Sinusitis

Soviet lunar program. Secret expedition of the USSR to the moon - photo archive

As is known, the Soviet Union failed to get ahead of America on the Moon. The N-1, the Soviet answer to the Saturn V, the rocket on which our lunar hopes rested, attempted to take off four times and exploded four times shortly after liftoff. Not wanting to spend millions and billions of rubles on an already lost race, in the mid-1970s the Soviet government forced designers to forget about the Moon.

But was the path that the Soviet Union ultimately took correct? lunar program? Of course, history does not know the subjunctive mood, and it would be too bold to say that if the reins of the program were not in the hands of S.P. Korolev and his successor V.P. Mishin, and, say, in the hands of M.K. Yangel or V.N. Chelomeya, the outcome of the competition with America would have been fundamentally different. However, all unrealized projects of manned flights to our satellite are certainly monuments of domestic design thought, and it is interesting and instructive to remember them, especially now, when flights to the Moon are increasingly being talked about in the future tense.

Train in orbit

From a formal point of view, both the American and Soviet lunar programs consisted of two stages: first a manned flyby of the Moon, then a landing. But if for NASA the first stage was the immediate predecessor of the second and had the same material and technical basis - the Saturn V - Apollo complex, then the Soviet approach was somewhat different. Forced by others.

Lunar spacecraft to fly around the Moon

The photo shows a diagram of the LC for a manned flyby of the Moon from the preliminary design prepared at the V.N. Design Bureau. Chelomeya.
1) Design. The preliminary design of the lunar ship (LK) was prepared at OKB-52 by June 30, 1965. The ship consisted of block "G" - the engine of the emergency rescue system, block "B" - the return vehicle, block "B" - the equipment compartment and the correction engine compartment, block "A" - the pre-acceleration stage for communicating a speed close to the second space speed, for flyby of the Moon.
2) Flight. The ship was to be launched into a reference orbit at an altitude of 186-260 km using a three-stage UR-500K rocket. The separation of the carrier occurred at the 585th second of flight. After an orbit around the Earth, the pre-acceleration block engines were turned on for about 5 minutes, giving the device a speed close to the second cosmic speed. The block was then separated. Along the way, three orbit corrections were carried out using the B block engines. It was planned to conduct 12 launches without a crew and up to ten launches with an astronaut on board.

The first calculations made at the Royal OKB-1 at the very beginning of the 1960s showed that in order to land a crew on the Moon, it would be necessary to first launch about 40 tons of payload into low-Earth orbit. Practice has not confirmed this figure - during lunar expeditions, the Americans had to launch three times more cargo into orbit - 118 tons.

Pre-acceleration block “A” is separated from compartment “B” (correction engines) by a metal truss. Characteristics of LC. Crew: 1 person // Ship weight at launch: 19,072 kg // Ship weight during flight to the Moon: 5187 kg // Return vehicle weight: 2457 kg // Flight duration: 6−7 days.

But even if we take the figure of 40 tons as a starting point, it was still obvious that Korolev had nothing to lift such a load into orbit. The legendary “seven” R-7 could “pull” a maximum of 8 tons, which means it was necessary to re-create a special super-heavy rocket. The development of the N-1 rocket was started in 1960, but S.P. Korolev was not going to wait for a new carrier to appear. A manned flyby of the Moon, he believed, could be carried out with cash.

His idea was to launch several relatively light blocks into orbit using the “sevens”, from which, by docking, it would be possible to assemble a ship to fly around the Moon (L-1). By the way, the name of the Soyuz spacecraft came from this concept of connecting blocks in orbit, and the immediate ancestor of the entire line of workhorses of the domestic cosmonautics was the 7K module. Other modules of the royal “train” had indexes 9K and 11K.

So, it was necessary to launch into orbit a capsule for the crew, a container with fuel, upper stages... From the initial plan to assemble the ship from just two parts, OKB-1 designers gradually came to a whole space train of five devices. Considering that the first successful docking in orbit in history occurred only in 1966, during the flight of the American spacecraft Gemini-8, then it is obvious that the hope for docking in the first half of the 1960s smacked of a gamble.

Crew: 2 people // Ship weight at launch: 154 t // Ship weight during flight to the Moon: 50.5 t // Return vehicle weight: 3.13 t // Flight time to the Moon: 3.32 days // Duration flight: 8.5 days.

Carrier for megatons

At the same time, V.N. Chelomey, Korolev’s main competitor, who headed OKB-52, had his own space ambitions and his own weighty arguments. Since 1962, branch No. 1 of OKB-52 (now the State Scientific Research Center named after M.V. Khrunichev) began designing the UR-500 heavy rocket. The UR (universal missile) index, which all ballistic missiles of Chelomeev’s “company” had, implied various options for using these products. In particular, the impetus for starting work on the UR-500 was the need for a powerful ballistic missile to deliver super-powerful hydrogen bombs to the territory of a potential enemy - the very “Kuzka mother” that N.S. promised to show to the West. Khrushchev. According to the recollections of Khrushchev’s son Sergei, who worked for Chelomey in those years, the UR-500 was proposed as a carrier of a thermonuclear charge with a capacity of 30 megatons. At the same time, however, it was meant that the new rocket would be able to play important role in manned cosmonautics (we wrote in detail about OKB-52 rocket planes and space planes in No. 9, 2008).

At first, a two-stage version of the rocket was created. When the third stage was still being designed, Chelomey came up with a proposal to fly around the Moon using the three-stage UR-500K - it will be able to launch up to 19 tons into orbit - and a single-module manned spacecraft (MCV), which will be assembled entirely on Earth and will not require any dockings on orbit. This idea formed the basis of a report made by Chelomey in 1964 at OKB-52 in the presence of Korolev, Keldysh and other outstanding designers. The project caused Korolev sharp rejection. He, of course, not without reason believed that his design bureau (unlike Chelomeev’s) had real experience in creating manned spacecraft, and the designer was not at all happy with the prospect of sharing space exploration with his fellow competitors. However, Korolev’s anger was directed not so much against the LK as against the UR-500. After all, this missile was clearly inferior in reliability and sophistication to the well-deserved “seven”, and on the other hand, it had three to four times less payload than the future N-1. But where is it, N-1?

Landing platform of the LK700 ship (model). She had to stay on the moon.

A year has passed, which, one might say, was lost for the Soviet lunar program. Continuing to work on his prefabricated ship, Korolev actually came to the conclusion that this project was untenable. At the same time, in 1965, with the help of the UR-500, the first of four “Protons” - heavy artificial satellites weighing from 12 to 17 tons - was launched into orbit. The R-7 would not have been able to do this. In the end, Korolev had to, as they say, step on the throat of his own song and compromise with Chelomey.

1) Direct landing. “The use of a direct flight pattern without dockings in satellite or ISL orbits, on the one hand, dramatically simplifies the task, reduces the cost and development time and increases the reliability of the task, and on the other hand, allows the ship to be used as a transport one. With the increase in cargo flow to the Moon, the only possible flight scheme will be a direct scheme, in which the entire ship (or all payload) is delivered to the surface of the Moon, as opposed to the unpromising flight scheme with docking in ISL orbit, where most of the cargo remains in the orbit of the Moon (from the text of the draft project).
2) Lunar bases. The UR-700-LK700 complex was designed not only for one-time landings on the Moon, but also for the creation of lunar bases on the Earth’s satellite. The development of the base was planned in three stages. The first launch delivers a heavy unmanned stationary lunar base to the lunar surface. The second launch delivers the crew to the Moon on the LK700 spacecraft, while the base is used as a lighthouse. After the ship lands, its crew moves to a stationary base, and the ship is mothballed until the return flight. The third launch delivers a heavy lunar rover, on which the crew makes expeditions to the Moon.

How to share failure

On September 8, 1965, a technical meeting was convened at OKB-1, to which the leading designers of the Chelomeyev Design Bureau, headed by the General Designer himself, were invited. The meeting was chaired by Korolev, who made the main report. Sergei Pavlovich agreed that the UR-500 was more promising for the lunar flyby project than the “seven”, and suggested that Chelomey focus on refining this carrier. At the same time, he intended to leave the development of a ship to fly around the Moon for himself.

Korolev's enormous authority allowed him to bring his ideas to life. In order to “concentrate the forces of design organizations,” the country’s leadership decided to stop work on the LK project. The 7K-L1 spacecraft was to fly around the Moon, which would lift the UR-500K from the Earth.

The pictures show archival photos of a full-size mock-up of the ship in the launch configuration and the lunar landing version.

On March 10, 1967, the Royal-Chelomeevsky tandem launched from Baikonur. In total, from 1967 to 1970, twelve 7K-L1 were launched, having the status of lunar probes. Two of them went into low-Earth orbit, the rest went to the Moon. The Soviet cosmonauts were looking forward to when one of them would be lucky enough to go to the night star on board the new ship! It turned out that never. Only two flights of the system passed without any problems, while the remaining ten had serious problems. And only twice the cause of failure was the UR-500K missile.

In such a situation, no one dared to risk human lives, and besides, the unmanned tests took so long that during this time the Americans had already managed to fly around the Moon and even land on it. Work on 7K-L1 was stopped.

Hope for a miracle

It seems that few of us have not wondered about the painful national consciousness question: why did the country that launched the first satellite into space and sent Gagarin into orbit lost the lunar race with a “clean score”? Why did the Saturn V super-heavy rocket, as unique as the N-1, perform like clockwork on all flights to the Moon, while our “hope” didn’t even launch a kilogram into low-Earth orbit?

One of the main reasons was named already during the years of perestroika by Korolev’s successor V.P. Mishin. “The construction of the production stand base,” he said in an interview with the Pravda newspaper, “was carried out two years late. And even then it’s stripped down. The Americans could test an entire engine block assembly at their test benches and install it on a rocket without any reassembly and send it into flight. We tested it piece by piece and didn’t dare think about launching 30 fully assembled first stage engines. Then assembling these pieces, of course, without a guarantee of clean lapping.”

It is known that an entire plant was built at the cosmodrome for flight testing of the N-1 rocket. The gigantic dimensions of the rocket did not allow it to be transported in ready-made stages. The rocket was literally completed before launch, including welding work. In other words, the Americans had the opportunity to test their systems and fix problems during ground bench tests and send the finished product into the sky, and the royal designers only had to hope that the “crude,” complex and insanely expensive rocket would suddenly take off and fly. But she didn’t fly.

N-1 rocket (OKB-1, left). From February 1969 to November 1972, four launches of this rocket were made, and all of them ended in failure. The fundamental difference between the N-1 rocket and the OKB-52 projects is the use of oxygen-kerosene engines designed by the Kuznetsov Design Bureau. The NK-33 engines created for the first stage (there were 30 of them, and they were placed in a circle) survived the Soviet lunar project and are still used in Russia, the USA and Japan. VP-700 missile with YARD RO-31 (in the center). Perhaps one of the most exotic projects of the Soviet lunar program. According to the calculations of the authors of the preliminary design, the use of nuclear jet engines in the third stage would significantly increase the mass of payload launched into orbit. Lifting a load of up to 250 tons, such a rocket could be used in the program for the construction of lunar bases. And at the same time, threaten the Earth with a spent reactor falling from the sky. UR-700K missile (OKB-52, right). The design of this super-heavy launch vehicle was based on elements of the UR-500K rocket, later known as the Proton. In the field of power plants, Chelomey worked with the Glushko Design Bureau, which developed powerful engines using highly toxic fuels: amyl (dianitrogen tetroxide) and heptyl (unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine). The use of toxic fuel is one of the reasons why Proton did not launch ships into space with a crew on board. All ready-made blocks from which the UR-700 rocket could be assembled at the cosmodrome fit into dimensions of 4100 mm, which made it possible to transport them on railway platforms. This way it was possible to avoid completing the rocket at the launch site.

Direct fit

Chelomey, Korolev’s eternal rival, had an alternative. Even before the unsuccessful launches of the N-1, in 1964, Vladimir Nikolaevich proposed sending an expedition to land on the Moon using the UR-700 carrier. Such a rocket did not exist, however, according to Chelomey, it could be developed in a very short terms based on mass-produced elements from the UR-500 missile. At the same time, the UR-700 would be superior in power not only to the N-1, which in its heaviest version would be capable (theoretically) of launching 85 tons of cargo into low-Earth orbit, but also to the American Saturn. In the basic version, the UR-700 could lift about 150 tons into orbit, and more “advanced” modifications, including with nuclear engine for the third stage, this figure would be increased to 250 tons. Since all the UR-500 blocks, and therefore the UR-700, fit into the 4100 mm size, they could be easily transported from the factory workshops to the cosmodrome, and only docked there, avoiding welding work and other complex production processes.

In addition to the rocket, the Chelomey Design Bureau proposed its own original concept for a lunar ship, called LK700. What was his originality? As you know, the American Apollo never landed entirely on the Moon. The ship with the return capsule remained in lunar orbit, and the landing module was sent to the surface of the satellite. The Royal Design Bureau followed approximately the same principle when developing its L-3 lunar spacecraft. But the LK 700 was intended for the so-called direct landing on the Moon, without entering lunar orbit. After the end of the expedition, he only left the landing platform on the Moon and went to Earth.

Did Chelomey's ideas really open up a cheaper and faster path for Soviet cosmonautics to land on the Moon? It was not possible to verify this in practice. Despite the fact that in September 1968 the preliminary design of the UR-700-LK-700 system, which comprised many volumes of documentation, was fully prepared, Chelomey was not allowed to make even a full-size mock-up of the launch vehicle. This fact, by the way, refutes the popular belief that due to the emergence of an alternative project, funds allocated for the Soviet lunar program were dissipated, and this allegedly became one of the reasons for its failure.

It was only possible to make a full-size mock-up of the LK-700. It has not survived to this day, but archival photographs and materials from the preliminary design make it possible to visually imagine what a Soviet ship on the Moon might look like.

We thank the employees of OJSC Military-Industrial Corporation NPO Mashinostroeniya for their help - A.V. Blagov, chief specialist of the design complex, and V.A. Polyachenko, assistant scientific secretary of NTS

D. Kennedy proposed a joint program to land on the Moon (as well as launch more advanced meteorological satellites), but, suspecting an attempt to find out the secrets of Soviet rocket and space technology, he refused [ ] . To maintain the championship [ ] in space exploration soviet government initially gave the Korolev design bureau (KB) permission and resources to continue modifying the Vostok and Voskhod type ships and only preliminary preparation lunar manned projects, including the flyby of the Moon assembled in orbit by the 7K-9K-11K complex of the early Soyuz spacecraft project.

Only a few years later, with a great delay relative to the United States, on August 3, the lunar manned program of the USSR was approved by government decree and real large-scale work began on two parallel manned programs: a flyby of the Moon (“Proton” - “Zond/L1)” by 1967 and landing on it (N-1-L3) by 1968 with the start of flight design tests in 1966.

The resolution contained a complete list of all participants in the development of systems for L1 and L3 and prescribed multilateral work in which, it seemed, “no one is forgotten and nothing is forgotten.” Nevertheless, questions about the detailed distribution of work - who issues requirements to whom and for which systems - were debated and the answers to them were signed with private decisions and protocols for another three years.

The design of the L1 and L3 spacecraft and the N-1 rocket units, as well as the development of schemes for expeditions to and to the Moon, began even before the adoption of the program - in 1963. In two next year working drawings of the N-1 rocket were released and the first preliminary designs of lunar spacecraft appeared.

Dozens of government officials needed to understand the production and technical scale of the entire lunar program, determine the full volume of capital construction and make preliminary calculations total necessary costs. The economy of those years did not allow much accurate calculations. Nevertheless, experienced Gosplan economists, with whom Korolev usually consulted, warned that the real figures for the necessary costs would not pass through the Ministry of Finance and Gosplan. Not to mention the costs of a nuclear missile shield, it was necessary to find funds for new proposals for heavy missiles from Chelomey and Yangel.

The calculations submitted to the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers were underestimated. Officials of the State Committee for Defense Equipment, the Council of Ministers and the State Planning Committee made it clear that the documents should not intimidate the Politburo with many billions. There should be no extra costs in the project estimate. Chelomey and Yangel began to prove that their projects were much cheaper. Pashkov, highly knowledgeable in Gosplan policies, advised:

Deploy production with at least four media per year, involve everyone who is needed in the work, but according to a single schedule. And then we will issue more than one resolution. It is unlikely that anyone would dare to close down a work of such magnitude. There will be success - there will be money! Involve as many businesses as possible without delay.

To understand the design contradictions between Korolev, Chelomey and Yangel, D. Ustinov instructed NII-88 to produce an objective comparative assessment possibilities of lunar exploration with carrier variants N-1 (11A52), UR-500 (8K82) and R-56 (8K68). According to the calculations of Mozzhorin and his employees, in order to unconditionally ensure priority over the United States, it is necessary to assemble a 200-ton rocket system in orbit near the Earth with the help of three N-1s. For this you will need three N-1 missiles or twenty UR-500 missiles. In this case, a ship weighing 21 tons will land on the Moon and a ship weighing 5 tons will return to Earth. All economic calculations were in favor of N-1. Thus, N-1 became the main promising carrier for the implementation of the Soviet lunar program and, as it turned out later, main reason her failures.

E-1 - collision with the Moon. Four launches. 1 partial success (Luna-1).
E-1A - collision with the Moon (Luna-2).
E-2 - photographing the far side of the Moon. The launch was planned for October-November 1958. Canceled.
E-2A - photographing the far side of the Moon using the Yenisei-2 photosystem. Completed (Luna-3).
E-2F - canceled due to problems with the Yenisei-3 photosystem. The launch was scheduled for April 1960.
E-3 - photographing the far side of the Moon. Launched in 1960.
E-4 - Atomic explosion on the surface of the Moon. Canceled.
E-5 - entry into lunar orbit. Was planned for 1960.
E-6 - soft landing on the Moon. Was planned for 1960.
E-7 - photographing the surface of the Moon from orbit. Was planned for 1960.

Implementation of the program

The program was implemented according to the same principles as in the United States. At first, attempts were made to reach the surface of the Moon using AMS.

With their help, it was planned to perform a number of important applied tasks:

understand better physical properties lunar surface;
study the radiation situation in near space;
develop technologies for creating delivery vehicles;
demonstrate high level domestic science and technology.

However, unlike the Americans, some of the work, especially those related to the manned aspect of the program, was classified. Before this year, only a few Soviet sources (“Yearbook of the TSB” and the encyclopedia “Cosmonautics”) casually mentioned that the “Zond” apparatus was an unmanned prototype of a ship for circling the Moon, and general and non-specific phrases about future landings of Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon in official sources stopped appearing even earlier - after a year.

In addition, imperfect technology has necessitated the need for redundancy of individual systems. Since a manned flight around the Moon and landing on its surface was a matter of prestige, it was necessary to take maximum measures to prevent casualties in case of emergency situations.

To study the lunar surface, as well as for detailed mapping of possible landing sites for Soviet lunar spacecraft, the Luna series of satellites (representing vehicles for various purposes) were created. Also, special versions of lunar rovers were designed to support landing expeditions.

Lunar Cosmonaut Squad

The lunar group of the Soviet detachment of civilian cosmonauts at the TsKBEM in the Cosmonaut Training Center was actually created in the year. At the same time, before the strictest secrecy was imposed on the Soviet lunar program, Tereshkova spoke to foreign journalists about this and the fact that Gagarin was initially the head of the group during a visit to Cuba. Since then, the group has been documented (as a department for training cosmonaut commanders and researchers for the lunar program), in May it was approved by the Military-Industrial Commission, and in February it was finally formed.

Manned flyby of the Moon (UR500K/Proton-L1/Zond complex)

In different design bureaus there were a number of projects to fly around the Moon, including several launches and assembly of a spacecraft in low-Earth orbit (before the advent of the Proton rocket) and direct flight around the Moon. For the implementation of the flight program, a project was selected and brought to the stage of the last unmanned development launches and flights from the newly created OKB-1 Korolev 7K-L1 spacecraft as part of the Soyuz family and the Chelomey OKB-52 Proton launch vehicle, created somewhat earlier.

submit a schedule for the production and testing of the UR-500 missile within a week;
together with the heads of OKB-1 and OKB-52, S. P. Korolev and V. M. Chelomey, within two weeks, consider and resolve issues about the possibility of unifying the manned spacecraft being developed for flying around the moon and landing an expedition on its surface;
within a month, submit the LCI program for the UR-500 rocket and manned spacecraft.

Nevertheless, both the military-industrial complex and the Ministry of General Machinery found it expedient to continue work based on the use of the Soyuz complex (7K, 9K, 11K) as another option for solving the problems of orbiting the Moon, and also instructed OKB-1 and OKB-52 to work out all the issues use of the UR-500K launch vehicle in the Soyuz complex program.

To fulfill the assignment of the Ministry and the issued instructions, during September-October, a comprehensive assessment of the state of work in OKB-52 and OKB-1 was carried out to implement the tasks of flying around the Moon with the involvement of employees of NII-88 (now TsNIIMASH), the Scientific and Technical Council of the Ministry, the heads of the Ministry, representatives of the government and the Central Committee of the CPSU. During the review, it became clear that OKB-52 is not able to resolve in a timely manner all issues related to the creation and testing of the UR-500 rocket, the rocket upper stage and the LK-1 lunar orbital vehicle. In OKB-1, on the contrary, the state of development of a manned spacecraft of type 7K and upper stage D for the N1-L3 complex was more favorable. This created the basis for the reorientation from OKB-52 to OKB-1 of work on the spacecraft and upper stage D for the flyby of the Moon, including solving a number of problems related to the implementation of the lunar expedition program carried out by the N1-L3 complex.

Flight schedule of 7K-L1 spacecraft (from the beginning of 1967):

Flight	Task	Date
2P		February - March 1967
3P	unmanned flight in highly elliptical orbit	March 1967
4L	unmanned lunar flyby	May 1967
5L	unmanned lunar flyby	June 1967
6L	world's first manned flyby of the Moon	June-July 1967
7L		August 1967
8L	unmanned or manned flyby of the Moon	August 1967
9L	unmanned or manned flyby of the Moon	September 1967
10L	unmanned or manned flyby of the Moon	September 1967
11L	unmanned or manned flyby of the Moon	October 1967
12L	manned lunar flyby	October 1967
13L	reserve

There were turtles on the Zond-5 ship. They became the first living beings in history to return to Earth after flying around the Moon - three months before the Apollo 8 flight.

In the nervous conditions of the “lunar race”, due to the USSR conducting two unmanned flights around the Moon and concealing failures in the L1 program, the United States made a risky rearrangement in its lunar program and made a flyby flight before the previously planned complete testing of the entire Apollo complex in low-Earth orbit. . The Apollo 8 lunar flyby was carried out without a lunar module (which was not yet ready) following the only near-Earth manned orbital flight. This was the first manned launch for the super-heavy launch vehicle Saturn 5.

In the USSR, to ensure priority for the world's first manned flight, the launch of the Zond-7 manned spacecraft as part of the L1 program was planned for December 8, 1968. Due to the fact that previous unmanned flights of the L1 spacecraft were completely or partially unsuccessful due to the lack of development of the ship and the carrier, such a risky flight was canceled - despite the fact that the crews wrote a statement to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee asking for permission to fly to the Moon immediately to get ahead of the United States . Even if permission had been received, the USSR would not have won the flyby stage of the “lunar race” - on January 20, 1969, when trying to launch the Zond-7 spacecraft in unmanned mode, the Proton launch vehicle exploded (the descent module was saved by the emergency rescue system) .

The last unmanned flight of the Soyuz-7K-L1 spacecraft, called Zond-8, was made in October, after which the L1 program was finally closed, since the non-stop flight of the Soviet cosmonauts on the Moon after the Americans landed on it twice was lost meaning.

Moon landing (complex N1-L3)

The leadership of the USSR set the task of ensuring priority also for the world's first landing on the Moon. This was provided for by the first decree of the year in general, and by decree from the beginning of the year the first expedition was prescribed for the third quarter of the year. The Soviet lunar landing program N1-L3 (parallel to the lunar flyby), which actually began in 1966, lagged far behind the American one, mainly due to problems with the carrier. The first two of the year (before the first American expedition), as well as the two subsequent ones, test launches of the new super-heavy launch vehicle N-1 ended in failure. The lunar orbital ship-module 7K-LOK of the L3 complex made one, and the lunar-landing ship-module T2K-LK made three test near-Earth unmanned launches after the first US landing. According to the N1-L3 program, which continued for some time even after the triumph of the United States, the first Soviet expedition could take place only in the year , followed by one to five subsequent ones.

A number of different projects for landing on the Moon were considered: several launches and assembly of a lunar ship from compartments in low-Earth orbit, direct flight to the Moon (without undocking in near-lunar orbit), etc. For a “direct” flight, OKB-52 Chelomeya proposed developing its own spacecraft LK -700 based on its carrier UR-700. This project was rejected as more technically complex and longer to implement. Due to greater developments and less technical risk, the Korolev Design Bureau N1-L3 project with a single-launch launch from the Earth and the division of ship-modules near the Moon into two - remaining on the lunar one - was selected and brought to the stage of unmanned test launches and flights. orbit and landing followed by takeoff and docking. During the development of this project, the “replanting” option with the launch of the entire L3 complex with one launch of the N-1 rocket, but without the cosmonauts, who were to be delivered on board the L3 by a separate launch of the Soyuz spacecraft, was considered as an option, but in the end it was rejected.

The main parts of the rocket and space system for landing on the Moon according to the N-1-L3 project were the Soyuz-7K-LOK lunar orbital ship, the LK lunar landing ship and the N1 super-heavy launch vehicle.

The lunar orbital vehicle was very similar and significantly unified with the Soyuz-7K-LOK near-Earth orbital vehicle and also consisted of a descent vehicle, a living compartment, on which a special compartment was located with orientation and mooring engines and a docking system unit, instrumentation and energy compartments, which housed the “I” rocket unit and units of the power supply system based on oxygen-hydrogen fuel cells. The living compartment also served as an airlock during the astronaut’s transition to the lunar spacecraft through outer space (after putting on the Krechet lunar suit).

The crew of the Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft consisted of two people. One of them had to go through outer space to the lunar ship and land on the Moon, and the second had to wait for the return of his comrade in lunar orbit.

The Soyuz-7K-LOK spacecraft was installed for unmanned flight tests on the N-1 carrier during its fourth (and last) launch in November, but due to the carrier accident it was never launched into space.

The lunar spacecraft LK consisted of a sealed cosmonaut cabin, a compartment with orientation engines with a passive docking unit, an instrument compartment, a lunar landing unit (LLA) and a rocket unit E. The LK was powered by chemical batteries installed externally on the LPA frame and in the instrument compartment. The control system was built on the basis of an on-board digital computer and had a manual control system that allowed the astronaut to independently select the landing site visually through a special window. The lunar landing module had four legs - supports with honeycomb absorbers of excessive vertical landing speed.

The lunar spacecraft LK T2K was successfully tested three times in low-Earth orbit in unmanned mode under the names “Cosmos-379”, “Cosmos-398” and “Cosmos-434”, respectively, in November and February and August.

Flight schedule of L3 ships (from the beginning of the year):

Mission	Target	Date
3L	mock-ups for testing N1	September
4L	reserve
5L	unmanned LOC and LC	December
6L	unmanned LOC and LC	February
7L		April 1968
8L	manned LOK and unmanned LC with landing on the Moon as a backup LC-R	June 1968
9L	manned LOC and unmanned LOC	August 1968
10L	manned LOK and LC with the world's first astronaut landing on the Moon	September 1968
11L	manned LOK and unmanned LC with landing on the Moon as a backup LC-R
12L	manned LOK and LC with landing of an astronaut on the Moon
13L	reserve

In the USA, when developing powerful carriers of the Saturn series, very large volume ground testing of their individual components and assemblies. This allowed the Americans to carry out all test and manned launches of the Saturn 5 rocket without any accidents. The N-1 rocket was developed in the same way as previous less powerful launch vehicles: by eliminating the causes of malfunctions identified during test launches. However, for a structure of this size and complexity, this path turned out to be too long and expensive. A total of four launches of the N-1 rocket were made. All of them ended in accidents even before the end of the first stage. The real disaster was the second launch of the N-1: immediately after taking off from the ground, the rocket caught fire and fell on the launch complex, almost completely destroying it.

The last launch of the N-1 rocket took place on November 23, less than a month before the last flight to the Moon under the Apollo program. After which it was decided that the prospect of visiting the Moon long after the Americans had completed their lunar program did not justify the effort and money spent on it. In May, further work with the N-1 carrier - and with them the entire N-1-L3 program - was finally closed.

July 3, 1969, Baikonur Cosmodrome. In the foreground is the Soviet lunar rocket N-1 (product No. 5L). In the background is a try-on rocket for testing ground launch systems (note that the try-on rocket does not have an escape system).

The closure of the Soviet manned lunar flight program occurred in June 1974, at which time the entire cosmonaut corps was disbanded. The following month, the rockets ready for launch were cut into pieces. The destruction of the technological backlog led to a 15-year lag in the development of astronautics. What is to blame? Why did attempts to get to the moon stop?

It is often said that the industry of the USSR could not create a spacecraft to fly to the Moon, that there was no appropriate technological base. They also say that it was simply impossible to compete with the USA. But the main reason for the failure of the project, which cost 4 billion at 1974 prices. rub., was the inability of various departments to agree among themselves and the personal aspirations of some leaders.

The United States began the lunar program with one goal: to surpass the USSR after the Russians launched the world's first satellite, took pictures of the far side of the Moon, and were the first to launch a man into space. Landing man on the moon was the last chance. To achieve this goal we collected best representatives science, orders were given to the most suitable corporations in the absence of competition. The USSR usually followed this path.

The Soviet lunar program was just a response to the United States. The Moon itself was not of interest to the leaders of OKB-1 Korolev. But the United States issued a challenge and the USSR accepted it. The N-1 rocket project was a continuation of the existing project, which was developed as a means of delivering a hydrogen bomb and launching large-sized complexes into orbit, many times larger than the later Soyuz, Salyut and Mir.

The implementation of the lunar program was not economically feasible. But the CPSU Central Committee did not abandon it. According to the Government Decree, issued in 1960, it was planned to create a new rocket system for launching heavy weapons into orbit. spaceship weighing up to 60-80 tons, creating new rocket engines, control systems and space radio communications. In 1964 it was delivered new goal- a manned flight to the Moon and landing on its surface before the Americans.

The L-1 lunar project became the cause of a fierce struggle between the design bureaus of Korolev and Chelomey. The existing Proton launch vehicle could theoretically make a manned flight around the Moon, but the recollections of participants in the events indicate that Korolev refused to put cosmonauts on a poisonous rocket. The fact is that the fuel for Proton was heptyl, and the oxidizing agent was nitric acid. In Kazakhstan, many poisonings were recorded among local residents who used the first stages of Protons in their households. Official information stated that the use of Proton was abandoned due to too high overloads that the astronauts could not withstand.

A difficult test for the project was the conflict between Korolev and Glushko, as a result of which the latter abandoned the development of an engine for the rocket. The work was transferred to the Kuznetsov design bureau.

It was planned that in lunar project two astronauts will participate, and only one will descend to the surface of the Moon, while the second was supposed to remain in orbit. The first person to walk on the moon was supposed to be A.A. Leonov, Yu.A. was supposed to act as an understudy. Gagarin. The N-1 launch vehicle was designed to deliver the Soyuz spacecraft with a manned lunar module into lunar orbit.

So why didn't it happen? One of the reasons was austerity. Four N-1 launches were unsuccessful due to the first stage, for which a test stand was not built. Since all first stage engines were tested separately, it was impossible to determine the cause of stage failure.

When it became known that the Americans were about to go to the Moon, Leonov was eager to fly, but he was not allowed in, which saved his life. N-1 launched on February 21, 1969 without a crew, six months before the launch of Apollo 11. The rocket exploded shortly after the flight began. The second attempt was carried out on July 3, 1969. The rocket exploded right on the launch pad, almost completely destroying the launch complex. Even then it became clear that we would not be the first to get to the Moon.

Korolev and Gagarin pass away. These two deaths were tantamount to the death of the Russian cosmonautics. And the point is not that there were no other talented designers and trained cosmonauts. Korolev and Gagarin were members of the Kremlin and their opinions were listened to. Korolev not only argued with anyone, regardless of rank, he knew how to present his project in such a way that the military advocated the need for its implementation. The first satellite was a beacon for ballistic missiles. He convinced the military that building a base on the Moon would allow them to keep the whole world under attack. He kept silent about the almost unaffordable cost of the project for the country. The military jumped at the idea. In addition, the N-1 rocket could launch into orbit stations weighing over 100 tons, such as the Zvezda station, which was conceived for military purposes.

Korolev knew how to use the needs and desires of the military for his own purposes, extracting funds for the implementation of his projects. For Korolev himself, the flight to the Moon was only the first step towards a flight to Mars.

The change of management in the design bureau did not bring anything good. Funding decreased significantly, the test stand was not built. The launch complex was restored, but subsequent attempts to launch the rocket were not successful due to the same reason for the failure of the first stage. And the Americans were already accepting congratulations on the successful landing on the Moon. The Soviet lunar program was curtailed, and Mars was also forgotten.

However, another attempt was made. The hopes of the Russian cosmonautics were pinned on the Energia rocket. The tests were successful. But the rocket was buried under the collapsed roof of the assembly and testing building at Baikonur. This put an end to Russia's plans. The United States has become a leader in space exploration. There is no point in trying to compete with them, spending hundreds of billions on flights.

Russia's leadership in space is a thing of the past due to the winding down of the lunar program and a change in leadership in astronautics. Today's undisputed leader is the United States. But if the country’s leadership had not forgotten Tsiolkovsky’s words that the one who conquered space would rule the world, the situation could have turned out differently.

Who can become the leader of tomorrow? Most likely China. His space program quite fantastic, the moon landing project should be completed with the construction of a lunar base by 2021. Many do not believe in the feasibility of this project, but China has already proven that it is capable of very unexpected actions, as evidenced by the ultra-fast growth of its economy.

Photo of the secret lunar program of the USSR

These photographic materials are some of the remaining evidence today that the USSR also tried to land a man on the Moon - obviously, after they could not do this, or, more precisely, did not have time to do it, the program was forgotten.

However, fortunately, few things disappear irrevocably and without a trace. The photographs that we can see show one of the laboratories of the Moscow Aviation Institute, as well as aerospace equipment, including a spacecraft and a lunar landing module.

The history of the “Moon Race” is well known to many contemporaries: before American President John Kennedy initiated the launch of the Apollo program, the Soviet Union was noticeably ahead of the United States in matters of lunar exploration. In particular, in 1959 the automatic interplanetary station “Luna-2” was delivered to the surface of the Moon, and in 1966 a Soviet satellite entered its orbit.

Like the Americans, Soviet scientists developed a multi-step approach to accomplishing the task. They also had two separate modules for orbit and landing.

While the Apollo 11 crew included three members, the entire burden of the Soviet lunar program had to rest on the shoulders of one cosmonaut - thus, the weight of the equipment was significantly reduced. In addition, there were other differences that made the Soviet apparatus lighter. First of all, these include the comparative simplicity of the design, the use of the same engine for landing and takeoff, as well as the lack of a direct connection between the orbital and lunar module. This meant that the astronaut would need to do a spacewalk to transfer to the lander before landing and, later, to climb back into the orbital module after returning from the Moon. After this, the lunar module was disconnected, and the spacecraft was sent to Earth without it.

The main reason that prevented the Soviet side from landing a man on the Moon was failures with launch vehicles. Although the first two test launches were successful, the rocket crashed during the third. In the fourth test, carried out in 1971, the test spacecraft returned to Earth along the wrong trajectory, ending up in Australian airspace, as a result of which an international scandal could have arisen: Soviet diplomats allegedly had to convince the Australians that the object falling on them was a test spacecraft. the Kosmos-434 module, not a nuclear warhead.

After several failures, the program became too expensive, and after the Americans presented the world with documentary evidence of the success of the Apollo 11 mission, it made no sense at all. As a result, space equipment has become something of a museum piece.

Space exploration in the middle of the last century was an extremely important matter for world powers, because it directly testified to their strength and power. The priority of developments in the space industry was not only not hidden from citizens, but, on the contrary, was emphasized in every possible way, instilling a sense of respect and pride for their country.

Despite the desire of many countries to take part in this difficult and interesting task, the main serious struggle took place between two superpowers - the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

The first victories in the space race were for the USSR

The series of successes of the Soviet cosmonautics became an open challenge to the United States, forcing America to speed up work in the field of space exploration and find a way to beat its main competitor, the USSR.

first artificial satellite lands - Soviet Sputnik-1 (October 4, 1957) USSR;
the first flights of animals into space - the astronaut dog Laika, the first animal launched into Earth orbit! (1954 - November 3, 1957) USSR;
the first human flight into space - Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin (April 12, 1961).

And yet, the competition for space continued!

First people on the moon

Today, almost everyone knows that America managed to seize the initiative in the space race by launching its astronauts on. The first manned spacecraft to successfully land on the moon back in 1969 was the American spacecraft Apollo 11, with a crew of astronauts on board: Neil Armstrong, Michael Collins and Buzz Aldrin.

Many of you remember the photo of Armstrong proudly planting the US flag on the surface of the Moon on July 20, 1969. The American government was triumphant that it had managed to overtake the Soviet space pioneers in conquering the Moon. But history is full of conjectures and assumptions, and some facts haunt critics and scientists to this day. And to this day the question is being discussed that the American ship, in all likelihood, reached the Moon, took it, but did the astronauts actually land on its surface? There is a whole caste of skeptics and critics who do not believe in the American landing on the Moon, however, let’s leave this skepticism to their conscience.

However, the Soviet spacecraft Luna-2 reached the Moon for the first time on September 13, 1959, that is, Soviet spacecraft ended up on the Moon 10 years earlier than the landing of American cosmonauts on the Earth’s satellite. And therefore it is especially offensive that few people know about the role of Soviet designers, physicists, and cosmonauts in the exploration of the Moon.

But a huge amount of work was done, and the results were achieved much earlier than Armstrong’s victorious march. The USSR pennant was delivered to the surface of the Moon a decade before man set foot on its surface. On September 13, 1959, the Luna 2 space station reached the planet for which it was named. The world's first spacecraft to reach the Moon (space station Luna-2) landed on the surface of the Moon in the Mare Mons region near the craters Aristyllus, Archimedes and Autolycus.

A completely logical question arises: if the Luna-2 station reached the Earth’s satellite, then there should have been Luna-1 as well? There was, but its launch, carried out a little earlier, turned out to be not so successful and, flying past the Moon... But even with this outcome, very significant scientific results were obtained during the flight of the Luna-1 station:

Using ion traps and particle counters, the first direct measurements of solar wind parameters were made.
Using an onboard magnetometer, the Earth's outer radiation belt was recorded for the first time.
It was established that the Moon does not have a significant magnetic field.
AMS "Luna-1" became the first in the world spacecraft, reaching the second escape velocity.

The launch participants were awarded the Lenin Prize; the people did not know their heroes by name, but the common cause - the honor of the country - was a priority.

USA lands first people on the moon

What about the USA? Yuri Gagarin's flight into space was a serious blow for America, and in order not to remain forever in the shadow of the Russians, a goal was set - and although the Americans lost the race to land the first spacecraft on the surface of the Moon, they had a chance to be the first to land astronauts on the Earth's satellite ! Work on improving the spacecraft, spacesuits and the necessary equipment proceeded by leaps and bounds, the American government attracted all the intellectual and technical potential of the country, and without skimping, spent billions of dollars on development. All NASA resources were mobilized and thrown into the furnace of science for a great purpose.

The step of an American citizen to the Moon is the only opportunity to emerge from the shadows, to catch up with the Soviet Union in this race. It is possible that America would not have been able to realize its ambitious plans, but at that time there was a change in the party leader in the USSR, and the leading designers - Korolev and Chelomey - could not come to a common opinion. Korolev, being an innovator by nature, was inclined to use the latest developments engines, and his colleague advocated for the old but proven Proton. Thus, the initiative was lost and the first to officially set foot on the surface of the Moon were American astronauts.

Did the USSR give up in the lunar race?

Even though Soviet cosmonauts failed to land on the Moon in the 20th century, the USSR did not give up in the race to explore the Moon. So already in 1970, the automatic interplanetary station “Luna-17” carried on board the world’s first, unprecedented, planetary rover, capable of fully operating in conditions of a different gravity of the moon. It was called “Lunokhod-1” and was intended to study the surface, properties and composition of the soil, radioactive and x-ray radiation of the Moon. Work on it was carried out at the Khimki Machine-Building Plant named after. S.A. Lavochkin, led by Babakin Nikolai Grigorievich. The sketch was ready in 1966, and all design documentation was completed by the end of the next year.

Lunokhod 1 was delivered to the surface of the Earth's satellite in November 1970. The control center was located in Simferopol, in the Space Communications Center and included the control panel of the crew commander, the lunar rover driver, the antenna operator, the navigator, and the operational information processing room. The main problem was the signal time delay, which interfered with full control. The Lunokhod worked there for almost a year, until September 14, it was on this day that the last, successful communication session took place.

The Lunokhod did a great job of studying the planet entrusted to it, working much longer than planned. A huge number of photographs, lunar panoramas, etc. were transmitted to Earth. Years later, in 2012, the International Astronomical Union gave names to all twelve craters encountered on the path of Lunokhod 1 - they received male names.

By the way, in 1993, “Lunokhod 1” was put up for auction at Sotheby’s, the stated price was five thousand dollars. The auction ended at a much higher amount - sixty-eight and a half thousand US dollars; the buyer was the son of one of the American astronauts. It is characteristic that the precious lot rests on the territory of the Moon; in 2013 it was discovered in photographs taken by an orbital American probe.

To summarize, it can be noted that the first people to land on the Moon (1969) were the Americans, here is a list of US astronauts who landed: Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, Pete Conrad, Alan Bean, Alan Shepard, Edgar Mitchell, David Scott, James Irwin , John Young, Charles Duke, Eugene Cernan, Harrison Schmitt. Neil Armstrong lived long life and died on August 25, 2012 at the age of 82, retaining the title of the first man to set foot on the moon...

But the first spaceships that conquered the Moon (1959) were Soviet, here the primacy undoubtedly belongs Soviet Union and Russian designers and engineers.

In January 1969, the CIA received information from informants in Moscow that the USSR was preparing to carry out special operation with the aim of disrupting the flight of American astronauts to the Moon. The Soviets allegedly intend to use powerful generators electromagnetic radiation cause interference in the on-board electronic equipment of the Apollo spacecraft during its takeoff and lead to disaster. President Richard Nixon ordered the top-secret Operation Crossroads to prevent any suspicious activity by Soviet ships off the coast of the United States during the Apollo launches.

At that time, the “moon race” was nearing its conclusion, and it was already obvious that the United States would win it. In December 1968, F. Borman, J. Lovell and W. Anders made a triumphant flyby of the Moon on Apollo 8. In May 1969, T. Stafford, J. Young and Y. Cernan on Apollo 10 circled the Moon several times, working through all stages of undocking and docking, descent and ascent of the lunar cabin, except for landing on the Moon and taking off from it. While in the USSR any launch into space was announced only after the fact, the Americans set the launch days of their ships in advance, inviting the press and television from all over the world. Therefore, everyone already knew that Apollo 11, which would fly to the Moon, was scheduled to launch from the J. Kennedy Space Center on July 16, 1969.

The Soviet lunar program was hopelessly behind. When Apollo 8 flew around the Moon, the USSR was just preparing a ship for such a flight, and there was no ship at all for landing on the Moon. After the successful flight of the Americans around the Moon, the Soviet leadership decided to abandon the manned flight of the Moon, which now could not have much effect. But the US administration was not sure that the USSR had decided to simply give up without a fight in the “moon race”, and expected some kind of “dirty trick” from it to prevent the Americans from triumphantly winning it. After all, in the United States, the moon landing became a fixed idea of national prestige for the entire 1960s.

At that time, Soviet electronic reconnaissance ships that plied the world's oceans and intercepted NATO communications signals were disguised as fishing seiners. This trick had long been known to NATO, and they, in turn, constantly monitored the movements of these “fishing fleets” under the red flag. At the beginning of 1969, an increase in the activity of the Soviet fleet near the American coast was noted. There were now two Soviet RER ships constantly on duty there, and in May 1969, during the Apollo 10 flight, there were already four. “This is not without reason,” the American intelligence services decided. During the Apollo 11 mission in July, large-scale measures were planned to counter possible “Russian machinations.”

American intelligence agencies believed (or pretended to believe) that the strong electromagnetic pulse, aimed at a take-off rocket, can cause irreparable failure of its equipment and, ultimately, its disaster. Theoretically this seems possible, although practical experiences No one has conducted this kind of research (more precisely, no one has reported about it). By the appointed day of takeoff—July 16—US Navy ships and Coast Guard aircraft were put on alert. Seven American submarines were on duty in the Cape Canaveral area. American electronic warfare ships had to, in addition to constantly monitoring the activities of Soviet ships, powerfully interfere with them at different frequencies. Combat ships and aircraft were ordered to open fire if there was any suspicious activity from Soviet ships. President Nixon had in front of him a prepared draft directive on the use of strategic weapons against the USSR nuclear forces. He had to sign it in the event that Apollo 11 crashed due to the use of electromagnetic superweapons by the Soviets.

The American measures did not seem unnecessary. By the announced day, seven Soviet seiners were already “fishing” off the coast of Florida!

So, the Apollo launch was scheduled for 8:32 a.m. Atlantic time. At exactly 8 a.m., American radars recorded the activation of radar equipment on Soviet ships at full power. At 8:05, an order was received from Washington for the US 2nd Fleet to bring all combat systems to full readiness. At 8:10, American electronic warfare aircraft "Orion" began to fly over Soviet ships, and warships began to approach the seiners in order to be ready to open fire at any moment.

At 8:20, intensive jamming of the equipment of Soviet ships began by creating interference. From 8:32 to 8:41, two stages of the Saturn 5 successfully launched the third stage, along with the Apollo 11 spacecraft, into low-Earth orbit. At 8:45 a.m., the Soviet vessels reduced their radar activity to normal levels. Two minutes later, American electronic warfare services received a clear signal. At 8:50, American ships and planes began to leave the scene.

Since the details of the Soviet operation are classified to this day, no one can say what it was. After all, Soviet ships really showed RER at that time increased activity! If this wasn't an attempt to throw Apollo off course, what could it be? Two versions are put forward.

According to one, Soviet electronic intelligence vessels collected information about the Apollo flight in order to establish whether it really went into space (after all, it is possible that the conspiracy theory about the possibility of staging American flights, so popular today, was born even then!). According to another, the USSR deliberately imitated its activity in order to make the Americans twitch once again. The twitching, by the way, was not cheap for the US budget: the costs of Operation Crossroads amounted to 230 million then dollars - almost 1% of the total cost of the Apollo program. Sometimes they add that information about the special operation being prepared by the Soviets against Apollo was skillful disinformation, specially launched from Moscow. Whether this is so is still anyone's guess.