likelihood of Berlin’s deals with other Western powers against the Soviet Union.

Assessing the non-aggression pact from the perspective today It can be noted that for the USSR it had both positive and negative consequences. Positive:

The Soviet Union avoided a war on two fronts, since the agreement created a crack in Japanese-German relations and deformed the terms of the Anti-Comintern Pact in favor of the USSR;

The line from which the Soviet Union could conduct its initial defense was moved several hundred kilometers away from Leningrad, Minsk and other centers;

The treaty contributed to the deepening of the split of the capitalist world into two warring camps, thwarted the plans of the Western powers to direct aggression to the east, and prevented their unification against the USSR. Western powers began to be forced to reckon with the Soviet Union as a military and political power that had the right to outline its interests on the political map of the world.

Negative:

The agreement undermined the morale of the Soviet people, the combat effectiveness of the army, lulled the vigilance of the military-political leadership of the USSR, disoriented the democratic, peace-loving forces, and, therefore, became one of the reasons for the failures of the Soviet side in initial period Great Patriotic War;

The treaty provided fertile ground for accusations against the Soviet Union by Western powers of supporting the aggressor and starting a war;

For a long time, it was considered a positive result of the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Treaty that the USSR received about two years to prepare for war and strengthen its defense capabilities. However, this time was used less effectively by the Soviet Union than by Germany, which increased its military potential to a greater extent in 22 months. If at the beginning of 1939 the military-political leadership of Germany assessed the Red Army as a very strong enemy, a clash with which was undesirable, then at the beginning of 1941 they already noted the weakness of the USSR Armed Forces, especially their command staff.

The legal, political and historical assessment of the Secret Protocol attached to this agreement may, in our opinion, be more unambiguous and categorical. This protocol can be considered as a great power request for “territorial and political reorganization” in the region, which, from a legal point of view, was in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of a number of states. It did not comply with the treaties that the USSR had previously concluded with these countries, with our obligations to respect their sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability in all circumstances. This protocol completely contradicted the official assurances about the abolition of secret diplomacy that the leadership of the USSR made to the world community, was a revision of the strategic course towards collective security and actually authorized an armed invasion of Poland.

Having freed its hands by signing a non-aggression pact and secret protocols, Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939.

England and France declared war on Germany, but did not provide effective military assistance to Poland and it was defeated.

The USSR and the USA declared their neutrality in the war.

On September 17, 1939, units of the Red Army entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, which was provided for by the provisions of the secret protocol.

So, the Second World War began.

At this time (end of September 1939), the leadership of the USSR, led by Stalin and Molotov, overstepped the bounds of reason in relations with Germany. On August 28, 1934, in Moscow, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed the Treaty of Friendship and Borders with the annex of several secret protocols, which, like the previous secret protocol, were not ratified. According to these documents, the spheres of influence of the USSR and Germany changed, the borders of countries in Poland were determined, the parties agreed on economic cooperation and the prevention of agitation directed against the other side. The territory of the Lithuanian state was recognized as a sphere of interests of the USSR, provided that the existing economic agreements between Germany and Lithuania would not be affected by the activities of the Government of the Soviet Union in this region. At the same time, the Lublin and Warsaw voivodeships were transferred to the German sphere of influence with appropriate amendments to the demarcation line. In one of the protocols, each side pledged to prevent “Polish propaganda” directed at the region of the other country.

At the same negotiations, Molotov made a statement in which he substantiated the idea that the fight against fascism was unnecessary and that an ideological agreement with Germany was possible. Together with Ribbentrop, he signed a note in which all responsibility for starting the war was shifted to England and France and stipulated that, if these countries continued to participate in the war, the USSR and Germany would consult on military issues.

The assessment of these agreements, in our opinion, should be unambiguous. If the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty in the minds of the Soviet people was justified by the need to avoid participation in the war, then the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Borders between the USSR and Germany was completely unnatural. This document was signed after the occupation of Poland and, consequently, was an agreement concluded with a country that committed an overt act of aggression. He questioned, if not undermined, the status of the USSR as a neutral party and pushed our country into unprincipled cooperation with Nazi Germany.

In our opinion, there was no need for this agreement at all. The change in the boundary of division of interests, recorded in the secret additional protocol, could have been formalized in a completely different way. However, motivated by the strengthening of personal power, Stalin went to great political and moral expense at the end of September in order to secure, as he believed, Hitler in a position of mutual understanding, but not with the USSR, but with him personally. It should be recognized that Stalin’s desire for parallel actions with Germany, which had been established since the end of September, expanded the freedom of maneuver of the Nazi leadership, including in carrying out a number of military operations.

Thus, in modern historical science, the Treaty of Friendship and Borders of September 28, 1939 is assessed sharply negatively. The conclusion of this agreement should be considered a mistake by the then leadership of the USSR. The treaty and everything that followed it in the media and in practical politics disarmed the Soviet people spiritually, contradicted the will of the people, Soviet and international legislation, and undermined the international authority of the USSR.

Summing up the story about the Soviet-German treaties of August 23 and September 28, 1939, it should be noted that according to the conclusions of the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies, the Non-Aggression Treaty and the Treaty of Friendship and Borders lost their force at the time of the German attack on the USSR, and the secret protocols , as signed in violation of existing Soviet legislation and international law, are not valid from the moment of signing.

After the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the secret protocols, the Soviet Union began to steadily implement all their provisions. In addition to the moral damage caused to the Soviet people by the terms of these documents, the practical activities of the Soviet leadership caused great damage to the country. For example, discontent among anti-fascists living in the USSR was caused by individual unfriendly actions of the government towards some of them. So, in the fall of 1939 it was closed in Moscow orphanage N 6, previously created specifically for the children of German political emigrants. At the beginning of 1940, several groups of German and Austrian anti-fascists who were repressed in the 30s and were under investigation or imprisoned were transferred to the German authorities. In most cases, this was done against the will of those being transferred. In addition, there were many cases of repression against Soviet citizens conducting anti-fascist propaganda. After the introduction, under the terms of the last Treaty, of the Red Army into the territory of Western Ukraine and Belarus, Lithuania and Poland, repression began there, the imposition of command and administrative methods of leadership, and the suppression of the national movement in these areas.

From 1939 to 1941, almost until the start of the Great Patriotic War, external rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union continued. The USSR, right up to the German attack in 1941, strictly complied with all the terms of the treaties it signed. So he did not participate in the events of 1940 -1941, when Hitler subjugated almost all European states, including France, and defeated the European contingent of British troops. Soviet diplomacy did everything to postpone the war and avoid fighting it on two fronts, in order to allow the USSR to prepare for war. For example, in 1941 the following were signed:

A note with Turkey, in which both sides pledged to remain neutral;

Non-aggression pact with Japan.

However, these measures could not solve main task foreign policy and prevent war.

2.2 Development of relations between the USSR and small states in the pre-war years.

In addition to interaction with the leading developed powers of the world: the USA, England, France, Germany, Italy, in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the pre-war (30-40) period, one more direction can be distinguished - the development of relations with the so-called small states . Of all the events of this period in which the USSR took part, we would like to highlight three main ones:

1. War with Japan

2. War with Finland

3. Entry of the Baltic states into the USSR.

Let's see how relations between the USSR and militaristic Japan developed on the eve of the Second World War.

Japan, in which in 30 A fascist regime was established and had long been nurturing expansionist plans for the Far Eastern territories of the USSR. After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, she had a real opportunity, in alliance with the strongest power in the world, to implement these plans.

In the summer of 1938, Japan invaded the territory of the Soviet Union in the area of ​​Lake Khasan, hoping to capture Vladivostok. However, the USSR had enough forces to fight this country and units of the Red Army under the leadership of Blucher quickly defeated the aggressors.

In May 1939, Japan attacked Mongolia in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, trying to gain a springboard for an attack on the USSR. According to the agreements in force between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, units of the Red Army under the leadership of Zhukov were introduced into this country to protect its sovereignty, and Japan was defeated in difficult battles.

After the signing of the Soviet-German treaties, Japan did not dare to continue its aggression against the USSR.

Thus, thanks to the successes of the Red Army in the fight against the Japanese aggressors, one of the possible opponents was taken out of combat readiness even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet Union managed to avoid a war on two fronts and successfully restrain Japanese aggression throughout the entire period. Undoubtedly, the Soviet-Japanese war must be considered fair on the part of the USSR and necessary in the current political situation.

A completely opposite assessment, in our opinion, must be given to the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 - 1940.

Since 1917, the Soviet Union has pursued a loyal policy towards all small states and national outskirts of the former Russian Empire, including towards Finland. As is known, according to Lenin’s principles of foreign policy, immediately after the revolution, in December 1917, a decree on the independence of this country was signed. In 1920, the final definition of the borders of two independent states took place. The border between the USSR and Finland was drawn at 32 km. from Petrograd (Leningrad). In 1932, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the two countries. Thus, until the mid-30s. Relations between the Soviet Union and Finland were generally normal.

However, what suited the Soviet Union during the period of peaceful respite between the two world wars could not suit it in the context of the outbreak of conflict. The close proximity of the border to the strategic, political and economic center of the country, the hostility expressed by the Finnish leadership towards the USSR, the real possibility of Hitler attacking our state from the territory of Finland, all these circumstances created real threat security of the Soviet Union and had to be eliminated.

From April 1938 to November 1939, the USSR tried to find a way out of the current situation peacefully. During this time period, the Soviet leadership put forward a number of proposals to ensure the security of Soviet borders, starting from the idea of ​​​​concluding a friendship treaty and ending with proposals for the exchange of territories. However, the Finnish leadership did not make concessions, which it undoubtedly had the right to do.

In response to this Finnish policy, in the fall of 1939, the USSR annulled the 1932 non-aggression treaty and recalled its diplomats. In November 1939, hostilities began between the Soviet and Finnish sides. The pretext for starting the war was the provocations that allegedly took place on the Soviet-Finnish border.

Finland stubbornly defended its sovereignty, but it did not have the forces sufficient to successfully resist such strong country, which was the Soviet Union. Units of the Red Army were actively advancing through the territory of the Finnish state. The Soviet leadership, considering the war already won, created the Government of the Finnish people's republic, consisting of Finnish emigrants living in the USSR. This government did not receive the support of the Finnish people and was recognized by them as an impostor. However, Molotov, who signed a friendship treaty with the new government, refused to negotiate peace with the current leadership. This action further strengthened the resistance of Finland, in whose defense the inhabitants, outraged by these unlawful actions, rose up.

Thus, due to the unreasonable actions of its leadership, the USSR found itself in a disadvantageous political position.

At the beginning of December 1939, the Finnish government turned to the League of Nations asking for help. This organization made a decision obliging the Soviet Union to cease hostilities and begin peace negotiations. Stalin's leadership rejected this order, which is why the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.

In the winter of 1940, the Red Army, continuing its offensive, at the cost of great effort and losses, broke the line of Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (the so-called Monerheim line).

England and France, fulfilling the decision of the League of Nations, decided to help Finland: in the winter of 1940, English and French weapons were supplied to the Finnish army, and a proposal was made to send troops to help. Finding themselves in danger of being drawn into a war with largest countries peace, the Soviet Union was forced to stop hostilities and sign a peace treaty in March 1940. Under the terms of this treaty, the USSR received the following benefits:

The Karelian Isthmus, the Rybachy Peninsula, and a number of islands were transferred to the possession of the Soviet Union;

The Hanko Peninsula was leased to the USSR for 30 years with the right to build Soviet naval bases on it.

Thus, despite some positive results, such as removing the border from the economic and strategic centers of the country and making it possible to build Soviet military bases in northern waters, Soviet-Finnish war in many ways prevented successful preparations for war with Germany, was a tragedy for both peoples, undermined the international authority of the USSR and, in general, should be assessed negatively.

The third important direction in the foreign policy of this period is the development of relations with the Baltic states, which resulted in the Baltic states joining the USSR.

As is known, under the terms of the secret protocols attached to the Soviet-German treaties, the territory of the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania was included in the sphere of interests of the Soviet Union, provided that economic agreements between Germany and these countries remain in force.

In September - October 1939, the USSR concluded non-aggression and mutual assistance treaties with these Baltic states, under the terms of which a limited contingent of Soviet troops was stationed on the territory of these countries.

However, not satisfied with such a limited influence on these countries, at the beginning of June 1940, statements by the Soviet leadership were made in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, which in form and substance were of an ultimatum nature. The USSR government argued that the leadership of these states grossly violated mutual assistance agreements and were preparing an attack on Red Army units stationed on their territory. It was alleged that in order to coordinate their actions against the USSR, the three countries created the anti-Soviet military-political alliance “Baltic Entente”.

In this regard, the leadership of the USSR demanded the resignation of the governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia and the formation of new ones capable, as stated in the statements, of “ensuring the fair implementation” of mutual assistance pacts, as well as the admission of additional large units of the Red Army to the territory of the three countries. In case of refusal to comply with these demands, Molotov warned that the Government of the Soviet Union would take appropriate measures. To respond, the Lithuanian government was given ten hours of night time, and the Estonian and Latvian ones - ten hours of day time. At the same time, diplomatic representatives of the three countries were told that Soviet representatives would take part in the formation of new governments.

Why did the USSR suddenly present these ultimatums? The leadership of these countries did not have any plans hostile to the Soviet state. When Molotov prepared these ultimatums, he had no evidence of the existence of such plans. They were not discovered later, when all the archives of the Baltic governments fell into the hands of the Soviet side.

In our opinion, the whole point is that by the end of May the imminent outcome of the hostilities in Western Europe became clear: France would be defeated, and Great Britain would be driven to its island. All these forecasts came true in early June. Germany emerged from this campaign even stronger economically and militarily, even more self-confident, and therefore even more aggressive. After the defeat of France, Germany lost its strategic interest in maintaining “friendship” with the USSR. It was during this period Soviet government it was decided to complete the “territorial and political reorganization” Baltic countries, the “rights” to which the Soviet Union received through secret protocols in 1939.

What about the Baltic governments? They knew that if they refused to satisfy Soviet demands, the issue would be resolved by force. In such a situation, only a German protest against such actions of the USSR in the Baltic states could help them. The German government considered these actions “Moscow’s departure from its categorical statements,” but found it inappropriate to quarrel with the Soviet Union ahead of time and therefore firmly adhered to a policy of non-intervention.

Under these conditions, the Balts had no choice but to accept the Soviet ultimatum. The old governments resigned, and significant Red Army forces were introduced into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, several times larger than the national armies of these states. To form new governments and subsequently manage their activities, Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. Dekanozov arrived in Lithuania, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A. Vyshinsky came to Latvia, and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. Zhdanov came to Estonia. The crisis ended with the creation of pro-Soviet governments, which acted in the time allotted to them by history on the basis of directives from Moscow and its representatives on the ground, and with the signing in July 1940 of declarations by the Baltic countries asking for their acceptance into the USSR.

Assessing the results of the policy of the Soviet Union towards the Baltic states, it should be noted that its annexation to the USSR played a positive role in ensuring the security of the western borders and made it possible to move the supposed line of initial defense from the centers of the country, however, the methods by which this policy was carried out deserve the harshest condemnation and contradict all international and Soviet legal norms.

3. Assessment of the foreign policy of the USSR 30 - 40.

To summarize the above, it is necessary to note the main results of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the pre-war decade. As a result of the USSR’s actions in the external arena, it achieved the following positive results:

The non-aggression pact, for all its negative features, somewhat delayed the Soviet Union's entry into the war;

The relative safety of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Baltic Fleet bases was ensured; the borders were removed from Minsk, Kyiv and some other centers;

It was possible to split the capitalist camp and avoid the unification of the major powers in the fight against the USSR, as well as disorient the allies under the “Anti-Comintern Pact” and avoid a war on two fronts.

However, the foreign policy of the USSR during this period also had many negative consequences and, in general, the task of preventing war and creating a system of collective security was not completed.

What assessment of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union can be given based on the above?

As you know, the Congress of People's Deputies formed a commission for the political and legal assessment of the non-aggression treaty concluded by the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939, which was headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev. This commission was called upon to assess the legality of concluding the treaties of 1939 and the results of the USSR’s foreign policy before the Great Patriotic War as a whole. The commission made the following conclusions, which can, in our opinion, be considered the most correct and compromise for the current state of the Soviet historical science.

In contrast to the previously prevailing official point of view, the Congress commission, based on a thorough analysis of documents of that time and the testimony of still living eyewitnesses, came to the unequivocal conclusion that the pact of August 23, 1939, the treaty of friendship and border of 28 September 1939 and other acts and agreements with Germany, in which the foreign policy aspirations of the Stalinist leadership were expressed, are in deep contradiction with the Leninist principles of international relations and legal norms, did not reflect the will of the Soviet people, and the people are not responsible for the secret criminal transactions of their leadership, and all secret foreign policy contradicts the ideas of peace and security proclaimed by the USSR in the external arena. In addition, the “policy of small wars,” in which the Soviet Union also became involved, cannot but cause condemnation from the world community and subsequent generations. Despite the fact that in the pre-war years the Soviet Union took significant steps to prevent the threat of war, Stalin’s internal policy of genocide towards its own people was reflected in the imperialist inclinations manifested in the implementation of the foreign policy of the USSR, which brought down all the peaceful initiatives of our state to zero result.

Soviet foreign policy in the pre-war period was contradictory. This inconsistency is explained by the uniqueness of the international situation of that time and the peculiarities of the bureaucratic system of party and state leadership that developed in the USSR, which neglected moral criteria and criteria of international law in its activities, including foreign policy.

REFERENCES:

1. Yakushevsky. "Conflicting Treaty" "Arguments and facts". 1989, N32.

2. Hilger. "We and the Kremlin." Germany, 1964.

3. Berezhkov. “Stalin’s miscalculation.” “The Week.” 1989, N 31.

4. Yakovlev. "The events of 1939 - a view from a half-century distance." "Is it true". 1989, N 230.

5. Message from the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies. "Is it true". 1989, N 230.

6. Dongarov. "Baltics. Fifty years ago." "Arguments and facts". 1989, N 36.

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