Russian War 1904. Reasons for the start and defeat of the Russo-Japanese War: briefly
1904-1905, the reasons for which are known to every schoolchild, had a great influence on the development of Russia in the future. Despite the fact that now it is very easy to “sort out” the prerequisites, causes and consequences, in 1904 it was difficult to imagine such an outcome.
Start
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which will be discussed below, began in January. The enemy fleet, without warning or obvious reasons, attacked the ships of Russian sailors. This happened for no apparent reason, but the consequences were great: the powerful ships of the Russian squadron became unnecessary broken garbage. Of course, Russia could not ignore such an event and on February 10 war was declared.
Causes of the war
Despite the unpleasant episode with the ships, which caused a significant blow, the official and main reason the war was different. It was all about Russia's expansion to the east. This is the underlying reason for the outbreak of war, but it began under a different pretext. The reason for the fury was the annexation of the Liaodong Peninsula, which previously belonged to Japan.
Reaction
How did the Russian people react to such an unexpected start to the war? This clearly outraged them, because how could Japan dare to take on such a challenge? But the reaction of other countries was different. The USA and England determined their position and sided with Japan. Press reports, which were numerous in all countries, clearly indicated negative reaction on the actions of the Russians. France declared a neutral position, as it needed Russian support, but soon it entered into an agreement with England, which worsened relations with Russia. In turn, Germany also declared neutrality, but Russia’s actions were approved in the press.
Events
At the beginning of the war, the Japanese took a very active position. The course of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 could change dramatically from one extreme to the other. The Japanese were unable to conquer Port Arthur, but made many attempts. An army of 45 thousand soldiers was used for the assault. The army met strong resistance from Russian soldiers and lost almost half of its employees. It was not possible to hold the fortress. The cause of the defeat was the death of General Kondratenko in December 1904. If the general had not died, the fortress could have been held for another 2 months. Despite this, Reis and Stoessel signed the act, and the Russian fleet was destroyed. More than 30 thousand Russian soldiers were captured.
Only two battles of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were truly significant. The Mukden land battle took place in February 1905. It was rightfully considered the largest in history. It ended disastrously for both sides.
The second most important battle is Tsushima. It happened at the end of May 1905. Unfortunately, for the Russian army it was a defeat. The Japanese fleet was 6 times larger than the Russian fleet. This could not but affect the course of the battle, so the Russian Baltic squadron was completely destroyed.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which we analyzed above, benefited Japan. Despite this, the country had to pay dearly for its leadership, because its economy was depleted to the point of impossibility. This is what prompted Japan to be the first to propose the terms of a peace treaty. In August, peace negotiations began in the city of Portsmouth. The Russian delegation was headed by Witte. The conference became a big diplomatic breakthrough for the domestic side. Despite the fact that everything was moving towards peace, violent protests took place in Tokyo. The people did not want to make peace with the enemy. However, peace was still concluded. At the same time, Russia suffered significant losses during the war.
Just look at the fact that the Pacific Fleet was completely destroyed, and thousands of people sacrificed their lives for the sake of their Motherland. And yet, Russian expansion in the East was stopped. Of course, the people could not help but discuss this topic, because it was clearly clear that the tsarist policy no longer had such power and might. Perhaps this is what caused the spread of revolutionary sentiments, which ultimately led to the famous events of 1905-1907.
Defeat
The results of the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are already known to us. And yet, why did Russia fail and could not defend its policy? Researchers and historians believe that there are four reasons for this outcome. Firstly, the Russian Empire was very isolated from the world stage diplomatically. That is why only a few supported her policy. If Russia had support in the world, it would be easier to fight. Secondly, Russian soldiers were not ready for war, especially in difficult conditions. The effect of surprise, which played into the hands of the Japanese, cannot be underestimated. The third reason is very banal and sad. It consists of multiple betrayals of the Motherland, betrayal, as well as the complete mediocrity and helplessness of many generals.
The results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were also losing because Japan was much more developed in the economic and military spheres. This is what helped Japan gain a clear advantage. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the causes of which we examined, was a negative event for Russia, which exposed all its weaknesses.
Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 - this is an imperialist war for the seizure of colonies, for the establishment of monopoly rights in the Far Eastern market; at the same time, this war was an attempt to resolve the imperialist contradictions between a number of powers seeking to divide China.
The pursuit of super-profits by Russian military-feudal imperialism caused the expansion of Russian capital to the East; however, here the aggressive policy of the autocracy came into conflict with the imperialist interests of Japanese capital. The imperialist aspirations of Russian and Japanese capital in the Far East found their resolution in the war.
Tsarist Russia and Japan went through the stage of joint participation with Germany, England, Italy, France, the USA and other countries in the international punitive expedition that suppressed the popular uprising in China. The punitive expedition was undertaken in order to prepare for the further division of China; This once again confirms that at a certain stage of development of contradictions between imperialists, the latter can temporarily combine their efforts for joint seizures.
The Russo-Japanese War is important stage in the development of military art. Such new phenomena as mass armies, smokeless gunpowder, rapid-fire artillery, repeating rifles, and new means of communication also led to new forms of war. Mass armies lead to an expansion of the front of the struggle. New fire weapons make a frontal attack more difficult and encourage efforts to envelop and envelop, which in turn further expands the battle front. The need to use the power of fire in order to force the enemy to turn around, as well as the need to deploy at a considerable distance from the enemy with an increased width of the front, lead to an increase in the duration of the battle, which was discovered for the first time in the Russian-Japanese War. http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_l/levic00.html
The cause of the war was Russian expansion in Manchuria. In May 1896, Russia obtained from China a concession for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) from Harbin to Port Arthur, and in March 1898, a lease for the southern part of the Liaodong Peninsula (Kwantung) and Port Arthur, which soon turned into its main naval base in the Far East. In 1900, taking advantage of the Yihetuan uprising in China, Russian troops occupied Manchuria. However, Russia's attempt to maintain its military presence there encountered opposition from Japan, Great Britain and the United States, who did not want to increase Russian influence in Northern China. In January 1902, Japan and Great Britain signed alliance treaty, directed against Russia. In this situation, Russia was forced to conclude an agreement with China in March 1902, undertaking to withdraw its troops from Manchuria within eighteen months, but delayed its implementation in every possible way, which led to a sharp deterioration in its relations with Japan. In March 1903, Russia demanded that China provide guarantees that it would not lease any part of Manchu territory to another power without its consent; The Chinese government, with the support of Japan and Great Britain, refused. In July 1903, Japan proposed to Russia a plan for dividing spheres of influence in Northern China, but subsequent negotiations were unsuccessful. January 23 (February 5), 1904 Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia. http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/istoriya/RUSSKO-YAPONSKAYA_VONA.html
The main reasons for the start of the Russo-Japanese War were:
- an attempt to capture foreign markets for the developing domestic economy;
- clash of Russian and Japanese interests in the Far East;
- the desire to enrich the wealth of Korea and China, Russia and Japan;
- Russian imperial expansion to the East;
- the desire of the tsarist government to distract the people from revolutionary uprisings.
The main reason for the outbreak of war between Japan and Russia in 1904 lies on the surface 1 . The geopolitical ambitions of these powers collided in Northeast Asia. But as with many armed conflicts, the immediate causes of the war are more complex.
These include Russia’s plans to build a railway in the Russian Far East, and Japan’s victory in the war with China in 1895, and the project of some St. Petersburg guards officers to open a logging enterprise on the Yalu River, and Tokyo’s concerns about St. Petersburg’s influence in Korea. Erratic, fickle diplomacy also played a big role.
But, as with the outbreak of the First World War, a clear understanding of how the Russo-Japanese conflict broke out can take us beyond the bounds of historical scholarship.
The answer concerns an important but often elusive concept of diplomacy, namely honor 2 . When attempts to encroach on the international authority of a state can be considered as dangerous as a military invasion of its territory. Alexander II once stated that in the life of states, as in the life of any person, there are moments when you need to forget everything except protecting your own honor 3 .
CONFUSION ON PEVCHESKY BRIDGE
Russia and Japan had been heading toward war since 1895, when the Japanese spectacularly defeated the Chinese in a brief conflict over Korea. Russia's attempt to prevent Japan from gaining a foothold on Chinese territory caused extreme indignation in the island empire. Russian intervention began after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki Peace Treaty on April 17, 1895, which marked the end of the Sino-Japanese War. Among the demands of the Japanese side was the possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, located not far from Beijing, with the strategically important naval base of Port Arthur. The Qing Dynasty agreed to cede rights to the peninsula, but St. Petersburg attracted Berlin and Paris to jointly demand the concession of Liaodong to Russia.
The Russian demarche came after heated debates among the dignitaries of Nicholas II, caused primarily by the proximity Eastern Siberia to the theater of military operations of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The main goal of the Romanovs was ice-free access to the Pacific Ocean. Owning the Pacific port of Vladivostok, surrounded by freezing seas, Russia did not have a convenient harbor washed by warm waters for the terminal station of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was then under construction. Prominent Russian naval commanders believed that the time had come to capture the port in Korea. This idea was enthusiastically shared by Nicholas II. Lacking the necessary support to take such a step, Foreign Minister Prince Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky proposed an agreement with Tokyo on a new port in the region.
But there was another point of view. Its most influential supporter was Finance Minister Sergei Witte, who considered good relations with China essential for the development of the Russian Far East. He had no doubt that the Romanovs would eventually dominate China. But the empire must go towards this peacefully and using economic methods. Russian and Chinese railways, banks, trading houses, and not troops, must compete with each other. Among other things, Witte often reminded Nikolai: “... for general position affairs within Russia, it is essential to avoid anything that could cause external complications" 4 .
As a result, after the Peace of Shimonoseki, Russia played more of a role as a defender of Beijing. The Minister of Finance quickly reaped dividends from the Chinese goodwill. He secured the consent of the Zongli Yamen (Chinese Foreign Office - Translator's note) to build the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, which significantly shortened the eastern section of the railway. And on June 3, 1896, the two empires entered into a secret agreement on joint confrontation in the event of possible aggression from Japan 5 .
However, just a year later, Emperor Nicholas abruptly changed course. Imitating his cousin William, who had captured Qingdao, he occupied southern part Liaodong Peninsula, which included Port Arthur. Three years later, the Cossacks unexpectedly entered the hereditary provinces of the Qing dynasty in Manchuria. Although Nicholas's diplomats officially promised to withdraw them, the military did not budge and even planned a campaign against neighboring Korea.
Such inconstancy reflected deep divisions in the Far Eastern policy of St. Petersburg. Unwavering Supporter friendly relations Sergei Witte remained with China, supported by Count Vladimir Lamsdorf, Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1900 to 1906. A coalition of “hawks” opposed it, including at various times naval commanders, Lamsdorf’s predecessor Count Mikhail Muravyov, a retired guards captain and the dubious businessman Alexander Bezobrazov and the Imperial Governor in the Russian Far East, Admiral Evgeny Alekseev. However, disagreements did not prevent the opponents from agreeing on one thing: Russia should play an active role in Northeast Asia.
"KOREA FOR MANCHURI"
Japanese dignitaries also agreed on one thing: main goal The geopolitics of their country was Korea, a hermit state that had long been a tributary of the Qing dynasty. However, by the end of the 19th century, China's progressive weakness led to the weakening of its rule on the peninsula and opened the door for stronger powers to operate there. The latter included Japan, which, during the Meiji Restoration, ended medieval isolation and became a modern state with a Europeanized army and its own colonial aspirations.
The simple logic of geography pointed to Korea as one of the main targets of the genro, the group of nine statesmen who determined the policy of the empire. At its narrowest point, only 60 kilometers separated Japan from Korea.
Already in 1875, Japanese troops clashed with the Koreans on the island of Ganghwa, and 20 years later the empire began a war with China, weakening its influence on the hermit country. As the Western powers divided China into spheres of influence, the Genro decided that they could fulfill their colonial ambitions by giving Russia a dominant role in Manchuria in exchange for their control of Korea. For the next eight years, the slogan “Man-Kan kokan” (“Korea for Manchuria”) became one of the leading imperatives of Japanese foreign policy 6 .
On April 13, 1898, Baron Rosen, the Russian envoy, and Japanese Foreign Minister Tokujiro Nishi signed a joint protocol in Tokyo recognizing Japanese economic dominance in Korea. But at the same time, both sides pledged to defend the country's political sovereignty. Rosen himself called the treaty “incomplete and meaningless,” and the Japanese also did not have the best opinion of it 7 .
Over the next four years, as Russia increasingly distanced itself from Korean affairs, Japan made repeated attempts to achieve official recognition of its primacy on the peninsula. However, Russian diplomats were unable to obtain permission from the government for such a turn in policy. As Alexander Izvolsky, then envoy to Tokyo, explained, both the tsar and his admirals “were too interested in Korea” 8 . At the same time, Lamsdorff feared Japanese hostility, warning in letters to Witte, General Kuropatkin and to the Minister of the Navy Tyrtov: if Russia is unable to pacify a new serious rival, then “a clear danger of an armed clash with Japan” will remain 9.
When the Japanese government was headed by Marquis Hirobumi Ito, cool heads prevailed in Tokyo. Since the Peace of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Marquis was inclined to a cautious policy towards Russia. One of the most prominent statesmen of the Meiji era, Ito had great authority among both dignitaries and the emperor. But despite this, in May 1901 his cabinet lost the confidence of parliament, and a new prime minister, Prince Taro Katsura, took office. The younger members of his cabinet were much more aggressive towards Russia 10 .
True, Marquis Ito, who found himself outside the government, did not give up. During a private visit to St. Petersburg in November 1901, he looked for ways to pursue a policy of reconciliation. The experienced dignitary received a warm welcome in St. Petersburg and was awarded the Order of St. by Nicholas II. Alexander Nevsky, and during meetings with Witte and Lamsdorff he defended the Korean-Manchurian project. But if the Minister of Finance was sympathetic to this idea, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was still against 11.
Most importantly, while Ito was negotiating with the king and his officials, the Japanese ambassador in London, Count Tadasu Hayashi, secretly concluded a defensive alliance with Great Britain 12 . Russian diplomats were taken by surprise by this news. Two main adversaries in the Far East have joined forces, simultaneously changing the political landscape in the Pacific region.
ST. PETERSBURG CONTINUES CONTINUES
Nicholas II's ministers hastily assured the world that Russian troops would leave Manchuria in the near future. However, even here opinions in St. Petersburg were sharply divided. Count Lamsdorff and Witte believed that Manchuria should be returned as soon as possible. They predicted that the reluctance to calm the atmosphere in the region would cause new unrest there 13 . This point of view was also supported by many Russians - for the simple reasons that there are no less problems at home 14. In addition, the “Kingdom of Witte” - the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) - flourished, and the military presence in Manchuria posed a serious threat to the plans of the Minister of Finance.
However, the idea of preserving Manchuria for Russia had no less influential defenders. The military believed that Manchuria would become part of the Russian Empire like Khiva, Kokand and Bukhara, annexed in the second half of the 19th century 15 . The most prominent "hawk" was Admiral Evgeny Alekseev, who was in Port Arthur. This naval commander had authority not only in the Pacific Fleet, but also among the garrison of the Liaodong Peninsula. His irrepressible temperament and ambition, coupled with rumors that Alekseev was the illegitimate son of Alexander II, ensured that he was the enmity of many of his contemporaries. And above all, Sergei Witte, who saw him as a dangerous rival in the Russian Far East.
The pathologically indecisive Nicholas II hesitated. The empire's confused and unstable policies sharply increased the hostility of other powers. Nevertheless, after a year of difficult negotiations with China, on April 8, 1902, Russia signed an agreement in Beijing, according to which the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria was to take place in three stages over 18 months 16 . On October 8, 1902, the first phase of evacuation of troops began in the southern part of Fengtian Province, including ancient capital Qing Dynasty Mukden (modern Shenyang). But the second stage, planned for April 1903, did not take place; Russian dignitaries were unable to agree among themselves. Petersburg did not keep its word.
"FUTULE NEGOTIATIONS"
In the summer of 1903, Russia and Japan again entered into debate, wanting to resolve their differences in East Asia. Moreover, the initiative was taken by the intractable Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura. By this point, the Russian line had also hardened significantly as the influence of Witte, a principled advocate of peace in East Asia, had plummeted at court. The Tsar called the hard line adopted in the spring of 1903 the “new course” 17. His goal was “to prevent foreign influence in any form from entering Manchuria” 18. Russia will emphasize its determination, he wrote to Alekseev, by embarking on a military and economic presence in East Asia 19 .
Tired of endless bickering among the ministers, Nikolai made two important decisions in the summer. On August 12, he appointed Admiral Alekseev as governor in the Far East, which actually made him the tsar’s personal representative in the Pacific region with full power here 20. And two weeks later, Nikolai removed Alekseev’s main opponent, Sergei Witte, from the post of Minister of Finance 21.
Alekseev's rise caused a sharp reaction in Tokyo. Baron Roman Rosen, the Russian envoy, reported that in Japan the appearance of the governor of the Far East was perceived as an act of aggression 22 . The Japanese were especially offended by the fact that the appointment happened two weeks after their government proposed starting a new round of negotiations 23 .
Throughout 1903, the foreign ministers European countries were confused, alarmed and often irritated by the constant sharp turns of tsarist policy, which exposed Russia to increasing international isolation. But a compromise was still possible even at this late stage. However, the king and his viceroy still did not take Japan seriously.
Nicholas, of course, did not consider endless negotiations a worthy reason to interrupt his long autumn trips abroad or hunting. And he believed that “there will be no war because I don’t want it” 24. As a result of fruitless negotiations until the winter, the Japanese cabinet finally came to the conclusion that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was impossible. On February 6, 1904, Foreign Minister Komura summoned Baron Rosen to announce that the government had lost patience with all these “futile negotiations.” Therefore, it decided to end them and break off diplomatic relations with Russia 25.
Upon returning to his residence, the Russian envoy learned from the naval attaché that earlier that day, at 6 a.m. local time, two Japanese squadrons had weighed anchor for unknown reasons. Shortly after midnight on February 8, 1904, torpedoes from Japanese destroyers hit three Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. Two empires went to war...
CONCLUSION
The Russo-Japanese War is often seen as a classic imperialist conflict. This is only partly true. Although expansionist goals have led St. Petersburg and Tokyo to disagree over Northeast Asia, such rivalry is not unique in the age of aggressive colonial wars. In the decades since the 1880s. and before the outbreak of the First World War, there were repeated clashes between the great states of Europe in Asia and Africa. However, none of them escalated into open war. Disagreements were invariably resolved by “imperial diplomacy,” 27 a tool for solving colonial disputes that were gaining momentum at the end of the 19th century.
An unwritten code governed the relations between the great powers of Europe. Although there were no strictly fixed rules here, they were quite clear. Based on rigid calculation and a sense of fair play, imperialism's diplomacy was effective. Crucial to its success was the understanding by the great powers that they all had legitimate interests outside of Europe. And this line successfully saved countries from open struggle on other continents.
But the diplomacy of imperialism itself was not without flaws. Chief among these was the failure of states to recognize newly developing non-European countries. Like an old-fashioned gentlemen's club, membership was limited to European governments. Thus, the tiny Belgian monarchy was considered a colonial power, while the ambitions of the United States or Japan were questioned. It was precisely this inability of a member of this club - Russia - to take seriously the colonial aspirations of an outsider - Japan - that led on February 8, 1904 to the outbreak of war in East Asia.
Tokyo saw how St. Petersburg trampled on its honor. And statesmen who do not properly respect the interests of other countries have put their own at serious risk. And more than a hundred years later, this conflict has not lost its relevance in international relations.
Translation by Evgenia Galimzyanova
Notes
1. This article is based on the chapter Russia's Relations with Japan before and after the War: An Episode in the Diplomacy of Imperialism from the book: The Treaty of Portsmouth and its Legacies. Steven Ericson and Alan Hockley, eds. Hanover, NH, 2008. pp. 11-23, as well as in my monograph: Schimmelpenninck van der Oye D. Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan. DeKalb, 2001.
2. Honor Among Nations: Intangible Interests and Foreign Policy. Elliot Abrams, ed. Washington, DC, 1998; Tsygankov A.P. Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations. Cambridge, 2012. P. 13-27.
3. Wohlforth W. Honor as Interest in Russian Decisions for War 1600-1995 // Honor Among Nations...
4. Witte to Nicholas II, memorandum, August 11, 1900 // RGIA. F. 560. Op. 28. D. 218. L. 71.
5. Collection of treaties between Russia and other states in 1856-1917. M., 1952. S. 292-294.
6. Nish I. The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, 1985. P. 45.
7. Rosen R.R. Forty Years of Diplomacy. Vol. 1. London, 1922. P. 159.
8. A.P. Izvolsky L.P. Urusov. Letter dated March 9, 1901 // Bakhmetyevsky archive. Box 1.
9. V.N. Lamsdorf S.Yu. Witte, A.N. Kuropatkin and P.P. Tyrtov. Letter dated May 22, 1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 175. L. 2-3.
10. Okamoto S. The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War. N.Y., 1970. P. 24-31.
11. V.N. Lamsdorf, reports 11/20/1901 // GARF. F. 568. Op. 1. D. 62. L. 43-45; V.N. Lamsdorf to Nicholas II, memorandum, 11/22/1901 // Red Archive (M.-L.). 1934. T. 63. P. 44-45; V.N. Lamsdorf A.P. Izvolsky, telegram, November 22, 1901 // Ibid. pp. 47-48.
12. Nish I. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907. L., 1966. P. 143-228.
13. V.N. Lamsdorf A.N. Kuropatkin. Letter dated March 31, 1900 // RGVIA. F. 165. Op. 1. D. 759. L. 1-2. See also: A.N. Kuropatkin V.V. Sakharov. Letter dated July 1, 1901 // Ibid. D. 702. L. 2.
14. Suvorin A. Small letters. New time. 1903. February 22. S. 3; Chinese Railway // New Times. 1902. May 3. S. 2; Kravchenko N. From the Far East. // New time. 1902. October 22. S. 2.
15. Good example For similar opinions, see: I.P. Balashev to Nicholas II, memorandum, March 25, 1902 // GARF. F. 543. Op. 1. D. 180. L. 1-26.
16. Glinsky B.B. Prologue of the Russian-Japanese War: materials from the archive of Count S.Yu. Witte. Pg., 1916. P. 180-183.
17. Although Nikolai coined this term, B.A. Romanov popularized it among historians to describe Bezobrazov's growing influence.
18. Romanov V.A. Russia in Manchuria. Ann Arbor, 1952. R. 284.
19. Ibidem.
20. Nicholas II E.I. Alekseev, telegram, September 10, 1903 // RGAVMF. F. 417. Op. 1. D. 2865. L. 31.
21. Nicholas II S.Yu. Witte, letter, August 16, 1903 // RGVIA. F. 1622. Op. 1. D. 34. L. 1.
22. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 219.
23. Gurko V.I. Facts and Features of the Past. Stanford, 1939. P. 281.
24. MacKenzie D. Imperial Dreams/Harsh Realities: Tsarist Russian Foreign Policy, 1815-1917. Fort Worth, 1994. P. 145.
25. Nish I. The Origins... P. 213.
26. Rosen R.R. Op. cit. Vol. 1. R. 231.
27. The phrase is taken from the title of William Langer’s classic work on European diplomacy at the turn of the 20th century: Langer W.L. The Diplomacy of Imperialism. N.Y., 1956.
* Mikado is the oldest title of the secular supreme overlord of Japan.
Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 was the result of a clash of interests between Russia and Japan in the Far East. Both countries, which experienced in the last decades of the 19th century. processes of internal modernization, at about the same time, intensified foreign policy in this region. Russia was aimed at developing economic expansion in Manchuria and Korea, which were nominally Chinese possessions. However, here she encountered Japan, which was rapidly gaining strength, which was also eager to quickly join in the division of weakened China.
Power rivalry in the Far East
The first major clash between St. Petersburg and Tokyo occurred when the Japanese, having defeated the Chinese in the war of 1894-1895, intended to impose extremely difficult peace conditions on them. The intervention of Russia, supported by France and Germany, forced them to moderate their appetites. But St. Petersburg, acting as a defender of China, strengthened its influence in this country. In 1896, an agreement was signed on the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) through Manchuria, which shortened the route to Vladivostok by 800 km and made it possible to expand the Russian presence in the region. In 1898, Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula was leased, which became the main Russian naval base on Pacific Ocean. It had an advantageous strategic position and, unlike Vladivostok, did not freeze.
In 1900, during the suppression of the so-called Boxer Rebellion, Russian troops occupied Manchuria. It was Tokyo's turn to express its extreme dissatisfaction. Proposals to divide spheres of interest (Manchuria - Russia, Korea - Japan) were rejected by St. Petersburg. Emperor Nicholas II was increasingly influenced by adventurers from his circle who underestimated the strength of Japan. Moreover, as Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve said, “to hold the revolution... a small victorious war is needed.” This opinion was supported by many at the top.
“Maxims” were adopted by the Russian army on May 28, 1895. In the Russo-Japanese War they were used in two forms: with large wheels and a shield, or, as shown in the figure, on a tripod
Meanwhile, Japan was actively preparing for war, increasing its military power. The Japanese army deployed for mobilization numbered over 375 thousand people, 1140 guns, 147 machine guns. The Japanese fleet consisted of 80 warships, including 6 squadron battleships, 8 armored ships and 12 light cruisers.
Russia initially had about 100 thousand people (about 10% of the entire army), 148 guns and 8 machine guns in the Far East. There were 63 Russian warships in the Pacific Ocean, including 7 squadron battleships, 4 armored ships and 7 light cruisers. The remoteness of this region from the center and the difficulties of transportation along the Trans-Siberian Railway had an impact. In general, Russia was noticeably inferior to Japan in terms of readiness for war.
Warriors move
January 24 (February 6, new style) 1904 Japan interrupted negotiations and severed diplomatic relations with Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, which followed on January 28 (February 10), 1904, Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian squadron in Port Arthur on the night of January 26-27 (February 8-9) and damaged two battleships and a cruiser. For the Russian sailors, the attack was sudden, although it was clear from the behavior of the Japanese that they were about to start a war. Nevertheless, the Russian ships stood in the outer roadstead without mine nets, and two of them illuminated the roadstead with searchlights (they were the ones that were hit in the first place). True, the Japanese were not distinguished by their accuracy, although they fired almost point-blank: out of 16 torpedoes, only three hit the target.
Japanese sailors. 1905
On January 27 (February 9), 1904, six Japanese cruisers and eight destroyers blocked the Russian cruiser “Varyag” (commander - Captain 1st Rank V.F. Rudnev) in the Korean port of Chemulpo (now Incheon) and gunboat“Korean” and asked them to surrender. The Russian sailors made a breakthrough, but after an hour-long battle they returned to the port. The heavily damaged "Varyag" was sunk, and the "Korean" was blown up by its crews, who boarded the ships of neutral states.
The feat of the cruiser “Varyag” received wide resonance in Russia and abroad. The sailors were solemnly welcomed to their homeland, they were received by Nicholas II. The song “Varyag” is still popular both in the navy and among the people:
To the top, comrades, everyone is in place! The last parade is coming... Our proud “Varyag” does not surrender to the enemy, No one wants mercy.
Failures at sea haunted the Russians. At the end of January, the mine transport "Yenisei" was blown up and sank on its own minefields, and then the cruiser "Boyarin" sent to its aid. However, the Japanese were blown up by Russian mines more often. So, on May 2 (15), two Japanese battleships exploded at once.
At the end of February, the new commander of the squadron, Vice Admiral S.O. Makarov, a brave and active naval commander, arrived in Port Arthur. But he was not destined to defeat the Japanese. On March 31 (April 13), the flagship battleship Petropavlovsk, moving to help ships attacked by the Japanese, ran into a mine and sank in a matter of minutes. Makarov and his personal friend battle painter V.V. Vereshchagin and almost the entire crew. The command of the squadron was taken by the low-initiative Rear Admiral V.K. Vitgeft. The Russians tried to break through to Vladivostok, but on July 28 (August 10) they were stopped by the Japanese in the battle in the Yellow Sea. In this battle, Vitgeft died, and the remnants of the Russian squadron returned to Port Arthur.
On land, things were also not going well for Russia. In February 1904, Japanese troops landed in Korea and in April reached the border with Manchuria, where they defeated a large Russian detachment on the Yalu River. In April - May, the Japanese landed on the Liaodong Peninsula and interrupted Port Arthur's connection with the main army. In June, Russian troops sent to help the fortress were defeated near Wafangou and retreated to the north. In July the siege of Port Arthur began. In August, the Battle of Liaoyang took place with the participation of the main forces of both sides. The Russians, having a numerical advantage, successfully repulsed the Japanese attacks and could count on success, but the army commander A.N. Kuropatkin showed indecisiveness and ordered a retreat. In September - October, the oncoming battle on the Shahe River ended in vain, and both sides, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive.
The epicenter of events shifted to Port Arthur. For more than one month, this fortress withstood a siege, repelling several assaults. But in the end, the Japanese were able to capture the strategically important Vysokaya Mountain. And after this, General R.I. Kondratenko, who was called the “soul of defense” of the fortress, died. On December 20, 1904 (January 21, 1905), generals A. M. Stessel and A. V. Fok, contrary to the opinion of the military council, surrendered Port Arthur. Russia lost its main naval base, the remnants of its fleet and more than 30 thousand prisoners, and the Japanese freed 100 thousand soldiers for action in other directions.
In February 1905, the largest battle of this war took place, the Battle of Mukden, in which more than half a million soldiers took part on both sides. Russian troops were defeated and retreated, after which active fighting stopped on land.
Tsushima disaster
The final chord of the war was Battle of Tsushima. Back on September 19 (October 2), 1904, a detachment of ships under the command of Vice Admiral 3. P. Rozhestvensky set off from the Baltic to the Far East, which received the name 2nd Pacific Squadron (followed by the 3rd Squadron under the command of Rear Admiral N . I. Nebogatova). They included, in particular, 8 squadron battleships, 13 cruisers different classes. Among them were both new ships, including those that had not yet been properly tested, and outdated ones, unsuitable for ocean voyages and general battles. After the fall of Port Arthur, we had to go to Vladivostok. Having made an exhausting journey around Africa, the ships entered the Tsushima Strait (between Japan and Korea), where the main forces of the Japanese fleet were waiting for them (4 squadron battleships, 24 cruisers different classes and other ships). The Japanese attack was sudden. The battle began on May 14 (27), 1905 at 13:49. Within 40 minutes, the Russian squadron lost two battleships, and then new losses followed. Rozhestvensky was wounded. After sunset, at 20:15, the remnants of the Russian squadron attacked dozens of Japanese destroyers. May 15 (28) at 11 o'clock the remaining ships afloat, surrounded Japanese fleet, St. Andrew's flags were lowered.
The defeat at Tsushima was the most difficult and shameful in the history of the Russian fleet. Only a few cruisers and destroyers managed to escape from the battlefield, but only the cruiser Almaz and two destroyers reached Vladivostok. More than 5 thousand sailors died, and over 6 thousand were captured. The Japanese lost only three destroyers and about 700 people killed and wounded.
There were many reasons for this disaster: miscalculations in the planning and organization of the expedition, unpreparedness for battle, weak command, obvious shortcomings of Russian guns and shells, different types of ships, unsuccessful maneuvering in battle, problems with communications, etc. The Russian fleet was clearly inferior to the Japanese in material terms. and moral preparation, military skill and perseverance.
The Treaty of Portsmouth and the outcome of the war
After Tsushima, the last hopes for a favorable outcome for Russia of the war, in which the Russian army and navy did not win a single major victory, collapsed. In addition, a revolution began in Russia. But both sides were exhausted. Human losses amounted to approximately 270 thousand people. Therefore, both Japan and Russia readily accepted the mediation of US President T. Roosevelt.
On August 23 (September 5), 1905, a peace treaty was signed in the American city of Portsmouth. Russia gave Japan South Sakhalin and its rights to lease Port Arthur and adjacent territories. It also recognized Korea as Japan's sphere of influence.
The Russo-Japanese War had a great influence on military and naval affairs. For the first time, machine guns and rapid-fire cannons were used so widely, light machine guns, mortars, and hand grenades appeared, and experience began to accumulate in the use of radios, searchlights, balloons, and wire barriers with electric current in war. Submarines and new sea mines were used for the first time. Tactics and strategy were improved. The defensive positions combined trenches, trenches, and dugouts. Of particular importance was the achievement of fire superiority over the enemy and close interaction between military branches on the battlefield, and at sea - the optimal combination of speed, fire power and armor protection.
In Russia, the defeat marked the beginning of a revolutionary crisis, which ended with the transformation of the autocracy into a constitutional monarchy. But the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War did not teach the ruling circles of the Russian Empire anything, and eight years later they pushed the country into a new, even more ambitious war - the First World War.
During 1903, negotiations were held between both states, at which the Japanese side offered Russia to carry out a mutually beneficial exchange: Russia would recognize Korea as a sphere of interest for Japan, and in exchange it would receive freedom of action in Manchuria. However, Russia did not want to give up its Korean ambitions.
The Japanese decided to break off the negotiations. On February 4, 1904, in the presence of Emperor Meiji, a meeting of senior statesmen was held, at which it was decided to start a war. Only the Secretary of the Privy Council, Ito Hirobumi, spoke out against it, but the decision was made by an absolute majority of votes. Just a month before many were talking about an imminent and even inevitable war, Nicholas II did not believe in it. The main argument: “They won’t dare.” However, Japan dared.
On February 5, naval attaché Yoshida cut the telegraph line north of Seoul. On February 6, the Japanese envoy in St. Petersburg, Chicken, announced the severance of diplomatic relations, but due to a damaged telegraph line, Russian diplomats and military personnel in Korea and Manchuria did not find out about this in time. Even after receiving this message, the governor in the Far East, General Alekseev, did not consider it necessary to inform Port Arthur and forbade publication of the news in newspapers, citing a reluctance to “disturb society.”
On February 8-9, the Russian fleet was first blocked and then destroyed by the Japanese naval forces in Chimulpo Bay and on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur. Despite plenty of evidence that war was approaching, the attack took the Russian fleet by surprise. After the defeat of the Russian fleet, Japanese troops began unhindered landings in Manchuria and Korea. Some time before, the Korean court asked Russia to send two thousand soldiers to Korea. Ironically, instead of Russian soldiers Japanese troops arrived.
War was officially declared only the day after the attack; newspapers reported this already on February 11.
The Meiji Decree declaring war noted: Russia is going to annex Manchuria, although it has promised to withdraw its troops from there, it poses a threat to Korea and to the entire Far East. There was a lot of truth in this statement, but this does not change the fact that it was Japan that first attacked Russia. Trying to whitewash itself in the eyes of the world community, the Japanese government considered that the war began on the day of the announcement of the severance of diplomatic relations. From this point of view, it turns out that the attack on Port Arthur cannot be considered treacherous. But to be fair, it should be noted that the formal rules of war (its advance declaration and notification of neutral states) were adopted only in 1907, at the Second Peace Conference in The Hague. Already on February 12, the Russian representative Baron Rosen left Japan.
This was the second time in a row last decade when Japan first declared war. Even after Japan broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, few in the Russian government believed that it would dare to attack the European superpower. The opinions of clear-headed politicians and military experts who noted that because of Russia's weakness in the Far East, Japan should make decisive concessions were ignored.
The war began with terrible defeats for the Russian army both on land and at sea. After naval battles in Chimulpo Bay and Tsushima battles Pacific navy Russia as an organized force ceased to exist. On land, the war was not conducted so successfully by the Japanese. Despite some successes in the battles of Liaoyang (August 1904) and Mukden (February 1905), the Japanese army suffered significant losses in killed and wounded. The fierce defense of Port Arthur by Russian troops had a great influence on the course of the war; approximately half of the losses of the Japanese army occurred in the battles to capture the fortress. On January 2, 1905, Port Arthur capitulated.
However, despite all the victories, the immediate future seemed very vague to the Japanese command. It clearly understood: the industrial, human and resource potential of Russia, if assessed from a long-term perspective, was much higher. Statesmen Japan, most distinguished by its sober mind, understood from the very beginning of the war that the country could only withstand one year of hostilities. The country was not ready for a long war. Neither materially nor psychologically, the Japanese had no historical experience of waging long wars. Japan was the first to start a war, and the first to seek peace. Russia Japan Manchuria Korea
At the request of Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutaro, American President Theodore Roosevelt initiated peace negotiations. Preparing the ground for his initiative, Roosevelt in Berlin focused on the Russian danger, and in London on the Japanese one, adding that if not for the position of the United States and England, Germany and France would have already intervened on Russia’s side. Berlin supported him as a mediator, fearing claims to this role from England and France.
On June 10, 1905, the Japanese government agreed to negotiations, although public opinion met this decision with hostility.
Although Russian patriots demanded war to a victorious end, the war was not popular in the country. There were many cases of mass surrender. Russia hasn't won a single one great battle. The revolutionary movement undermined the strength of the empire. Therefore, the voices of supporters of a speedy conclusion of peace became increasingly louder among the Russian elite. On June 12, Russia responded positively to the American president’s proposal, but was slow in terms of the practical implementation of the negotiating idea. The final argument in favor of an early conclusion of peace was the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin. Most researchers believe that Roosevelt pushed Japan to take this step in order to make Russia more willing to negotiate.
Advance elements of the 13th Division landed on the island on July 7. There were almost no regular troops on Sakhalin; the convicts had to be armed. Despite the promise to write off a year of imprisonment for each month of participation in the defense, the vigilantes seemed to number in the hundreds. There was no single leadership; initially the focus was on guerrilla warfare.
Sakhalin was captured by Japanese troops in just a few days. Among the defenders of the island, 800 people died, about 4.5 thousand were captured. The Japanese army lost 39 soldiers.
Peace negotiations were to take place in the small American city of Portsmouth. A huge crowd saw off the Japanese delegation, led by Japanese Foreign Minister Baron Komura YUTAR Yusammi, at the port of Yokohama. Ordinary Japanese were confident that he would be able to extract huge concessions from Russia. But Komura himself knew that this was not so. Already anticipating the reaction of the people to the outcome of the upcoming negotiations, Komura quietly said: “When I return, these people will turn into a rebellious crowd and will greet me with clods of dirt or shooting. Therefore, now it is better to enjoy their cries of “Banzai!”
The Portsmouth Conference began on August 9, 1905. Negotiations proceeded at a rapid pace. Nobody wanted to fight. Both sides have demonstrated a penchant for compromise. The level of the Russian delegation was higher - it was headed by the Emperor's Secretary of State and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Russian Empire S.Yu. Witte. Although a truce was not formally declared, hostilities ceased during the negotiations
Few people in the public expected that Witte, and with him the whole of Russia, would be able to achieve a “favorable” peace. And only experts understood: yes, Japan won, but it was no less drained of blood than Russia. Since Japan waged a predominantly offensive war, its human losses were heavier than in Russia (50 thousand killed in Russia and 86 thousand in Japan). Hospitals were filled with the wounded and sick. The ranks of soldiers continued to be mowed down by beriberi. A quarter of Japanese losses at Port Arthur were caused by this disease. Reservists began to be drafted into the army in the next year of conscription. In total, during the war, 1 million 125 thousand people were mobilized - 2 percent of the population. The soldiers were tired, morale was falling, prices and taxes were rising in the metropolis, and the external debt was increasing.
Roosevelt considered it beneficial for America that as a result of the signing of a peace treaty, neither side would receive a decisive advantage. And then, after the end of the war, both countries will continue their confrontation, and American interests in Asia will not be threatened - there is no “yellow” or “Slavic” danger. Japan's victory had already dealt the first blow to American interests. Convinced that Western states could be resisted, the Chinese became emboldened and began to boycott American goods.
The sympathies of American society were inclined in favor of Russia. Not even so much for Russia itself, but in favor of Witte himself. Komura was short, sickly and ugly. In Japan he was nicknamed "mouse". Gloomy and uncommunicative, Komura was not perceived by most Americans. These impressions were superimposed on the anti-Japanese sentiments that were quite widespread among ordinary “Americans.” More than 100 thousand Japanese emigrants were already living in America at that time. The majority believed that by agreeing to low wages, the Japanese were leaving them without jobs. Trade unions demanded that the Japanese be expelled from the country.
In this sense, the choice of America as a place for negotiations was perhaps not the most pleasant for the Japanese delegation. However, anti-Japanese emotions had no influence on the actual course of the negotiations. Ordinary Americans did not yet know that America had already concluded a secret agreement with Japan: Roosevelt recognized the Japanese protectorate over Korea, and Japan agreed to America's control of the Philippines.
Witte tried to adapt to the Americans. He shook hands with service staff, said pleasantries to journalists, flirted with the anti-Russian Jewish community and tried not to show that Russia needed peace. He argued that there is no winner in this war, and if there is no winner, then there is no loser. As a result, he "save face" and rejected some of Komura's demands. So Russia refused to pay the indemnity. Witte also rejected demands to hand over Russian warships interned in neutral waters to Japan, which was contrary to international law. He also did not agree to the reduction of the Russian military fleet in the Pacific Ocean. For the Russian state consciousness, this was an unheard of condition that could not be fulfilled. However, Japanese diplomats were well aware that Russia would never agree to these conditions, and they put forward them only in order to later, by abandoning them, demonstrate the flexibility of their position.
The peace agreement between Japan and Russia was signed on August 23, 1905 and consisted of 15 articles. Russia recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests on the condition that Russian subjects would enjoy the same privileges as subjects of other foreign countries.
Both states agreed to completely and simultaneously evacuate all military formations that were in Manchuria and return it to Chinese control. The Russian government stated that it was renouncing special rights and preferences in Manchuria that were incompatible with the principle of equality.
Russia ceded in favor of Japan its rights to lease Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territories and territorial waters, as well as all rights, benefits and concessions associated with this lease. Russia also gave Japan railway, which connected Chang Chun and Port Arthur, as well as all the coal mines that belonged to this road.
Komura also managed to achieve a territorial concession: Japan received part of the already occupied Sakhalin. Of course, Sakhalin did not then have of great importance, neither geopolitical nor economic, but as another symbol of space, expanding, it was not at all superfluous. The border was established along the 50th parallel. Sakhalin was officially declared a demilitarized zone and both states agreed not to build any military facilities on it. The La Perouse and Tatar straits were declared a free navigation zone.
In essence, Japan's leaders got everything they sought. Finally, they wanted recognition of their "special" interests in Korea and partly in China. Everything else can be considered as an optional application. The instructions that Komura received before the start of negotiations talked about the “optionality” of indemnity and annexations of Sakhalin. Komura was bluffing when he demanded the entire island at the beginning of the negotiations. Having received half of it, he achieved unconditional success. Japan beat Russia not only on the battlefield, but also in the diplomatic game. In the future, Witte spoke about the treaty in Portsmouth as his personal success (he received the title of count for this), but in reality there was no success. Yamagata Aritomo claimed that Witte's tongue was worth 100 thousand soldiers. However, Komura managed to talk him down. But he did not receive any title.
In November 1905, a Japanese-Korean agreement was concluded to establish a protectorate over Korea. The palace where the negotiations took place was surrounded by Japanese soldiers just in case. The text of the agreement belonged to Ito Hirobumi. He was considered an opponent of this war, but this did not prevent him from being among those who took advantage of its fruits with the greatest success. According to the terms of the agreement, Korea did not have the right, without the consent of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to conclude international treaties. Ito Hirobumi was appointed Governor General of Korea. The dreams of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Saigo Takamori finally came true: Korea was finally punished for not recognizing itself as a vassal of Japan for several centuries.
Assessing the results of the conference as a whole, they should be recognized as quite realistic for both Japan and Russia - they coincided with the results of the war. Ten years ago, after the victorious war with China, a coalition of European states did not recognize Japan’s encroachment on the role of Far Eastern hegemon. Now everything was different: they accepted Japan into their closed club, which determined the fate of countries and peoples. Striving for parity with the West and literally winning this equality, Japan took another decisive step away from the will of its ancestors, who lived only in the interests of their archipelago. As the subsequent events of the cruel 20th century showed, this departure from traditional way thinking led the country to disaster.
