German spies in the Red Army. German spies in the Red Army during World War II
History is written by the victors, and therefore it is not customary for Soviet chroniclers to mention German spies who worked behind the lines in the Red Army. And there were such intelligence officers, even in the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as the famous Max network. After the end of the war, the Americans brought them in to share their experience with the CIA.
Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the USSR managed to create an agent network in Germany and the countries it occupied (the most famous is the Red Chapel), but the Germans did not. And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written about in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that the winner is not customary to admit his own miscalculations.
In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the department “Foreign Armies - East” (in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation so that at the very end of the war he would surrender to the Americans and offer them a “product face”.
His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the context of the emerging Cold War, Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States.
Later, the general headed the intelligence service of Germany, and his archive remained in the USA (some copies were left to Gehlen). Having already retired, the general published his memoirs “Service. 1942-1971", which was published in Germany and the USA in 1971-72. Almost simultaneously with Gehlen’s book, his biography was published in America, as well as the book of British intelligence officer Edward Spiro, “Gelen – Spy of the Century” (Spiro wrote under the pseudonym Edward Cookridge, he was a Greek by nationality, a representative of British intelligence in the Czech resistance during the war). Another book was written by American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called “Gehlen - German Spymaster.” All these books are based on Gehlen's archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence service BND. They contain some information about German spies behind Soviet lines.
Gehlen’s “field work” in German intelligence was carried out by General Ernst Kestring, a Russian German born near Tula. It was he who served as the prototype for the German major in Bulgakov’s book “The Days of the Turbins,” who saved Hetman Skoropadsky from execution by the Red Army (in fact, the Petliurists). Kestring knew the Russian language and Russia perfectly, and it was he who personally selected agents and saboteurs from Soviet prisoners of war. It was he who found one of the most valuable, as it later turned out, German spies.
On October 13, 1941, 38-year-old captain Minishky was captured. It turned out that before the war he worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and earlier in the Moscow City Party Committee. Since the start of the war, he served as political commissar on the Western Front. He was captured along with his driver while driving around the front lines during the Battle of Vyazemsky.
Minishky immediately agreed to cooperate with the Germans, citing some old grievances against the Soviet regime. Seeing what a valuable personnel they had come across, they promised, when the time came, to take him and his family to the West with the provision of German citizenship. But first, business.
Minishky spent 8 months studying in a special camp. And then began the famous Operation Flamingo, which Gehlen carried out in collaboration with intelligence officer Baun, who already had a network of agents in Moscow, among whom the most valuable was a radio operator with the pseudonym Alexander. Baun's people transported Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the first Soviet headquarters the story of his captivity and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gehlen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, remembering his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the State Defense Committee.
Along the chain, through several German agents in Moscow, Minishky began to supply information. The first sensational message came from him on July 14, 1942. Gehlen and Guerre sat all night, drawing up a report to Chief of the General Staff Halder based on it. The report was made: “The military meeting ended in Moscow on the evening of July 13. Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov stated that their retreat would be as far as the Volga in order to force the Germans to winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction must be carried out in the abandoned territory; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.
The British representative asked for Soviet help in Egypt, but received the answer that the Soviet resources of mobilized manpower were not as great as the Allies believed. They are also short on planes, tanks and guns, in part because some of the arms supplies intended for Russia that the British were supposed to deliver through the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf were diverted to defend Egypt. It was decided to carry out offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A diversionary attack should be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be held.”
That's exactly what happened. Halder later noted in his diary: “The FHO provided accurate information about the enemy forces newly deployed since 28 June and the estimated strength of these formations. He also gave a correct assessment of the enemy’s energetic actions to defend Stalingrad.”
The above authors made a number of inaccuracies, which is understandable: they received the information through several hands and 30 years after the events described. For example, the English historian David Kahn gave a more correct version of the report: on July 14, that meeting was attended not by the heads of the American, British and Chinese missions, but by the military attaches of these countries.
There is no consensus about the real name of Minishkiya. According to another version, his last name was Mishinsky. But perhaps she is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.
Coolridge and other authors report sparingly about the further fate of Agent 438. Participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minischkiy, arranging, with the help of Baun, a meeting with one of the advanced reconnaissance detachments of the "Valley", which transported him across the front line.
Subsequently, Minishkiya worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, working with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.
Minischia and Operation Flamingo are also referred to by other respected authors, such as the British military historian John Ericsson in his book The Road to Stalingrad, French historian Gabor Rittersporn. According to Rittersporn, Minishky actually received German citizenship, after the end of the Second World War he taught at an American intelligence school in Southern Germany, then moved to the United States, receiving American citizenship. The German “Stirlitz” died in the 1980s at his home in Virginia.
Minishkia wasn't the only super spy. The same English military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city. There were several “moles” in Rokossovsky’s entourage, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler was successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was considered as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin as a result of a coup by the generals.
The British knew well about these German spies (it is clear that they still know). Soviet military historians also admit this. Thus, former military intelligence colonel Yuri Modin, in his book “The Fates of the Scouts: My Cambridge Friends,” argues that the British were afraid to supply the USSR with information obtained through deciphering German reports precisely because they feared that there were agents in Soviet headquarters.
But they personally mention another German super-intelligence officer - Fritz Kauders, who created the famous Max intelligence network in the USSR. His biography is outlined by the aforementioned Englishman David Kahn.
Fritz Kauders was born in Vienna in 1903. His mother was Jewish and his father was German. In 1927 he moved to Zurich, where he began working as a sports journalist. Then he lived in Paris and Berlin, and after Hitler came to power he went to Budapest as a reporter. There he found himself a profitable occupation - an intermediary in the sale of Hungarian entry visas to Jews fleeing Germany. He made acquaintances with high-ranking Hungarian officials, and at the same time met the head of the Abwehr station in Hungary, and began working for German intelligence.
He makes acquaintance with the Russian emigrant general A.V. Turkul, who had his own intelligence network in the USSR - it later served as the basis for the formation of a more extensive German spy network. Agents are dropped into the Union for a year and a half, starting in the fall of 1939. The annexation of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR greatly helped here, when at the same time they “annexed” dozens of German spies who had been abandoned there in advance.
With the outbreak of war with the USSR, Kauders moved to the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia, where he headed the Abwehr radio post, which received radiograms from agents in the USSR. But who these agents were has not yet been clarified. There are only scraps of information that there were at least 20-30 of them in various parts of the USSR. The Soviet super-saboteur Sudoplatov also mentions the Max intelligence network in his memoirs.
As mentioned above, not only the names of German spies, but also minimal information about their actions in the USSR is still closed. Did the Americans and British convey information about them to the USSR after the victory over fascism? It’s unlikely - they themselves needed the surviving agents. The most that was declassified then was minor agents from the Russian emigrant organization NTS.
(quoted from the book by B. Sokolov “The Hunt for Stalin, the Hunt for Hitler”, Veche Publishing House, 2003, pp. 121-147)
““On November 15, 1942, the Red Army is preparing to attack near Rzhev. Max". Such a ciphergram landed on the desk of the Abwehr chief, Admiral Canaris. The old fox (as he was called in the top leadership of the Reich) immediately rushed to Hitler."
Reinhard Gehlen, who was present at that meeting, then the head of the General Staff department “Foreign Armies of the East”, who later replaced Canaris as head of the Abwehr, wrote about this in his “Memoirs”.
Military Merit Cross
- My Fuhrer, I told you that the Russians will fall for disinformation about our attack on Moscow! – Canaris handed Hitler the encryption. – They are gathering troops near Rzhev under the command of Zhukov himself. He was urgently recalled by Stalin from Stalingrad.
– This time we will rub the nose of Stalin and Zhukov! - Hitler grinned. -Who is Max?
“This is our most valuable agent, my Fuhrer.” Serves as a liaison officer for Shaposhnikov himself, in their General Staff. By the way, he is a descendant of an old noble family and hates the Soviets. He conveyed many reports about the plans of the General Staff and the regrouping of their troops. The Soviets believe that we will move towards Moscow again.
- Prepare an order to award this Max the Cross of Military Merit with swords for bravery.
Canaris hastened to personally inform his beloved agent about the Fuhrer’s order. On the same day, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Lavrentiy Beria was informed about this award. If Hitler and Canaris knew what a pig the Soviet counterintelligence played on them. In fact, Max was introduced into the Abwehr at the beginning of the war.
Believing the report that Canaris brought him, Hitler moved divisions to Rzhev, instead of helping Paulus. The Germans missed the preparations for the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Hitler was confident that in the winter of 1942 the Russians were unlikely to do anything to save the encircled armies of Chuikov and Shumilov, or even Stalingrad itself.
Racing horse
Who really was the mysterious Max, who forced Hitler to rush to Rzhev and refuse to send divisions to help Friedrich Paulus, who was surrounded in November 1942? The author of the article learned about this from state security veteran Alexander Nikolaevich Kruglov.
“My immediate superior, Grigory Fedorovich Grigorenko, told me about Alexander Demyanov, a deeply secret agent of Soviet intelligence Heine,” Kruglov began his story. – From 1942 to 1944, he provided radio technical support for Operation “Monastery” - a radio game with the Abwehr. The main violin in it was played by our agent Heine, aka Max, aka Alexander Demyanov. He really came from a noble noble family. His great-grandfather, ataman of the Kuban Cossacks Anton Andreevich Golovaty, was a close associate of Catherine the Great, the founder of Ekaterinodar. Demyanov's father, captain of the Cossack troops, died in the First World War. Little Sasha was raised by his princess mother, a graduate of the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens, who was reputed to be the first beauty of St. Petersburg. She did not want to leave Russia with the wave of emigration and, despite the difficult times, tried to give her son a decent education. Alexander entered the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute.
He came under the gun of the OGPU in 1929 by accident. Former nobles who hated Soviet power and were looking for ways to get closer to Hitler created the monarchical organization “The Throne” in the Novodevichy Convent. Demyanov was aware of their plans. The security officers, who followed the 19-year-old student’s every step, accused him of reading Chaliapin’s banned memoirs and “illegal possession of a pistol,” having planted it in advance. Sasha was offered a choice: ten years of camps or continuing his studies. But for this he had to help the OGPU “in identifying the opposition that dreams of selling the Motherland to the Germans.” After painful deliberation, the young man agreed. The security officers transferred Demyanov to Moscow, where he got a job as an electrical engineer at Goskinoprokat, and later at the Mosfilm film studio.
Pleasant appearance and noble manners allowed Alexander to easily enter the company of young film actors, directors, writers and poets. His friends were impressed by his hospitality, noble origin, friendship with Mikhail Romm himself and some foreign diplomats, and most importantly, the fact that he was the only one who kept his own racing horse in the Manege! Very soon, employees of the German embassy in Moscow became interested in Demyanov. And not only them. This is what the security officers were counting on, having approved Heine’s contacts (he was given such an undercover pseudonym because of his love for the work of the German poet) with the people of Canaris.
Defector
– In December 1941, the security officers, intending to introduce Demyanov into the Abwehr, organized for him to cross the front line as an emissary of the anti-Soviet organization “Throne”. The anti-Soviet people were helped to create this organization by the security officers themselves, who wanted to penetrate Canaris’ department,” Alexander Nikolaevich clarified. “After the most severe check of the defector, they believed Heine and offered him training at an intelligence school. He agreed. By the way, shortly before this, Alexander was trained by the Soviet intelligence ace William Fisher, better known to the world as Rudolf Abel. He taught Heine how to work with a walkie-talkie and encryption. Therefore, now the Nazis were only amazed at the outstanding abilities of the Russian.
After graduating from school, the newly minted agent Max (under this pseudonym Demyanov was listed in the Abwehr file cabinet) was offered to infiltrate one of the Soviet headquarters.
“An Abwehr agent on your General Staff...”
Imagine Canaris’s amazement when Max reported in code that he “managed to get a job as a communications officer with Marshal Shaposhnikov himself.” Canaris couldn't have dreamed of anything more. The Abwehr chief was delighted by another message from Max: about the involvement of his wife and father-in-law, an employee of the diplomatic corps, in the work. Now the apartment in the center of Moscow could be used as a safehouse for members of the Throne organization and Abwehr couriers. The old fox had no idea that the security officers were leading him by the nose. Sooner or later, Abwehr agents who came under the surveillance of Soviet counterintelligence fell asleep. To cover up Heine, newspaper reports included information about supposedly “major sabotage on the Soviet railways.” The Germans entrusted the organization of such sabotage to Demyanov. In addition, he had to collect information about the plans of the General Staff, about the formation and deployment of new military units.
His activities were so successful that even the ubiquitous British intelligence reported to Churchill about a “mole” - a German agent who had infiltrated the General Staff of the Red Army. The British Prime Minister immediately reported this in a personal secret message to Stalin. The Soviet leader "heartily thanked his friend Winston." Agent Max - Captain Demyanov - was awarded the Order of the Red Star. The head of the foreign department of the NKVD P. Sudoplatov, his officers V. Ilyin, M. Maklyarsky and G. Grigorenko, who headed the “Monastery” operation, were awarded the highest orders of the USSR.
From the operational information on the agent of the 2nd department of the NKVD Demyanov (Heine): “Demyanov Alexander Petrovich, born in 1910, Russian, non-party, higher education, majoring in electrical engineering, knows subversive and radio business well. During his time working with us, he showed himself to be an proactive, strong-willed, capable agent who loves intelligence work. He was prepared to work in Moscow in case it was captured by the Germans. In June 1942, he reported to the Abwehr that emergency measures had been taken in Moscow to repel a massive German air raid. This message forced the German command to abandon the air raid. Currently participating in the radio game “Monastery.”
Paulus' army in the cauldron
– Did the Germans really not have any suspicions about Max?
- They arose. Walter Friedrich Schellenberg, chief of foreign intelligence, did not trust his reports. Heine walked on the razor's edge. He was carefully watched, but there was nothing to complain about. Moscow supplied completely reliable information through him. This happened with the ciphergram transmitted by Demyanov about the preparation of our counterattack in the Rzhev area. Hitler immediately ordered Army Group Center to be reinforced with fresh divisions, instead of moving them to help Paulus. Max, as a “liaison officer of the General Staff,” explained to the Germans the “some revival” of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, recorded by German aviation, by the regrouping of Soviet troops to move to winter defense. In fact, we were preparing for a counteroffensive at Stalingrad.
By transmitting a message about the impending counterattack near Rzhev, Demyanov-Heine actually helped save Stalingrad from complete capture in October-November 1942. Only 500 meters separated Paulus from the Volga at that time. On a narrow strip of shore, Chuikov’s guards bit into the ground to death. Had Hitler then brought in divisions transferred from France, the fall of Stalingrad would have been a foregone conclusion. But Hitler kept them near Rzhev, held them even when Paulus’s army was in a cauldron.
– What is the future fate of Demyanov-Heine?
– After the successful completion of the “Monastery” radio game, he “helped” Hitler reschedule his offensive in the Kursk region. This gave us the opportunity to prepare to fight back. In 1944, Alexander Demyanov was involved in the counterintelligence operation Berezino. In the summer of 1944, the formation of Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Scherhorn found himself surrounded in the forests of Belarus. The Germans tried to use it for fighting behind Russian lines. Soviet counterintelligence introduced a certain William Fischer into Scherhorn's detachment under the guise of a Wehrmacht officer. The radio game with the Abwehr was hosted by the same Heine. None of Scherhorn's soldiers escaped the encirclement. The role of Ivan Susanin was perfectly played by William Fisher (Abel) and Demyanov.
After the war, they tried to introduce him and his wife into emigrant circles in Paris, but the couple did not find support there and were recalled. Alexander Petrovich Demyanov died in Moscow in 1978. Up to this day, no one knew who this modest Muscovite really was.
Having placed the main emphasis on the armed forces in the impending aggression, the Nazi command did not forget about waging a “secret war” against the Soviet Union. Preparations for it were in full swing. All the rich experience of imperialist intelligence, all the secret service organizations of the Third Reich, contacts of the international anti-Soviet reaction and, finally, all the known spy centers of Germany's allies now had a clear focus and goal - the USSR.
The Nazis tried to conduct reconnaissance, espionage, and sabotage against the Land of the Soviets constantly and on a large scale. The activity of these actions increased sharply after the capture of Poland in the fall of 1939 and especially after the end of the French campaign. In 1940, the number of spies and agents sent to the territory of the USSR increased almost 4 times compared to 1939, and in 1941 - already 14 times. During just eleven pre-war months, Soviet border guards detained about 5 thousand enemy spies. The former head of the first department of German military intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr), Lieutenant General Pickenbrock, testifying at the Nuremberg trials, said: “... I must say that already from August - September 1940, the Foreign Armies Department of the General Staff began to significantly increase reconnaissance missions for the Abwehr in the USSR. These tasks were certainly related to the preparations for war against Russia.”
He showed great interest in the preparations for the “secret war” against the Soviet Union. Hitler himself, believing that the activation of the entire huge reconnaissance and subversive apparatus of the Reich secret services will significantly contribute to the implementation of his criminal plans. On this occasion, the English military historian Liddell Hart subsequently wrote: “In the war that Hitler intended to wage ... the main attention was paid to attacking the enemy from the rear in one form or another. Hitler disdained frontal assaults and hand-to-hand combat, which are the basics for an ordinary soldier. He began the war by demoralizing and disorganizing the enemy... If in the First World War artillery preparation was carried out to destroy the enemy’s defensive structures before the infantry offensive, then in a future war Hitler proposed to first undermine the enemy’s morale. In this war all types of weapons and especially propaganda had to be used.”
Admiral Canaris.Chief of the Abwehr
On November 6, 1940, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel, and the Chief of Staff of the Operational Command of the OKB, General Jodl, signed a directive from the Supreme High Command addressed to the Wehrmacht intelligence services. All intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were instructed to clarify available data about the Red Army, the economy, mobilization capabilities, the political situation of the Soviet Union, the mood of the population and to obtain new information related to the study of theaters of military operations, the preparation of reconnaissance and sabotage activities during the invasion, and to ensure covert preparation for aggression, while simultaneously misinforming about the true intentions of the Nazis.
Directive No. 21 (Barbarossa Plan) provided, along with the armed forces, for the full use of agents, sabotage and reconnaissance units in the rear of the Red Army. Detailed evidence at the Nuremberg trials was given on this issue by the deputy head of the Abwehr-2 department, Colonel Stolze, who was captured by Soviet troops: “I received instructions from Lahousen (head of the department - Author) to organize and lead a special group under the code name “A” , which was supposed to prepare acts of sabotage and work on disintegration in the Soviet rear in connection with the planned attack on the Soviet Union.
At the same time, Lahousen gave me for review and guidance an order received from the operational headquarters of the armed forces... This order contained the main directive instructions for carrying out subversive activities on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after the German attack on the Soviet Union. This order was first marked with the code “Barbarossa...”
The Abwehr played an important role in preparing the war against the USSR. This one of the most knowledgeable, extensive and experienced secret bodies of fascist Germany soon became almost the main center for preparing the “secret war”. The Abwehr expanded its activities especially widely with the arrival of Land Admiral Canaris on January 1, 1935 at the “Fox Hole” (as the Nazis themselves called the main residence of the Abwehr), who began to strengthen his espionage and sabotage department in every possible way.
The central apparatus of the Abwehr consisted of three main departments. The direct center for the collection and preliminary processing of all intelligence data concerning the ground forces of foreign armies, including the army of the Soviet Union, was the so-called Abwehr-1 department, headed by Colonel Pickenbrock. This received intelligence data from the Reich Security Directorate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fascist Party apparatus and other sources, as well as from military, naval and aviation intelligence. After preliminary processing, Abwehr-1 presented the available military data to the main headquarters of the armed forces. Here the processing and generalization of information was carried out and new requests for exploration were drawn up.
The Abwehr-2 department, headed by Colonel (in 1942 - Major General) Lahousen, was engaged in preparing and carrying out sabotage, terror, and sabotage on the territory of other states. And finally, the third department - Abwehr 3, headed by Colonel (in 1943 - Lieutenant General) Bentivegni - carried out the organization of counterintelligence within the country and abroad. The Abwehr system also included an extensive peripheral apparatus, the main links of which were special bodies - “Abwehrstelle” (ACT): “Konigsberg”, “Krakow”, “Vienna”, “Bucharest”, “Sofia”, which in the fall of 1940 received the task of maximally intensifying reconnaissance and sabotage activities against the USSR, primarily by sending agents. All intelligence agencies of army groups and armies received a similar order.
There were Abwehr branches at all major headquarters of Hitler's Wehrmacht: Abwehrkommandos - in army groups and large military formations, Abwehrgruppen - in armies and formations equal to them. Abwehr officers were assigned to divisions and military units.
In parallel with Canaris’s department, another organization of Hitler’s intelligence worked, the so-called VI Directorate of the Main Imperial Security Directorate of the RSHA (foreign intelligence services of the SD), which was headed by Himmler’s closest confidant, Schellenberg. At the head of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) was Heydrich, one of the bloodiest executioners of Nazi Germany.
Canaris and Heydrich were the chiefs of two competing intelligence services, which were constantly squabbling over their “place in the sun” and the favor of the Fuhrer. But the commonality of interests and plans made it possible to temporarily forget personal hostility and conclude a “friendly pact” on the division of spheres of influence in preparation for aggression. Military intelligence abroad was a generally recognized field of activity for the Abwehr, but this did not prevent Canaris from conducting political intelligence within Germany, and Heydrich from engaging in intelligence and counterintelligence abroad. Next to Canaris and Heydrich, Ribbentrop (through the Foreign Ministry), Rosenberg (APA), Bole (“foreign organization of the NSDAP”), and Goering (“Air Force Research Institute”, which was engaged in deciphering intercepted radiograms) had their own intelligence agencies. Both Canaris and Heydrich were well versed in the intricate web of sabotage and intelligence services, providing all possible assistance whenever possible or tripping each other up when the opportunity presented itself.
By mid-1941, the Nazis had created more than 60 training centers to train agents to be sent to the territory of the USSR. One of these “training centers” was located in the little-known remote town of Chiemsee, another in Tegel near Berlin, and a third in Quinzsee, near Brandenburg. Future saboteurs learned here various subtleties of their craft. For example, in the laboratory in Tegel they taught mainly subversion and methods of arson in the “eastern territories”. Not only seasoned intelligence officers, but also chemist specialists worked as instructors. In Quinzee there was located the Quentsug training center, well hidden among forests and lakes, where “general profile” terrorist saboteurs were trained with great thoroughness for the upcoming war. Here there were models of bridges, sections of railway tracks, and to the side, at our own airfield, there were training aircraft. The training was as close as possible to “real” conditions. Before the attack on the Soviet Union, Canaris introduced a rule: every intelligence officer must undergo training at Camp Quentsug in order to bring his skills to perfection.
In June 1941, in the town of Sulejuwek near Warsaw, a special management body “Abwehr-zagranitsa” was created to organize and manage reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence activities on the Soviet-German front, which received the code name “Walli Headquarters”. At the head of the headquarters was an experienced Nazi intelligence officer, Colonel Shmalypleger. Under an unimpressive code name and an ordinary five-digit field postal number (57219) hid an entire city with high, several rows of barbed wire fences, dozens of sentries, barriers, and security checkpoints. Powerful radio stations tirelessly monitored the airwaves throughout the day, maintaining contact with Abwehrgruppen and at the same time intercepting transmissions from Soviet military and civilian radio stations, which were immediately processed and deciphered. Special laboratories, printing houses, workshops for the production of various non-serial weapons, Soviet military uniforms, insignia, false documents for saboteurs, spies and other items were also located here.
To combat partisan detachments and identify persons associated with partisans and underground fighters, the Nazis organized a counterintelligence agency called “Sonderstab R” at the “Valli Headquarters”. It was headed by the former chief of counterintelligence of the Wrapgel army, Smyslovsky, also known as Colonel von Reichenau. Hitler's agents with considerable experience, members of various white émigré groups like the People's Labor Union (NTS), and nationalist rabble began their work here.
To carry out sabotage and landing operations in the Soviet rear, the Abwehr also had its own “home” army in the person of thugs from the Brandenburg-800 and Elector regiments, the Nachtigal, Roland, Bergman battalions and other units, the creation of which began in 1940, immediately after the decision was made on the large-scale deployment of preparations for war against the USSR. These so-called special units were mostly formed from Ukrainian nationalists, as well as White Guards, Basmachi, and other traitors and traitors to the Motherland.
Covering the progress of the preparation of these units for aggression, Colonel Stolze showed at the Nuremberg trials: “We also prepared special sabotage groups for subversive activities in the Baltic Soviet Republics... In addition, a special military unit was prepared for subversive activities on Soviet territory - a special-purpose training regiment "Brandenburg-800", subordinate directly to the head of "Abwehr-2" Lahousen." Stolze’s testimony was supplemented by the head of the Abwehr-3 department, Lieutenant General Bentivegni: “... From the repeated reports of Colonel Lahousen to Canaris, which I was also present at, I know that a lot of preparatory work was carried out through this department for the war with the Soviet Union. During the period February - May 1941, there were repeated meetings of senior officials of Abwehr-2 with Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont... In particular, at these meetings, in accordance with the requirements of the war against Russia, the issue of increasing the special purpose units, called "Brandenburg- 800", and on the distribution of the contingent of these units among individual military formations." In October 1942, a division with the same name was formed on the basis of the Brandenburg-800 regiment. Some of its units began to be staffed with saboteurs from Germans who spoke Russian.
Simultaneously with the preparation of “internal reserves” for aggression, Canaris energetically involved his allies in intelligence activities against the USSR. He instructed Abwehr centers in the countries of South-Eastern Europe to establish even closer contacts with the intelligence agencies of these states, in particular with the intelligence of Horthy Hungary, fascist Italy, and the Romanian Siguranza. Abwehr cooperation with Bulgarian, Japanese, Finnish, Austrian and other intelligence services was strengthened. At the same time, the intelligence centers of the Abwehr, Gestapo, and Security Services (SD) in neutral countries strengthened. The agents and documents of the former Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian bourgeois intelligence services were not forgotten and came to court. At the same time, at the orders of the Nazis, the lurking nationalist underground and gangs in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic republics intensified their activities.
A number of authors also testify to the large-scale preparation of Hitler’s sabotage and intelligence services for the war against the USSR. Thus, the English military historian Louis de Jong in his book “The German Fifth Column in the Second World War” writes: “The invasion of the Soviet Union was carefully prepared by the Germans. ...Military intelligence organized small assault units, recruiting them from the so-called Brandenburg training regiment. Such units in Russian uniforms were supposed to operate far ahead of the advancing German troops, trying to capture bridges, tunnels and military warehouses... The Germans tried to collect information about the Soviet Union also in neutral countries adjacent to the Russian borders, especially in Finland and Turkey,...intelligence established connections with nationalists from the Baltic republics and Ukraine with the aim of organizing an uprising in the rear of the Russian armies. In the spring of 1941, the Germans established contact with the former ambassadors and attaches of Latvia in Berlin, the former chief of intelligence of the Estonian general staff. Personalities such as Andrei Melnik and Stepan Bandera collaborated with the Germans.”
A few days before the war, and especially with the outbreak of hostilities, the Nazis began to send sabotage and reconnaissance groups, lone saboteurs, spies, spies, and provocateurs into the Soviet rear. They were disguised in the uniforms of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, employees of the NKGB, railway workers, and signalmen. The saboteurs were armed with explosives, automatic weapons, telephone listening devices, supplied with false documents, and large sums of Soviet money. Those heading to the rear were prepared with plausible legends. Sabotage and reconnaissance groups were also assigned to regular units of the first echelon of the invasion. On July 4, 1941, Canaris, in his memo to the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, reported: “Numerous groups of agents from the indigenous population, that is, Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, Georgians, Estonians, etc., were sent to the headquarters of the German armies. Each group consisted of 25 or more people. These groups were led by German officers. The groups used captured Russian uniforms, weapons, military trucks and motorcycles. They were supposed to penetrate into the Soviet rear to a depth of fifty to three hundred kilometers in front of the front of the advancing German armies in order to report by radio the results of their observations, paying special attention to collecting information about Russian reserves, the state of railways and other roads, as well as about all activities carried out by the enemy..."
At the same time, the saboteurs were faced with the task of blowing up railway and highway bridges, tunnels, water pumps, power plants, defense enterprises, physically destroying party and Soviet workers, NKVD employees, Red Army commanders, and sowing panic among the population.
To undermine the Soviet rear from the inside, introduce disorganization into all parts of the national economy, weaken the morale and combat stamina of the Soviet troops, and thereby contribute to the successful implementation of their ultimate goal - the enslavement of the Soviet people. All the efforts of Hitler’s reconnaissance and sabotage services were aimed at this. From the first days of the war, the scope and tension of the armed struggle on the “invisible front” reached its highest intensity. In its scale and form, this struggle had no equal in history.
Encyclopedia of misconceptions. Third Reich Likhacheva Larisa Borisovna
Spies. What destroyed the German intelligence officers?
Something subtly betrayed him as a German spy: either a parachute dragging behind his back, or a Schmeisser dangling from his neck...
Thoughts out loud from a SMERSH employee
John Lancaster alone, mostly at night.
He clicked his nose - an infrared lens was hidden in it,
And then in normal light it appeared in black
What we value and love, what the team is proud of...
Vladimir Vysotsky
There is an opinion that Nazi Germany trained perhaps the most invulnerable spies in the world. They say that with the notorious German pedantry they could take care of everything, even the most seemingly insignificant little things. After all, according to the old spy saying, it is they who always “burn” the best agents.
In reality, the situation on the invisible German-Allied front was somewhat different. Sometimes the Nazi “knights of cloak and dagger” were destroyed by their scrupulousness. A similar story is given in the book “Spy Hunter” by the famous English counterintelligence officer Colonel O. Pinto. At the beginning of World War II, British counterintelligence had a lot of work: refugees from European countries conquered by the Reich flocked to the country in an endless stream. It is clear that under their guise, German agents and collaborators recruited in the occupied territories tried to penetrate the land of Foggy Albion. O. Pinto had a chance to deal with one such Belgian collaborator - Alphonse Timmermans. Timmermans himself did not arouse anyone’s suspicion: the former merchant seaman went through a lot of difficulties and dangers in order to find himself in the safety of England. His simple belongings also contained nothing from the spy arsenal. However, the attention of Colonel O. Pinto was attracted by 3 completely harmless, at first glance, things. However, let’s give the floor to the counterintelligence officer himself: “Whoever instructed him before his trip to England took into account every little detail and thereby betrayed the newcomer to English counterintelligence. He supplied Timmermans with three things necessary for “invisible” writing: pyramidon powder, which dissolves in a mixture of water and alcohol, orange sticks - a writing medium - and cotton wool for wrapping the tips of the sticks, thus avoiding treacherous scratches on the paper. Timmermans's problem was that he could buy all these things in any pharmacy in England, and no one would ever ask him why he was doing it. Now, because his mentor turned out to be too scrupulous a person. he had to answer some questions for me... Timmermans - a victim of German scrupulousness - was hanged in Vandevort prison..."
Very often, German pedantry turned out to be fatal for agents who had to work under the guise of US Army soldiers. Having a perfect command of the “great and mighty” English language, fascist intelligence officers turned out to be completely unprepared for American slang. Thus, many carefully hidden and legendary spies were caught using the literary name for gasoline at army gas stations, instead of the typical jargon “gas station” - “patrol”. Naturally, no one expected to hear such a clever word from a simple American soldier.
But the possible troubles of the German spies did not end there. As it turned out, Yankee soldiers even renamed military ranks in their own way. A sabotage group supervised by the most venerable German spy, Otto Skorzeny, was convinced of this from its own sad experience. The Scar Man's subordinates arrived in captured American self-propelled guns at the location of the 7th Armored Division near the Belgian city of Potto. The commander of the group of spies bravely jumped out of the car and introduced himself, according to the regulations, introducing himself as a company commander. It could never have occurred to him that in the US Army this name for a military rank has long become an anachronism, and various slang abbreviations are used instead. The Yankee soldiers immediately recognized the forgery and shot their pseudo-colleagues on the spot, led by their “company commander”...
It was even more difficult for pedantic German agents to work in the USSR. Let's give an example. Nazi Germany was preparing a group of spies to be sent to Soviet territory. All intelligence officers underwent thorough training and were fluent in Russian. Moreover, they were even introduced to the peculiarities of the Soviet mentality and the mysterious Russian soul. However, the mission of these almost ideal agents failed miserably at the first check of documents. The treacherous little thing that completely betrayed the soldiers of the invisible front turned out to be... passports! No, the “red passports” themselves, made by the best German masters of falsification, were no different from the real ones and were even worn and tattered accordingly. The only way the “pro-fascist” documents differed from their original Soviet counterparts was the metal staples with which they were sewn together. Diligent and punctual Germans made counterfeit “xivs” conscientiously, as if for themselves. Therefore, the pages of the passport were fastened with staples made of high-quality stainless wire, while in the Soviet Union they could not even imagine such wasteful and inappropriate use of stainless steel - the most ordinary iron was used for the main document of every citizen of the USSR. Naturally, over many years of use, such a wire oxidized, leaving characteristic red marks on the pages of the passport. It is not surprising that the valiant SMERSH became very interested when he discovered among the usual “rusty” passports books with clean, shiny stainless steel paper clips. According to unverified data, only at the beginning of the war, Soviet counterintelligence managed to identify and neutralize more than 150 such “clipper” spies. Truly, there are no trifles in intelligence. Even if it is intelligence of the Third Reich.
From the book Great Secrets of Gold, Money and Jewels. 100 stories about the secrets of the world of wealth author Korovina Elena AnatolyevnaThe Infanta's dowry and wedding dresses of German princesses And the blue diamond, which, it would seem, was destined to remain forever in the monastery treasury, again ended up in the royal treasury. Velazquez saw him in 1660, when Philip IV decided to give away one of his daughters,
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From the book I Explore the World. Aviation and aeronautics author Zigunenko Stanislav NikolaevichSpies in the stratosphere Another specialty of military aviation is reconnaissance. As already mentioned at the beginning of this book, the first thing that pilots began to do during military operations was to look from the heights where the headquarters of the military units were located, where they were being transferred
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From the book Intelligence and Espionage author Damaskin Igor AnatolievichSuccesses of German saboteurs During the First World War, the only serious achievement of German intelligence was the acts of sabotage that it organized and carried out against the United States. It was a real war, started long before the US entered into
author Malashkina M. M.Sea spies This story took place in our days. A Scottish trawler - a fishing vessel - tried to break away from its pursuers. A Danish frigate was chasing him, firing her guns. Despite the volleys of naval artillery, the trawler did not stop. Trawler crew
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From the book I Explore the World. Forensics author Malashkina M. M.Intelligence mistakes There are times when an experienced agent loses a briefcase with secret papers in the subway, taxi or train. Any intelligence officer is not immune from such cases, no matter how well he is prepared. "Inexplicable" and "sudden" attack of absent-mindedness can be explained
