Projects of Soviet submarines of the Second World War. German submarines of the Second World War: photos and technical characteristics
This text should perhaps begin with a short introduction. Well, for starters, I didn't intend to write it.
However, my article about the Anglo-German war at sea in 1939-1945 gave rise to a completely unexpected discussion. There is one phrase in it - about the Soviet submarine fleet, in which large amounts of money were apparently invested before the war, and “... whose contribution to the victory turned out to be insignificant...”.
The emotional discussion that this phrase generated is beside the point.
I received several e-mails accusing me of “...ignorance of the subject...”, of “... Russophobia...”, of “... keeping silent about the successes of Russian weapons...”, and of “. .. waging an information war against Russia...".
Long story short - I ended up becoming interested in the subject and did some digging. The results amazed me - everything was much worse than what I had imagined.
The text offered to readers cannot be called an analysis - it is too short and shallow - but as a kind of reference it may be useful.
Here are the submarine forces with which the great powers entered the war:
1. England - 58 submarines.
2. Germany - 57 submarines.
3. USA - 21 submarines (operational, Pacific Fleet).
4. Italy - 68 submarines (calculated from the flotillas stationed in Taranto, La Spezia, Tripoli, etc.).
5. Japan - 63 submarines.
6. USSR - 267 submarines.
Statistics are a rather insidious thing.
Firstly, the number of combat units indicated is to a certain extent arbitrary. It includes both combat boats and training boats, obsolete ones, those being repaired, and so on. The only criterion for including a boat on the list is that it exists.
Secondly, the very concept of a submarine is not defined. For example, a German submarine with a displacement of 250 tons, intended for operations in coastal areas, and a Japanese ocean-going submarine with a displacement of 5,000 tons are still not the same thing.
Thirdly, a warship is assessed not by displacement, but by a combination of many parameters - for example, speed, armament, autonomy, and so on. In the case of a submarine, these parameters include diving speed, diving depth, underwater speed, time during which the boat can remain under water - and other things that would take a long time to list. They include, for example, such an important indicator as crew training.
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from the table above.
For example, it is obvious that the great naval powers - England and the USA - were not particularly actively preparing for submarine warfare. And they had few boats, and even this number was “spread out” across the oceans. American Pacific Fleet - two dozen submarines. The English fleet - with possible military operations on three oceans - the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian - is only fifty.
It is also clear that Germany was not ready for a naval war - in total there were 57 submarines in service by September 1939.
Here is a table of German submarines - by type (data taken from the book “War At Sea”, by S Roskill, vol.1, page 527):
1. “IA” - ocean, 850 tons - 2 units.
2. “IIA” – coastal, 250 tons - 6 units.
3. “IIB” - coastal, 250 tons - 20 units.
4. “IIC” - coastal, 250 tons - 9 units.
5. “IID” - coastal, 250 tons - 15 units.
6. “VII” - ocean, 750 tons - 5 units.
Thus, at the very beginning of hostilities, Germany had no more than 8-9 submarines for operations in the Atlantic.
It also follows from the table that the absolute champion in the number of submarines in the pre-war period was the Soviet Union.
Now let's look at the number of submarines that took part in hostilities by country:
1. England - 209 submarines.
2. Germany - 965 submarines.
3. USA - 182 submarines.
4. Italy - 106 submarines
5. Japan - 160 submarines.
6. CCCP - 170 submarines.
It can be seen that almost all countries during the war came to the conclusion that submarines are a very important type of weapon, they began to sharply increase their submarine forces, and used them very widely in military operations.
The only exception is the Soviet Union. In the USSR, no new boats were built during the war - there was no time for that, and no more than 60% of those built were put into use - but this can be explained by many very good reasons. For example, the fact that the Pacific Fleet practically did not participate in the war - unlike the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern.
The absolute champion in building up the forces of the submarine fleet and in its combat use is Germany. This is especially obvious if you look at the roster of the German submarine fleet: by the end of the war - 1155 units. The large difference between the number of submarines built and the number of those that participated in hostilities is explained by the fact that in the second half of 1944 and 1945 it was increasingly difficult to bring a boat to a combat-ready state - boat bases were mercilessly bombed, shipyards were the priority target of air raids, training flotillas in the Baltic Sea did not have time to train crews, and so on.
The contribution of the German submarine fleet to the war effort was enormous. The figures for the casualties they inflicted on the enemy and the casualties they suffered vary. According to German sources, during the war, Doenitz's submarines sank 2,882 enemy merchant ships, with a total tonnage of 14.4 million tons, plus 175 warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers. 779 boats were lost.
The Soviet reference book gives a different figure - 644 German submarines sunk, 2840 merchant ships sunk by them.
The British (“Total War”, by Peter Calviocoressi and Guy Wint) indicate the following figures: 1162 German submarines built, and 941 sunk or surrendered.
I did not find an explanation for the difference in the statistics provided. The authoritative work of Captain Roskill, “War At Sea”, unfortunately, does not provide summary tables. Perhaps it has to do with different methods of accounting for sunk and captured boats - for example, in what column was a damaged boat, grounded and abandoned by the crew, taken into account?
In any case, it can be argued that German submariners not only inflicted huge losses on the British and American merchant fleets, but also had a profound strategic impact on the entire course of the war.
Hundreds of escort ships and literally thousands of aircraft were sent to fight them - and even this would not have been enough if not for the successes of the American shipbuilding industry, which made it possible to more than compensate for all the tonnage sunk by the Germans.
How did things go for other participants in the war?
The Italian submarine fleet performed very poorly, completely disproportionate to its nominally high numbers. The Italian boats were poorly built, poorly equipped, and poorly managed. They accounted for 138 sunk targets, while 84 boats were lost.
According to the Italians themselves, their boats sank 132 enemy merchant ships, with a total displacement of 665,000 tons, and 18 warships, for a total of 29,000 tons. Which gives an average of 5,000 tons per transport (corresponding to the average English transport ship of the period), and 1,200 tons on average per warship - corresponding to a destroyer, or English escort sloop.
The most important thing is that they did not have any serious impact on the course of hostilities. The Atlantic campaign was a complete failure. If we talk about the submarine fleet, the greatest contribution to the Italian war effort was made by Italian saboteurs who successfully attacked British battleships in the Alexandria roadstead.
The British sank 493 merchant ships with a total displacement of 1.5 million tons, 134 warships, plus 34 enemy submarines - while losing 73 boats.
Their successes could have been greater, but they did not have many goals. Their main contribution to the victory was the interception of Italian merchant ships going to North Africa, and German coastal ships in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway.
The actions of American and Japanese submarines deserve a separate discussion.
The Japanese submarine fleet looked very impressive in its pre-war phase of development. The submarines that were part of it ranged from tiny dwarf boats designed for sabotage operations to huge submarine cruisers.
During World War II, 56 submarines larger than 3,000 tons of displacement were put into service - and 52 of them were Japanese.
The Japanese fleet had 41 submarines capable of carrying seaplanes (up to 3 at once) - something no other boat in any other fleet in the world could do. Neither in German, nor in English, nor in American.
Japanese submarines had no equal in underwater speed. Their small boats could make up to 18 knots under water, and their experimental medium-sized boats showed even 19, which exceeded the remarkable results of the German XXI series boats, and was almost three times faster than the speed of the standard German “workhorse” - the VII series boats .
Japanese torpedo weapons were the best in the world, surpassing the American ones three times in range, twice as much in the destructive power of the warhead, and, until the second half of 1943, had a huge advantage in reliability.
And yet, they did very little. In total, Japanese submarines sank 184 ships, with a total displacement of 907,000 tons.
It was a matter of military doctrine - according to the concept of the Japanese fleet, the boats were intended to hunt warships, not merchant ships. And since military ships sailed three times faster than “merchants”, and, as a rule, had strong anti-submarine protection, the successes were modest. Japanese submariners sank two American aircraft carriers and a cruiser, damaged two battleships - and had virtually no effect on the overall course of military operations.
Starting from a certain time, they were even used as supply ships for besieged island garrisons.
It is interesting that the Americans started the war with exactly the same military doctrine - the boat was supposed to track down warships, not “merchants”. Moreover, American torpedoes, in theory the most technologically advanced (they were supposed to explode under the ship under the influence of its magnetic field, breaking the enemy ship in half) turned out to be terribly unreliable.
The defect was corrected only in the second half of 1943. By this time, pragmatic American naval commanders switched their submarines to attacks on the Japanese merchant fleet, and then added another improvement to this - now Japanese tankers became a priority target.
The effect was devastating.
Of the 10 million tons of displacement total lost by the Japanese military and merchant fleet, 54% was attributed to the submariners.
The American fleet lost 39 submarines during the war.
According to the Russian reference book, American submarines sank 180 targets.
If American reports are correct, then 5,400,000 tons divided by 180 "targets" hit gives an incongruously high figure for each ship sunk - an average of 30,000 tons. An English merchant ship from the Second World War had a displacement of about 5-6 thousand tons, only later the American Liberty transports became twice as large.
It is possible that the directory only took into account military vessels, because it does not provide the total tonnage of targets sunk by the Americans.
According to the Americans, about 1,300 Japanese merchant ships were sunk by their boats during the war - from large tankers, and almost to sampans. This gives an estimated 3,000 tons for each maru sunk, which is roughly what is expected.
An online reference taken from the usually reliable site: http://www.2worldwar2.com/ also gives a figure of 1,300 Japanese merchant ships sunk by submarines, but estimates the losses of American boats higher: 52 boats lost, out of a total of 288 units ( including training and those who did not participate in hostilities).
It is possible that boats lost as a result of accidents are taken into account - I don’t know. The standard American submarine during the Pacific War was the Gato class, 2,400 tons, equipped with superior optics, superior acoustics, and even radar.
American submarines made a huge contribution to the victory. Analysis of their actions after the war revealed them as the most important factor that strangled the military and civilian industries of Japan.
The actions of Soviet submarines must be considered separately, because the conditions of their use were unique.
The Soviet pre-war submarine fleet was not just the largest in the world. In terms of the number of submarines - 267 units - it was two and a half times larger than the English and German fleets combined. Here it is necessary to make a reservation - British and German submarines were counted for September 1939, and Soviet ones - for June 1941. Nevertheless, it is clear that the strategic plan for the deployment of the Soviet submarine fleet - if we take the priorities of its development - was better than the German one. The forecast for the start of hostilities was much more realistic than that determined by the German “Plan Z” - 1944-1946.
The Soviet plan was made on the assumption that the war could start simply today, or tomorrow. Accordingly, funds were not invested in battleships that required long construction. Preference was given to small military vessels - in the pre-war period, only 4 cruisers were built, but more than 200 submarines.
The geographical conditions for the deployment of the Soviet fleet were very specific - it was, of necessity, divided into 4 parts - the Black Sea, Baltic, Northern and Pacific - which, in general, could not help each other. Some ships, apparently, managed to pass from the Pacific Ocean to Murmansk, small ships like small submarines could be transported disassembled by rail - but in general, the interaction of the fleets was very difficult.
Here we come across the first problem - the summary table indicates the total number of Soviet submarines, but does not say how many of them operated in the Baltic - or in the Black Sea, for example.
The Pacific Fleet did not participate in the war until August 1945.
The Black Sea Fleet joined the war almost immediately. In general, he had no enemy at sea - except perhaps the Romanian fleet. Accordingly, there is no information about successes - due to the absence of the enemy. There is also no information about losses - at least detailed ones.
According to A.B. Shirokorad, the following episode took place: on June 26, 1941, the leaders “Moscow” and “Kharkov” were sent to raid Constanta. While retreating, the leaders came under attack from their own submarine, Shch-206. She was sent on patrol but was not warned about the raid. As a result, the leader "Moscow" was sunk, and the submarine was sunk by its escorts - in particular, the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".
This version is disputed, and it is argued that both ships - the leader and the submarine - were lost at a Romanian minefield. There is no exact information.
But here’s what is absolutely indisputable: in the period April-May 1944, German and Romanian troops were evacuated from Crimea by sea to Romania. During April and twenty days of May, the enemy conducted 251 convoys - many hundreds of targets and with very weak anti-submarine protection.
In total, during this period, 11 submarines in 20 combat campaigns damaged one (!) transport. According to commanders' reports, several targets were allegedly sunk, but there was no confirmation of this.
The result is astounding inefficiency.
There is no summary information on the Black Sea Fleet - the number of boats, the number of combat exits, the number of targets hit, their type and tonnage. At least I didn't find them anywhere.
The war in the Baltic can be reduced to three phases: the defeat in 1941, the blockade of the fleet in Leningrad and Kronstadt in 1942, 1943, 1944 - and the counter-offensive in 1945.
According to information found on forums, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in 1941 conducted 58 trips to German sea communications in the Baltic.
Results:
1. One German submarine, U-144, was sunk. Confirmed by the German reference book.
2. Two transports were sunk (5769 GRT).
3. Presumably, the Swedish mobilized patrol boat HJVB-285 (56 GRT) was also sunk by a torpedo from the S-6 submarine on 08/22/1941.
This last point is even difficult to comment on - the Swedes were neutral, the boat was - most likely - a bot armed with a machine gun, and was hardly worth the torpedo that was fired at it. In the process of achieving these successes, 27 submarines were lost. And according to other sources - even 36.
Information for 1942 is vague. It is stated that 24 targets were hit.
Summary information - the number of boats involved, the number of combat exits, the type and tonnage of targets hit - is not available.
Regarding the period from the end of 1942 to July 1944 (the time of Finland’s exit from the war), there is complete consensus: not a single combat entry of submarines into enemy communications. The reason is very valid - the Gulf of Finland was blocked not only by minefields, but also by an anti-submarine network barrier.
As a result, throughout this period the Baltic was a quiet German lake - Doenitz's training flotillas trained there, Swedish ships with important military cargo for Germany - ball bearings, iron ore, etc. - sailed without interference - German troops were transferred - from the Baltics to Finland and back, and so on further.
But even at the end of the war, when the nets were removed and Soviet submarines went to the Baltic to intercept German ships, the picture looks rather strange. During the mass evacuation from the Courland Peninsula and from the Danzig Bay area, in the presence of hundreds of targets, including large-capacity ones, often with completely conditional anti-submarine protection in April-May 1945, 11 submarines in 11 military campaigns sank only one transport, a mother ship and a floating battery .
It was at this time that high-profile victories happened - the sinking of the Gustlov, for example - but nevertheless, the German fleet managed to evacuate about 2 and a half million people by sea, the largest rescue operation in history - and it was neither disrupted nor even slowed down by the actions of the Soviets submarines
There is no summary information about the activities of the Baltic Submarine Fleet. Again - they may exist, but I haven't found them.
The situation is the same with statistics on the actions of the Northern Fleet. The summary data is nowhere to be found, or at least not in public circulation.
There is something on the forums. An example is given below:
“...On August 4, 1941, the British submarine Tygris and then Trident arrived in Polyarnoye. At the beginning of November they were replaced by two other submarines, Seawolf and Silayen. In total, until December 21, they made 10 military campaigns, destroying 8 targets. Is it a lot or a little? In this case, this is not important, the main thing is that during the same period, 19 Soviet submarines in 82 military campaigns sank only 3 targets...”
The biggest mystery comes from the information from the pivot table:
http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
According to it, 170 Soviet submarines took part in the hostilities. Of these, 81 were killed. 126 targets were hit.
What is their total tonnage? Where were they sunk? How many of them are warships and how many are merchant ships?
The table simply does not provide any answers on this matter.
If the Gustlov was a large ship, and is named in the reports, why are other ships not named? Or at least not listed? In the end, both a tugboat and a four-oared boat can be counted as hit.
The idea of falsification simply suggests itself.
The table, by the way, contains another falsification, this time completely obvious.
The victories of the submarines of all the fleets listed in it - English, German, Soviet, Italian, Japanese - contain the sum of the enemy ships they sunk - commercial and military.
The only exception is the Americans. For some reason, they only counted the warships they sunk, thereby artificially reducing their indicators - from 1480 to 180.
And this small modification of the rules is not even specified. You can find it only by doing a detailed check of all the data given in the table.
The final result of the check is that all data is more or less reliable. Except Russian and American. The American ones are worsened by 7-something times through obvious manipulation, and the Russian ones are hidden in a thick “fog” - by using numbers without explanation, detail and confirmation.
In general, from the above material it is obvious that the results of the actions of Soviet submarines during the war were insignificant, the losses were great, and the achievements did not correspond at all to the enormous level of expenditure that was invested in the creation of the Soviet submarine fleet in the pre-war period.
The reasons for this are clear in general terms. In a purely technical sense, the boats lacked the means to detect the enemy - their commanders could only rely on not very reliable radio communications and their own periscopes. This was generally a common problem, not just for Soviet submariners.
In the first period of the war, German captains created an improvised mast for themselves - the boat, in the surface position, extended the periscope up to the limit, and a watchman with binoculars climbed onto it, like a pole at a fair. This exotic method helped them little, so they relied more on a tip - either from colleagues in the “wolf pack”, or from reconnaissance aircraft, or from the coastal headquarters, which had data from radio intelligence and decoding services. Radio direction finders and acoustic stations were in wide use.
What exactly the Soviet submariners had in this sense is unknown, but if we use the analogy with tanks - where orders in 1941 were transmitted by flags - then we can guess that the situation with communications and electronics in the submarine fleet at that time was not the best.
The same factor reduced the possibility of interaction with aviation, and probably with headquarters on land too.
An important factor was the level of crew training. For example, German submariners - after crew members graduated from the relevant technical schools - sent boats to training flotillas in the Baltic, where for 5 months they practiced tactical techniques, conducted firing exercises, and so on.
Particular attention was paid to the training of commanders.
Herbert Werner, for example, a German submariner whose memoirs provide a lot of useful information, became a captain only after several campaigns, having managed to be both a junior officer and a first mate, and receive a couple of orders in this capacity.
The Soviet fleet was deployed so quickly that there was simply nowhere to find qualified captains, and they were appointed from people who had experience sailing in the merchant fleet. In addition, the guiding idea at that time was: “... if he doesn’t know the matter, it doesn’t matter. He will learn in battle...”
When handling such a complex weapon as a submarine, this is not the best approach.
In conclusion, a few words about learning from mistakes made.
A summary table comparing the actions of boats from different countries is taken from the book by A.V. Platonov and V.M. Lurie “Commanders of Soviet Submarines 1941-1945.”
It was published in 800 copies - clearly only for official use, and clearly only for commanders of a sufficiently high level - because its circulation was too small to be used as a teaching aid for trainee officers at naval academies.
It would seem that in such an audience you can call a spade a spade?
However, the table of indicators is compiled very slyly.
Let's take, say, such an indicator (by the way, chosen by the authors of the book) as the ratio of the number of sunk targets to the number of lost submarines.
The German fleet in this sense is estimated in round numbers as follows - 4 targets for 1 boat. If we convert this factor into another - say, tonnage sunk per boat lost - we get approximately 20,000 tons (14 million tons of tonnage divided by 700 boats lost). Since the average oceangoing English merchant ship of that time had a displacement of 5,000 tons, everything fits.
With the Germans - yes, it agrees.
But with the Russians - no, it doesn’t fit. Because the coefficient for them - 126 targets sunk against 81 lost boats - gives a figure of 1.56. Of course, worse than 4, but still nothing.
However, this coefficient, unlike the German one, is unverifiable - the total tonnage of targets sunk by Soviet submarines is not indicated anywhere. And the proud reference to a sunken Swedish tug weighing as much as fifty tons makes one think that this is far from accidental.
However, that's not all.
The German coefficient of 4 goals per 1 boat is the overall result. At the beginning of the war - in fact, until mid-1943 - it was much higher. It turned out to be 20, 30, and sometimes even 50 ships for each boat.
The indicator was reduced after the victory of the convoys and their escorts - in mid-1943 and until the end of the war.
That is why it is listed in the table - honestly and correctly.
The Americans sank approximately 1,500 targets, losing approximately 40 boats. They would be entitled to a coefficient of 35-40 - much higher than the German one.
If you think about it, this relationship is quite logical - the Germans fought in the Atlantic against Anglo-American-Canadian escorts equipped with hundreds of ships and thousands of aircraft, and the Americans fought a war against weakly protected Japanese shipping.
But this simple fact cannot be recognized, and therefore an amendment is introduced.
The Americans - somehow imperceptibly - are changing the rules of the game, and only “military” goals are counted, reducing their coefficient (180 / 39) to a figure of 4.5 - obviously more acceptable for Russian patriotism?
Even now - and even in the narrowly professional military environment for which the book by Platonov and Lurie was published - even then it turned out to be undesirable to face the facts.
Perhaps this is the most unpleasant result of our small investigation.
P.S. The text of the article (better font and photos) can be found here:
Sources, short list of websites used:
1. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - American boats.
2. http://www.valoratsea.com/subwar.htm - submarine warfare.
3. http://www.paralumun.com/wartwosubmarinesbritain.htm - English boats.
4. http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/britsubs.html - English boats.
5. http://www.combinedfleet.com/ss.htm - Japanese boats.
6. http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/2270/ww2e.htm - Italian boats.
7. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/podlodka.htm - Soviet boats.
8. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/84/84929.htm - Soviet boats.
9. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/255/255106.htm - Soviet boats.
10. http://www.2worldwar2.com/submarines.htm - submarine warfare.
11. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Soviet boats.
12. http://vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/0/archive/46/46644.htm - Soviet boats.
13. - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
14. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Navy - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
15. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/cou/sov/sea/gpw-sea.html - Wikipedia, Soviet boats.
16. http://www.deol.ru/manclub/war/ - forum, military equipment. Hosted by Sergei Kharlamov, a very smart person.
Sources, short list of books used:
1. “Steel Coffins: German submarines, 1941-1945”, Herbert Werner, translation from German, Moscow, Tsentrpolygraf, 2001
2. “War At Sea”, by S. Roskill, in Russian translation, Voenizdat, Moscow, 1967.
3. “Total War”, by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Penguin Books, USA, 1985.
4. “The Longest Battle, The War at Sea, 1939-1945,” by Richard Hough, William Morrow and Company, Inc., New York, 1986.
5. “Secret Raiders”, David Woodward, translation from English, Moscow, Tsentrpoligraf, 2004
6. “The Fleet that Khrushchev Destroyed”, A.B.Shirokograd, Moscow, VZOI, 2004.
Reviews
The daily audience of the Proza.ru portal is about 100 thousand visitors, who in total view more than half a million pages according to the traffic counter, which is located to the right of this text. Each column contains two numbers: the number of views and the number of visitors.
I very much doubt that it will be possible to find anything from all of the above, but these items will always remain in history and on the lists of treasure hunters.
Library of Ivan the Terrible
It is believed that the library of Ivan the Terrible was brought to Russia by Sophia Paleolog. Vasily III ordered the translation of these books to begin: there is a version that the famous scientist Maxim the Greek was sent to the capital for this purpose.
John IV developed a special relationship with the “ancient Liberia”. The king, as you know, was a great lover of books and tried not to part with the dowry of his Byzantine grandmother. According to legend, after his move to Alexandrovskaya Sloboda, Ivan the Terrible took the library with him. Another hypothesis says that John hid it in some reliable Kremlin hiding place. But be that as it may, after the reign of Ivan the Terrible, the library disappeared.
The first Russian printed book “Apostle” (1564). She was definitely in the library of Ivan the Terrible.
There are many versions of the loss. The first is that priceless manuscripts burned in one of the Moscow fires. According to the second version, the “liberea” was taken to the West by the Poles during the occupation of Moscow and sold there in parts. According to the third version, the Poles actually found the library, but in conditions of famine they ate it there in the Kremlin.
As we know, myths are created by people. For the first time we learn about “liberei” from the Livonian Chronicle. It describes how Ivan IV called the captive pastor Johann Wettermann to him and asked him to translate his library into Russian. The pastor refused.
The following mention occurs already in Peter’s time. From the note of the sexton Konon Osipov, we learn that his friend, clerk Vasily Makaryev, discovered a room filled with chests in the Kremlin dungeons, told Sophia about this, but she ordered him to forget about the find. And so, in line with the classic plot, the clerk carried this secret with him... until he told the sexton about everything. Konon Osipov not only undertook an independent search for the treasured room (the passage was covered with earth), but also took Peter I himself on a search.
In 1822, a professor at the University of Dorpat, Christopher von Dabelow, wrote an article “On the Faculty of Law in Dorpat.” Among other things, he cited a document he called "Index of an Unknown Person." This was no less than a list of manuscripts kept in the library of Ivan the Terrible. When another professor, Walter Klossius, became interested in the original list, Dabelov said that he sent the original to Pernov’s archive. Clossius undertook a search. The document was not found either in fact or in the inventory.
However, in 1834, after Dabelov’s death, Klossius published an article “The Library of Grand Duke Vasily Ioannovich and Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich,” in which he spoke in detail about the professor’s find and announced a list of manuscripts from the “Index” - the works of Titus Livius, Tacitus, Polybius, Suetonius, Cicero, Virgil, Aristophanes, Pindar, etc.
Searches for “liberea” were also carried out in the 20th century. As we know, in vain. However, academician Dmitry Likhachev said that the legendary library is unlikely to be of great value. Nevertheless, the myth of “liberea” is very tenacious. For several centuries it was overgrown with new “details”. There is also a classic legend about the “spell”: Sophia Paleologus imposed the “curse of the pharaohs” on the books, which she learned about from ancient parchment stored in the same library.
Amber room
The search for this masterpiece has been going on for more than half a century. Their plot is similar to a twisted mystical and detective novel at the same time.
Let's turn to history.
In 1709, Master Schlüter created the Amber Cabinet for the King of Prussia. Friedrich was delighted. But not for long. Strange things began to happen in the room: candles went out and flared up, curtains opened and closed, and the room was regularly filled with mysterious whispers.
“We don’t need such amber!” - the monarch decided. The room was dismantled and put into the basement, and Master Schlüter was expelled from the capital. Friedrich's son and successor, Friedrich Wilhelm, presented the amber room to Peter I.
For several decades, the dismantled office gathered dust somewhere in the royal warehouse until it was discovered by Empress Elizaveta Petrovna. The room was safely assembled in the Winter Palace, but something went wrong.
Within a month, the Empress orders the abbot of the Sestroretsk Monastery to send thirteen of the most pious monks. The monks spend three days in the amber room in fasting and prayer. On the fourth night, the Chernetsy proceed to the procedure of exorcism. For a while the room “calmed down.”
With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the office mysteriously ended up in the Royal Castle of Königsberg. After the Soviet troops stormed Königsberg in April 1945, the amber room disappeared without a trace, and its further fate still remains a mystery.
Repeated searches were undertaken for the missing relic. Everyone who took part in them died under mysterious circumstances.
The Amber Room has been restored. From time to time, original items from the “bad old” amber room that come up at auctions confirm the good work of Russian restorers.
Golden Gate of Vladimir
An outstanding monument of ancient Russian architecture was built under Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky in 1164. In beauty, grandeur and architectural power it surpassed the golden gates of Kyiv, Jerusalem and Constantinople.
The massive oak gates were decorated with cast gold plates. “The prince taught them with gold,” as recorded in the Ipatiev Chronicle.
The gates disappeared in February 1238, when Tatar-Mongol armies approached the city. Khan Batu dreamed of triumphantly entering the city through the Golden Gate. The dream didn't come true. The public execution in front of the Golden Gate of Prince Vladimir Yuryevich, who was captured in Moscow, did not help Batu either.
On the fifth day of the siege, Vladimir was taken, but through a different gate. But the Golden Gate did not open in front of Batu even after the capture of the city. According to legend, the golden plates of the gate were removed and hidden by the townspeople in order to protect the relic from the attacks of the Horde. They hid it so well that they still can’t find it.
They are not in museums or private collections. Historians, having carefully studied the documents of those years and based on the logic of Vladimir’s defenders, suggest that the gold was hidden at the bottom of the Klyazma. Needless to say, neither the search for professionals nor the digging of black archaeologists brought any results.
Meanwhile, the doors of the Golden Gate of Vladimir are listed in the UNESCO registers as a value lost by humanity.
Remains of Yaroslav the Wise
Yaroslav the Wise, son of Vladimir the Baptist, was buried on February 20, 1054 in Kyiv in the marble tomb of St. Clement.
In 1936, the sarcophagus was opened https://www.softmixer.com/2011/06/blog-post_8163.html and they were surprised to find several mixed remains: a man, a woman and several bones of a child. In 1939, they were sent to Leningrad, where scientists from the Institute of Anthropology established that one of the three skeletons belonged to Yaroslav the Wise. However, it remained a mystery who owned the other remains and how they got there.
Yaroslav the Wise
According to one version, Yaroslav’s only wife, the Scandinavian princess Ingegerde, rested in the tomb. But who was Yaroslav’s child buried with him?
With the advent of DNA technology, the question of opening the tomb arose again. The relics of Yaroslav, the oldest surviving remains of the Rurik family, were supposed to “answer” several questions. The main one is: are the Rurik family Scandinavians or Slavs?
On September 10, 2009, looking at the pale anthropologist Sergei Szegeda, the staff of the St. Sophia Cathedral Museum realized that things were bad. The remains of Grand Duke Yaroslav the Wise disappeared, and in their place lay a completely different skeleton and the newspaper “Pravda” for 1964.
The mystery of the newspaper's appearance was quickly solved. It was forgotten by Soviet specialists, the last ones who worked with the bones. But with “self-proclaimed” relics the situation was more complicated. It turned out that these were female remains, and from two skeletons dating back to completely different times! Who these women are, how their remains ended up in the sarcophagus, and where Yaroslav himself disappeared remains a mystery.
Faberge egg. Gift from Alexander III to his wife
Emperor Alexander III presented it as a gift to his wife Maria Feodorovna for Easter in 1887. The egg was made of gold and richly decorated with precious stones; it is surrounded by wreaths of leaves and roses, encrusted with diamonds, and all this brilliant splendor is complemented by three large sapphires.
A Swiss watch movement from the Vacheron & Constantin manufactory is hidden inside. During the revolution, the monarch's gift was confiscated by the Bolsheviks, however, it “did not leave” Russia, as it was mentioned in the Soviet inventory of 1922. However, this was the last “trace” of the precious egg; antique dealers considered it lost.
Imagine the surprise of specialists when an American collector saw a photograph of the masterpiece in the old catalog of the auction house Parke Bernet (now Sotheby’s) for 1964. According to the catalog, the rarity went under the hammer as a simple piece of jewelry, the manufacturer of which was listed as a certain “Clark”.
The royal gift was sold for ridiculous money - $2,450. Experts took heart, as it became known that the egg was in Great Britain at that time, and is unlikely to have been taken outside the country's borders. Most likely, the current owners are not even aware of the true value of the egg. According to experts, its value is now about 20 million pounds.
Kazan Icon of the Mother of God
The holy image was found on July 8, 1579 through the appearance of the Mother of God to the young Matrona, on the ashes of the house of the Kazan archer. The icon, wrapped in an old sleeve, was not damaged at all by the fire. The fact that the image was miraculous became clear immediately. During the very first religious procession, two Kazan blind men regained their sight. In 1612, the icon became famous as the patroness of Dmitry Pozharsky during the battle with the Poles.
Before the Battle of Poltava, Peter the Great and his army prayed precisely in front of the icon of the Kazan Mother of God. The Kazan image of the Mother of God overshadowed Russian soldiers in 1812. Even under Ivan the Terrible, the icon was dressed in a robe of red gold, and Catherine II in 1767, when visiting the Bogoroditsky Monastery, put a diamond crown on the icon.
On June 29, 1904, the icon disappeared. Two shrines were stolen from the temple: the icons of the Kazan Mother of God and the Savior Not Made by Hands. The thief was quickly discovered, the peasant Bartholomew Chaikin, a church thief. The defendant claimed that he sold the precious setting and burned the image itself in the oven. In 1909, rumors appeared that the icon was found among the Old Believers. And it began...
Several prisoners in different prisons immediately admitted that they knew the location of the shrine. Active searches were conducted until 1915, but none of the versions led to the discovery of a miraculous image. Was the icon burned? And where did her precious robe go? This is still one of the greatest mysteries of our history.
Cross of Euphrosyne of Polotsk
The name of this princess-abbess is associated with the creation of the famous cross in 1161 by master jeweler Lazar Bogsha. The masterpiece of ancient Russian jewelry also served as an ark for storing Christian shrines received from Constantinople and Jerusalem.
The six-pointed cross was richly decorated with precious stones, ornamental compositions and twenty enamel miniatures with images of saints. In five square nests located in the middle of the cross, there were relics: drops of the blood of Jesus Christ, a particle of the Cross of the Lord, a piece of stone from the tomb of the Virgin Mary, parts of the relics of Saints Stephen and Panteleimon and the blood of Saint Demetrius. On the sides the shrine was lined with twenty silver plates with gilding and an inscription warning that whoever steals, gives away or sells the shrine will face a terrible punishment.
Despite this, the fear of God's punishment stopped few people. At the turn of the 12th-13th centuries, the cross was taken from Polotsk by the Smolensk princes. In 1514 it passed to Vasily III, who captured Smolensk. In 1579, after the capture of Polotsk by the Poles, the shrine went to the Jesuits. In 1812, the cross was walled up in the wall of the St. Sophia Cathedral away from the eyes of the French. During the years of the revolution, the relic became a museum exhibit in the city of Mogilev.
The museum staff, of course, began to celebrate the mass pilgrimage to the shrine. The cross was moved to storage. It was only missed in the 1960s. It turned out that the cross had disappeared...
More than ten versions of the disappearance of the ancient relic have been developed. There is a version that it needs to be looked for in the museum archives of some provincial Russian town. Or maybe the cross went to one of the top military officials of that time... It is also possible that the cross of Euphrosyne of Polotsk ended up in the United States along with other valuables transferred as payment for American military assistance. But there is an assumption that the cross never left Polotsk at all, and in 1812, they simply forgot to “unwall” the shrine, mistaking one of the many fakes for a real cross.
The submarine fleet of the Kriegsmarine of the Third Reich was created on November 1, 1934 and ceased to exist with the surrender of Germany in World War II. During its relatively short existence (about nine and a half years), the German submarine fleet managed to write itself into military history as the most numerous and deadliest submarine fleet of all times. Thanks to memoirs and films, German submarines, which inspired terror in the captains of sea vessels from the North Cape to the Cape of Good Hope and from the Caribbean Sea to the Strait of Malacca, have long turned into one of the military myths, behind the veil of which real facts often become invisible. Here are some of them.
1. The Kriegsmarine fought with 1,154 submarines built in German shipyards (including the submarine U-A, which was originally built in Germany for the Turkish Navy). Of the 1,154 submarines, 57 submarines were built before the war, and 1,097 were built after September 1, 1939. The average rate of commissioning of German submarines during World War II was 1 new submarine every two days.
Unfinished German submarines of type XXI on slips No. 5 (in the foreground)
and No. 4 (far right) of the AG Weser shipyard in Bremen. In the photo in the second row from left to right:
U-3052, U-3042, U-3048 and U-3056; in the near row from left to right: U-3053, U-3043, U-3049 and U-3057.
On the far right are U-3060 and U-3062
Source: http://waralbum.ru/164992/
2. The Kriegsmarine fought with 21 types of German-built submarines with the following technical characteristics:
Displacement: from 275 tons (type XXII submarines) to 2710 tons (type X-B);
Surface speed: from 9.7 knots (XXII type) to 19.2 knots (IX-D type);
Submerged speed: from 6.9 knots (type II-A) to 17.2 knots (type XXI);
Immersion depth: from 150 meters (type II-A) to 280 meters (type XXI).
The wake of German submarines (Type II-A) at sea during maneuvers, 1939
Source: http://waralbum.ru/149250/
3. The Kriegsmarine included 13 captured submarines, including:
1 English: “Seal” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - U-B);
2 Norwegian: B-5 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UC-1), B-6 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UC-2);
5 Dutch: O-5 (before 1916 - British submarine H-6, in the Kriegsmarine - UD-1), O-12 (in the Kriegsmarine - UD-2), O-25 (in the Kriegsmarine - UD-3 ), O-26 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UD-4), O-27 (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UD-5);
1 French: “La Favorite” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UF-1);
4 Italian: “Alpino Bagnolini” (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-22); "Generale Liuzzi" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-23); "Comandante Capellini" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-24); "Luigi Torelli" (as part of the Kriegsmarine - UIT-25).
Kriegsmarine officers inspect the British submarine Seal (HMS Seal, N37),
captured in the Skagerrak Strait
Source: http://waralbum.ru/178129/
4. During World War II, German submarines sank 3,083 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 14,528,570 tons. The most successful Kriegsmarine submarine captain is Otto Kretschmer, who sank 47 ships with a total tonnage of 274,333 tons. The most successful submarine is U-48, which sank 52 ships with a total tonnage of 307,935 tons (launched on 22 April 1939, and on 2 April 1941 received heavy damage and did not participate in hostilities again).
U-48 is the most successful German submarine. She is in the picture
almost halfway to its final result,
as shown by white numbers
on the wheelhouse next to the boat emblem (“Thrice black cat”)
and the personal emblem of the submarine captain Schulze (“White Witch”)
Source: http://forum.worldofwarships.ru
5. During World War II, German submarines sank 2 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 9 cruisers and 63 destroyers. The largest of the destroyed ships - the battleship Royal Oak (displacement - 31,200 tons, crew - 994 people) - was sunk by the submarine U-47 at its own base at Scapa Flow on 10/14/1939 (displacement - 1040 tons, crew - 45 people).
Battleship Royal Oak
Source: http://war-at-sea.narod.ru/photo/s4gb75_4_2p.htm
Commander of the German submarine U-47 Lieutenant Commander
Günther Prien (1908–1941) signing autographs
after the sinking of the British battleship Royal Oak
Source: http://waralbum.ru/174940/
6. During World War II, German submarines made 3,587 combat missions. The record holder for the number of military cruises is the submarine U-565, which made 21 trips, during which it sank 6 ships with a total tonnage of 19,053 tons.
German submarine (type VII-B) during a combat campaign
approaches the ship to exchange cargo
Source: http://waralbum.ru/169637/
7. During World War II, 721 German submarines were irretrievably lost. The first lost submarine was the submarine U-27, sunk on September 20, 1939 by the British destroyers Fortune and Forester off the coast of Scotland. The latest loss is the submarine U-287, which was blown up by a mine at the mouth of the Elbe after the formal end of World War II (05/16/1945), returning from its first and only combat campaign.
British destroyer HMS Forester, 1942
Submarines dictate the rules in naval warfare and force everyone to meekly follow the routine.
Those stubborn people who dare to ignore the rules of the game will face a quick and painful death in the cold water, among floating debris and oil stains. Boats, regardless of flag, remain the most dangerous combat vehicles, capable of crushing any enemy.
I bring to your attention a short story about the seven most successful submarine projects of the war years.
T type boats (Triton-class), UK
The number of submarines built is 53.
Surface displacement - 1290 tons; underwater - 1560 tons.
Crew - 59…61 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m (riveted hull), 106 m (welded hull).
Full surface speed - 15.5 knots; in underwater - 9 knots.
A fuel reserve of 131 tons provided a surface cruising range of 8,000 miles.
Weapons:
- 11 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber (on boats of subseries II and III), ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 1 x 102 mm universal gun, 1 x 20 mm anti-aircraft "Oerlikon".
HMS Traveler
A British underwater Terminator capable of knocking the crap out of any enemy's head with a bow-launched 8-torpedo salvo. The T-type boats had no equal in destructive power among all the submarines of the WWII period - this explains their ferocious appearance with a bizarre bow superstructure that housed additional torpedo tubes.
The notorious British conservatism is a thing of the past - the British were among the first to equip their boats with ASDIC sonars. Alas, despite their powerful weapons and modern detection means, the T-class high seas boats did not become the most effective among the British submarines of World War II. Nevertheless, they went through an exciting battle path and achieved a number of remarkable victories. “Tritons” were actively used in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean Sea, destroyed Japanese communications in the Pacific Ocean, and were spotted several times in the frozen waters of the Arctic.
In August 1941, the submarines "Tygris" and "Trident" arrived in Murmansk. British submariners demonstrated a master class to their Soviet colleagues: in two trips, 4 enemy ships were sunk, incl. "Bahia Laura" and "Donau II" with thousands of soldiers of the 6th Mountain Division. Thus, the sailors prevented the third German attack on Murmansk.
Other famous T-boat trophies include the German light cruiser Karlsruhe and the Japanese heavy cruiser Ashigara. The samurai were “lucky” to get acquainted with a full 8-torpedo salvo of the Trenchent submarine - having received 4 torpedoes on board (+ another one from the stern tube), the cruiser quickly capsized and sank.
After the war, the powerful and sophisticated Tritons remained in service with the Royal Navy for another quarter of a century.
It is noteworthy that three boats of this type were acquired by Israel in the late 1960s - one of them, INS Dakar (formerly HMS Totem) was lost in 1968 in the Mediterranean Sea under unclear circumstances.
Boats of the "Cruising" type XIV series, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 11.
Surface displacement - 1500 tons; underwater - 2100 tons.
Crew - 62…65 people.
Full surface speed - 22.5 knots; in underwater - 10 knots.
Surface cruising range 16,500 miles (9 knots)
Submerged cruising range - 175 miles (3 knots)
Weapons:
- 2 x 100 mm universal guns, 2 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic guns;
- up to 20 minutes of barrage.
...On December 3, 1941, German hunters UJ-1708, UJ-1416 and UJ-1403 bombed a Soviet boat that tried to attack a convoy near Bustad Sund.
Hans, can you hear this creature?
- Nain. After a series of explosions, the Russians lay low - I detected three impacts on the ground...
-Can you determine where they are now?
- Donnerwetter! They are blown away. They probably decided to surface and surrender.
The German sailors were wrong. From the depths of the sea, a MONSTER rose to the surface - the cruising submarine K-3 series XIV, unleashing a barrage of artillery fire on the enemy. With the fifth salvo, Soviet sailors managed to sink U-1708. The second hunter, having received two direct hits, began to smoke and turned to the side - his 20 mm anti-aircraft guns could not compete with the “hundreds” of the secular submarine cruiser. Scattering the Germans like puppies, K-3 quickly disappeared over the horizon at 20 knots.
The Soviet Katyusha was a phenomenal boat for its time. Welded hull, powerful artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, powerful diesel engines (2 x 4200 hp!), high surface speed of 22-23 knots. Huge autonomy in terms of fuel reserves. Remote control of ballast tank valves. A radio station capable of transmitting signals from the Baltic to the Far East. An exceptional level of comfort: shower cabins, refrigerated tanks, two sea water desalinators, an electric galley... Two boats (K-3 and K-22) were equipped with Lend-Lease ASDIC sonars.
But, oddly enough, neither the high characteristics nor the most powerful weapons made the Katyusha effective - in addition to the dark K-21 attack on the Tirpitz, during the war years the XIV series boats accounted for only 5 successful torpedo attacks and 27 thousand brigades. reg. tons of sunk tonnage. Most of the victories were achieved with the help of mines. Moreover, its own losses amounted to five cruising boats.
K-21, Severomorsk, today
The reasons for the failures lie in the tactics of using Katyushas - the powerful submarine cruisers, created for the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, had to “tread water” in the shallow Baltic “puddle”. When operating at depths of 30-40 meters, a huge 97-meter boat could hit the ground with its bow while its stern was still sticking out on the surface. It was not much easier for the North Sea sailors - as practice has shown, the effectiveness of the combat use of Katyushas was complicated by the poor training of personnel and the lack of initiative of the command.
It's a pity. These boats were designed for more.
“Baby”, Soviet Union
Series VI and VI bis - 50 built.
Series XII - 46 built.
Series XV - 57 built (4 took part in combat operations).
Performance characteristics of boats type M series XII:
Surface displacement - 206 tons; underwater - 258 tons.
Autonomy - 10 days.
Working immersion depth - 50 m, maximum - 60 m.
Full surface speed - 14 knots; in underwater - 8 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 3,380 miles (8.6 knots).
Submerged cruising range is 108 miles (3 knots).
Weapons:
- 2 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 2 torpedoes;
- 1 x 45 mm anti-aircraft semi-automatic.
Baby!
The project of mini-submarines for the rapid strengthening of the Pacific Fleet - the main feature of the M-type boats was the ability to be transported by rail in a fully assembled form.
In the pursuit of compactness, much had to be sacrificed - service on the Malyutka turned into a grueling and dangerous undertaking. Difficult living conditions, strong roughness - the waves mercilessly tossed the 200-ton “float”, risking breaking it into pieces. Shallow diving depth and weak weapons. But the main concern of the sailors was the reliability of the submarine - one shaft, one diesel engine, one electric motor - the tiny “Malyutka” left no chance for the careless crew, the slightest malfunction on board threatened death for the submarine.
The little ones quickly evolved - the performance characteristics of each new series were several times different from the previous project: the contours were improved, the electrical equipment and detection equipment were updated, the dive time was reduced, and the autonomy increased. The “babies” of the XV series no longer resembled their predecessors of the VI and XII series: one-and-a-half-hull design - the ballast tanks were moved outside the durable hull; The power plant received a standard two-shaft layout with two diesel engines and underwater electric motors. The number of torpedo tubes increased to four. Alas, Series XV appeared too late - the “Little Ones” of Series VI and XII bore the brunt of the war.
Despite their modest size and only 2 torpedoes on board, the tiny fish were simply distinguished by their terrifying “gluttony”: in just the years of World War II, Soviet M-type submarines sank 61 enemy ships with a total tonnage of 135.5 thousand gross tons, destroyed 10 warships, and also damaged 8 transports.
The little ones, originally intended only for operations in the coastal zone, have learned to fight effectively in open sea areas. They, along with larger boats, cut enemy communications, patrolled at the exits of enemy bases and fjords, deftly overcame anti-submarine barriers and blew up transports right at the piers inside protected enemy harbors. It’s simply amazing how the Red Navy were able to fight on these flimsy ships! But they fought. And we won!
Boats of the “Medium” type, series IX-bis, Soviet Union
The number of submarines built is 41.
Surface displacement - 840 tons; underwater - 1070 tons.
Crew - 36…46 people.
Working immersion depth - 80 m, maximum - 100 m.
Full surface speed - 19.5 knots; submerged - 8.8 knots.
Surface cruising range 8,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 148 miles (3 knots).
“Six torpedo tubes and the same number of spare torpedoes on racks convenient for reloading. Two cannons with large ammunition, machine guns, explosive equipment... In a word, there is something to fight with. And 20 knots surface speed! It allows you to overtake almost any convoy and attack it again. The technique is good...”
- opinion of the commander of the S-56, Hero of the Soviet Union G.I. Shchedrin
The Eskis were distinguished by their rational layout and balanced design, powerful armament, and excellent performance and seaworthiness. Initially a German project from the Deshimag company, modified to meet Soviet requirements. But don’t rush to clap your hands and remember the Mistral. After the start of serial construction of the IX series at Soviet shipyards, the German project was revised with the aim of a complete transition to Soviet equipment: 1D diesel engines, weapons, radio stations, a noise direction finder, a gyrocompass... - there was not a single one in the boats designated “series IX-bis”. foreign made bolt!
The problems with the combat use of "Medium" type boats, in general, were similar to the K-type cruising boats - locked in mine-infested shallow water, they were never able to realize their high combat qualities. Things were much better in the Northern Fleet - during the war, the S-56 boat under the command of G.I. Shchedrina made the transition through the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, moving from Vladivostok to Polyarny, subsequently becoming the most productive boat of the USSR Navy.
An equally fantastic story is connected with the S-101 “bomb catcher” - during the war years, the Germans and Allies dropped over 1000 depth charges on the boat, but each time the S-101 returned safely to Polyarny.
Finally, it was on the S-13 that Alexander Marinesko achieved his famous victories.
S-56 torpedo compartment
“Cruel alterations in which the ship found itself, bombings and explosions, depths far exceeding the official limit. The boat protected us from everything..."
- from the memoirs of G.I. Shchedrin
Gato type boats, USA
The number of submarines built is 77.
Surface displacement - 1525 tons; underwater - 2420 tons.
Crew - 60 people.
Working immersion depth - 90 m.
Full surface speed - 21 knots; submerged - 9 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 11,000 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 96 miles (2 knots).
Weapons:
- 10 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 24 torpedoes;
- 1 x 76 mm universal gun, 1 x 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun, 1 x 20 mm Oerlikon;
- one of the boats, USS Barb, was equipped with a multiple launch rocket system for shelling the coast.
Ocean-going submarine cruisers of the Getou class appeared at the height of the war in the Pacific Ocean and became one of the most effective tools of the US Navy. They tightly blocked all strategic straits and approaches to the atolls, cut all supply lines, leaving Japanese garrisons without reinforcements, and Japanese industry without raw materials and oil. In battles with the Gatow, the Imperial Navy lost two heavy aircraft carriers, lost four cruisers and a damn dozen destroyers.
High speed, lethal torpedo weapons, the most modern radio equipment for detecting the enemy - radar, direction finder, sonar. The cruising range allows for combat patrols off the coast of Japan when operating from a base in Hawaii. Increased comfort on board. But the main thing is the excellent training of the crews and the weakness of Japanese anti-submarine weapons. As a result, the "Getow" mercilessly destroyed everything - it was they who brought victory in the Pacific Ocean from the blue depths of the sea.
...One of the main achievements of the Getow boats, which changed the whole world, is considered to be the event of September 2, 1944. On that day, the Finback submarine detected a distress signal from a falling plane and, after many hours of searching, found a frightened and already desperate pilot in the ocean . The one who was saved was one George Herbert Bush.
The cabin of the submarine "Flasher", memorial in Groton.
The list of Flasher trophies sounds like a naval joke: 9 tankers, 10 transports, 2 patrol ships with a total tonnage of 100,231 GRT! And for a snack, the boat grabbed a Japanese cruiser and a destroyer. Lucky damn thing!
Electric robots type XXI, Germany
By April 1945, the Germans managed to launch 118 submarines of the XXI series. However, only two of them were able to achieve operational readiness and go to sea in the last days of the war.
Surface displacement - 1620 tons; underwater - 1820 tons.
Crew - 57 people.
Working depth of immersion is 135 m, maximum depth is 200+ meters.
Full speed in the surface position is 15.6 knots, in the submerged position - 17 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 15,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 340 miles (5 knots).
Weapons:
- 6 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 17 torpedoes;
- 2 Flak anti-aircraft guns of 20 mm caliber.
U-2540 "Wilhelm Bauer" permanently moored in Bremerhaven, present day
Our allies were very lucky that all the forces of Germany were sent to the Eastern Front - the Krauts did not have enough resources to release a flock of fantastic “Electric Boats” into the sea. If they appeared a year earlier, that would be it! Another turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Germans were the first to guess: everything that shipbuilders in other countries are proud of - large ammunition, powerful artillery, high surface speed of 20+ knots - is of little importance. The key parameters that determine the combat effectiveness of a submarine are its speed and cruising range while submerged.
Unlike its peers, “Electrobot” was focused on being constantly under water: a maximally streamlined body without heavy artillery, fences and platforms - all for the sake of minimizing underwater resistance. Snorkel, six groups of batteries (3 times more than on conventional boats!), powerful electric. Full speed engines, quiet and economical electric. "sneak" engines.
The stern of U-2511, sunk at a depth of 68 meters
The Germans calculated everything - the entire Elektrobot campaign moved at periscope depth under the RDP, remaining difficult to detect for enemy anti-submarine weapons. At great depths, its advantage became even more shocking: 2-3 times greater range, at twice the speed of any wartime submarine! High stealth and impressive underwater skills, homing torpedoes, a set of the most advanced detection means... “Electrobots” opened a new milestone in the history of the submarine fleet, defining the vector of development of submarines in the post-war years.
The Allies were not prepared to face such a threat - as post-war tests showed, the “Electrobots” were several times superior in mutual hydroacoustic detection range to the American and British destroyers guarding the convoys.
Type VII boats, Germany
The number of submarines built is 703.
Surface displacement - 769 tons; underwater - 871 tons.
Crew - 45 people.
Working immersion depth - 100 m, maximum - 220 meters
Full surface speed - 17.7 knots; submerged - 7.6 knots.
Cruising range on the surface is 8,500 miles (10 knots).
Submerged cruising range 80 miles (4 knots).
Weapons:
- 5 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, ammunition - 14 torpedoes;
- 1 x 88 mm universal gun (until 1942), eight options for superstructures with 20 and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns.
* the given performance characteristics correspond to boats of the VIIC subseries
The most effective warships ever to roam the world's oceans.
A relatively simple, cheap, mass-produced, but at the same time well-armed and deadly weapon for total underwater terror.
703 submarines. 10 MILLION tons of sunk tonnage! Battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, corvettes and enemy submarines, oil tankers, transports with aircraft, tanks, cars, rubber, ore, machine tools, ammunition, uniforms and food... The damage from the actions of German submariners exceeded all reasonable limits - if only Without the inexhaustible industrial potential of the United States, capable of compensating for any losses of the allies, German U-bots had every chance to “strangle” Great Britain and change the course of world history.
U-995. Graceful underwater killer
The successes of the Sevens are often associated with the “prosperous times” of 1939-41. - allegedly, when the Allies appeared the convoy system and Asdik sonars, the successes of the German submariners ended. A completely populist statement based on a misinterpretation of “prosperous times.”
The situation was simple: at the beginning of the war, when for every German boat there was one Allied anti-submarine ship, the “sevens” felt like invulnerable masters of the Atlantic. It was then that the legendary aces appeared, sinking 40 enemy ships. The Germans already held victory in their hands when the Allies suddenly deployed 10 anti-submarine ships and 10 aircraft for each active Kriegsmarine boat!
Beginning in the spring of 1943, the Yankees and British began to methodically overwhelm the Kriegsmarine with anti-submarine equipment and soon achieved an excellent loss ratio of 1:1. They fought like that until the end of the war. The Germans ran out of ships faster than their opponents.
The whole history of the German “seven” is a formidable warning from the past: what threat does a submarine pose and how high are the costs of creating an effective system to counter the underwater threat.
A funny American poster of those years. "Hit the weak points! Come serve in the submarine fleet - we account for 77% of the sunk tonnage!" Comments, as they say, are unnecessary
The article uses materials from the book “Soviet Submarine Shipbuilding”, V. I. Dmitriev, Voenizdat, 1990.
