The Great Patriotic War. Great Patriotic War Women and children meet the liberating soldiers

The largest military-political event of World War II

February 2, 2018 will mark the 75th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, which has become a symbol of the courage and resilience of our people unprecedented in world history. B The war that unfolded on the banks of the Volga from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943 marked the beginning of a radical change not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War as a whole.

The victory near Moscow was of great international significance. Japan and Türkiye refrained from entering the war against the Soviet Union. The increased authority of the USSR on the world stage contributed to the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. However, in the summer of 1942, due to mistakes by the Soviet leadership, the Red Army suffered a number of major defeats in the North-West, near Kharkov and in the Crimea. German troops reached the Volga - Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The Germans again seized the strategic initiative and went on the offensive. General G. Blumentritt, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, recalled: “Industrial and economic circles in Germany put strong pressure on the military, proving the importance of continuing offensive operations. They told Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat.” Hitler fully shared the point of view of his economists, and in the spring of 1942 the General Staff developed a plan for the summer offensive (all major Wehrmacht operations were called options. The German summer offensive in the USSR was given the code name “Fall Blau” - the blue option.) the main goal of which was to capture the North Caucasian oil fields of Maikop and Grozny and take Baku. It was also supposed to seize the entire Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and force Turkey to enter the war on the side of Germany. However, unexpectedly, Hitler at the beginning of July, without waiting for the capture of Stalingrad and the turn to the Caucasus, ordered the removal of 11 divisions from the advancing troops, and some reserve units, which were sent to Army Group North with the order to take Leningrad. The 11th German Army was also transported there from Crimea. Hitler's next step was the signing of Directive No. 45 on July 23, 1942. It ordered Army Groups "A" and "B" to split - the first was to advance through the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus and through the Caucasus to Grozny and Baku, and the second was to capture Stalingrad, and then Astrakhan. Almost all tank and motorized units were assigned to Army Group A. Stalingrad was to be taken by the 6th Field Army of General Paulus.

The Soviet command, attaching paramount importance to the Stalingrad direction, believed that only the stubborn defense of this area could thwart enemy plans, ensure the integrity of the entire front, and keep Stalingrad in its hands. It was also taken into account that in the current situation the Stalingrad direction became extremely advantageous in operational terms, since from there it was possible to deliver a very dangerous blow to the flank and rear of the enemy group advancing through the Don to the Caucasus. Thus, the Stavka’s idea for organizing strategic defense was to bleed and stop the enemy in stubborn defensive battles, preventing him from reaching the Volga, to gain the time necessary to prepare strategic reserves and move them to the Stalingrad area, so that in the future go on a decisive offensive.

On July 17, 1942, the vanguards of the divisions of the 6th German Army met at the turn of the Chir and Tsimla rivers with the advanced detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies of the Stalingrad Front. The fighting of the detachments marked the beginning of the great Battle of Stalingrad.

Failures in the summer battles had a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops. On July 28, 1942, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 227 was issued, later known as the order “Not a step back!” For the first time during the war, Soviet soldiers, officers and generals, who were in a difficult state of mind under the influence of the successes of the Wehrmacht, heard the truth about the current state of affairs. Stalin managed to find simple, precise words that really reached the consciousness and heart of everyone.

“...Some stupid people at the front console themselves with talk that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of territory, a lot of land, a lot of population, and that we will always have plenty of bread...Every commander, Red Army soldier and political workers must understand that our funds are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children... After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, therefore, it became much less people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We no longer have a superiority over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Every new piece of territory we leave behind will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defenses in every possible way...

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat. No step back! This should now be our main call.”

These words, according to the recollections of many veterans, worked as a relief from uncertainty and strengthened the morale of the entire army.

In August, fierce battles of Soviet troops unfolded on the near approaches to Stalingrad. And in September, German troops began storming the city. After two weeks of exhausting battles, they captured the city center, but were unable to complete their main task - capturing the entire bank of the Volga in the Stalingrad area. Fierce fighting in the city itself continued for more than two months. In military history before Stalingrad, such stubborn urban battles were not known. For every house. For each floor or basement. For every wall. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Alexander Rodimtsev described those August days as follows: « The city looked like absolute hell. The flames of the fires rose several hundred meters. Clouds of smoke and dust hurt my eyes. Buildings collapsed, walls fell, iron warped.”. In a London radio report on October 11, 1942, a very characteristic statement appeared: “Poland was conquered in 28 days, and in Stalingrad in 28 days the Germans took several houses. In 38 days France was conquered, and in Stalingrad in 38 days the Germans advanced from one side of the street to the other.” “Lyudnikov Island” - a small piece of land 700 meters along the front and 400 meters in depth in the Nizhny village of the Barrikady plant - has forever gone down in the history of the Battle of Stalingrad. Here the 138th Red Banner Rifle Division under the command of Colonel I.I. Lyudnikov fought to the death. The division was surrounded on three sides by the Nazis, the fourth side was the Volga. Despite the huge losses, the Nazis continuously attacked units of the division from November 11th. On this day alone, six enemy attacks were repulsed and up to a thousand fascists were destroyed. The defense of the city lasted more than two months and ended in the collapse of enemy plans. Hitler did not achieve his goal. The city was held. Thus ended the first half of the heroic Battle of Stalingrad, unprecedented in history.

For Nazi Germany, the end of 1942, despite the seizure of large territories, was characterized by a deterioration in the economic, political and military situation. During the defensive operations, all enemy plans to defeat the Red Army and capture the Caucasus with its oil sources were thwarted. The offensive capabilities of the German armed forces on the Soviet-German front were exhausted. The strike forces were weakened. The front of the advancing armies turned out to be stretched, there were no large operational reserves. In such a situation, on October 14, 1942, Hitler’s high command issued order No. 1, according to which the fascist German army was to go on the defensive on the entire Soviet-German front in order to hold the captured territory, exhaust Soviet troops, make up for losses and create the preconditions for the resumption of offensive in the spring of 1943

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Forces decided to defeat it in the winter of 1942–1943. the southern wing of the Nazi front from Voronezh to the Black Sea and simultaneously carry out a series of operations to improve the strategic position of Moscow and Leningrad. The ultimate goal of these operations was to achieve favorable conditions for the deployment of new major offensive operations. The Soviet command decided to initially launch a counteroffensive near Stalingrad with the goal of defeating the main enemy grouping in the south, and then to develop an offensive in the Kharkov, Donbass and North Caucasus directions. By the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, our troops were opposed by a group that included: the 6th field and 4th tank armies of the fascist German army, the 8th army of fascist Italy, the 3rd and 4th armies, the 6th army and 4th 1st Cavalry Corps of Royal Romania. The enemy troops consisted of more than a million people (of which 660 thousand were in combat units), about 700 tanks, 10,300 guns and mortars of all calibers (including field guns - up to 5 thousand, anti-tank guns - 2.5 thousand, mortars of caliber 81 mm and above - 2.7 thousand) and more than 1,200 aircraft. Although the German troops suffered heavy losses in previous battles, they still retained the ability to resist stubbornly.

The main forces of the Germans occupied a tactical defense. There were only 6 divisions in the operational reserve. The vast majority of Nazi divisions were drawn into the fight for Stalingrad. The weakest areas of defense were on the flanks of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. The Romanian troops defended here, which were weaker armed and trained, and the majority of their personnel did not share the aggressive aspirations of both the Nazi ruling clique and their sold-out fascist and pro-fascist rulers.

By the second half of November 1942, Soviet troops near Stalingrad were united into three fronts: Southwestern, Don, Stalingrad. In total, at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the fronts had ten combined arms, one tank and four air armies. Soviet troops had to solve a difficult problem. Its difficulty was explained, first of all, by the relatively unfavorable balance of forces. Therefore, the fronts and armies experienced great difficulty in creating strike groups; the fronts were not able to allocate a sufficient number of forces to their reserves, and the creation of second echelons in them turned out to be completely impossible. In this regard, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and under his personal control, during September and October 1942, in the deepest secrecy, a huge number of Soviet troops and military equipment from Siberia were transferred to the Stalingrad Front. Of course, all measures of secrecy and secrecy were observed, even postal messages were prohibited. Our foreign intelligence did a good job. As the head of the NKVD department Sudoplatov said in his book, through the double agent Max (who worked for both the NKVD and the Abwehr) and served in the communications department at Rokossovsky’s headquarters, the Germans were “leaked” information that a major operation was being prepared in the Rzhev direction. Moreover, Stalin, shortly before the start of the counter-offensive, removed Zhukov from Stalingrad and instructed him to start preparing the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation. The Germans were notified of this appointment in a timely manner. And they hastily transferred four tank divisions here, believing that where Zhukov was, Stalin would deliver the main blow.

Indeed, the Germans knew nothing about the impending counter-offensive of the Soviet troops. Subsequently, the chief of the general staff of the German 6th Field Army, Arthur Schmidt, admits: “We all did not realize the scale of the threat and again underestimated the Russians.” Noteworthy is also the mistake of the intelligence department of the foreign eastern armies, which was then headed by the future chief of West German intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen. On October 31, he reported that there were no signs of an impending major Russian offensive anywhere. .

It should be noted that the situation at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Stalingrad was incomparably more favorable than at the beginning of the counteroffensive near Moscow. A powerful means of developing operational success appeared on the fronts in the form of tank and mechanized corps. In his order on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, J.V. Stalin promised: “There will be a holiday on our street!” And these were not empty words, since the date of the Red Army’s counteroffensive on the Stalingrad front - November 19 - had already been precisely determined.

The goal of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was to defeat the enemy’s main strategic grouping, wrest the initiative from the enemy’s hands and begin a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War in favor of the Soviet Union and all progressive forces of the world. In accordance with this goal, according to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the troops of the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in a number of sectors and, developing an attack in converging directions towards Kalach - Sovetsky, encircle and destroy the main enemy group near Stalingrad.

The counteroffensive began on November 19, 1942 with attacks from the Southwestern and Don Fronts. The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front began hostilities. The Southwestern Front, with the forces of the 5th Tank and 21st armies, went on the offensive at 8:50 a.m. after 80 minutes of artillery preparation. In three hours of battle, the rifle divisions captured the first position of the main defense line. After this, tank corps were brought into battle, which quickly completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line and rushed into the operational depth. Following the tank corps, cavalry corps entered the breakthrough. By the end of the day, the troops of the shock group of the Southwestern Front had advanced with rifle divisions up to 10–19 km, and tank corps – up to 18–35 km. Having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the troops of all three fronts continued to develop the offensive in operational depth. Tank and mechanized corps attacked with great success, sometimes within a day, advancing up to 60–70 km. This was how the enemy was surrounded. Subsequently, a fierce struggle by our troops unfolded to eliminate the encircled enemy and strengthen the position on the external front.

Thus, as a result of the combat operations of our troops at the first stage of the operation, the enemy’s defenses were broken through, the encirclement of his main forces was completed, and favorable conditions were created for their subsequent destruction. A 273,000-strong group of Nazi troops found themselves surrounded. In addition, during the fighting, the 3rd Army of Royal Romania, consisting of fifteen divisions, was defeated, of which four divisions were captured in the Raspopinskaya area. The formations of the 6th Army and 4th Cavalry Corps of the 4th Romanian Army also suffered major defeats south of Stalingrad.

Meanwhile, the fascist German command decided to rescue its encircled troops at all costs. To carry out this operation, a new Army Group “Don” was created under the command of Field Marshal Manstein, which included up to 30 divisions. Part of the forces of this group was supposed to operate against the Southwestern Front and was concentrated in the Tormosin area. Another part of its troops was concentrated in the Kotelnikovo area and was intended for action against the Stalingrad Front. The greatest danger was posed by the Kotelnikov group, which had up to 350 tanks. From the Tormosin and Kotelnikovo areas, the Don group was supposed to strike in the general direction of Sovetsky, Marinovka and connect with the encircled troops. The surrounded troops were also preparing a strike to meet the Don group.

Preparing an offensive against the encircled enemy group, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, from the end of November 1942, launched preparations for a further offensive of our troops on the external front, with its general development towards Rostov. It was decided to begin the defeat of the enemy in the Rostov direction with a powerful blow from the troops of the Southwestern Front and part of the forces of the Voronezh Front. In November, five rifle divisions, four tank and two mechanized corps were sent to strengthen the Southwestern Front. The success of our troops in this operation greatly facilitated the fight of the Stalingrad Front against the enemy Kotelnikov group. However, despite the success achieved by the Soviet troops, the fascist German command managed to launch its counterattack in this direction, and the troops of the Stalingrad Front in the period from December 12 to 14, 1942 had to fight heavy defensive battles. During this time, the Kotelnikov group of German troops managed to advance up to 40 km and reach the line of the Myshkova River; There were no more than 40 km left to the surrounded group. According to Manstein, it was during these days that Paulus had the last opportunity to escape with his army from the clutches. To do this, it was necessary to strike with all available means towards Hoth’s tanks. But Paulus did not try to do this, although Manstein, according to him, took full responsibility upon himself. After the war, Paulus angrily denied this, but this did not change the essence of the matter - he, together with the Fuhrer, took full responsibility for the deaths of his soldiers. Hoth could not wait for Paulus for long on Myshkovo and already on December 22, under powerful blows from Soviet troops, he began to quickly retreat and, as a result, was able to gain a foothold only 100 km from the “cauldron”. The death sentence of the 6th Army was signed. In the early 50s, Erich von Manstein, who was captured by the British, revealed the harsh logic of war. Despite the fact that I myself, he writes, urged the Fuhrer to decide on a breakthrough, was firmly convinced that the 6th Army “was obliged to pin down the enemy forces opposing it for as long as possible,” even at the cost of self-sacrifice.

On January 30, Paulus sent warm congratulations to Hitler on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of his rise to power. In a response radiogram, the Fuhrer awarded Paulus the rank of Field Marshal and said that not a single German field marshal had ever been captured. Paulus understood everything perfectly, but did not want to shoot himself. With the onset of the new year, 1943, severe hunger came to the 6th Army, especially unbearable against the backdrop of 20-degree frost. The Soviet command knew about the position of the German troops and was in no hurry to attack - hunger, cold and typhus were already coping well. An eyewitness to these events, the commander of the 767th Grenadier Regiment, Colonel Steidle, wrote about the situation in which Paulus’s subordinates were then: “The field strewn with dead bodies is indescribably scary. We looked in horror at the corpses with naked limbs, torn chests and with arms cramped, with faces frozen in mournful grimaces, and pewter eyes bulging with fear from fear. And the living encroached on the dead, removing their boots and uniforms, using a knife and an ax for this. Everyone thinks only about himself. This is how they will leave you, and this is how they will desecrate your frozen corpse. And we all tremble at the thought that we will inevitably face the same fate as these inhabitants of the field. If earlier they dug graves and erected crosses, now there were no longer enough living people to dig graves for the dead.”

Our troops went on the offensive against the Kotelnikov group on December 24, 1942 at 6 a.m. after a 15-minute powerful fire raid. By the end of December 26, the enemy defense was broken through, and on December 30, the troops of the Stalingrad Front completed the defeat of the Kotelnikov group. So, the successful actions of our troops in December 1942 on the external front thwarted the enemy’s attempt to release the encircled group at Stalingrad, and its position became hopeless. The liquidation of the encircled enemy group was entrusted to the troops of the Don Front (commanded by Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky). The front consisted of seven combined arms armies; the air offensive was supported by the forces of the air army. According to the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, in this operation, called the “Ring,” the troops of the Don Front were supposed to deliver the main blow from west to east, given that in the western part of the ledge there were enemy troops who suffered the greatest losses, and their defense was less prepared. The main blow was delivered by the forces of the 65th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General P.I. Batov) and the 21st Army (commanded by Major General I.M. Chistyakov). From the south towards the station. Voroponovo carries out an attack by the 57th and 64th armies. The 24th, 66th and 62nd armies attacked Gorodishche from the north and from the Stalingrad area. The delivery of these strikes was supposed to lead to the dismemberment of the encircled enemy group and its destruction in parts.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky and the representative of the Headquarters, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. On January 8, 1943, Voronov presented an ultimatum to the commander of the encircled troops, Field Marshal Paulus. This ultimatum was humane, preserved life and did not humiliate the dignity of those surrounded. However, it was not accepted. Then, on January 10, 1943, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive.

Overcoming fierce enemy resistance, the troops of the 21st Army on January 26 in the area west of Mamayev Kurgan united with the troops of the 62nd Army. The encircled enemy troops were pressed to the Volga and cut into two parts. On January 31, the southern strike force was captured along with Field Marshal Paulus and his headquarters. On February 2, after a strong artillery fire strike, the northern group also laid down its arms. The great historical battle of Stalingrad ended with the complete victory of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus, the great battle on the Volga ended in a brilliant victory for the Soviet Armed Forces. Five armies of Nazi Germany and its allies were defeated: two German, two Romanian and one Italian. In total, the enemy lost up to one and a half million people killed, wounded and captured, lost three and a half thousand tanks, over three thousand combat and transport aircraft, more than twelve thousand guns and mortars.

The Battle of Stalingrad is rightly defined as the largest military-political event of the entire Second World War. It was the Stalingrad victory that predetermined the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc, increased the scope of the liberation movement in countries that fell under the yoke of Nazi occupation, and obviously showed that fascism was doomed to inevitable death. The world perceived the victory on the Volga as a victory of Soviet military art over German art.

Fatal decisions (Sb) Military publishing house Ministry of Defense of the USSR Union M., 1958

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Battle of Stalingrad. Chronicle, facts, people. In 2 volumes Publishing house : Olma-Press M., 2002

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Sudoplatov P.A. Special operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930–1950. - M.: “Olma-press”, 1997.

Reinhard Gehlen Intelligence War. Secret operations of the German intelligence services. Publisher: M., Tsentrpolitgraf 2004 1942-1971

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Von Manstein Erich Lost victories "Military History Library" 1955

L. Steidle From the Volga to Weimar Publishing house "Veche" 2010

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Reader on Russian history Publishing house "Vlados" M., 1996

Tsobekhia Gabriel

By November 1942, associations of fascist German troops and their allies (Romanians and Italians), which were part of Army Group B (Colonel General M. Weichs), were operating in the Stalingrad direction. The enemy's strike force, which consisted of the most combat-ready 6th Field (Tank Forces General F. Paulus) and 4th Tank (Colonel General G. Gol) German armies, fought in the Stalingrad area and directly in the city itself. Its flanks were covered by the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies. In addition, the 8th Italian Army defended itself in the Middle Don. The operational formation of Army Group B was single-echelon. In its reserve there were only 3 divisions (two tank and one motorized). The enemy ground forces were supported by the Don aviation group and part of the forces of the 4th Air Fleet.

The enemy's defense in the Middle Don and south of Stalingrad consisted of only one main zone 5-8 km deep, which had two positions. In the operational depths there were separate resistance units, equipped at the most important road junctions. The enemy group operating in the Stalingrad direction consisted of 1 million 11 thousand people, about 10.3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 700 tanks and assault guns, and over 1.2 thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops at Stalingrad were united into three fronts: Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad. Southwestern Front (Lieutenant General, from December 7, 1942, Colonel General N.F. Vatutin), which included four armies (1st Guards and 21st Combined Arms, 5th Tank and 17th air), at the beginning of the operation he occupied the defense in a 250-kilometer strip from Upper Mamon to Kletskaya. In a strip 150 km wide, from Kleskaya to Erzovka, the Don Front was defended (Lieutenant General, from January 15, 1943, Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky), which also included four armies (24, 65 and 66 -th combined arms, 16th air force). Further south in a 450-kilometer strip, from the village of Rynok (north of Stalingrad) to the Kuma River, the Stalingrad Front (Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) occupied the defense. It included six armies (62, 64, 57, 51, 28th combined arms and 8th air force). The troops of all three fronts numbered 1 million 135 thousand people, about 15 thousand guns and mortars (including 115 divisions of rocket artillery - “Katyushas”), up to 1.6 thousand tanks and over 1.9 thousand aircraft.

In the areas of Serafimovich. At Kletskaya and Sirotinskaya, our troops held bridgeheads on the right bank of the Don, and south of Stalingrad, the operationally important defile of the Sarpinsky lakes. The terrain in the area of ​​the upcoming hostilities was suitable for the use of all types of troops. At the same time, numerous snow-covered ravines and gullies, and steep river banks presented serious obstacles for tanks. The presence of the Don River, 170-300 m wide and up to 6 m deep, in the enemy’s operational depths represented a serious obstacle and placed increased demands on the engineering support of troops’ combat operations. Severe climatic and difficult weather conditions had a significant impact on the combat use of aviation: frequent and dense fogs, heavy clouds and snowfalls at this time of year limited its capabilities.

The counteroffensive plan was developed by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff of the Red Army with the participation of the commanders of the Armed Forces and branches of the armed forces, as well as the military councils of the fronts of the Stalingrad direction under the direct leadership of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Army General G.K. Zhukov and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky. The decision to launch a counteroffensive near Stalingrad (code name of Operation Uranus) was made by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on September 13, 1942. The idea was this. in order to defeat the Romanian troops covering the flanks of the enemy strike force with strikes from the bridgeheads on the Don and from the Sarpinsky Lakes region, developing an offensive in converging directions on the city of Kalach-on-Don, the Sovetsky farm, encircling and destroying its main forces operating in the Stalingrad area .

The Southwestern Front was tasked with the forces of the 5th Tank and 21st Combined Arms Armies to deliver the main blow from the bridgeheads in the Serafimovich and Kletskaya areas, defeat the troops of the 3rd Romanian Army, and reach the Kalach-on-Don area by the end of the third day of the operation. Sovetsky, Marinovka and connect with the troops of the Stalingrad Front, closing the encirclement ring of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. At the same time, the 1st Guards Army was supposed to strike in a southwestern direction, reach the line of the Chir River and create an external encirclement front there.

The Stalingrad Front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 51st, 57th and 64th Armies from the Sarpinsky Lakes region, defeat the 4th Romanian Army and, developing an offensive in the direction of Sovetsky, Kalach-on-Don, unite there with the troops of the South-Western front. Part of the front forces received the task of advancing in the direction of Abganerovo, Kotelnikovsky (now the city of Kotelnikovo) and forming an external encirclement front along the line 150-170 km southwest of Stalingrad.

The Don Front launched attacks from the bridgehead in the Kletskaya area (65th Army) and from the Kachalinskaya area (24th Army) in converging directions to the village of Vertyachiy with the task of encircling and destroying enemy troops in the small bend of the Don. Subsequently, together with the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, he was supposed to participate in the liquidation of the encircled group of Nazi troops. The dates for going on the offensive were determined: for the Southwestern and Don Fronts - November 19, for the Stati and City Fronts - November 20. This was due to the need for the simultaneous entry of strike groups of the fronts into the Kalach-on-Don, Sovetsky area. The troops of the shock group of the Southwestern Front had to cover a distance of 110-140 km in three days, and the troops of the Stalingrad Front had to cover 90 km in two days.

Taking into account the shallow formation of the enemy’s tactical defense and his lack of prepared defensive lines in the operational depth, as well as the shallow depth of the operation, the operational formation of the fronts was single-echelon, with the allocation of small reserves. The main attention in the decisions of the front commanders was given to breaking through the enemy’s defenses at a high pace and ensuring a rapid offensive in its operational depth. For this purpose, forces and means were massed in the directions of the main attacks, and all tank, mechanized and cavalry corps were assigned to the armies for reinforcement. In the breakthrough areas, which accounted for only 9% of the total length of the front line, 50-66% of all rifle divisions, up to 85% of artillery and over 90% of tanks were concentrated. As a result, in the breakthrough areas, superiority over the enemy was achieved: in men - by 2-2.5 times, in tanks and artillery - by 4-5 times.

At Stalingrad, for the first time on a large scale, the combat use of artillery and aviation was planned in the form of an artillery and air offensive.

2-6 days before going on the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out. Rifle battalions (in some cases companies), supported by artillery, were involved in it. During the course of it, it was revealed that in front of the Soviet troops preparing to strike, only the enemy’s combat outpost was located, and its front edge was located at a depth of 2-3 km. This made it possible to make the necessary adjustments to the artillery offensive plan and, most importantly, eliminated artillery preparation from scratch. In addition, intelligence established the presence of several new formations within the enemy group.

At 8 o'clock, 50 min. On November 19, 1942, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts went on the offensive. The counteroffensive of the Red Army on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, which was destined to become fateful not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the Second World War, has begun!

Unfavorable meteorological conditions did not allow aviation training to be carried out. The rifle divisions of the 5th Tank (Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko) and 21st (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) armies completed the breakthrough of the first position of the enemy’s main defense line by noon. To increase the pace of the breakthrough, the army commanders, by order of the front commander, introduced mobile groups into the battle: 1st (Major General V.V. Butkov) and 26th (Major General A.G. Rodin) tank corps of the 5th Tank Army and the 4th Tank Corps (Major General A.G. Kravchenko) of the 21st Army. They attacked the enemy on the move, together with the rifle divisions they quickly broke his resistance in the second position and. Having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, they broke into operational space. In the afternoon, the 3rd Guards (Major General I.A. Plie) and 8th (Major General M.D. Borisov) cavalry corps entered the breakthrough. By the end of the first day of the offensive, the defense of the 3rd Romanian Army was broken through in two areas: southwest of Serafimovich and in the Klstskaya area. At the same time, rifle divisions advanced to a depth of 10-19 km, and tank and cavalry corps - to 25-30 km. On the Don Front, troops of the 65th Army (Lieutenant General P.I. Batov). Having encountered strong enemy resistance, they were unable to break through his defenses. They only managed to wedge themselves into the enemy’s position to a depth of 3-5 km.

On November 20, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. Bad weather did not allow the use of aviation here either. Troops of the 51st (Major General N.I. Trufanov), 57th (Major General F.I. Tolbukhin) and 64th (Major General M.S. Shumilov) armies broke through the defenses of the 4th Romanian Army on the first day of the offensive. In the afternoon, army mobile groups were introduced into the breakthrough: 13th Tank (Major General T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th Mechanized (Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th Cavalry (Lieutenant General TT. Shapkin) housing. By the end of the day they had advanced to a depth of 20 km. Having entered the operational space, the mobile formations of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts launched a rapid offensive in the general direction of Kalach-on-Don, covering the enemy’s Stalingrad group from the flanks. As a result of the first two days of the offensive, Soviet troops achieved major successes: the 3rd and 4th Romanian armies suffered a heavy defeat, the enemy’s operational reserves were destroyed, and deep coverage of a large group of Romanian troops in the Raspopinskaya area was indicated.

The successful solution of this task depended to a large extent on the rapid capture of crossings across the Don. For this purpose, on the evening of November 21, the commander of the 26th Tank Corps allocated an advance detachment consisting of two motorized rifle companies. five tanks and one armored vehicle. It was headed by the commander of the 14th motorized rifle brigade, Lieutenant Colonel G.N. Filippov. When approaching the river, it turned out that the bridge at Kalach-on-Don had already been blown up by the Germans. A local resident led the detachment to another bridge, located several kilometers northwest of Kalach-on-Don. In a short battle, using the factor of surprise (the bridge guards initially mistook the advance detachment for their retreating unit and freely allowed them to approach the crossing), the advance detachment destroyed the guards and captured the bridge, which was already prepared for the explosion. All attempts by the enemy to return the crossing were unsuccessful. By evening, the 19th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel N.M. Filippenko) fought its way to the aid of the forward detachment, exhausted in the unequal struggle, defeating large enemy forces on the approaches to the bridge. The success of the advance detachment was consolidated. The capture of the bridge over the Don ensured the rapid overcoming of this large water barrier by formations of the 26th tank corps and the 4th tank corps, which soon arrived. On November 23, the 26th Tank Corps, after stubborn fighting, captured the city of Kalach-on-Don, capturing large trophies there (Kalach-on-Don was the main rear base of the German 6th Field Army). For the courage and heroism shown during the capture of the bridge over the Don and the liberation of the city of Kalach-on-Don, all the soldiers and commanders of the forward detachment were awarded orders and medals, and Lieutenant Colonels Filippov and Filippenko were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

At 16:00 on November 23, the 4th Tank Corps of the Southwestern Front and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Stalingrad Front united in the area of ​​the Sovetsky farm, completing the operational encirclement of the enemy’s Stalingrad group. The first to reach this Don farm were the 45th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.K. Zhidkov) of the 4th Tank Corps and the 36th Mechanized Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel M.I. Rodionov) of the 4th Mechanized Corps. 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units that were part of the enemy’s 6th field and 4th tank armies were surrounded. The total number of the encircled enemy group was about 300 thousand people. On the same day, the Raspopin group of the enemy (27 thousand people) capitulated. This was the first capitulation of a large enemy group in the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, troops of the 57th Army destroyed two Romanian divisions in the area of ​​Oak Ravine (the western shore of Lake Sarpa).

On November 24-30, troops on all fronts, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, squeezed the encirclement more and more closely. With the improvement of the weather, aviation provided significant assistance to the ground troops, carrying out 6 thousand sorties in six November days. By November 30, the territory occupied by the encircled enemy was reduced by more than half. By the end of November, the rifle divisions and cavalry corps of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, advancing in the southwestern and southern directions, created an external encirclement front. It passed along the boundary of the Chir and Don rivers, then turned to Kotelnikovsky and was almost 500 km wide. The distance between the outer and inner fronts of the encirclement ranged from 30 to 110 km.

For the blockade of Paulus’s troops, the fascist German command in November created Army Group “Don” (Field Marshal E. Manstein), which included German and Romanian formations that had escaped encirclement, newly arrived divisions, as well as the encircled 6th Army, - a total of 44 divisions. Initially, Manstein planned to strike from two directions - from the Tormosin and Kotelnikovsky areas in the general direction of Stalingrad. However, a lack of forces (due to opposition from partisans and Soviet air strikes on railway junctions, the transfer of German divisions from the West to the Don was very slow), as well as the activity of Soviet troops on the external front of the encirclement, did not allow this plan to be realized. Then Manstein decided to begin actions to relieve the blockade with the forces of only one Kotelnikov group, which had more troops than the Tormosin group, which was supposed to go on the offensive later. The Kotelnikovsky group (army group “Goth”: 13 divisions and several separate units) received the task of striking along the Kotelnikovsky-Stalingrad village railroad and breaking through to the encircled troops. It was based on the 57th German Tank Corps (up to 300 tanks and assault guns).

The fronts of the Stalingrad direction at this time were preparing to solve three tasks simultaneously: defeating the enemy in the Middle Don, eliminating the group encircled in the Stalingrad area and repelling a possible enemy counterattack on the outer front of the encirclement.

On December 12, 1942, the Germans went on the offensive from the Kotelnikovo area. The enemy's tank divisions broke through the center front of a duck that had been seriously weakened in previous battles and had not yet had time to firmly gain a foothold on the occupied line of the 51st Army (it was inferior to the enemy in tanks by 3 times, and in guns and mortars by more than 2.5 times) and by the end of the day they had advanced to a depth of 40 km. But the stubborn resistance of army units and formations on the flanks of the breakthrough forced the enemy to send significant forces to fight them and thereby weaken the blow on the main direction. Taking advantage of this, the commander of the 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, from January 8, 1943, Major General N.I. Trufanov) with rifle divisions pinned down the enemy group that had broken through from the front, and with mobile formations (105 tanks) struck her counterattack on the flank. As a result, the enemy was forced to disperse his forces over a wide front and sharply reduce the pace of the offensive.

The troops of the 51st Army failed to defeat the enemy strike force, but its advance slowed down. Over the next 10 days, despite all efforts, the Goth army group was able to advance only 20 km. She encountered especially strong resistance in the area of ​​the Verkhnekumsky farm (the Myshkov-Esaulovsky Aksai interfluve). Here, the Soviet soldiers of the 51st Army fought to the death, showing high combat skill, unshakable fortitude and mass heroism. Thus, the 1378th Infantry Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division, headed by Lieutenant Colonel M.S. Diasamidze, subjected to continuous attacks from enemy aircraft, repelled more than 30 enemy attacks over the course of five days (from December 15 to 19) and destroyed up to two infantry battalions and several dozen German tanks. The regiment left its position only after the Nazis managed, using overwhelming numerical superiority, to encircle the main forces of the 4th Mechanized Corps defending in the Verkhnekumsky area. After this, Diasamidze gathered the remnants of his regiment into one fist and with a sudden blow at night broke through the encirclement.

The 55th Separate Tank Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.A., also fought valiantly near Verkhnekumsky. Aslanov. He repelled 12 enemy attacks, destroying up to two companies of infantry. 20 tanks and up to 50 vehicles with soldiers and ammunition. For the courage and heroism shown in the battles near Verkhnekumsk, Lieutenant Colonels Aslanov and Diasamidze were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Their subordinates also stood firm to match their commanders. Twenty-four soldiers of the 1378th Infantry Regiment, led by Lieutenant I.N. Nechaev knocked out and destroyed 18 German tanks. Up to 300 enemy soldiers and 18 tanks were destroyed by the rifle company of Senior Lieutenant P.N. Naumova, who defended height 137.2. Only after all the company soldiers, along with the commander, died a heroic death in an unequal battle. the enemy managed to take control of the heights.

In the battles near Verkhnekumsky, the Nazis lost up to 140 tanks. 17 guns and over 3.2 thousand people. The 4th Mechanized Corps also suffered heavy losses. But he will complete his task; fully. For the massive heroism shown in the six-day battles near Verkhnekumsk, the highest steadfastness and courage, the corps was transformed into the 3rd Guards Mechanized.

Having reached the Myshkova River, Manstein’s tanks unsuccessfully attacked the Soviet troops defending here for four days. From this line to the encircled group they had only about 40 km to go. But here, on the way of the German tank divisions, an insurmountable obstacle stood in the way of the 2nd Guards Army (Lieutenant General R.Ya. Malinovsky), urgently promoted from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. It was a powerful combined arms formation, fully equipped with personnel and military equipment (122 thousand people, more than 2 thousand guns and mortars, about 470 tanks). In the fierce battle that unfolded on the banks of the Myshkova River on December 20-23, the enemy suffered heavy losses and completely exhausted its offensive capabilities. By the end of December 23, he was forced to stop attacks and go on the defensive.

The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive. The enemy's resistance on the Myshkova River was quickly broken, and he began to retreat, pursued by Soviet troops. All his attempts to gain a foothold on intermediate lines were unsuccessful. On December 29, the 7th Tank Corps (Major General P.A. Rotmistrov) liberated the village of Kotelnikovsky after fierce battles. On December 31, the city of Tor Mosin was captured. The remnants of the Goth army group were thrown back across the Sad River.

The most important step of the Soviet command to disrupt the enemy’s attempt to release the encircled group was the offensive of the Southwestern Front on the Middle Don (Operation “Little Saturn”). It began on December 16, 1942. During intense 2-week battles, the Italian 8th Army, the German-Romanian Task Force Hollidt and the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army were completely defeated. The 24th Tank Corps (Major General V.M. Badanov) particularly distinguished itself, having carried out a 240-kilometer raid behind enemy lines. The result of this raid was the capture of the Tatsinskaya railway station, the destruction of the most important German rear base located there and two large airfields from which supplies were supplied to the group encircled in the Stalingrad area. The enemy lost enormous material assets overnight, including over 300 aircraft.

The major victory of Soviet troops in the Middle Don and the threat of the main forces of the Southwestern Front reaching the rear of Army Group Don radically changed the situation in the Stalingrad direction. The enemy finally abandoned attempts to unblock the Paulus group and concentrated its main efforts on repelling the offensive of Soviet troops in the Middle Don.

By the end of December 1942, the fascist German command still managed to restore the defense front on the Don, but had to abandon the 6th Army in Stalingrad to its fate. Thus, by December 31, 1942, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, having defeated the enemy, advanced to a depth of 150-200 km. Favorable conditions were created for the liquidation of the group of fascist German troops surrounded at Stalingrad.

A major role in changing the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was played by the diversionary Operation Mars, carried out in November - December 1942 by troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts. It pinned down large Wehrmacht forces in the western direction and did not allow troops to be transferred from here to the Don. By the beginning of 1943, the front line on the Don ran west of Kantemirovka, along the Kalitva River. north of Morozovsk, along the Chir River, further through Tormosin, Pronin. Andreevskaya.

The Stalingrad enemy group was finally eliminated during Operation Ring, carried out by troops of the Don Front from January 10 to February 2, 1943. At the beginning of the operation, the Don Front included eight armies (21, 24, 57, 62, 64, 65, 66- I combined arms and 16th air) - a total of 212 thousand people, about 6.9 thousand guns and mortars, up to 260 tanks and 300 aircraft. The enemy group numbered over 250 thousand people, more than 4.1 thousand guns and mortars and up to 300 tanks.

On January 8, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Soviet command presented the encircled enemy group with an ultimatum to surrender, which was rejected. The German 6th Army carried out Hitler's order to “stand to the end.”

On the morning of January 10, after a powerful 55-way artillery barrage, the troops of the Don Front went on the offensive. The main blow was delivered from the west by the 65th Army. It was faced with the task of, in cooperation with other armies of the front, destroying the enemy west of the Rossoshka River and eliminating the so-called Marinovsky ledge.

For the first time in the Great Patriotic War, artillery support for infantry and tank attacks in the offensive zone was carried out with a barrage of fire to a depth of 1.5 km. Soviet troops encountered fierce enemy resistance and were unable to break through their defenses on the first day. Only in the direction of the main attack did they manage to wedge themselves into the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 3-5 km. The breakthrough problem was solved only the next day. By the end of January 12, the troops of the Don Front reached the Rossoshka River and eliminated the Marinovsky salient of the front. Three German divisions were defeated here.

The second line of enemy defense ran along Rossoshki. Its breakthrough was entrusted to the 21st Army. Having resumed the offensive on January 15, the troops of the 21st Army completed the breakthrough of the enemy defenses by January 17 and reached the Voroiono-vo area, where they again encountered a well-prepared defense. In stubborn battles on January 22-25, the resistance of the Nazi troops at this line was broken. On the evening of January 26, soldiers of the 21st Army in the Mamayev Kurgan area united with soldiers of the 62nd Army, which had been fighting in Stalingrad since September 1942. The first to meet here were the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.D. Kozin) 21st Army and the 284th Rifle Division (Colonel N.F. Batyuk) of the 62nd Army. Thus, the enemy group was cut into two parts.

However, despite the hopelessness of the situation, the enemy continued to stubbornly resist. Under powerful blows from Soviet troops, he lost one position after another. Soon the struggle among the city ruins, where the remnants of the 6th German Army were driven, broke up into several isolated pockets. The mass surrender of German and Romanian soldiers began. On the morning of January 31, the southern group of forces of the 6th Army ceased to exist. With her, along with his headquarters, the commander of the 6th Field Army, Field Marshal General F. Paulus, surrendered (Paulus received this highest military rank in the German army just a few hours before the surrender). On February 2, the northern group, led by Colonel General K. Strecker, also capitulated. More than 140 thousand German and Romanian soldiers and officers were destroyed by the troops of the Don Front during Operation Ring, over 91 thousand people surrendered, including more than 2.5 thousand officers and 24 generals led by Paulus.

On February 2, 1943, the representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on the Don Front, Colonel General of Artillery N.N. Voronov and the commander of the Don Front, Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin about the liquidation of the enemy’s Stalingrad group.

The Battle of Stalingrad ended in complete triumph of Soviet military art. As a result of the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, the 4th German tank was destroyed. The Romanian 3rd and 4th, the Italian 8th Armies and several task forces, and the German 6th Field Army ceased to exist. The total enemy losses during the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad amounted to over 800 thousand people, up to 2 thousand tanks and assault guns, more than 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 3 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Nazi troops and their allies were thrown back far to the west of the Volga.

The victorious outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad was of great military and political significance. He made a decisive contribution to achieving a radical turning point not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War, and was the most important stage on the path of the Soviet people to victory over Germany. Conditions were created for the deployment of a general offensive of the Red Army and the mass expulsion of invaders from the territories they occupied.

As a result of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet Armed Forces wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy and retained it until the end of the war. The victory at Stalingrad raised the international authority of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces even higher, contributed to the further strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition and the intensification of military operations in other theaters of war. The peoples of Europe, enslaved by Nazi Germany, believed in their imminent liberation and began to wage a more active struggle against the Nazi occupiers.

The crushing defeat at Stalingrad was a severe moral and political shock ala fascist Germany and its satellites. It completely shook the foreign policy positions of the Third Reich, shocked its ruling circles, and undermined the trust of its allies. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, nationwide mourning was declared in Germany for the 6th Field Army killed in Stalingrad. Japan was forced to finally abandon plans to attack the USSR, and Turkey, despite strong pressure from Germany, decided to refrain from entering the war on the side of the fascist bloc and maintain neutrality.

The outstanding victory of the Red Army on the banks of the Volga and Dol showed the whole world its increased power and the high level of Soviet military art.

The most important prerequisites for a successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad were: the correct choice of strikes and methods of action of troops, the skillful creation of strike groups for the offensive, the thoroughness and secrecy of the preparation of the operation, the correct use of forces and means in the offensive, clear interaction between fronts and armies, the rapid creation of internal and external fronts encirclement with the simultaneous development of an offensive on both fronts.

The moment was successfully chosen to launch a counter-offensive, when the enemy had already exhausted its offensive capabilities, but had not yet had time to create a defensive grouping and prepare a strong defense. The encirclement of the enemy was carried out with an almost equal balance of forces and means of the parties and in a short time. At the same time, selected, well-equipped and armed enemy troops, who had rich combat experience, became the object of encirclement.

A skillfully organized enemy air blockade played an important role in eliminating the encircled group of Nazi troops. As a result, the attempt to create a so-called “air bridge” to supply the group encircled at Stalingrad by air, which the Nazi command had counted on, completely failed. During the entire period of the air blockade, which began in December 1942, 1,160 enemy combat and transport aircraft were destroyed, and one third of this number was destroyed at airfields.

An extremely important role in matters of the effective use of strategic reserves and the skillful organization of interaction between groups of fronts operating in different strategic directions belonged to the Supreme Command Headquarters.

For military distinctions in the Battle of Stalingrad, 44 units and formations were given honorary titles, 55 were awarded orders, 183 units, formations and formations were converted into guards. Tens of thousands of Stalingrad soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 112 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The medal “For the Defense of Stalingrad” (established on December 22, 1942) was awarded to more than 707 thousand participants in the battle. At the same time, it should be noted that the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad over one of the strongest armies in the world - the Nazi German - came at a high price for the Red Army. During the counteroffensive, Soviet troops lost 486 thousand people, including about 155 thousand people irrevocably, about 3.6 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2.9 thousand tanks and over 700 aircraft.

On the 20th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, Volgograd (Stalingrad) was awarded the honorary title of Hero City with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (May 8, 1965). The memory of the Battle of Stalingrad is immortalized in a grandiose monument-ensemble erected on Mamayev Kurgan in 1967. Centuries will pass, but the unfading glory of the defenders of the Volga stronghold will forever live in the memory of the peoples of the world as the brightest example of courage and heroism unparalleled in military history. The name “Statingrad” is forever inscribed in golden letters in the history of our Fatherland.

On this day of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, an operation began to encircle the German group in the Stalingrad area.

Women and children meet the liberating soldiers

Stalingrad, broken transport

From a military point of view, the Battle of Stalingrad was a turning point in the course of the war. The strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Soviet army, and the expulsion of the German invaders from our country actually began.

By mid-November 1942, the offensive capabilities of the German strike force in Stalingrad (now Volgograd) were exhausted and the Germans went on the defensive. Thus, the main task facing this group - to cross the Volga in the Stalingrad area and deprive the Soviet army and rear of supplies of oil and food from the Caucasus - was not completed. The entire power of the German military machine was shattered by the steadfastness and heroism of the defenders of Stalingrad, who in the most difficult defensive battles exhausted the enemy and forced him to stop just a few hundred meters from the cherished goal - the banks of the Volga.

It is interesting that the feeling of the proximity of victory and, as it seemed, the last effort led the German command to the fact that it “overlooked” the preparations for the Soviet counteroffensive in the Stalingrad area. Throwing more and more reinforcements towards Stalingrad, the Germans “exposed” their flanks. A situation arose in which the far advanced strike group found itself poorly protected on the flanks, where the front line was held by Romanian and Italian divisions, which had much less combat capability than the German ones. The Soviet command took advantage of this situation and began preparing a counteroffensive in September.

Secretly and in a short time, a colossal amount of work was carried out to prepare a counter-offensive, in which troops of three fronts took part - Don, Stalingrad and South-Western. This preparation required the efforts of the entire country. As a result, in the directions of the main attacks, an approximately double superiority of our troops over the enemy in artillery and tanks was created. The idea of ​​the Soviet command was to encircle the German group with powerful tank attacks south and north of Stalingrad and develop an offensive to the west, thereby eliminating the possibility of releasing the encircled units.

The offensive began on November 19, 1942. After an 80-minute artillery barrage with an unprecedented density of fire, the troops of the Don Front (commanded by Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky) went on the offensive. Tank formations quickly broke through the enemy's defenses. The next day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front (commanded by Colonel General A.I. Eremenko) went on the offensive. The offensive developed rapidly and coordinatedly. Just four days later - November 23 - the troops of the two fronts united, closing the encirclement ring of two German armies (about 330 thousand German soldiers and officers). By the end of November, the distance between the encirclement ring and the front advancing to the west was about 170 km, which made the task of releasing the encircled units practically impossible.

Having recovered from the first shock caused by the encirclement of the German group in Stalingrad, the German command withdrew some troops from the Caucasus direction and concentrated a strong tank strike group south of Stalingrad, which in mid-December attempted to break through to the encircled units. Fierce fighting lasted for almost two weeks. The Germans managed to penetrate our defenses, but they were unable to overcome the entire encirclement. By the end of December it became clear that the situation of the surrounded people was hopeless.

The Nazis still resisted and did not want to give up. Filming location: Stalingrad

In an effort to avoid needless bloodshed, the Soviet command twice offered the commander of the German group, Field Marshal Paulus, to capitulate. At the same time, the survival of all soldiers, medical care for the wounded, return to their homeland after the end of the war, etc. were guaranteed. Both proposals were rejected. Therefore, during January 1943, our troops, through several strikes, “tightened” the encirclement ring.

A column of German prisoners of war passes through Stalingrad

Captured Germans in the destroyed Stalingrad on the Square of "Fallen Fighters"

Finally, on February 2, 1943, the last group of troops in Stalingrad surrendered. During this operation, 91 thousand German soldiers and officers were captured, including 24 generals. Thus ended one of the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War.

The victory in the Battle of Stalingrad had enormous moral, political and military significance.

From a military point of view, the Battle of Stalingrad was a turning point in the course of the war. The strategic initiative passed into the hands of the Soviet army, and the expulsion of the German invaders from our country actually began. The defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad forced Japan and Turkey to refuse to enter the war on the side of Germany, which significantly complicated the position of Germany and its allies.

The whole country and the whole world watched the battle on the Volga with tension for three months. To many, the position of our army seemed hopeless. The stronger was the moral and political effect of the victory at Stalingrad. It became clear to everyone that the German military machine could not overcome the resilience of the Soviet soldier and that our rear was able to ensure the organization of a counteroffensive, which was brilliantly carried out by Soviet military leaders.

The victory in Stalingrad increased the strength of the Soviet people tenfold, both in the army and in the rear, and instilled in them firm confidence in the final victory over the enemy.

The advantages of the USSR in mobilizing resources for a long-term war became clear to the whole world. This gave confidence to the resistance forces in German-occupied European countries, for which Stalingrad became a symbol of imminent liberation from fascism. A tribute of gratitude was the appearance after the war in many European capitals and cities of streets named after Stalingrad. Speech by the 1st Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.S. Chuyanov, at a rally dedicated to the defeat of the Nazi troops.

Filming location: Stalingrad, Fallen Fighters Square.

The last shot on Mamayev Kurgan

Return. Stalingrad 1943

Cleaning up the Volga River Embankment in the center cities

The first spring after the terrible battles. 1944

Anniversary of the Victory in Stalingrad. 1944

In 1965, Stalingrad was awarded the honorary title of Hero City.

The attack on the Soviet Union occurred without a declaration of war in the morning hours of June 22, 1941. Despite long preparations for the war, the attack turned out to be completely unexpected for the USSR, since the German leadership did not even have a pretext for the attack.

The military events of the first weeks inspired full hope for the success of the next “blitzkrieg”. Armored formations advanced quickly and occupied vast areas of the country. In major battles and encirclement, the Soviet Army suffered millions of losses in killed and captured. A large amount of military equipment was destroyed or captured as trophies. Once again it seemed that the doubts and feelings of fear that had spread in Germany, despite careful ideological preparation, were refuted by the successes of the Wehrmacht. The Church Board of Trustees of the German Evangelical Church expressed the sentiments of many by assuring Hitler by telegraph that “he is supported by the entire evangelical Christianity of the Reich in the decisive battles with the mortal enemy of order and Western Christian culture.”

The successes of the Wehrmacht caused various reactions from the Soviet side. There were manifestations of panic and confusion, soldiers left their military units. And even Stalin addressed the population for the first time only on July 3. In areas captured or annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939/40. part of the population welcomed the Germans as liberators. Nevertheless, from the first day of the war, Soviet troops showed unexpectedly strong resistance even in the most hopeless situations. And the civilian population actively participated in the evacuation and relocation of militarily important industrial facilities beyond the Urals.

Stubborn Soviet resistance and heavy losses of the German Wehrmacht (up to December 1, 1941, about 200,000 killed and missing, almost 500,000 wounded) soon dashed German hopes for an easy and quick victory. Autumn mud, snow and terrible cold in winter hampered the Wehrmacht's military operations. The German army was not prepared for war in winter conditions; it was believed that by this time victory would have already been achieved. The attempt to capture Moscow as the political center of the Soviet Union failed, although German troops approached the city at a distance of 30 kilometers. At the beginning of December, the Soviet Army unexpectedly launched a counteroffensive, which was successful not only near Moscow, but also on other sectors of the front. Thus, the concept of lightning war finally collapsed.

In the summer of 1942, new forces were accumulated to advance in the southern direction. Although German troops managed to capture large territories and advance as far as the Caucasus, they were unable to gain a foothold anywhere. The oil fields were in Soviet hands, and Stalingrad became a bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga. In November 1942, the German front line on the territory of the Soviet Union reached its greatest extent, but there could be no talk of decisive success.

Chronicle of the war from June 1941 to November 1942

22.6.41. The beginning of the German attack, the advance of three army groups. Romania, Italy, Slovakia, Finland and Hungary entered the war on the side of Germany.

29/30.6.41 The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks declares the war a “patriotic” war of the entire people; formation of the State Defense Committee.

July August. German offensive along the entire front, destruction of large Soviet formations in the encirclement (Bialystok and Minsk: 328,000 prisoners, Smolensk: 310,000 prisoners).

September. Leningrad is cut off from the rest of the country. East of Kyiv, over 600,000 Soviet soldiers were captured and surrounded. The general offensive of the German troops, which suffer heavy losses, is slowed down due to the constant resistance of the Soviet Army.

2.10.41. The offensive on Moscow began; some sections of the front line at the end of November were 30 km from Moscow.

5.12.41. The beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive with fresh forces near Moscow, the German retreat. After Hitler's intervention, Army Group Center's defensive positions were stabilized in January 1942 at the cost of heavy losses. Soviet success in the south.

12/11/41. Germany declares war on the USA.

In 1941, the Soviet Army lost 1.5 - 2.5 million soldiers killed and about 3 million captured. The number of civilian deaths is not precisely established, but is estimated in the millions. The losses of the German army were about 200,000 people killed and missing.

January - March 1942 Wide winter offensive of the Soviet Army, partly successful, but did not achieve its goals due to heavy losses. The losses of the German army in manpower and equipment were also so great that continuing the offensive on a broad front turned out to be impossible at the moment.

May. The failure of the Soviet offensive near Kharkov; During the counter-offensive, 250,000 Soviet soldiers were surrounded and captured.

June July. Capture of the fortress of Sevastopol and thereby the entire Crimea. The beginning of the German summer offensive, with the goal of reaching the Volga and capturing oil fields in the Caucasus. The Soviet side, in view of Germany's new victories, is in a state of crisis.

August. German troops reach the Caucasus Mountains, but are unable to decisively defeat the Soviet troops.

September. The beginning of the battles for Stalingrad, which was almost entirely captured by the Germans in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga under the command of General Chuikov could not be destroyed.

9.11.42. The beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad.

50 The Soviet population listens on the street to the government announcement about the beginning of the war, June 22, 1941.

Text 33
From a radio speech by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov on June 22, 1941.

Citizens and women of the Soviet Union! The Soviet government and its head, Comrade Stalin, instructed me to make the following statement:

Today, at 4 o'clock in the morning, without declaring any claims against the Soviet Union, without declaring war, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and bombed our cities from their planes - Zhitomir, Kiev, Sevastopol, Kaunas and some others, and more than two hundred people were killed and wounded. Enemy air raids and artillery shelling were also carried out from Romanian and Finnish territories. This unheard of attack on our country is a treachery unparalleled in the history of civilized nations. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Germany, and the Soviet government fulfilled all the terms of this treaty in all good faith. The attack on our country was carried out despite the fact that during the entire duration of this treaty the German government could never make a single claim against the USSR regarding the implementation of the treaty. All responsibility for this predatory attack on the Soviet Union will fall entirely on the German fascist rulers. [...]

This war was imposed on us not by the German people, not by German workers, peasants and intellectuals, whose suffering we well understand, but by a clique of bloodthirsty fascist rulers of Germany who enslaved the French, Czechs, Poles, Serbs, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece and other peoples . [...]

This is not the first time our people have had to deal with an attacking, arrogant enemy. At one time, our people responded to Napoleon’s campaign in Russia with a Patriotic War and Napoleon was defeated and came to his collapse. The same will happen to the arrogant Hitler, who announced a new campaign against our country. The Red Army and all our people will once again wage a victorious patriotic war for the Motherland, for honor, for freedom.

Text 34
An excerpt from Elena Scriabina’s diary dated June 22, 1941 about the news of the German attack.

Molotov’s speech sounded hesitantly, hurriedly, as if he was short of breath. His encouragement sounded completely out of place. Immediately there was a feeling that a monster was slowly approaching menacingly and terrifying everyone. After the news, I ran out into the street. The city was in panic. People quickly exchanged a few words, rushed into stores and bought everything they could get their hands on. They rushed through the streets as if beside themselves; many went to savings banks to take away their savings. This wave overwhelmed me, too, and I tried to get rubles from my savings book. But I arrived too late, the cash register was empty, the payment was suspended, everyone was making noise and complaining. And the June day was blazing, the heat was unbearable, someone felt bad, someone cursed in despair. The whole day the mood was restless and tense. Only in the evening it became strangely quiet. It seemed that everyone was huddled somewhere in horror.

Text 35
Excerpts from the diary of NKVD Major Shabalin from October 6 to October 19, 1941

Major Shabalin died on October 20. when trying to get out of the environment. The diary was transferred to the German army for military analysis. Back translation from German; the original is lost.

Diary
NKVD Major Shabalin,
head of the special department of the NKVD
at 50 army

For accuracy of transmission
Chief of Staff of the 2nd Tank Army
Subp. Frh.f. Liebenstein
[...]

The army is not what we are used to thinking and imagining at home. Huge shortage of everything. The attacks of our armies are disappointing.

We are interrogating a red-haired German prisoner, a shabby, man-haired guy, extremely stupid. [...]

The situation with personnel is very difficult; almost the entire army consists of people whose homelands were captured by the Germans. They want to go home. Inactivity at the front and sitting in the trenches demoralize the Red Army soldiers. There are cases of drunkenness among command and political personnel. People sometimes don't return from reconnaissance. [...]

The enemy has us surrounded. Continuous cannonade. Duel of artillerymen, mortarmen and machine gunners. Danger and fear almost all day long. I'm not even talking about the forest, swamp and overnight stay. Since the 12th I haven’t slept anymore, since October 8th I haven’t read a single newspaper.

Creepy! I wander around, there are corpses around, the horrors of war, continuous shelling! Hungry and sleepless again. I took a bottle of alcohol. I went into the forest to investigate. Our complete destruction is obvious. The army was defeated, the convoy was destroyed. I am writing in the forest by the fire. In the morning I lost all the security officers, I was left alone among strangers. The army fell apart.

I spent the night in the forest. I haven't eaten bread for three days. There are a lot of Red Army soldiers in the forest; there are no commanders. Throughout the night and morning, the Germans fired at the forest with weapons of all kinds. At about 7 o'clock in the morning we got up and walked north. The shooting continues. At the rest stop I washed my face. [...]

We walked all night in the rain through marshy areas. Pitchless darkness. I was soaked to the skin, my right leg was swollen; it's terribly hard to walk.

Text 36
Field mail letter from non-commissioned officer Robert Rupp to his wife dated July 1, 1941 about the attitude towards Soviet prisoners of war.

They say that the Fuhrer issued an order that prisoners and those who surrender are no longer subject to execution. It makes me happy. Finally! Many of the shot people I saw on the ground lay with their hands raised up, without weapons or even a belt. I've seen at least a hundred people like this. They say that even a parliamentarian walking with a white flag was shot dead! After lunch they said that the Russians were surrendering in whole companies. The method was bad. Even the wounded were shot.

Text 37
Diary entry of former ambassador Ulrich von Hassell dated 18.8.1941 regarding Wehrmacht war crimes.

Ulrich von Hassell took an active part in the anti-Hitler Resistance of conservative circles and was executed after the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944.

18. 8. 41 [...]

The whole war in the east is terrible, general savagery. One young officer received an order to destroy 350 civilians, among whom were women and children, herded into a large barn, at first he refused to do this, but he was told that this was a failure to comply with the order, after which he asked for 10 minutes to think and finally did it , together with some others, directed machine-gun bursts into the open door of the barn into a crowd of people, and then, finishing off those still alive with machine guns. He was so shocked by this that, having later received a slight wound, he firmly decided not to return to the front.

Text 38
Excerpts from the order of the commander of the 17th Army, Colonel General Khot, dated November 17, 1941, regarding the basic principles of warfare.

Command
17th Army A.Gef.St.,
1a No. 0973/41 secret. from 11/17/41
[...]

2. The campaign to the East should end differently than, for example, the war against the French. This summer it is becoming increasingly clear to us that here, in the East, two internally irresistible views are fighting against each other: the German sense of honor and race, the centuries-old German army against the Asian type of thinking and primitive instincts, fueled by a small number of mainly Jewish intellectuals: fear of whip, neglect of moral values, equalization with inferiors, neglect of one’s life of no value.

51 The launch of German Junker Ju-87 (Stukas) dive bombers from a field airfield in the Soviet Union, 1941.

52 German infantry on the march, 1941

53 Soviet prisoners dig their own grave, 1941.

54 Soviet prisoners before execution, 1941. Both photographs (53 and 54) were in the wallet of a German soldier who died near Moscow. The location and circumstances of the shooting are unknown.

More strongly than ever, we believe in the historical turn when the German people, by virtue of the superiority of their race and their successes, will take over the government of Europe. We realize more clearly our calling to save European culture from Asian barbarism. Now we know that we have to fight an embittered and stubborn enemy. This struggle can only end in the destruction of one side or the other; there can be no agreement. [...]

6. I demand that every soldier in the army be imbued with pride in our successes and a sense of unconditional superiority. We are the masters of this country which we have conquered. Our sense of dominance is expressed not in well-fed tranquility, not in disdainful behavior, and not even in the selfish abuse of power by individuals, but in conscious opposition to Bolshevism, in strict discipline, unyielding determination and tireless vigilance.

8. There should be absolutely no place for sympathy and softness towards the population. The Red soldiers brutally killed our wounded; they brutally dealt with the prisoners and killed them. We must remember this if the population that once endured the Bolshevik yoke now wants to accept us with joy and worship. One should behave towards Volksdeutsche with a sense of self-awareness and calm restraint. The fight against impending food difficulties should be left to the self-government of the enemy population. Any trace of active or passive resistance or any machinations of Bolshevik-Jewish instigators must be immediately eradicated. The need for brutal measures against elements hostile to the people and our policy must be understood by the soldiers. [...]

In everyday life, we should not lose sight of the global significance of our struggle against Soviet Russia. The Russian mass has been paralyzing Europe for two centuries. The need to take Russia into account and the fear of its possible attack constantly dominated political relations in Europe and hampered peaceful development. Russia is not a European, but an Asian state. Every step into the depths of this dull, enslaved country allows one to see this difference. Europe and especially Germany must be freed forever from this pressure and from the destructive forces of Bolshevism.

For this we fight and work.

Commander Hoth (signed)
Send to the following units: regiments and individual battalions, including construction and service units, to the patrol commander; distributor 1a; reserve = 10 copies.

Text 39
Report from the rear commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General von Schenkendorff, dated March 24, 1942, regarding the looting.

Commander of the 2nd Tank Army 24.3.42
Rel.: unauthorized requisition;
Application

1) The rear commander of the 2nd Tank Army in a daily report dated 2/23/42: “The unauthorized requisition by German soldiers near Navleya is increasing. From Gremyachey (28 km southwest of Karachev), soldiers from the Karachevo area took 76 cows without a certificate, and from Plastovoye (32 km southwest of Karachev) - 69 cows. In both places there was not a single head of cattle left. In addition, the Russian law enforcement service in Plastov was disarmed; the next day the village was occupied by partisans. In the area of ​​Sinezerko (25 km south of Bryansk), soldiers of the platoon commander, Fel-Feb Sebastian (code 2), wildly requisitioned livestock, and in a neighboring village they shot at the village headman and his assistants. [...]

Such cases are being reported more and more frequently. In this regard, I especially point out the orders issued on the conduct of troops and their supply in the country in accordance with the order. They are once again reflected in the application.”

Taking into account the tasks being solved, the peculiarities of the conduct of hostilities by the parties, the spatial and temporal scale, as well as the results, the Battle of Stalingrad includes two periods: defensive - from July 17 to November 18, 1942; offensive - from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943

The strategic defensive operation in the Stalingrad direction lasted 125 days and nights and included two stages. The first stage is the conduct of defensive combat operations by front-line troops on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12). The second stage is the conduct of defensive actions to hold Stalingrad (September 13 - November 18, 1942).

The German command delivered the main blow with the forces of the 6th Army in the direction of Stalingrad along the shortest route through the big bend of the Don from the west and southwest, just in the defense zones of the 62nd (commander - Major General, from August 3 - Lieutenant General , from September 6 - Major General, from September 10 - Lieutenant General) and the 64th (commander - Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov, from August 4 - Lieutenant General) armies. The operational initiative was in the hands of the German command with an almost double superiority in forces and means.

Defensive combat operations by troops of the fronts on the distant approaches to Stalingrad (July 17 - September 12)

The first stage of the operation began on July 17, 1942 in the big bend of the Don with combat contact between units of the 62nd Army and the advanced detachments of German troops. Fierce fighting ensued. The enemy had to deploy five divisions out of fourteen and spend six days to approach the main defense line of the troops of the Stalingrad Front. However, under the pressure of superior enemy forces, Soviet troops were forced to retreat to new, poorly equipped or even unequipped lines. But even under these conditions they inflicted significant losses on the enemy.

By the end of July, the situation in the Stalingrad direction continued to remain very tense. German troops deeply engulfed both flanks of the 62nd Army, reached the Don in the Nizhne-Chirskaya area, where the 64th Army held the defense, and created the threat of a breakthrough to Stalingrad from the southwest.

Due to the increased width of the defense zone (about 700 km), by the decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the Stalingrad Front, which was commanded by a lieutenant general from July 23, was divided on August 5 into the Stalingrad and South-Eastern fronts. To achieve closer cooperation between the troops of both fronts, from August 9, the leadership of the defense of Stalingrad was united in one hand, and therefore the Stalingrad Front was subordinated to the commander of the South-Eastern Front, Colonel General.

By mid-November, the advance of German troops was stopped along the entire front. The enemy was forced to finally go on the defensive. This completed the strategic defensive operation of the Battle of Stalingrad. The troops of the Stalingrad, South-Eastern and Don Fronts completed their tasks, holding back the powerful enemy offensive in the Stalingrad direction, creating the preconditions for a counter-offensive.

During the defensive battles, the Wehrmacht suffered huge losses. In the fight for Stalingrad, the enemy lost about 700 thousand killed and wounded, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1000 tanks and assault guns and over 1.4 thousand combat and transport aircraft. Instead of a non-stop advance towards the Volga, enemy troops were drawn into protracted, grueling battles in the Stalingrad area. The German command's plan for the summer of 1942 was thwarted. At the same time, the Soviet troops also suffered heavy losses in personnel - 644 thousand people, of which irrevocable - 324 thousand people, sanitary 320 thousand people. The losses of weapons amounted to: about 1,400 tanks, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2 thousand aircraft.

Soviet troops continued their offensive