Attempts at democratic change in Latin America. See what “Military dictatorship” is in other dictionaries
After World War II, numerous military coups throughout Latin America, especially from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, toppled legitimately elected civilian governments. Conciliation systems have been replaced by bureaucratic authoritarian ones. Frontier warfare took place in societies where weak civilian institutions had failed to establish their influence over the military. In China and Vietnam, the communist parties controlled the army. As Mao declared, “the rifle gives birth to power.” But “our principle is that the party commands this rifle, and the rifle will never be allowed to command the party.”6 In Latin America, the situation was the opposite: since the times of the Spanish settlers of the early 16th century. the army played a dominant role in political life. Even in the 20th century. political parties and social groups rarely received power sufficient to resist active military intervention in the implementation of policy. Nevertheless, over the last century, social pluralism has remained stronger here than in China or Vietnam. In countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, conciliatory and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes periodically succeeded each other. The coups that took place between 1964 and 1973, overthrowing legitimately elected civilian governments, were aimed at strengthening the capitalist economy and ousting leftist forces that supported socialist, communist and populist programs from the political arena. These upheavals were preceded by intensifying structural, cultural and behavioral conflicts.
The civilian pro-government coalition was too weak to prevent military intervention. The military had capabilities that allowed them to disobey orders from civilians. They kept repressive forces under control, acted secretly, and were good specialists and organizers, which is necessary for managing bureaucratic institutions. Civil organizations, such as political parties, legislatures and courts, were often unable to resist them due to their fragmentation. Influential social groups (business corporations, landowners, religious leaders) were opposed to civilian politicians and welcomed the military's rise to power. If a coup aimed at overthrowing a legally elected government received support from TNCs or the US government, then such assistance led to the collapse of the conciliation system.
Crises of legitimacy undermined the structural power of conciliatory regimes and increased the likelihood of the ascendancy of bureaucratic authoritarian systems. Fierce conflicts between pressure groups, resulting in violence and political unrest, made conciliation systems vulnerable. Duly elected rulers were unable to reconcile conflicting interests. They found it difficult to develop consensus among the various groups sharing political power. In addition, they did not have the repressive forces to suppress the anti-pluralist opposition, which considered the conciliation system illegal.
With the legitimacy of elected civilian officials declining, military leaders came to the conclusion that they had neither the will nor the power to protect the interests of the military. The cost of civilians remaining in power outweighed the benefits of their rule. Conciliatory policies endangered corporate, class and ideological interests. Whenever the presidential guard, workers' militia and other associations began to pose a threat to the corporate interests of the military, a coup occurred. Corporate interests included independence in military appointments, officer ranks, defensive strategies, military training programs, and the maintenance of order and national security. Often personal interests merged with corporate ones: the military wanted to receive large budgetary allocations not only for weapons and combat training, but also for increased salaries, cars, pensions, medical care and housing. In addition, class interests were also involved in the coups that took place in Brazil and in the “southern cone” (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay). Most senior officers came from aristocratic landowning families or families belonging to the highest ranks of industrialists, civil servants and military officials. In their opinion, radical Marxist parties and trade unions threatened the security of both capitalists and the nation as a whole. The military, whose duty it was to defend the nation from external and especially from internal enemies, believed that duly elected civilian politicians who promised to introduce egalitarianism jeopardized not only economic growth and capitalism, but also civic unity and the Christian faith.
Thus, material interests merged with spiritual, moral and ideological values. The fact that civilian leaders could not defend these interests and values increased the likelihood of a coup.
The crisis giving rise to deinstitutionalization forced people to turn to the bureaucratic authoritarian system. Torn by violent conflicts, South American countries lacked the procedural consensus needed to reconcile diverse interests and values. Army officers did not consider themselves obligated by law to obey elected civilian leaders. With little legal dependence on civilian control, the armed forces carried out a coup whenever their interests were harmed.
The behavioral crisis also increased the likelihood of a military coup. Weak civilian leaders could not offer public policy, capable of coping with problems such as high inflation, economic stagnation, foreign trade deficit and political violence in the country. Focused on maintaining political order and economic growth, the military often carried out coups, as a result of which technocrats, professionals and managers came to power. Together with the military elite, such civilian technocrats tried to oust radical trade unions from the political arena, as well as those political parties that organized social activities during the reign of the conciliatory regime. Although ordinary citizens rarely took part in coups, their weak support for the civilian governments in power pushed the military into action.
The coups that took place in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay from 1964 to 1976 have general principles transition from a conciliatory to a bureaucratic authoritarian regime. Civilian governments fell apart because they could not create a strong coalition around themselves that would force the military to reckon with the conciliation system. Government institutions, political parties and social groups (landowners, business associations, religious leaders) are weakened by fragmentation. Instead of rallying around the civilian administration in power, many factions supported the military. This situation deprived the government of the ability to make decisions. The president, as a rule, faced opposition from a hostile Congress. The institution of presidential power had neither the repressive nor the consensual power necessary to restrain the military: In Chile, the court recognized the legality of the coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende (1973). Neither Allende nor the presidents of Brazil (1964), Argentina (1976), and Uruguay (1973) could rely on cohesive political parties to organize support for the regime and build coalitions with sympathetic groups. The disunity of the labor movement deprived civic leaders of such a source of support as working-class solidarity. Business associations in these countries were on the side of the coup organizers. Landowners rejected land redistribution programs put forward by Salvador Allende and Brazilian President Joao Goulart. The Catholic Church in Chile and especially Argentina welcomed the military's rise to power, believing that army officers would restore order and adhere to Christian principles in their policies. Presidents Allende and Goulart faced strong opposition from MNCs and the United States government; these foreign institutions declared that leftist movements constituted a threat to capitalism, pursued misguided socialist policies, and threatened the West with “communist” aggression. From the early 60s to the mid-70s, the US government provided the Argentine military with weapons and military advisers, and also carried out technical training army. This increased the determination of the military elites to overthrow civilian presidents who were unable to achieve rapid economic modernization and provide the nation with a government that would guarantee its security.
When the political process stalled, deinstitutionalization increased the likelihood of a coup. Most Latin American countries, including the four discussed above, suffered from personalism in government. Even in a fragmented environment, the president had more power than the legislature or the judiciary. The political process was based on a patron-client relationship. The president acted as a super-patron, distributing political support in exchange for resources (patronage, loans, contracts, licenses). State institutions remained weak. Personal connections of government officials played a greater role than the norms of civil society. Viewing conflicts of interest as illegitimate, many Latin American elites have never developed a reliable procedural consensus as a means of reconciling differences. The laws could not protect the civil administration from the arbitrariness of the military. For many civilians who supported the coup, a military coup seemed to be the most effective and legitimate way to suppress illegitimate conflicts.
The deinstitutionalization and incapacity of government institutions was reinforced by the contemptuous attitude of military elites towards the legitimacy of conciliation systems. From their point of view, they did not take into account the corporate, personal, class and ideological interests of the armed forces and their allies. Claiming that the damage from the rule of civil administrations outweighed the benefits of such rule, the military saw this as a basis for seizing supreme power. Following the Prussian tradition, Chilean, Argentine and Brazilian militaries believed that presidents threatened their corporate autonomy by siding with conscripts over officers. military service privates, organizing a workers' militia and interfering in the decisions of army officials. Although the threat to corporate interests was a more important motive for the coup than personal interests, they believed that their rule would ensure increased government spending on their salaries, pensions, housing and health care.
Class interests also motivated the coups in all four countries. Supporters of accelerating economic growth, reducing inflation and modernization through state support development of private entrepreneurship and investment by foreign corporations, the initiators of the coup feared a threat to capitalist development from the leftist movement. According to the military and their allies in the form of civilian businessmen, radical trade unions demanded too much high salaries. Brazilian and Chilean peasant associations seized land; the policy of land redistribution threatened the interests of large landowners. Guerrilla movements were organized under the leadership of young people against a weak conciliatory government, for example: the Left Revolutionary Movement in Chile, the Peronist movement, which was leftist in nature, and the Trotskyist People's Revolutionary Army of Argentina, the Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (Tupamaros) and radical Catholic groups in Brazil. Assuming that these movements were associated with leftist factions of political parties - socialists, communists, Peronists - the military believed that they posed a threat to national security.
Ideological values merged with capitalist interests, thereby intensifying military opposition to the civilian government. The “enemy within” came to be associated with atheism, infidelity and dishonor. Seeing themselves as guardians of national security and defenders of internal order, the military justified coups as the only way to preserve Christian, Western, capitalist civilization.
Weak civilian government and the refusal of the masses to support the conciliatory regime also contributed to coups in Latin America. Political “patrons” bargained for government benefits for their “clients,” but there were few active politicians supporting them and no effective coalition emerged. Viewing politics as a game that could not be won, the civilian politicians in power were unable to find compromise and formulate policies that could satisfy the interests of various groups. Low growth, declining output, declining real incomes, and inflation prevented them from playing a winning game that would generate enough money to subsidize government support. The coups were preceded not only by economic stagnation, but also by widespread violence. Political assassinations, bank robberies, and child abductions demonstrated the inability of civilian governments to resolve conflicts peacefully. Left-wing guerrillas fought with right-wing paramilitary organizations. Society became polarized, not between the poor and the rich, but between government supporters and their socially diverse opponents . Supported by leading opposition organizations and certain categories of the population, the armed forces that overthrew the conciliatory systems took upon themselves the obligation to ensure the development of capitalism while maintaining the existing political system8.
Lecture No. 4
Topic: Development problems in Asia, Africa and Latin America
Plan
I. Newly industrialized countries of Latin America and East Asia
II. Muslim countries. Türkiye. Iran. Egypt
III. China. India
Newly industrialized countries of Latin America
and East Asia
Newly industrialized countries in the 1980s. began to be called a number of countries in Latin America (Chile, Argentina, Brazil, etc.) and East Asia ( South Korea, Taiwan, etc.). Despite the fact that they belong to different civilizational regions, they turned out to have a lot in common. They managed to short term take a leap in your economic development under dictatorships and authoritarian regimes. Thus arose a discussion about the nature of authoritarianism in modern world, which at the everyday level often boils down to the question of whether dictators have merit.
Latin America: from dictatorships to democracy.
The struggle between authoritarian and democratic methods of modernization was particularly acute in Latin American countries. The army played a special role in the life of the countries of the region. Military dictatorships (juntas) were periodically replaced by civilian rule until the 1980s and 1990s. Sometimes the army became the force that overthrew the dictatorships that existed at one time or another in almost all countries of the region. In some countries they changed every 7–8 years, displacing the next civilian government, in others they ruled for decades. Military dictatorships were as persistent as civilian governments in the 1950s and 1960s. strengthened public sector in the economy, they sought to replace the import of goods with their own production (import-substituting industrialization), and in the 1970s - 1980s. persistently transferred state-owned enterprises and banks into private hands (privatization), encouraged the openness of the economy, reduced government taxes and spending, orienting the economy towards the export of non-traditional goods. What united dictatorships at all times was that they prohibited or limited the activities of political parties, parliaments, free press, carried out arrests and repressions against the opposition, even to the point of arbitrariness against ordinary citizens. Dictatorships traditionally strive for external expansion to strengthen their authority within the country, but almost always fail. For example, the military junta in Argentina fell after an unsuccessful attempt (1982) to seize the Falkland Islands, which were under British control. Dictators and their henchmen in a number of countries were eventually brought to justice, and where there was no mass outrage, an amnesty was granted. General A. Pinochet, who went down in history as a dictator who carried out (1973–1990) the authoritarian modernization of the country (thanks to the economic program of M. Friedman, Chile became the economic leader of Latin America), also failed to escape prosecution. But is the merit of dictators so great? “There is nothing to praise the Pinochet regime for. The fundamental principles of military organization are directly opposed to the principles of a free market and a free society. This is an extreme form of centralized control. The junta went against its principles when it supported market reforms” (Milton Friedman, 1002).
The economic policies pursued by dictators and authoritarian leaders were in line with global development trends, as modern Latin American researchers point out. Dictatorships have been equally persistent in increasing or limiting the role of the state in the economy. Therefore, the image of a dictator-reformer, which for a long time was created by the propaganda apparatus of the dictators themselves, should be revised, scientists believe. The dictatorship, where reforms were carried out, solved only one task - the task of ensuring social world and political stability through naked violence. The ruling elites of Latin America saw the main threat to stability in the strong positions of the left forces - the socialist and communist parties. The influence of leftist forces was determined by the scale of poverty in the region. The far left in a number of countries initiated civil wars. It was against the left forces that the repressions were primarily directed dictatorial regimes.
So, by the end of the 20th century. the military left government offices for barracks. The dictatorship disappeared from the history of Latin America not because all the problems were solved and the far-left forces lost their influence, but because in the conditions of globalization and the transition to a post-industrial information society, the dictatorship is not able to solve new historical problems. The course to limit the role of the state in the economy, encourage private initiative and open the country to the world market, which dictatorships were forced to start under the influence of world realities, undermined the very foundations of their existence. Such a course is incompatible with dictatorship. All democratic governments in the region began to pursue this course with great success. It led to the rise, but also revealed serious problems. The vulnerability of the national financial system in the context of global capital movements was revealed, which led to financial crises in a number of countries. The income gap between rich and poor has widened. But military dictatorships did not return. Leftist forces came to power in many countries in the 1990s. and at the beginning of the 21st century. (Chile, Brazil, etc.). They began to combine the course of lifting restrictions in order to develop entrepreneurial initiative with active state policy in the social sphere, health care and education.
By the mid-80s. There was an evolution of military-authoritarian regimes: as a result of mass protest movements of various forms and the intensification of the opposition, the social base of dictatorships narrowed, their political weight decreased, and the process of eliminating dictatorships accelerated. The revolution in Nicaragua overthrew the tyrannical dictatorship of Somoza.
In Argentina, the civil opposition candidate, representative of the Radical Party, Raul Alfonsin, won the 1983 presidential election, ending military rule. Former Argentine dictators were tried and sentenced long terms imprisonment. The leading political parties in the country were the radical and Peronist. With the economic situation deteriorating, Peronist Carlos Menem was elected president in 1989. During the 10 years of his presidency, Menem, having transformed the principles of Peronism towards the rejection of the “third way” of development, launched a neoliberal program. His like-minded person D. Cavallo - the “father” of the Argentine economic miracle - implemented market reforms, which allowed the country to achieve high macroeconomic indicators. However, the high social cost of the “miracle” given the country’s foreign policy orientation toward the United States and NATO gradually caused the majority of Argentines to reject Menem’s course. In the 1999 elections, the candidate of the center-left opposition, Fernando De la Rua, won, proposing for the period until 2004 a program to eradicate corruption, education reform, the fight against unemployment, labor law reform, and the resumption of investigations related to human rights violations under dictatorial regimes in order to punish the perpetrators; development of integration processes with the countries of southern Latin America.
In Brazil, in 1985, the military transferred power to civilian President J. Sarney. The successive governments of Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Enrique Cardoso adhered to a neoliberal orientation under the vigilant tutelage of the World Bank and the IMF. Transition period from a military-authoritarian system to a democratic system and neoliberal economy has been going on for 15 years since 1985 and is characterized by gradualness, using the “trial and error” method. For example, denationalization, which began in 1990, took place in waves and more gradually than in other countries, covering the entire ferrous metallurgy, petrochemical industry, and almost all railways, and this process is still ongoing. A much worse situation is developing in financial sector- in dire need of capital, the government increased discount rates in 1998 (over 40%), hoping to attract foreign investment, albeit at a high price. “Hot money” poured into Brazil, which led to the devaluation of the national currency and a general economic decline (in 1999, growth rates were less than 1%). External debt reached almost $250 billion, becoming the largest in the developing world. Dissatisfaction with the current financial course arose and the need arose to adjust it. Now Brazil prefers to attract mainly direct investment and long-term loans from abroad and to repay the anti-crisis “fire loans” taken out as quickly as possible with their high interest rates.
In Central America, in Haiti, in 1986, another tyrannical dictatorship of the Duvalier family (father and son), which had existed for almost 30 years, fell. That same year, constitutional governments came to power in Guatemala and Honduras. After 35 years of rule, the Paraguayan dictator A. Stroessner was overthrown in 1989. Dictatorships have ended, but the influence of the armed forces on politics remains.
"Lost Decade", economic problems
In the 1980s, the constitutional governments that came to power on the wave of the liquidation of dictatorships began to eliminate the negative consequences of dictatorial regimes and correct the course of modernization. The latter became especially relevant due to the fact that the first wave of neoliberal reforms revealed their significant shortcomings and caused a stream of criticism. 80s began to be called the “lost” (“debt”, “inflationary”) decade. The “Lost 10 Years” resulted in increased economic, scientific and technological dependence of the region, aggravation of interstate contradictions and stagnation of integration processes, a reduction in the growth of per capita income (in the 80s annually by an average of 0.2 and even 1.7%) .
Investment boom of the 80s. stimulated economic growth in Latin America in the early 90s. In 1994, the average annual growth rate for the continent as a whole reached the highest level in all previous post-reform years - 5.3%. However, after the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-1995. The neoliberal model began to falter, and due to the shocks of the Asian monetary and financial crisis of 1997-1998. and the second wave of the global financial crisis caused by the Russian default in August 1998, Latin America's growth rate fell to 0.0%.
The essence of the modern development model of Latin American countries is a priority focus on external factors - export earnings and foreign investments. The Latin American economy cannot exist without regular financial and investment support from outside. Life and well-being “on credit” are typical for most countries in the region, both small and large. The huge external debt of Latin American countries is constantly growing - in the early 90s. it was approximately $400 billion, and by mid-2000 it had increased to a record amount of $770 billion. The ratio of external debt to GDP was 35% in Mexico, 45% in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and about 100% in Ecuador. Significant regular outflow of funds to service external debt is main reason deficits of state budgets and balances of payments, development of inflation, lack of funds for technological modernization. The outflow of funds makes Latin America a kind of financial donor, a paradoxical exporter of capital. Particularly in trouble are Central American and Andean countries, which believe that foreign debt is a “new, sophisticated form of genocide.” These countries are in favor of writing off at least part of the debt.
The need to make systematic debt repayments has forced many countries to carry out mass privatization. Proceeds from the sale of state property became an additional source of real foreign exchange income. However, this is clearly not enough. Inflation remains one of the key problems holding back the payment of external debt. It covers both small and large countries: in Bolivia, whose money was printed in Germany, depreciation occurred already during air travel; in Argentina and Brazil in the late 80s. inflation was in the four digits.
The results of the financial and economic reforms of the “lost decade” are especially noticeable in the social sphere that is most sensitive to the population. One of the aspects of disappointment in market reforms is a reduction in spending on social needs, a decrease in nominal and real wages, a reduction in social services, an increase in the layer of low-income disadvantaged people, and a nationwide deterioration in the quality of life. Other pain point in modern Latin America, the main source of poverty is unemployment, which has reached unprecedented proportions (over 10% in Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador). The inability to work for a huge army of “superfluous” people, their uncertainty about the future, and the deepening stratification of property have given rise to an unprecedented rise in crime. To this should be added a crisis of family values, an increase in the number of divorces, and mental trauma. The Catholic Church, concerned about this situation, calls on the authorities to humanize the reforms and make them more fair.
The moral cost of reforms, in particular privatization, was an unprecedented surge in corruption. And although the privatization process was limited by certain legal frameworks (tendering regime, announcements in the press), it nevertheless caused a wave of speculative excitement, increased bribery and fraud, both from local and foreign businessmen. It is no coincidence that during the presidential campaigns of 1998-2000. Almost all program documents contained provisions on the need to combat corruption and compliance with moral and legal standards at all levels.
"The Lost 10th Anniversary" of the 80s. showed that finance can become the main obstacle to economic growth and modernization in a globalized world. Therefore, it was financial problems that were at the center of the reform of most countries in the region in the 90s. Financial and economic strategy of Latin America for the 90s. was based on the “Washington Consensus” - a conciliation document prepared by the Institute of International Economics in the USA. The objectives of the consensus included overcoming inflation, reducing the budget deficit, and strengthening the national currencies of Latin America. This document was approved by the IMF, IBRD, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The main thing was that the Washington Consensus, like other stabilization programs, oriented Latin America towards regular payments of external debt. Debt management emerged as the IMF's core function in Latin America in the 1990s.
The search for an alternative is the main direction of the current political and economic efforts of Latin American governments, which soberly assess the current situation in the world and understand that alone they are doomed to complete powerlessness, especially in relations with the United States. Life itself forces them to improve the ways of regional integration. The leader of this process is Brazil, the “country-continent”. Brazil's role as a geopolitical counterbalance to the United States will increase in the future, given its importance in the activities of MERCOSUR, which, under favorable circumstances, could become a kind of response to the presence of NAFTA in the Western Hemisphere. MERCOSUR has increased its trade turnover almost fivefold over the past 10 years, and promising ties have been established with the EEC.
At the end of the 90s. In Latin America, the issue of possible “dollarization” is being actively discussed - the introduction of the dollar as the only means of payment in a particular country. Some countries (Argentina) are favorably exploring this issue. Others (Mexico and Brazil) are opposed. The attempt to introduce dollarization in Ecuador was one of the reasons for the overthrow of Ecuadorian President D. Maouad Witt in early 2000. But Panama, which uses the dollar as its legal currency, has become neither rich, nor prosperous, nor stable. The issue of dollarization continues to be discussed at various levels.
Currently, Latin America is realizing the harmfulness of a passive role in the global financial and economic process, and a search is underway for an optimal development strategy in the new millennium. In September 1999, a forum of representatives of Latin American civil societies was convened in Santiago (Chile). There was a call to make the coming 21st century. “a century of socially oriented development in the world.” This is what the second generation reforms are aimed at, designed to strengthen government regulation and place greater emphasis on social problems, increase attention to moral and ethical standards of business. Perhaps a synthesis of statism and neoliberalism in proportions corresponding to the national-historical characteristics of each country will be the most promising.
People often hear the word “Junta” in everyday life or in the media. What is it? What does this concept mean? Let's try to figure it out. This term is associated with Latin America. We are talking about such a concept as the “junta” regime. Translated, the word mentioned means “united” or “connected.” The power of the junta is an authoritarian military-bureaucratic dictatorship established as a result of a military coup and governing the state in a dictatorial way, as well as through terror. To understand the essence of this regime, you must first understand what a military form of dictatorship is.
Military dictatorship
Military dictatorship- This is a form of government in which the military practically has control. They usually overthrow the current government through a coup d'état. This form is similar, but not identical to stratocracy. At the last country directly ruled by military officials. Like every type of dictatorship, this form can be either official or unofficial. Many dictators, like those in Panama, had to submit to a civilian government, but this was only nominal. Despite the structure of the regime, based on forceful methods, it is still not entirely a stratocracy. Some kind of screen still existed. There are also mixed types of dictatorial management, in which military officials have a very serious influence on the government, but do not control the situation individually. Typical military dictatorships in Latin America, as a rule, were precisely a junta.
Junta - what is it?
Spreading this term received thanks to military regimes in Latin American countries. In Soviet political science, the junta meant the power of reactionary military groups in a number of capitalist states that established a regime of military dictatorship of a fascist or close to fascism kind. The junta was a committee that consisted of a number of officers. Moreover, it was not always the high command. This is evidenced by the popular Latin American expression “the power of the colonels.”
In the post-Soviet space, the concept in question has acquired a clearly negative connotation, and therefore is also used for propaganda purposes to create a negative image of the government of a particular state. In a figurative sense, the concept of "junta" is also applied to the governments of kleptocratic countries with the highest level corruption. In everyday life colloquial speech this term can even be used in relation to a group of people who take some action by mutual agreement. However, their goals are dishonest or even criminal.
Junta: what is it in terms of the political system?
The military junta was one of the most widespread types of authoritarian regimes that arose during the period when a number of Latin American and other states gained freedom from colonial dependence. After the creation of national states in traditional societies, the military turned out to be the most cohesive and organized layer of society. They were able to lead the masses, based on the ideas of national self-determination. After being confirmed in power, the policy of the military elite in different countries received different focus: in some states it led to the removal of corrupt comprador elites from office and generally benefited the formation of a national state (Indonesia, Taiwan). In other cases, the military elite itself became an instrument for realizing the influence of serious centers of power. History has it that most military dictatorships in Latin America were financed by the United States. The US benefit was that a certain country would not have a communist regime while the junta ruled. What this is, we hope, has already become clear.
The fate of most juntas
The fact is that many believe that democracy in many countries began precisely with the “junta” regime. What does this mean? After the end of the Second World War, most of the military dictatorships that took control of a number of countries were only of a transitional nature. The power of the junta gradually evolved from an authoritarian regime to democracy. Examples are countries such as South Korea, Argentina, Spain, Brazil and others. The reasons for this lie in the following. Firstly, over time, contradictions of an economic and political nature grew within the power. Secondly, the influence of developed industrial states, which sought to increase the number of democratic countries, grew. Nowadays, people like the junta are practically never found. However, this term has firmly entered into use throughout the world.
In the second half of the twentieth century, many Latin American countries switched to an authoritarian political regime, mainly to its military-bureaucratic type. This type was characterized by the seizure of power by the military and was in most cases established through a coup d'etat.
The most prominent representatives of military dictatorships in Latin America were such countries as Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay. However, despite the fact that all these states had a similar structure of power headed by the military, the duration of the existence of the regimes turned out to be significantly different. Each of the dictatorships of these countries experienced its own crisis and subsequently was liquidated in the 80s XX century.
Chile
In Chile by the early 70s. there was a strong weakening of the democratic corps, which was accompanied by problems such as over-dependence on copper exports, large external debt and low level investment in industry. Against this background, on September 11, 1973, a military coup took place under the leadership of General Augusto Pinochet , a dictatorship was established that lasted until 1989.
Despite the fact that the documented new leader of the state was the president, his rule had all the attributes of authoritarian power: opposition political parties were banned, repressions were carried out for political reasons, the country's parliament - the National Congress - was dissolved, the spiritual life of the population was strictly regulated, and representative institutions and the elites in power were strictly controlled by General Pinochet.
In addition, a characteristic feature of the regime in Chile was "the occupation of ministerial positions by technocratic economists known as the Chicago Boys". Economists, with the support of the military junta, developed a “shock therapy” program, thanks to which they were able to improve the economic situation in the country.
However, by the early 1980s, the Pinochet regime began to lose its influence. The crisis, which affected all sectors of the economy, contributed to the emergence of opposition movements, as a result of which Pinochet was forced to take a course towards gradual liberalization: the legalization of political parties and the holding of free presidential elections.
As a result, in 1989, Augusto Pinochet lost the election to a representative of the Christian Democratic Party Patricio Aylwin , which also marked the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Chile.
Brazil
As for another Latin American state - Brazil, in this country period of military dictatorship 1964-1985. also came against a backdrop of economic and political instability. The marshal who came to power Humberto Branco banned the activities of all political parties except two legal ones: National Union of Renewal (ARENA) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MBD), and also carried out large-scale repressions of opponents of the existing regime.
From an economic point of view, the period of military dictatorship was quite successful. The economic growth was due to the development of the military-industrial complex. As a result, the period from 1968-1974. became known as the “Brazilian economic miracle.”
On the other hand, such a course for economic development had a negative impact on the political and social sphere Brazil, mainly because the strengthening of the military-industrial complex occurred due to increased taxes and lower wages of the population. In addition, financing of the social sector was carried out on a residual basis, which led to strong social differentiation in the country and, consequently, dissatisfaction with the current government regime.
All this, together with the political disenfranchisement of the population, led to a strengthening of the movement against the military dictatorship. The main opposition force was formed on February 10, 1980. Workers' Party, led by Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva . She advocated for direct presidential elections and the restoration of democracy, for the punishment of those responsible for repression, for the legalization of political parties, the independence of trade union organizations and the convening of a constitutional assembly.
As a result, the party achieved its goal, and in 1985, the last representative of the military dictatorship, Joao Figueiredo, was replaced by Tancredo Neves, a representative of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement.
Argentina
In Argentina period of military dictatorship 1976-1983 gg. although it was not distinguished by its duration, as in other countries of Latin America, it stood out for its cruelty. First of all Jorge Videlom there was a ban on any political activity Strict press censorship was established for everyone except the ruling junta, a policy of repression was pursued, especially among trade union leaders, and the death penalty was allowed.
Between 1976-1979 a wave of terror swept the country so much that the reign of H. Videl began to be called the “Dirty War”». Huge number killed and missing people, including women and children, as well as unsuccessful economic policy, which led to an economic crisis in the country, caused dissatisfaction among the population with the actions of the ruling junta.
Nevertheless, decisive factor the elimination of the military dictatorship in Argentina became defeat in the Falklands War in 1982 ., as a result of which the Falkland Islands completely passed into the possession of Great Britain, and Argentina's external debt increased to $35 million.
As a result, in 1983, the last dictator of Argentina, Reynaldo Bignone, was forced to transfer power to Raul Alfosin, representative of the Civil Radical Union. And Bignone himself, along with General Leopold Galtieri and Jorge Videl, who lost the war, was sentenced to prison for crimes committed against the population
Bolivia
In Bolivia, two periods of the military-bureaucratic regime can be distinguished: this is the board Hugo Basnera from 1971 to 1978 And Luis Garcia Mesa from 1980 to 1981. Both generals came to power as a result of a coup d'etat and, as in Chile, Brazil or Argentina, repressed people disliked by the regime, and also pursued a policy of anti-communism.
Characteristics the military dictatorship of Basner's time in Bolivia was strong influence German Nazis who fled to the country after World War II, and the active support of the ruling elite for the Bolivian drug mafia, which paid taxes on sales of cocaine and other illegal substances. Moreover, by the end of the 1970s. Almost all industries in the country were criminalized.
Another factor that caused discontent not only among the population of the country, but also among part of the ruling elite of Bolivia, was the falsification of election results. Hugo Basner was forced to resign, and a democratic regime was established in the country for several years.
The period of Garcia Mesa's reign was characterized by even greater instability than that of General Basner. Civil war, arbitrariness of the authorities, economic sanctions, imposed by the United States, and international isolation due to a conflict with the International Monetary Fund led to the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1981.
Having come to power, he revised the country's current Constitution, according to which the president could not hold this position for more than two consecutive terms, which allowed him to retain power for five terms.
Despite the rather tight control of the country's political sphere and human rights violations, General Stroessner improved economic situation countries, but poverty of the population, disagreements with Catholic Church and criticism of the regime in other countries around the world, especially the United States, which abolished preferential export tariffs for Paraguay in 1987, led to a weakening of the military regime.
In 1989, as a result of a coup d'etat, General Stroessner was overthrown and exiled to Brazil, where he lived until the end of his life.
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