Unified State Exam. History of Russia

Prince, His Serene Highness Prince (1871), Russian statesman and diplomat, Chancellor of Foreign Affairs (1867), honorary member of the St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences (1856).

From the Gorchakov family. He graduated from the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum (1817; he studied with A.S. Pushkin, and subsequently maintained friendly relations with him). Since 1817, in the diplomatic service (Gorchakov’s mentor at the Foreign Ministry was I. Kapodistrias). As an attaché, he was in the retinue of Emperor Alexander I at the Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821) and Verona (1822) congresses of the Holy Alliance. 1st secretary of the embassy in London (1822-1827) and mission in Rome (1827-1828). Chargé d'affaires in Florence and Lucca (1828/29-1832). Counselor of the embassy in Vienna (1833-1838). He opposed Russia’s orientation toward an alliance with Austria and disagreed on this issue with Foreign Minister K.V. Nesselrode; resigned. Since 1839 again in the diplomatic service. Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary in Württemberg (1841-1854) and part-time during the German Confederation 1815-1866 (1850-1854).

Envoy on Special Assignments (1854-1855) and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Vienna (1855-1856). Achieved Austrian neutrality in . Taking into account the anti-Russian position of Austria, he insisted on accepting all the preconditions for peace (see the article Vienna Conferences of 1854-1855), presented to him in July 1854 on behalf of the Allied powers by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria K. F. Buol.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Russia's defeat in Crimean War prompted Gorchakov to reconsider the goals and methods of Russian foreign policy. They were substantiated by him in a report to Emperor Alexander II, and then set out in a circular sent to the heads of Russian diplomatic missions dated August 21 (09/02), 1856. In it Gorchakov expressed his intention Russian government temporarily abandon active intervention in international relations in order to “devote your concerns to the well-being of your subjects” (phrases from the circular became widely known: “They say that Russia is angry. Russia is not angry. Russia is concentrating”). Gorchakov also emphasized the need to continue to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy. Most important direction Russian foreign policy Gorchakov considered the struggle for the abolition of the terms of the Paris Peace of 1856, which provided for the so-called neutralization of the Black Sea - the prohibition of Russia and the Ottoman Empire to have navy and fortifications on the coast. To achieve this, he initiated the process of rapprochement between Russia and France [in 19.02 (03.03). 1859, a secret agreement was concluded between the two countries on the neutrality of Russia in the event of a Franco-Austrian war and on mutual consultations when changing existing international treaties], but it was interrupted after that , as the French Emperor Napoleon III began to insist on international discussion of the issue of the status of Poland during.

The conclusion between Russia and Prussia of the Alvensleben Convention in 1863, which provided for cooperation between the two countries in suppressing the uprising, as well as the growth international influence Prussia in the 1860s prompted Gorchakov to seek rapprochement with Berlin. Gorchakov took a position of benevolent neutrality towards Prussia during. Taking advantage of the weakening of France during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and Prussia’s interest in Russia’s neutrality, Gorchakov stated that Russia does not consider itself bound by regulations that limited its sovereign rights in the Black Sea [Gorchakov’s circular dated October 19 (31), 1870 representatives of Russia at the courts of the powers that signed the Paris Peace of 1856]. At the London Conference of 1871 (see the article London Conventions on the Straits of 1840, 1841, 1871), Gorchakov’s demands were recognized by the European powers and the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov contributed to the creation of the “Union of Three Emperors” (1873). At the same time, he believed that in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe, France must once again take “its rightful place in Europe.”

In an effort to avoid complications in relations between Russia and Great Britain, Gorchakov opposed offensive actions in Central Asia, on this issue he disagreed with the Minister of War D. A. Milyutin. Under the leadership of Gorchakov, a number of agreements were concluded with China (Argun Treaty of 1858, Tianjin Treaty of 1858), which assigned the Amur region and the Ussuri region to Russia. Signed the compromise Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875 with Japan, according to which Russia, in exchange for Kuril Islands Sakhalin Island was annexed (since 1855 it was jointly owned by both countries). During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, on the initiative of Gorchakov, Russia took a benevolent position towards the government of President A. Lincoln. Gorchakov provided the conclusion Washington Treaty 1867, according to which the territory of Russian America was sold to the United States.

He supported the desire of the Balkan peoples for independence from the Ottoman Empire, at the same time, during the Balkan crisis of the 1870s, he opposed Russia’s armed intervention in the conflict (he changed his position at the end of 1876), and sought to resolve the crisis through diplomatic measures. He concluded a series of agreements with Austria-Hungary, according to which Russia recognized its territorial claims in the western Balkans in exchange for Austria-Hungary’s neutrality in the event of a Russian-Turkish war. After the signing of the Peace of San Stefano in 1878, Gorchakov, fearing the formation of a broad anti-Russian coalition, agreed to international congress discussion of the terms of the concluded peace. At the Berlin Congress of 1878, he was forced to sign the compromise Berlin Treaty of 1878.

In 1879, due to illness, Gorchakov actually resigned from the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During his diplomatic service, Gorchakov gained the trust of the Prussian kings Frederick William IV and William I of Hohenzollern, as well as many minor Italian and German rulers; was in friendly relations with major statesmen: in France - with A. Thiers, in Great Britain - with W. Yu. Gladstone, in Prussia (Germany) - with O. von Bismarck. Gorchakov’s arsenal of diplomatic means was in demand by domestic diplomats in late XIX-XX centuries.

He was awarded the orders of St. Alexander Nevsky (1855), St. Vladimir, 1st degree (1857), St. Andrew the First-Called (1858), etc., as well as the Order of the Legion of Honor, 1st degree (1857).

Famous diplomat, Russian State Chancellor; genus. July 4, 1798; He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he was a friend of Pushkin. In his youth, “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world, a brilliant observer of customs” (as Pushkin characterized him in one of his letters), G., until his late old age, was distinguished by those qualities that were considered most necessary for a diplomat; but, in addition to secular talents and salon wit, he also possessed a significant literary education, which was subsequently reflected in his eloquent diplomatic notes. Circumstances early allowed him to study all the behind-the-scenes springs of international politics in Europe. In 1820-22 he served under Count Nesselrod at congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona; in 1822 he was appointed secretary of the embassy in London, where he remained until 1827; then he was in the same position at the mission in Rome, in 1828 he was transferred to Berlin as an embassy adviser, from there to Florence as a charge d'affaires, in 1833 - as an embassy adviser in Vienna. In 1841 he was sent to Stuttgart to arrange a proposed marriage Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna with the Crown Prince of Württemberg, and after the wedding he remained envoy extraordinary there for twelve years. From Stuttgart he had the opportunity to closely follow the progress of the revolutionary movement in Southern Germany and the events of 1848-49. in Frankfurt am Main. At the end of 1850, he was appointed commissioner to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, retaining his previous post at the Württemberg court. Russian influence then dominated political life Germany. In the restored Union Sejm, the Russian government saw “the guarantee of preserving common peace.” Prince Gorchakov stayed in Frankfurt am Main for four years; there he became especially close friends with the Prussian representative, Bismarck. Bismarck was then a supporter of a close alliance with Russia and ardently supported its policies, for which Emperor Nicholas expressed special gratitude to him (according to the report of the Russian representative at the Diet after G., D. G. Glinka). G., like Nesselrode, did not share the passions of Emperor Nicholas on the Eastern issue, and the beginning of the diplomatic campaign against Turkey aroused great fears in him; he tried to at least contribute to maintaining friendship with Prussia and Austria, as far as this could depend on his personal efforts. In the summer of 1854, G. was transferred to Vienna, where at first he temporarily managed the embassy instead of Meyendorff, who was closely related to the Austrian minister, Count. Buol, and in the spring of 1855 he was finally appointed envoy to the Austrian court. This critical period, when Austria “surprised the world with its ingratitude” and was preparing to act together with France and England against Russia (under the treaty of December 2, 1854), the position of the Russian envoy in Vienna was extremely difficult and responsible. After the death of the emperor. Nicholas, a conference of representatives of the great powers was convened in Vienna to determine the conditions of peace; but the negotiations in which Drouin de Louis and Lord John Rossel participated did not lead to a positive result, partly thanks to the art and perseverance of G. Austria again separated from the cabinets hostile to us and declared itself neutral. The fall of Sevastopol served as a signal for a new intervention by the Vienna cabinet, which itself, in the form of an ultimatum, presented Russia with well-known demands for an agreement with the Western powers. The Russian government was forced to accept the Austrian proposals, and in February 1856 a congress met in Paris to develop a final peace treaty.

The Treaty of Paris on March 18/30, 1856 ended the era of Russia's active participation in Western European political affairs. Count Nesselrode retired, and Prince G. was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (in April 1856). G. felt the bitterness of defeat more than anyone else: he personally endured the most important stages of the struggle against the political hostility of Western Europe, in the very center of hostile combinations - Vienna. The painful impressions of the Crimean War and the Vienna conferences left their mark on G.'s subsequent activities as a minister. General views his attitude to the tasks of international diplomacy could no longer seriously change; his political program was clearly determined by the circumstances under which he had to take over the management of the ministry. First of all, it was necessary to observe great restraint in the first years, while great internal changes were taking place; then Prince Gorchakov set himself two practical goals - firstly, to repay Austria for its behavior in 1854-55, and secondly, to achieve the gradual destruction of the Paris Treaty.

In 1856, Prince. G. avoided participating in diplomatic measures against the abuses of the Neapolitan government, citing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign powers (circ. note 22/10 September); at the same time, he made it clear that Russia was not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but was only gathering strength for the future: “La Russie ne boude pas - elle se recueille.” This phrase had great success in Europe and was accepted as an accurate description of the political situation in Russia after the Crimean War. Three years later, Prince. G. stated that “Russia is leaving the position of restraint that it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.” The Italian crisis of 1859 seriously worried our diplomacy: G. proposed convening a congress to resolve the issue peacefully, and when war turned out to be inevitable, he kept the minor German states from joining the policy of Austria and insisted on the purely defensive significance of the German Confederation (in note 15/27 May 1859). From April 1859, Bismarck was the Prussian envoy in St. Petersburg, and the solidarity of both diplomats regarding Austria did not remain without influence on the further course of events. Russia openly stood on the side of Napoleon III in his conflict with Austria over Italy. There was a noticeable turn in Russian-French relations, which was officially prepared by the meeting of the two emperors in Stuttgart in 1857. But this rapprochement was very fragile, and after the triumph of the French over Austria under Magenta and Solferino, G. again seemed to be reconciled with the Viennese cabinet. In 1860, he considered it timely to remind Europe of the disastrous state of the Christian nations subject to the Turkish government, and expressed the idea of ​​an international conference to revise the provisions of the Paris Treaty on this subject (note May 20/2, 1860); He expressed at the same time that “events in the West responded in the East as encouragement and hope” and that “conscience does not allow Russia to remain silent any longer about the unfortunate situation of Christians in the East.” The attempt was unsuccessful and was abandoned as premature. In October of the same 1860, Prince. G. already speaks of the general interests of Europe, affected by the successes of the national movement in Italy; on the note 10 Oct. (Sept. 28) he hotly reproaches the Sardinian government for its actions regarding Tuscany, Parma, Modena: “this is no longer a question of Italian interests, but of the general interests inherent in all governments; this is a question that has a direct connection with those eternal laws, without of which neither order, nor peace, nor security can exist in Europe. The need to fight anarchy does not justify the Sardinian government, because one should not go along with the revolution in order to take advantage of its inheritance." Condemning the popular aspirations of Italy so sharply, G. retreated from the principle of non-interference, which he proclaimed in 1856 regarding the abuses of the Neapolitan king, and unwittingly returned to the traditions of the era of congresses and the Holy Alliance; but his protest, although supported by Austria and Prussia, had no practical consequences.

The Polish question that appeared on the scene finally upset the nascent “friendship” of Russia with the empire of Napoleon III and consolidated the alliance with Prussia. At the head of the Prussian government in September. 1862 Bismarck rose. Since then, the policy of our Minister has paralleled the bold diplomacy of his Prussian brother, supporting and protecting it as far as possible. Prussia concluded a military convention with Russia on February 8. (March 27) 1863 to facilitate the task of Russian troops in the fight against the Polish uprising. The intercession of England, Austria and France for the national rights of the Poles was decisively rejected by the prince. G., when it took the form of direct diplomatic intervention (in April 1863). Skillful and, in the end, energetic correspondence on the Polish issue gave G. the glory of a top diplomat and made his name famous in Europe and Russia. This was the highest, culminating point of the prince’s political career. G. Meanwhile, his ally, Bismarck, began to implement his program, equally taking advantage of both the dreamy gullibility of Napoleon III and the constant friendship and assistance of the Russian minister. The Schleswig-Holstein dispute escalated and forced the cabinets to postpone concerns about Poland. Napoleon III again floated his favorite idea of ​​a congress (at the end of October 1863) and again proposed it shortly before the formal break between Prussia and Austria (in April 1866), but without success. Book G., approving the French project in principle, objected both times to the practical expediency of the congress under the given circumstances. A war began, which with unexpected speed led to the complete triumph of the Prussians. Peace negotiations were carried out without any interference from other powers; The idea of ​​a congress came to the prince. G., but was immediately abandoned by him, due to his reluctance to do something unpleasant to the victors. Moreover, Napoleon III this time abandoned the idea of ​​a congress in view of Bismarck’s tempting secret promises regarding territorial rewards for France.

The brilliant success of Prussia in 1866 further strengthened its official friendship with Russia. Antagonism with France and mute opposition from Austria forced the Berlin cabinet to firmly adhere to the Russian alliance, while Russian diplomacy could completely retain freedom of action and had no intention of imposing on itself unilateral obligations beneficial exclusively for the neighboring power. The Candiot uprising against Turkish oppression, which lasted almost two years (from the autumn of 1866), gave Austria and France a reason to seek rapprochement with Russia on the basis of the eastern question; the Austrian minister Count Beist even allowed the idea of ​​revising the Paris Treaty for the general improvement of the life of Christian subjects of Turkey. The project of annexing Candia to Greece found support in Paris and Vienna, but was coldly received in St. Petersburg. The demands of Greece were not satisfied, and the matter was limited to the transformation of the local administration on the ill-fated island, allowing for some autonomy of the population. For Bismarck, it was completely undesirable for Russia to achieve anything in the East before the expected war in the West with the assistance of outside powers. Prince G. saw no reason to exchange Berlin friendship for any other; Having decided to follow Prussian policy, he chose to surrender to it with confidence, without doubts or worries. However, serious political measures and combinations did not always depend on the minister or chancellor, since the personal feelings and views of the sovereigns constituted a very important element in the international politics of that time. When the prelude to the bloody struggle broke out in the summer of 1870, Prince G. was in Wildbad and - according to our diplomatic organ, the Journal de St. Petersbourg - was no less amazed than others by the unexpectedness of the break between France and Prussia. “Upon his return to St. Petersburg, he could only fully join the decision made by Emperor Alexander II to keep Austria from participating in the war in order to avoid the need for intervention from Russia. The Chancellor expressed only regret that reciprocity of services had not been agreed upon with the Berlin cabinet, for proper protection of Russian interests" ("Journ. de St. Pet.", March 1, 1883). The Franco-Prussian war was considered inevitable by everyone, and both powers had been openly preparing for it since 1867; Therefore, the absence of preliminary decisions and conditions regarding such an important issue as support for Prussia in its fight against France cannot be considered a mere accident. Obviously, Prince G. did not foresee that the empire of Napoleon III would be so brutally defeated; and yet the Russian government took the side of Prussia in advance and with complete determination, risking drawing the country into a clash with victorious France and its ally Austria and not caring about any specific benefits for Russia, even in the event of the complete triumph of Prussian weapons. Our diplomacy not only kept Austria from interfering, but diligently protected Prussia's freedom of military and political action throughout the duration of the war, until the final peace negotiations and the signing of the Frankfurt Treaty. The gratitude of Wilhelm I, expressed in a telegram on February 14/26, 1871 to the Emperor, is understandable. Alexander II. Prussia achieved its cherished goal and created a powerful new empire with the significant assistance of Prince G., and the Russian chancellor took advantage of this change in circumstances to destroy the 2nd article of the Paris Treaty on the neutralization of the Black Sea. The dispatch of October 17/29, 1870, notifying the cabinets of this decision of Russia, caused a rather sharp response from Lord Grenville, but all the great powers agreed to revise the said article of the Treaty of Paris and again allow Russia to keep a navy in the Black Sea, which was what happened approved by the London Conference in 1871

After the defeat of France mutual relations Bismarck and Gorchakov changed significantly: the German chancellor had outgrown his old friend and no longer needed him. From this time on, a series of bitter disappointments began for Russian diplomacy, which gave a sad, melancholic hue to the entire last period of G.'s activity. Anticipating that the Eastern question would not be slow to arise again in one form or another, Bismarck hastened to arrange a new political combination with the participation of Austria as a counterweight to Russia in East. Russia's entry into this triple alliance, which began in September. 1872, made Russian foreign policy dependent not only on Berlin, but also on Vienna, without any need for that. Austria could only benefit from the constant mediation and assistance of Germany in relations with Russia, and Russia was left to protect the so-called pan-European, i.e., essentially the same Austrian, interests, the range of which was increasingly expanding in the Balkan Peninsula. Having bound himself to this system of preliminary agreements and concessions, Prince G. allowed or was forced to allow the country to be drawn into a difficult, bloody war, with the obligation not to derive any corresponding benefit from it for the state and to be guided in determining the results of victory by the interests and desires of alien and partly hostile cabinets. In minor or extraneous matters, such as, for example, in the recognition of the government of Marshal Serrano in Spain in 1874, Prince. G. often disagreed with Bismarck, but in the essential and most important things he still trustingly obeyed his suggestions. A serious disagreement occurred only in 1875, when the Russian chancellor assumed the role of guardian of France and general peace from the encroachments of the Prussian military party and officially informed the powers of the success of his efforts in a note on April 30 (May 12) of the same year. Book Bismarck harbored irritation and maintained his former friendship in view of the emerging Balkan crisis, in which his participation was required in favor of Austria, indirectly, Germany; later he repeatedly stated that relations with Gorchakov and Russia were spoiled by his “inappropriate” public intercession for France in 1875. All phases of eastern complications were passed through by the Russian government as part of the Triple Alliance, until it came to war; and after Russia fought and dealt with Turkey, the Triple Alliance again came into its own and, with the help of England, determined the final peace conditions most beneficial for the Vienna cabinet.

In April 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey. Even with the declaration of war, the elderly chancellor associated the fiction of authority from Europe, so that the paths to independent and frank defense of Russian interests in Russia were cut off in advance. Balkan Peninsula after the enormous sacrifice of a two-year campaign. Prince G. promised Austria that Russia would not go beyond the limits of the moderate program when concluding peace; in England it was entrusted to gr. Shuvalov to declare that the Russian army would not cross the Balkans, but the promise was taken back after it had already been transferred to the London cabinet - which aroused displeasure and gave another reason for protests. Hesitations, errors and contradictions in the actions of diplomacy accompanied all the changes in the theater of war. The Treaty of San Stefano on February 19 (March 3), 1878, created a vast Bulgaria, but increased Serbia and Montenegro with only small territorial increments, left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Turkish rule and gave nothing to Greece, so almost everyone was extremely dissatisfied with the treaty Balkan peoples and precisely those who made the most sacrifices in the fight against the Turks - Serbs and Montenegrins, Bosniaks and Herzegovinians. The Great Powers had to intercede for the offended Greece, make territorial gains for the Serbs and arrange the fate of the Bosniaks and Herzegovinians, whom Russian diplomacy had previously given under the rule of Austria (according to the Reichstadt Agreement of July 8/June 26, 1876). There could be no question of avoiding the congress, as Bismarck managed after Sadovaya. England was apparently preparing for war. Russia proposed to the German Chancellor to organize a congress in Berlin; between gr. Shuvalov and the Marquis of Salisbury reached an agreement on May 30/12 regarding issues to be discussed between the powers. At the Berlin Congress (from June 1/13 to July 1/13, 1878), Prince G. participated in the meetings little and rarely; he attached particular importance to the fact that part of Bessarabia, taken from it under the Treaty of Paris, should be returned to Russia, and Romania should receive Dobruja in return. England's proposal for the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austrian troops was warmly supported by the chairman of the congress, Bismarck, against the Turkish commissioners; book G. also spoke out for the occupation (meeting on June 16/28). The German Chancellor supported every positively stated Russian demand, but could not, of course, go further than Russian diplomats in protecting Russia's political interests - and our diplomacy, from the beginning of the crisis to the end, acted without clearly defined goals and without deliberate methods of implementation. Blaming Bismarck for our military-political mistakes and shortcomings would be too naive; he himself was confident that Russia would put an end to the eastern question this time and would be able to take advantage of the “beati possidentes” principle, giving Austria and England a certain share of participation in the Turkish inheritance. Prince G. cared primarily about the consent of the powers, about the interests of Europe, about the selflessness of Russia, which, however, did not require such bloody and difficult evidence as war. The destruction of individual articles of the Treaty of Paris, which was more a matter of diplomatic pride than a serious state interest, came to the fore. Later, part of the Russian press brutally attacked Germany and its chancellor as allegedly the main culprit of our failures; There was a cooling between both powers, and in September 1879, Prince Bismarck decided to conclude a special defensive alliance against Russia in Vienna. The political career of Prince Gorchakov ended with the Berlin Congress; From then on, he took almost no part in affairs, although he retained the honorary title of State Chancellor. He died in Baden on February 27. 1883. He ceased to be a minister, even nominally, in March 1882, when N.K. Girs was appointed in his place.

To correctly assess Gorchakov’s entire activity, it is necessary to keep in mind two circumstances. Firstly, its political character was developed and finally established during the reign of Emperor Nicholas, in that era when it was considered obligatory for Russia to take care of the fate of various European dynasties, to work for balance and harmony in Europe, even to the detriment of the real interests and needs of its own country . Secondly, Russian foreign policy is not always directed solely by the foreign minister. Next to Gorchakov, although under his nominal leadership, Count Ignatiev and Count acted on behalf of Russia. Shuvalov, who had little agreement with each other and hardly agreed in many ways with the chancellor himself: this lack of unity was expressed especially sharply in the drafting of the Treaty of San Stefano and in the way it was defended at the congress. Book G. was a sincere supporter of peace and, nevertheless, had to, against his will, bring matters to war. This war, as was stated frankly in the Journal de St.-Pétersbourg after his death, “was a complete overthrow of all political system book Gorchakov, which seemed to him mandatory for Russia for many years to come. When war became inevitable, the Chancellor stated that he could guarantee Russia against a hostile coalition only under two conditions - namely, if the war was short and if the goal of the campaign was moderate, without crossing the Balkans. These views were accepted by the imperial government. Thus, we undertook a half-war, and it could only lead to half-peace." Meanwhile, the war turned out to be real and very difficult, and its comparative futility was partly the result of the half-policy of Prince Gorchakov. His hesitations and half-measures reflected, as it were, a struggle between two directions - the traditional, the ambitious -international, and practical, based on an understanding of the internal interests of the state. This ambiguity of the initial point of view and the lack of an accurate practical program were revealed primarily in the fact that events were never foreseen in advance and always took us by surprise. Bismarck's sober, life-like methods did not have a noticeable impact. on the diplomacy of Prince Gorchakov. The latter still adhered to many outdated traditions and remained a diplomat of the old school, for whom a skillfully written note was a goal in itself. The pale figure of G. could seem bright only due to the absence of rivals in Russia and the calm course of political affairs. .

Since with the name of the prince. G. is closely connected with the political history of Russia during the reign of the Emperor. Alexander II, then information and discussions about him can be found in every historical work related to Russian politics for this quarter of a century. A more detailed, although very one-sided, characterization of our chancellor in comparison with Bismarck was made in the well-known French book Yuliana Klyachko: "Deux Chanceliers. Le prince Gortschakoff et le prince de Bismarck" (P., 1876).

L. Slonimsky.

(Brockhaus)

Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich

d.s. t., member of the State Court. owls from April 15 1856, chancellor; r. 1799, † 27 Feb. 1883 at 84.

(Polovtsov)

Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich

(1798-1883) - a famous Russian diplomat and statesman, from April 1856 - Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and from 1867 - State Chancellor. He was educated at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum and belonged to the galaxy of brilliant high-society youth of the times of Alexander I. From a young age he devoted himself to a diplomatic career. G. received his first acquaintance with the big politics of European courts during the era of restoration and reaction. His first impressions were the congresses in Troppau, Laibach and Verona (1820-1822), which passed resolutions Holy Alliance. His boss was Nesselrode(see), his teachers and examples - Metternich And Talleyrand and a society of high-quality diplomats, where impeccable manners, elegant French speech and subtle wit were combined with a significant dose of aristocratic ignorance and a firm belief that the fate of peoples and states was decided by a skillful game of diplomacy in the recesses of diplomatic offices. After the congresses, G. was secretary of the embassy in London (until 1827) and Rome (until 1828), counselor of the embassy in Berlin (from 1828), charge d'affaires in Florence and (from 1833) counselor of the embassy in Vienna. Having been envoy extraordinary in Stuttgart since 1841, he witnessed the German revolution of 1848. From 1850 he was Russia's representative at the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main. In 1854 he was transferred to Vienna as a temporary envoy, and in 1855 he was confirmed as envoy. With the change in the throne and the retirement of the elderly Nesselrode, Gorchakov was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (April 1856). “A pet of fashion, a friend of the great world” (as A. S. Pushkin, G.’s friend at the Lyceum, once called him), a man not devoid of literary talents and powers of observation, a diplomat who had gone through a great school, G. was well versed in the international situation at that moment , when he took over the leadership of Russian foreign policy, and was smart enough to draw appropriate practical conclusions. After the defeat at Sevastopol, Russia lost its prestige in Europe and was busy internally with the liquidation of the Nicholas regime. G. managed to find a beautiful formula that covered up the difficult experience of the war that had just happened (La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille, i.e. “Russia is not sulking, it is gathering its strength”). But the position of the new minister was very difficult. His task was to maintain the façade of the dilapidated Russian building. absolutism; for the sake of preserving it, again take on such enterprises that, in the international situation of his time, could hardly count on success, despite all the diplomatic dexterity of the minister. Without being a major politician, there would have been nowhere to develop such a thing in Russia at that time. creative activity, - G. was still a talented representative of the diplomatic craft, capable of warning the most dangerous consequences political steps, the absurdity of which lay in the nature of the system tending to decline. G. skillfully got out of difficult situations more than once. His famous "phrases", his brilliant circulars and notes created his fame in Europe. But in the moments of the most difficult international situations, the results of his successes were more than doubtful; his diplomatic victories were sometimes political defeats. And this was not at all explained by a lack of his art, but by the fact that the policy of the Western European powers reflected the upward movement of industry better than the policy of Russian absolutism. capitalism, which in the West is also incomparably more powerful and influential than in Russia. Even before his appointment as minister, G. was a supporter of rapprochement with France. A strong France, in his opinion, should be a counterweight to England and a guarantee of the dismemberment of Germany. G. understood that Russia's liberal policy in Poland strengthens this rapprochement and strengthens Russia's position in relation to the participants in the Polish partitions - Austria and Prussia. But the Russian-French rapprochement was blocked by the strong economic connection between Russia and the German Customs Union, headed by Prussia (the export of Russian grain to Germany and the import of German goods to Russia). The Russian-French friendship, cemented by the Stuttgart meeting (1857), began to weaken the very next day after Magenta and Solferino, because G. was afraid of too great a defeat for Austria and the strengthening of Prussia in Germany. Gorchakov's liberal flirtations with Poland ended in nothing for the same reason. Economically interested in its Polish provinces, Prussia proactively declared its friendship in suppressing the Polish uprising of 1863 and finally thwarted the Russian-French rapprochement. Gorchakov could only go with the flow and speak the language of the emerging Russian. nationalism led by Katkov. As a result, G. found himself connected with Prussia more tightly than it seemed appropriate to him. Bismarck cleverly used Russia for German purposes. the unification that the Russians so feared. G. was forced to stay b. or m. an indifferent witness to the defeat of Austria in 1866 and an involuntary, albeit passive accomplice in the defeat of France in 1870. At the same time, he had to be satisfied with the ambiguous promise of future benefits from Bismarck and actually receive the abolition of the resolutions of the Paris Congress that prohibited Russia from having a fleet in the Black Sea. In the 70s, especially with the beginning of complications in the Balkans (Bosno-Herzegovina uprising), Georgia's policy was aimed at preparing the diplomatically inevitable Russian intervention in Balkan affairs and, if possible, using the new power - Germany - to support the Russians. lust in the East (straits - Constantinople) for the “services” that Russia provided to the German unification. And along the way, bitter disappointments awaited him. A witness to Sevastopol, G. was afraid of a new anti-Russian coalition and was far from a fan of the war with Turkey. But the fear of loss of prestige pushed the Russian. absolutism to small wars of conquest. G. saw himself forced to put up with the agitation of Pan-Slavism and its agents, who were pursuing their own policies behind the back of the government. The result was the Russian-Turkish War, which G. did not want, the Peace of San Stefano, concluded contrary to all previous treaties and agreements with Austria and England, and the “dock” at the Berlin Congress, where the decrepit G. suffered a miserable, sometimes just a funny role. The Berlin Congress was the de facto end political activity Gorchakova. In vain did he warn against a new rapprochement with Germany (the Alliance of the Three Emperors, negotiations began in 1879). They didn’t listen to him, they didn’t take him into account. Due to his illness and constant absences abroad, the management of affairs passed already from 1879 to Giers, who in 1882 was officially appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. G. died in Baden on 27/II 1883.

Alexander Gorchakov was born on June 15, 1798 in the Estonian city of Gapsala in the family of Major General Prince Mikhail Gorchakov and Baroness Elena Dorothea Fersen.

“Gorchakov came from an aristocratic family, albeit not a very rich one, and this largely determined his future life,” the candidate said in an interview with RT historical sciences, Associate Professor, Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov Oleg Airapetov.

The young prince received his education at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where he studied.

However, historians note that, contrary to some stories, Gorchakov was not a close friend of Pushkin.

According to the reviews of his contemporaries, Gorchakov, who was very capable in various fields of knowledge, nevertheless envied Pushkin’s literary talent and, at any opportunity, tried to emphasize his noble origin in the presence of the poet.

“Nevertheless, when Pushkin was sent into exile, Gorchakov was not afraid to visit him in 1825. This is a worthy act for a young official. Although their relationship was still cool then,” Airapetov noted.

• A.S. Pushkin. Portrait of Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883), future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire and Chancellor

Despite this, the poet dedicated several famous poems to his lyceum friend, calling him “happy from the first days” and “a pet of fashion, a friend of the great world.” It is interesting that of the entire “Pushkin” issue, it was Gorchakov who lived the longest life. It so happened that these lines of the great poet were addressed to him:

“Which of us, in our old age, has the day of the Lyceum
Will you have to celebrate alone?
Unhappy friend! among new generations
The annoying guest is both superfluous and alien,
He will remember us and the days of connections,
Closing my eyes with a trembling hand..."

"Solid back"

In 1819, Gorchakov entered service with the rank of chamber cadet. As his teachers said, he was destined to realize himself precisely as a diplomat. In the early 1820s, he was an official under the head of the Russian foreign policy department, Count Karl Nesselrod. Subsequently, Gorchakov served as secretary of the embassies in London and Rome, and also served in various diplomatic posts in Berlin, Florence and Vienna.

“Gorchakov was distinguished by a special feature that, unfortunately, was not characteristic of many other officials both in his era and in other times. He was a man with a strong back, not inclined to bend in front of anyone,” Airapetov noted in a conversation with RT.

The young diplomat did not curry favor with Nesselrode, and when, during a visit to Vienna, Count Alexander Benckendorff, the chief of gendarmes and one of the statesmen closest to Nicholas I, demanded that Gorchakov serve him lunch, he defiantly rang the bell and noted that on such issues It is customary to address the servants. However, such “obstinacy” caused the promising diplomat a lot of trouble.

In 1838, Gorchakov proposed to the niece of his boss Dmitry Tatishchev, Maria, the widow of Ivan Musin-Pushkin and one of the first beauties of Russia. However, Tatishchev, who was looking for a more profitable match for his relative, was set against Gorchakov by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Metternich, who did not like the young diplomat for his intransigence and emphasized “Russianness.” Therefore, in order to get married, Gorchakov pointedly submitted his resignation. And Nesselrode accepted him without question.

• MM. Duffinger. Maria Alexandrovna Musina-Pushkina (detail of miniature)

After the wedding, Gorchakov decided to return to service, but it turned out to be difficult. He was never approved for the post of envoy to the Ottoman Empire, despite the help of his sister Sophia Radziwill and father-in-law Alexander Urusov, the president of the Moscow Palace Office.

“Because of his character, Gorchakov found himself locked into relatively minor envoy positions in the principalities of the German Confederation for more than a decade,” Airapetov said.

Career rise

In 1854, during the Crimean War, Gorchakov served as Russian envoy in Vienna. A year later, he was officially confirmed in this post.

“It was a very responsible place, and Gorchakov showed himself worthily there,” noted Airapetov.

Austria, despite the help that Russia provided it during the revolution of 1848, supported the actions of England and France in the Crimean War. And Gorchakov made every effort to ensure that Vienna did not take new anti-Russian steps. After the death of Nicholas I, Russian diplomats even achieved Austria's transition to a policy of neutrality.

“Gorchakov did not go to the Paris Congress, which resulted in the adoption of enslaving conditions for Russia on the demilitarization of the Black Sea and the seizure of lands in Bessarabia. The diplomats of the outgoing era of Nicholas I had to turn this page. Gorchakov, with whom the future of Russian foreign policy was linked, had nothing to do there,” the expert emphasized.

• Fragment of the panorama “Defense of Sevastopol”

After the end of the Crimean War, Count Nesselrode resigned, and his successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs was Gorchakov, who had proven himself well in Vienna.

“Although Gorchakov is often contrasted with Nesselrode in historiography, this is not entirely true. They were both, as befits diplomats, “people of nuance.” The program tasks that Gorchakov set for the Foreign Ministry largely duplicated what Nesselrode planned to do. He then needed to avoid worsening relations with Austria, improve relations with Prussia and improve relations with France,” said Airapetov.

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Gorchakov needed to change the conditions of the political combination that had developed at any cost. This period of his activity dates back to the famous statement that Russian diplomacy plans to regain control of the Black Sea and Bessarabia without money and without shedding a drop of Russian blood, as well as the words: “Russia is not angry, Russia is concentrating.”

True, historians admit that at first Gorchakov made a mistake in believing that the French Emperor Napoleon III would support Russia. However, he made only vague promises, primarily solving his own foreign policy problems. During the Polish uprising of 1863, France, together with Great Britain and Austria, once again took a tough anti-Russian position. The only European power to side with St. Petersburg was Prussia.

After the Austro-Prussian-Italian War, which led to the strengthening of Prussia, its relations with France sharply deteriorated. For the French, a united Germany was a danger, and a new war was almost inevitable. In this confrontation, Russia relied on Prussia, although domestic diplomats did not rule out that Paris and Vienna would gain the upper hand and then act against the Russians. However, France was the loser.

“Alexander II and Gorchakov decided that both victorious Germany and defeated France no longer cared about the demilitarization of the Black Sea, and England itself would not dare to active actions. And Russia announced that it would no longer comply with the demands of the Paris Congress,” Leonid Lyashenko, candidate of historical sciences, professor of the Department of Russian History at Moscow State Pedagogical University, told RT.

Gorchakov kept his promise. Russia actually reversed the decisions of the Paris Congress bloodlessly and without expense. According to Oleg Airapetov, this was “the peak of Minister Gorchakov’s career.”

For his achievements, the diplomat was awarded the title of lordship, as well as the highest civilian rank of the Russian Empire - chancellor.

In 1872, Gorchakov consolidated his success in Russian-German relations by becoming one of the initiators of the union of Russia, Germany and Austria.

Historians note that some narcissism and a tendency toward narcissism, which were characteristic of Alexander Gorchakov, only progressed with age, which sometimes greatly irritated those around him.

“In Russian historiography they tend to idealize Gorchakov. But this was not an ideal, but a living person with his own advantages and disadvantages. Of course, it’s very bright,” Airapetov noted.

"The Blackest Day"

According to the expert, Gorchakov was a very cautious person.

“After the Crimean War, he was very afraid of creating a new anti-Russian military alliance and therefore kept the tsar from active politics in the Balkans and Central Asia,” Airapetov said.

And yet, in 1877, the Russian authorities, under the influence of the military, declared war on Turkey, which turned out to be very successful for St. Petersburg. And in 1878, a deal beneficial for Russia was concluded. However, the Europeans were not satisfied with his conditions, and they initiated the Berlin Congress.

“In those days, the elderly Gorchakov felt very bad, he could not even stand on his feet, he was carried in a chair. While communicating with a British representative, he mistakenly immediately showed him maps that showed the maximum concessions that St. Petersburg was ready for. And the British diplomat immediately told all the participants of the congress about this. As a result, the negotiations ended according to the worst scenario for Russia and its supporters. Gorchakov later told Alexander II that this was the darkest day in his life. Alexander II responded to this that it was his too,” Lyashenko said in an interview with RT.

• Berlin Congress July 13, 1878

After the Berlin Congress, Gorchakov actually retired and spent a lot of time receiving treatment abroad. In March 1882, he officially resigned as minister, and on April 9 of the same year he died in Baden-Baden. Gorchakov was buried in St. Petersburg. After his death, the rank of chancellor was no longer awarded to anyone.

According to Lyashenko, Gorchakov became one of the first statesmen in the history of the Russian Empire who thought in terms of national interests.

“However, he made the mistake of many of our other outstanding compatriots - he failed to leave on time,” the expert concluded.

GORCHAKOV, ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH(1798–1883), Russian statesman, diplomat, His Serene Highness Prince. He came from an ancient princely family, one of the branches of the Rurikovichs. Born on June 4 (15), 1798 in Gapsala (modern Haapsalu, Estonia) in the family of Major General M.A. Gorchakov. Received an excellent home education. He studied at the gymnasium in St. Petersburg. In 1811 he entered the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum; classmate of A.S. Pushkin, A.A. Delvig, V.K. Kuchelbecker, I.I. Pushchin.

Having graduated from the Lyceum in 1817 with a gold medal, he was accepted into the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the rank of titular adviser. At the end of 1819 he received the rank of chamber cadet. In 1820–1822 – secretary of the head of the Russian foreign policy department K.V. Nesselrode; participant in the congresses of the Holy Alliance in Troppau (October-December 1820), in Laibach (modern Ljublana; January-March 1821) and in Verona (October-December 1822). From December 1822 - first secretary of the embassy in London; in 1824 he received the rank of court councilor. In 1827–1828 - first secretary of the diplomatic mission in Rome; in 1828–1829 – adviser to the embassy in Berlin; in 1829–1832 - chargé d'affaires in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and in the Principality of Lucca. In 1833 he became an adviser to the embassy in Vienna. At the end of the 1830s, due to tense relations with K.V. Nesselrode resigned; lived for some time in St. Petersburg. In 1841 he returned to the diplomatic service; was sent to Stuttgart to arrange the marriage of Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna (1822–1892), second daughter of Nicholas I, with the Hereditary Grand Duke of Württemberg, Karl Friedrich Alexander. After their wedding, he was appointed envoy extraordinary to Württemberg (1841–1854). From the end of 1850 he also served as envoy extraordinary to the German Confederation in Frankfurt am Main (until 1854); made efforts to strengthen Russian influence in small German states and tried to prevent them from being absorbed by Austria and Prussia, which claimed to be the unifiers of Germany; during this period he became close to O. Bismarck, the Prussian representative to the German Confederation.

During the Crimean War of 1853–1856 he tried to prevent the rupture of Russia's relations with Austria and Prussia. As temporary manager of the embassy (1854–1855), and then ambassador plenipotentiary in Vienna (1855–1856), he tried to keep the Austrian government from joining the anti-Russian coalition. Represented Russia at the Vienna Conference of Ambassadors in the spring of 1855; contributed to the preservation of Austrian neutrality; without the knowledge of K.V. Nesselrode entered into separate negotiations with France with the aim of splitting the Anglo-French alliance.

After the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War and the subsequent resignation of K.V. Nesselrode, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 15 (27), 1856. Being a champion of Europeanism (the priority of pan-European interests over national ones), he was nevertheless forced, in the conditions of the collapse of the Holy Alliance system, to pursue a policy that primarily met the state needs of his country. It pursued two main goals: to restore Russia's position in the international arena and to avoid major foreign policy complications and military conflicts in order to ensure the possibility of carrying out reforms within the country. The most urgent task was the fight for the abolition of the restrictions imposed on Russia by the Paris Peace Treaty of March 18 (30), 1856.

In the second half of the 1850s, he set a course for rapprochement with France and isolation of Austria, which dealt Russia a “stab in the back” final stage Crimean War. In September 1857, a meeting between Napoleon III and Alexander II took place in Stuttgart. Russian diplomacy supported France and Sardinia during their war with Austria in 1859. Like France, Russia was hostile to the unification of Italy in 1860. However, attempts by Paris to put pressure on Russia during the Polish uprising of 1863 led to a cooling of Franco-Russian relations. Back at the end of 1862, Russia rejected Napoleon III’s proposal for joint intervention by the European powers in Civil War in the USA on the side of the southerners, and in September 1863 held a naval demonstration in favor of the northerners, sending two of its squadrons to the North American coast.

From the beginning of the 1860s, the Balkan and Western European ones became the two main directions of A.M. Gorchakov’s policy. Russian diplomacy has renewed pressure on Ottoman Empire in defense of the interests of the Christian population in the Balkans: in 1862 she came out in support of the Montenegrins and Herzegovinians, in 1865 - the Serbs, in 1868 - the Cretans. As for Western Europe, here Russia reoriented itself towards an alliance with Prussia: in exchange for Russia’s promise not to interfere with the unification of Germany under Prussian supremacy, O. Bismarck pledged to assist St. Petersburg in revising the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty. Russia maintained neutrality in the Danish-Prussian War of 1864 and provided diplomatic assistance to Prussia during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. The defeat of France, the main guarantor of the Paris Peace, in 1870 allowed A.M. Gorchakov to openly raise the question of its revision: on October 19 (31), 1870, he announced his refusal to comply with the restrictions imposed on Russia (“Gorchakov’s circular”); At the London Conference in January-March 1871, the great powers were forced to agree to the abolition of the “neutralization” of the Black Sea. Russia's sovereign rights in the Black Sea have been fully restored.

Diplomatic successes and the growth of Russia’s international authority in the 1860s and early 1870s strengthened A.M. Gorchakov’s position in the ruling circles of the Empire. In 1862 he became a member of the State Council and Vice-Chancellor, in 1867 - Chancellor, in 1871 - His Serene Highness.

From the beginning of the 1870s, the Balkan issue became the focus of his policy. In an effort to organize an anti-Turkish coalition of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary and to agree with the latter on the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans, he contributed to the creation in 1873 of the Union of Three Emperors - Alexander II, Wilhelm I and Franz Joseph. However, not wanting to establish German hegemony in Europe, in the spring of 1875 he decisively opposed its plans to start new war with France (“Gorchakov’s telegram”); this seriously worsened Russian-German relations.

During the period of aggravation of the situation in the Balkans (Eastern Crisis of 1875–1877), he preferred diplomatic methods of pressure on the Ottoman Empire: he was opposed to a large-scale war, fearing the unification of European powers against Russia. When the Russian-Turkish war became inevitable, he managed to ensure the neutrality of Austria-Hungary by concluding the Budapest Convention with it on January 3 (15), 1877. At the end of the war of 1877–1878 at the Berlin Congress (June-July 1878), he had to, despite the victory of Russian weapons, make serious concessions in the face of a united front of the Western powers, in particular, agree to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary (called the Berlin Congress is the “darkest page” in his biography). At court and in public opinion, the prestige of A.M. Gorchakov was significantly undermined. Since 1879 he actually retired; in 1880 he went abroad for treatment. Officially resigned in March 1882.

He died in Baden-Baden on February 27 (March 11), 1883. He was buried near St. Petersburg in the cemetery of the Trinity-Sergius Primorskaya Desert in the Gorchakov family crypt.

In 1998, the bicentennial anniversary of the birth of A.M. Gorchakov was widely celebrated in Russia.

Ivan Krivushin

Years of life: 1798-1883

From the biography:

• Alexander Mikhailovich Gorchakov was for 26 years Minister of Foreign Affairs - from 1856 to 1882
• This is the last chancellor of the Russian Empire (since 1876). The Chancellor is highest rank civil servant.
• He studied at the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, studied together with A.S. Pushkin. He graduated from the Lyceum with a gold medal and was appointed to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
• An educated person who knows several things foreign languages, from his youth he already possessed the qualities necessary for a diplomat: eloquence, the ability to conduct a dialogue with people on equal terms, and defend his positions.
• Worked in embassies in Berlin, Rome, London, Vienna.
• He was appointed head of the Russian foreign policy department at a difficult time - Russia lost in the Crimean War, the international authority of the state fell sharply.
• From 1856-1882 - Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Since 1882 - retired

Activities of A.M. Gorchakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs

• The purpose of his policy- protecting Russia’s national interests, increasing the country’s international authority. First of all, this is the repeal of the provisions of the Paris Treaty.
• His motto - “Russia is concentrating!”
• 1870 - achieved a humiliating ban for Russia on having a navy on the Black Sea. Russia received the right to build naval bases here.
• Correctly identified the need to conclude an alliance with France in 1859, during the period of aggressive German policy
• Managed to overcome the Polish crisis
• In 1858, the Treaty of Aigun was signed with China on establishing borders, and in 1860, the Treaty of Beijing, which determined the eastern Russian-Chinese border.
• 1867 - agreement with Japan on the peaceful resolution of the conflict over Sakhalin. It was declared “joint ownership.”
• The agreement on the sale of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the United States in 1867 was negative.
• Conducted diplomatic reform a service that not only survived until 1917, but also forms the basis of diplomacy to this day.
• A. Gorchakov's popularity and authority declined sharply after he took an uncertain position during the war with Turkey in 1877-1878 and after the unsuccessful Berlin Congress, when Russia lost almost everything it had won during this war. A. Gorchakov initially understood that Russia was not ready for war.

The main provisions of the diplomatic reform of A.M. Gorchakov

“They say Russia is angry. No, Russia is not angry, but focused »

(The famous phrase of A.M. Gorchakov).

• The main provisions of the reforms were set out in his report to the emperor and in a circular dated August 21, 1856 "Russia is concentrating", sent throughout Europe
• Russia will always follow the course of diplomatic relations with countries.
• Russia will never be unfair to any country
• Russia refrains from active interference in the affairs of other states
• Russia does not intend to sacrifice its national interests to maintain the principles of the Holy Alliance
• Russia considers itself free to choose future friends
• Respect own interests, multi-vector foreign policy, including the readiness to conduct dialogue with any country in any region on an equal, mutually respectful basis - these are the basic principles that should underlie foreign policy
• The diplomatic department, according to A. Gorchakov, should employ people who can protect the interests of Russia. It was necessary to have knowledge of two foreign languages ​​and a diploma of higher education.
• Internal tests were introduced for those aspiring to the diplomatic service.
• Systematization of military archives was carried out. Scientists were allowed to visit them for research. This was the first time in Russia.

Thus. A.M. Gorchakov was an outstanding statesman and a brilliant diplomat. He experienced the burden of fame and experienced the envy of his ill-wishers. It was true patriot countries, distinguished by his enormous efficiency, knowledge of the diplomatic intricacies of his work, courage, self-control, and firmness in defending the interests of Russia.

His contribution was appreciated by his contemporaries, and the modern leadership of Russia also turns to his experience of diplomacy. Thus, one of V.V. Putin’s articles in 2012 was entitled: “Russia is concentrating - the challenges that we must respond to.” And October 13 2014 year, as part of the celebration of the 70th anniversary of MGIMO, a monument to the diplomat was unveiled. Sculptor - Ivan Charapkin.

Material for a historical essay

(1855-1881) Area of ​​activity:

Reasons:

• A sharp decline in Russia's authority due to defeat in the Crimean War
• Unsuccessful diplomatic policy that led to temporary isolation of Russia

Consequence:

• Increasing the international authority of Russia in connection with the strengthening of its military power and reforms in the army
• The victory of Russian diplomacy in decisions related to the denunciation of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty, the establishment of diplomatic relations with many countries, including France and the United States.

Great credit for the successful foreign policy during the reign of Alexander II - A.M.Gorchkova, who headed the foreign department for 26 years, from 1856-1882.

It was the diplomatic talent of this minister, the ability to clearly defend positions, express the national interests of the country, and knowledge of the intricacies of diplomatic negotiations that led to a successful foreign policy. First of all, it should be noted the efforts of A.M. Gorchakov aimed at revising the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Russia was returned the right to have a navy and bases on the Black Sea. This did not happen as a result of the war, but thanks to diplomatic negotiations led by A. Gorchakov.

During the period of A. Gorchakov’s activity, Russia signed agreements with China on borders, with Japan on joint ownership of Sakhalin, and with France. Unfortunately, there were negative results in politics. This included the sale of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands to the United States in 1867, and the unsuccessful Congress of Berlin after the war with Turkey of 1877-1878.

However, in general, it was largely the activities of A.M. Gorchakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russia was able to solve the most important foreign policy problems.

This material can be used in preparation for task No. 25.

Material prepared by: Melnikova Vera Aleksandrovna