Underwater radar. Detection of submarines using naval aviation

The material is largely consonant with personal feelings about what is happening with the Russian Navy, but at the same time it contains something that has never been heard of before, namely, a new way of identifying and tracking submarines:

« ...a technology that allows aircraft to carry out a radar search for submarines in a submerged (underwater) position based on disturbances in the surface environment they create while moving (the radar detects, as it were, “traces” on the surface of the water, which are left by a submarine moving in the depths)».

Of course, it became very interesting to figure out what we were talking about, fortunately the author of the article, respected Alexander Timokhin, not only described the phenomenon, but also provided a fairly broad evidence base, with links to sources, including English-language ones.

So we have the thesis:

« Having added all of the above, we have to admit: the possibility of detecting a submarine using radar and optical-electronic surveillance of the surface of water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely denied by modern domestic naval strategy».

Let us study the sources on the basis of which the respected A. Timokhin formulated this thesis. So, the first is the report "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" published in 1975. The author of this article downloaded and diligently translated the English text to the best of his ability ( alas, the level of proficiency in English is “reading with a dictionary”, so errors are possible). In short, the essence of the report is as follows:

1. Since the Second World War, and especially during 1959-1968. There have been numerous cases of radar detection of submarines traveling underwater. Almost all types of American submarines that existed at that time were discovered at depths of up to 700 feet (213.5 m).

2. Although in some cases it was possible to control the movement of the submarine for quite a long time (up to 2 hours), in general this effect was not permanent. That is, it could be observed at some point, and then not observed: they could detect the submarine, immediately lose it and not be able to restore contact, even knowing the position of the submarine.

3. And now - the strangest, and very unusual. The fact is that it was not a submarine that was detected by the radar - this is impossible, the radar does not work under water. It can be assumed that the radar detects some traces above the submarine on the surface of the sea... nothing like that! Radar detects disturbances in the airspace at an altitude of 1000-2000 feet (300-600 m) above sea level! It sounds completely crazy (which the author of the report himself admits), but, nevertheless, it has been repeatedly confirmed by observations.

To avoid misunderstandings with the translation, I will quote a fragment of the report in English:

« It is hard to imagine how a submerged submarine can give rise to an effect one or two thousand feet above the surface. It is indeed understandable why there might be skepticism. Nevertheless, it is an experimental observation reported on many occasions».

Then the author of the report points out that the United States has not been able to come up with a theory that could justify such a phenomenon and tries to explain what, in his opinion, is still happening. Having considered various “sources” that, at least theoretically, could lead to such a phenomenon (thermal footprint, the influence of magnetic fields, etc.), the author comes to the following conclusion.

The radar sees some kind of “air turbulence”, and this is how it is formed. It is known that the layer of air near sea water is saturated with water vapor and is in constant motion (convection). A large underwater body, such as a submarine, exerts pressure on the water in which it moves, including upwards (that is, the boat, as it were, “pushes” the water column, “pushing” the water in different directions). This pressure creates an underwater wave, also directed upward, which, upon reaching the surface layer of water, changes it relative to its natural state (the report calls this effect the “Bernoulli Hump”). And these changes provoke the direction of convective air movement and ultimately create the same air turbulence that is detected by the radar.

The author points out that work in this area in the United States was curtailed, and believes that this was done in vain, because the indicated effect, which makes it possible to observe submarines, although does not occur on an ongoing basis, is still observed quite regularly. And the lack of a theory why this happens is not a reason to stop working in this direction. It’s interesting that the report ends with a classic horror story: Russian BODs are equipped with very powerful radars, stronger than those that the United States used to monitor submarines, which means they probably figured it out a long time ago and...

Thus, we can summarize: according to American data and in certain circumstances, a submarine located underwater can be detected using radar. But... it must be said that the Americans took the underwater threat very seriously. The memory of the “Dönitz boys” was still fresh, and the Soviet fleet in the 50s and 60s was built primarily underwater.

Diesel submarine of project 613. In the period 1950-1957. 215 submarines were built

And yet the Americans are closing the project. This can only mean one thing - despite many precedents at that time, the detection of submarines using radar never reached the level of technology, that is, something that could give stable results when searching for enemy submarines. However, there is no information that the Americans have resumed work in this direction. That is, we have a report in which the author considers it necessary to resume work on this project, but there is no evidence that his opinion was listened to.

The next argument in favor of the fact that the Americans not only resumed work on radar methods for detecting submarines, but also achieved complete success in them, is the story of Lieutenant General V.N. Sokerin, former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet.

Without quoting it in full, let us briefly recall the essence: in 1988, the Northern Fleet conducted exercises during which 6 nuclear and 4 diesel submarines were deployed at sea. At the same time, each of them received its own sea area where it was supposed to be located, however, within the given area (and they were quite extensive), the commander himself determined where his underwater ship would be located. In other words, until the end of the maneuvers, no one, including the fleet command, could know the exact location of the deployed ships. And then the patrol “Orion” of our “sworn friends” appeared - it passed over the submarine deployment areas along a strange, “broken” route. And when naval officers compared the maneuvering of our submarines, then:

« ... having superimposed the “movement” route of the “Orion” on the map, I made an unambiguous conclusion that all ten “turning” points of its actual route were absolutely exactly above the actual location (during the flight) of all 10 (!) submarines. Those. the first time in 1 hour and 5 minutes, the second - in 1 hour and 7 minutes, one plane “covered” all 10 submarines».

What would you like to say about this? Just a few words about the person who told us this: Viktor Nikolaevich Sokerin, an honored military pilot of Russia, commanded the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet in 2000-2004 and... left this post, like the ranks of our armed forces, writing a report “on his own” , in protest against the collapse of Russian naval (and other) aviation. But he was “in sight”, “in good standing” with our powers that be. I think there is no point in explaining that no matter how bad the state of a particular branch of the military is, its senior officers always have the opportunity to ensure a comfortable and comfortable existence for themselves. That’s all there is to do - somewhere to remain diplomatically silent, somewhere to cheerfully report what they are waiting to hear from you... But Viktor Nikolaevich was a person of a completely different type, one of those for whom the work he was doing was above all else. I recommend reading his collection of poems - yes, not Pushkin’s style, but how much love he has for the sky and airplanes... And also - V.N. Sokerin served in the north for a long time and was friends with Timur Avtandilovich Apakidze.

Of course, the author of this article wanted to know in more detail what V.N. said. Sokerin on the issues of detecting submarines using radar methods. And this is where things got weird. The fact is that the respected A. Timokhin writes that quotes from V.N. Sokerin was taken from the article “What to ask Yasen” by M. Klimov, but... the problem is that they are not there. The author of the article, Maxim Klimov, mentions the fact of identifying 10 Soviet submarines, but without any reference to the respected V.N. Sokerina. Well, let's look.

Google reported that these lines appear in the article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from the S.S.S.R.", published from the pen of Alexander Sergeevich Semenov - " There was direct evidence that the US Navy was much further along in developing “unconventional” search methods. I will cite the testimony of the commander of naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet...»

In confirmation of his words, A.S. Semenov provides an interesting screenshot:

I would like to note the following. The authenticity of this screenshot does not raise the slightest doubt. It is well known that V.N. After retiring, Sokerin did not shy away from the Internet at all; by the way, there is his material on VO), and he was also most likely present on the AVIAFORUM website, where, in fact, this screenshot was taken. Alas, today the discussion thread in which this comment by V.N. Sokerin, is in the archive, so it is impossible to get to it “from the Internet”. However, one of the forum administrators was kind enough to confirm the existence of this comment.

And here the author of this article finds himself in a very ambiguous position. On the one hand, Viktor Nikolaevich’s words do not require any confirmation or evidence - they themselves are evidence. On the other hand... If this had been said in an interview, or stated in an article, there could no longer be any options. But a remark on the Internet, especially taken out of context, is still a little different. When communicating on such forums “for their own people,” people can joke, tell stories, etc., without thinking that someone will later “defend a scientific dissertation” in their words. Let us repeat, much has become clearer; it would be possible to read the entire forum thread, but alas, it is not. And it won’t be possible to ask Viktor Nikolaevich - he left this forum many years ago.

But here’s what else needs to be especially noted - reading the words of V.N. Sokerina, we still do not see direct confirmation that the radar method of detecting enemy submarines was brought to fruition in the United States. Dear V.N. Sokerin only says that “Orion” accurately identified the location of our submarines, and he himself is not the primary source of information (speaks from the words of an unnamed officer) and makes the assumption that perhaps this is a consequence of the “Window” theme, which our abandoned, but the Americans promoted it.

Royal Australian Air Force Orion

But remember that, in addition to hydroacoustic, there are other methods for determining the location of submarines. One of them is magnetometric, aimed at detecting anomalies in the Earth’s magnetic field that are created by such a large object as a submarine. Or, for example, infrared (which, by the way, should in no case be confused with radar) - the fact is that a nuclear submarine uses water as a coolant, which is then dumped overboard, having, of course, a higher temperature than the sea or ocean surrounding the boat. And this can be tracked. Of course, such a method is only suitable for detecting atomic submarines, but over time - who knows? After all, a submarine moves in the water column, “pushing” the water away from itself with a propeller or water cannon, and in any case, this is friction. And friction, as we know, increases body temperature, and, in principle, the wake is probably at least a little warmer than the water surrounding it. The only question is the “sensitivity” of surveillance devices.

That is, strictly speaking, the fact that the Americans detected our submarines (which, in fact, is what V.N. Sokerin is talking about) does not yet indicate the triumph of the radar method of detecting submarines - perhaps the Americans used some other one earlier existing method by improving it.

By the way, what kind of “Window theme” is this? Let's try to figure this out based on the same article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from S.S.S.R.” A.S. Semenov, especially since the respected A. Timokhin in his article “presents him as: “ One of the “fathers” of the “Window” theme, an anti-submarine pilot from the Pacific Fleet»

Operating principle of "Window" A.S. Semenov describes it this way:

« ...using on-board radar...to find the same zones of disturbances, called “Standing Wave”. With some experience and radar settings, they looked like concentric circles, several tens of kilometers in diameter, with a boat in the center of this circle... An attempt to apply this method on the Il-38, Tu-142 was not particularly successful. It was clear that for such a purpose it was necessary to develop a radar of the appropriate frequency range».

Let us immediately note that, in terms of its operating principle, the “Window” is radically different from what the Americans were going to use. They were going to look for the “air trail”, and we were going to look for the sea trail, some kind of concentric waves... or not? The fact is that when describing the work of “Window” A.S. Semenov points out: “A brief description of the principle. From the story “Non-Tradition”.

What kind of “Non-Tradition” is this? And this is the story of the same A.S. Semenov. So what, the reader will say, can’t the author take the description from his own “early” work? Of course, maybe this is normal, if only not for one “but”. Genre of the story. Simply by opening the page of A.S. Semenov on samizdat, we read (specially highlighted in red):

Fantasy. No, it is clear that “The fairy tale is a lie, but there is a hint in it, a lesson for good fellows,” the work itself is based on the fact that the author is caught “into himself,” that is, he returns to his younger self in all the splendor of the life experience he has received over the years of service and creates an alternative reality. Often in such works a lot of what really existed is revealed... But the problem is that we can only guess which of what is said in the story is true and which is fiction. And that is to say, the work is not written in the simplest language, it is, so to speak, intended rather “for our own and for our own,” that is, for those who are familiar with the hardships of naval service first-hand, and who, apparently, are easily capable separate fact from fiction.

In general, A.S. Semyonov is a man who obviously knows, but what he wrote... it turns out that it may be “this way, not quite that way, or even not that way at all.” But in this case, does it make sense to refer to his works?

And also, when reading his “Anti-submarine warfare. A View from S.S.S.R.”, which is positioned by the author precisely as an article, and not as a literary work of fiction, this is what really hurt the eye. A.S. Semenov, describing the state of our submarine forces (in short, according to A.S. Semenov - complete darkness, the Americans controlled us at every step and could take us for soft spots at any moment), refers to Vice Admiral Valery Dmitrievich Ryazantsev, author of the book "In the wake of death." At the same time, A.S. Semenov characterizes Valery Dmitrievich as an extremely competent person.

So the whole point is that V.D. In 2014, Ryazantsev wrote an article with an extremely “telling” title: “Once again about sea tales and sailor-storytellers,” in which, among other things, he paid attention to “Window.” In his words, the very beginning of work on this topic was a form of fraud and manipulation of facts, that during the intermediate tests, the commanders of ships and aircraft received the order: ““Nosebleed,” but the results of the research must be positive,” and that all this was done in order to obtain funding, and then:

« I would like to ask today those who have wasted huge amounts of money: “Where is the new technology that would allow us to detect foreign submarines? Where is the plane or helicopter on which this equipment is installed? There are no planes, no helicopters, no equipment. And there is no money. The “Window” theme turned out to be a soap bubble, a “Potemkin village”, a dummy».

However, about all this A.S. Semyonov does not mention, although his article “Anti-submarine warfare. A view from S.S.S.R.” was published on Samizdat much later than the vice admiral’s material. However, the author is not at all going to blame A.S. Semenov in deliberately concealing information - after all, he was not obliged to read all the works of V.D. Ryazantsev and could easily have simply missed this article of his.

And this is what we get. The “alarm” sounds - the submarines of the Fatherland are in danger, the Americans are using a new method of radar detection of underwater submarines, they see everyone! However, when you start to understand all this in detail, it turns out that the justification for the “alarm” is:

1. A report born in 1975, from which it follows that work in this direction was once closed in the United States, and it is completely unclear whether they were resumed as a result of the report;
2. Forum remark from a very respected person;
3. And, finally, a work written in the fantastic genre of “alternative history”.

Here the question arises: is this basis sufficient for declaring an “alarm”? Let everyone reading these lines decide this for themselves.

And one more thing - under-ice detection of submarines. Here, the respected A. Timokhin refers to the words of “another Navy officer, an experienced anti-submarine officer, commander of an anti-submarine ship, captain of the first rank A.E. Soldatenkova". All this is true - dear A.E. Soldatenkov actually published his memoirs “Admiral’s Routes (or flashes of memory and information from the outside), but... we have to admit that A. Timokhin quoted A.E. Soldatenkova is not entirely correct.

The bottom line is that friend A.E. Soldatenkova actually observed a certain ellipse around the place where the submarine soon surfaced. Moreover, similar ellipses were recorded by radar before (outside the ice), but for a long time no one associated them with submarines, considering them just interference. Then they connected, already using radar reconnaissance satellites: “So, for example, in the area of ​​​​Cuba in the Caribbean Sea, an American submarine was detected by a satellite using the ring effect.”

Generally speaking, all of the above correlates perfectly with the data of the report “A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES” - similar formations were observed there. But then A.E. Soldatenkov is trying to explain the nature of this phenomenon... or, rather, he is simply playing a trick on the reader.

« When the submarine moves in a submerged position, the specified immersion depth is maintained by horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or autopilot. Accuracy of maintaining the set depth within ±5 meters. That is, a gigantic mass of metal (from 6000 to 33800 tons) makes vertical oscillations in depth, and along with the mass its gravitational field also oscillates. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of an underwater ship, with a tension recorded by measuring instruments, reaches the surface of the water, to the boundary of two media - water and air. This part of the gravitational field, at some identical level of its intensity, enters into resonant interaction with the surface layers of sea water and air».

For those who, due to the current troubles, have completely forgotten the physics course, let us remind you that the gravitational field is a fundamental physical field through which gravitational interaction occurs between all material bodies. Moreover, the essence of this interaction is that the force of gravitational attraction between two points is directly proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance separating them. That is, all the objects of the world are in the gravitational field - not only the “surface layers of sea water” interact with the same submarine, but also the Sun, Jupiter and Alpha Centauri, it’s just that the force of their interaction is negligible. But “part of the gravitational field sticking out above the surface of the water” is, generally speaking, physical and mathematical nonsense.

Of course, one could assume that the respected E.A. Soldatenkov simply did not formulate his idea quite correctly, and by “the gravitational field of a boat” is meant the distance from it at which its gravitational attraction can noticeably influence some particles of air and water. But even in this case, his further explanation of this phenomenon does not look entirely scientific, and allows us to suspect the respected author of... let's say, one of his favorite sea sports: “telling tales” to gullible civilians.

But what’s important is A.E. himself. Soldatenkov prefaces his scientific calculations with the words “Regarding all of the above, I dare to assume the following.” That is, he directly writes that his words are nothing more than his personal hypothesis. At the same time, A. Timokhin’s quote looks as if A.E. Soldatenkov is completely confident and does not feel a shadow of doubt in his words.

But that's not even the biggest question. As we said earlier, dear A. Timokhin in his article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse” made two key statements. The first is that modern technologies make it possible to detect submarines underwater and even under ice. And secondly, we completely ignore the existence of such opportunities.

So, to confirm the first thesis, A. Timokhin quotes a fragment of one of the chapters of the book by A.E. Soldatenkova. But for some reason he completely “forgets” to quote another fragment of the same chapter, in which A.E. Soldatenkov suggests... that this method of detecting submarines is widely used by the Russian Navy! We quote:

« But there are indirect signs that the polarization method of detecting submarines has made its way into life. So, for example, the hydroacoustic complex of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" (with all its perfection) could not provide complete coverage of the underwater situation during the tragic events with the Kursk nuclear-powered missile system, nevertheless it had it. Moreover, one of the officers of the press center of the General Staff of the Navy openly said that the underwater situation at the site of the disaster was being monitored by radar. This could have been mistaken for incompetence or a slip of the tongue of a former political worker, but the officer told the truth, it’s just that no one believed it. In addition, nowhere in the open press is there any mention of work in the field of the polarization method for detecting submarines. And this happens in two cases: the first, when no one is working on this problem at all, the second, when significant progress has been made and the topic is classified.

Another sign. An ultra-long voyage of the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" around the world to the Far East to participate in Pacific Fleet exercises without escort ships. It seems like a big negligence for the only ship of this class on the Planet. But no, the BIP (or BIC) of the cruiser knew ALL the situation around the ship: surface, underwater, air, space and would hardly allow himself to be offended. Another indirect sign: when communicating with the media in interviews with high-ranking naval commanders, tragic notes ceased to sound when mentioning the underwater threat from a potential enemy, but before they were already torn from the consciousness of their own powerlessness. Plus the loss of interest in anti-submarine surface ships and the reduction of fire brigades in all fleets. Plus the resumption of long-range aviation flights around the borders of the Russian Federation. After all, hundreds of tons of aviation kerosene are burned not only for pilot training».

It turns out bad: where the words of the respected A.E. Soldatenkov is confirmed by the theses of the author of the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse,” they are not only quoted, but also presented to readers as a given (while A.E. Soldatenkov himself presents only a personal hypothesis). And in those cases when the opinion of A.E. Soldatenkova comes into conflict with the opinion of A. Timokhin, then what happens, let’s replace it for clarity?

Well, what conclusion would you like to draw from all this? But none - the author has no facts at his disposal that would confirm or refute the assumptions of the respected A. Timokhin. And, despite all the criticism expressed above, the evidence base on which the article “A fleet without ships. The Russian Navy is on the verge of collapse,” it may well turn out that its main postulates are still absolutely true.

The personal opinion of the author of this article, which he does not impose on anyone, is as follows. Most likely, a method of detecting submarines underwater using radar actually exists. But it, like other methods of detecting submarines (magnetometric, hydroacoustic, thermal, and now, according to some data, some kind of “chemical” has also been patented), is not a guarantee of detecting and destroying submarines, although it may work under certain circumstances - like all the methods listed above. In other words, it is quite possible, and even more than likely, that it will now be even more difficult for submariners, but, nevertheless, submarines as a class of warships have not yet lost their combat significance.

This point of view is indirectly confirmed by the following considerations. Let's say that at the end of the 20th century the United States actually invented a method that allows you to identify submarines with an efficiency close to 100%. But in this case, the very concept of American nuclear submarines, implying the ability to operate independently in conditions of strong enemy anti-aircraft defense, loses its meaning. Why then are the Americans increasing the pace of commissioning their newest Virginias? After all, it is quite obvious that sooner or later potential adversaries of the United States will also learn this method and will be able to identify American nuclear submarines operating near their bases.

In such a case, it would be logical to expect the creation of some completely new type of submarines, or perhaps the abandonment of them altogether, or at least a slowdown in the construction programs for new nuclear submarines - but nothing of the kind is happening. And, most likely, this indicates that with the methods of searching for submarines underwater by radar, everything is not so simple.

But in any case, we need to clearly understand that a submarine is not at all a self-sufficient means of combat at sea. The illusion that by developing one type of naval armed forces can solve the problems of the Navy as a whole should be said goodbye as quickly as possible. A submarine, for all its advantages, is not a wunderwaffe, and submariners will be able to inflict damage on the enemy only in close cooperation with surface ships, land-based and deck-based naval aviation aircraft and in the presence of a developed naval reconnaissance and target designation system - over-the-horizon radars, spy satellites, networks of underwater hydroacoustic stations and so on and so forth.

Major engineer V. Kamov

The commands of the US Navy and other NATO countries, carrying out aggressive military preparations, consider the successful fight against enemy submarines to be one of the most important conditions for achieving supremacy at sea. In solving this problem, an important role is assigned to anti-submarine aircraft (planes and helicopters), equipped with means of searching and destroying submarines.

The operating principles of the created means of searching and detecting submarines underwater are based on the use of physical fields (acoustic, magnetic, thermal, radiation), which can unmask boats in the search area (Fig. 1), as well as atmospheric pollution from exhaust gases of diesel propulsion systems . The complex of aviation means for searching and detecting submarines includes hydroacoustic, magnetometric and infrared equipment. Submarines that are on the surface or moving under the RDP can be detected using radar, infrared and television equipment, as well as gas analysis equipment.

Hydroacoustic systems appeared in the arsenal of anti-submarine aircraft of capitalist states during the Second World War and continue to be the main means of detecting submarines from the air.

Two systems of radio-acoustic buoys have become widespread in anti-submarine aviation of the US Navy and some other countries: “Jezebel” and “Julie”. Currently, in the USA, the first is being replaced by the Difar system, and the second by the Kass system. The Difar system, as stated in the foreign press, with the help of 2-3 RSLs ensures the location of a submarine with sufficient accuracy, while previously a larger number of buoys were required for this purpose. In terms of its technical characteristics, the equipment of the Difar system does not yet fully meet the requirements due to the low reliability of the AN/SSQ-53 buoys used.

Hydroacoustic systems consist of disposable and disposable sea RSLs, on-board equipment for receiving, analyzing and processing information received from buoys. According to the principle of operation and design, buoys are divided into passive and active.

Passive buoys detect a submarine through the noise it creates, while active buoys detect a submarine by receiving echoes generated by explosive sound sources or the buoy's acoustic antenna.

Passive RSLs, such as AN/SSQ-41, AN/SSQ-49 and AN/SSQ-53, are generally used for primary detection of submarines. For this purpose, a barrier or field of buoys is placed in the search area, the distance between which is selected based on the calculation of its reliable detection based on a given value of the noise of the boat.

To further clarify the coordinates of the submarine, explosive sound sources interacting with passive buoys, or active RSLs, which are also used for initial detection, are used. Active RSLs, for example AN/SSQ-47 and AN/SSQ-50, in addition to determining location, determine the range to the target. They come in directional and non-directional action. Directional buoys allow you to more accurately determine the location of a target using fewer of them.

RSLs are equipped with transponder beacons operating on one of the standard frequencies, as well as night lights and colored markers for visual identification and determination of their location from an aircraft. Buoys are dropped from altitudes of 50-3000 m at an aircraft flight speed of 280-450 km/h. The detection range of an aircraft radar buoy from an altitude of 600 m is 20-30 km, and from an altitude of 1500 m is 135 km. RSLs have special devices that provide smooth splashdown, the necessary buoyancy, as well as self-flooding after a specified period of validity. The dimensions of most buoys are standard (height - 900 mm, diameter - 124 mm).

Along with RGBs designed for target detection, bathythermographic buoys are also widely used, allowing remote measurement of water temperature at various depths up to 300 m. This achieves more effective detection of submarines using detection buoys in specific hydrological conditions.

According to foreign press data, radio sonobuoy systems are being further improved: the range and duration of operation are increasing, their reliability is increasing, weight and dimensions are being reduced, the processes of controlling the buoys and processing information coming via the radio channel from the RSL to the aircraft are being automated.

On anti-submarine helicopters, due to their ability to hover over a certain point on the water surface, lowered sonar stations are used. The station's acoustic antenna, lowered on a cable cable, consists of an omnidirectional vibrator and a hydrophone. The bearing to the target is determined by the phase shift of the received signals. The indicator unit, located in the helicopter cockpit, is designed for signal processing, situation display and control. When the lowered sonar operates in the noise direction-finding mode, surveillance secrecy and precise determination of the bearing to the submarine are ensured, but in this case the distance to it cannot be measured. When the noise of the submarine is insignificant, the operation of the lowered sonar in the echo direction finding mode has significant advantages compared to noise direction finding. In echo direction finding mode, the station provides determination of bearing and distance to a submarine at ranges of 9-15 km.

Anti-submarine helicopters of NATO countries are equipped mainly with American lowered sonar AN/AQS-10 and AN/AQS-13 or their modifications (produced in other countries), which have approximately the same characteristics.

The table shows the characteristics of the English station 195 (released in 1964) and the American AN/AQS-13 (released in 1966).
Lowered sonars for stepwise and sectoral (circular) viewing of underwater space are known. The former are able to examine the horizon in 3-5 minutes, and the latter in 30-6O s. As reported in the foreign press, lowered sonars are unstable to “accidental towing,” since the resulting interference greatly drowns out useful signals. The phenomenon of “accidental towing” can occur when the helicopter’s automatic stabilization system has not entered mode.

Foreign experts attach great importance to work aimed at creating methods that increase the speed of horizon scanning and increase the range of action of lowered sonar systems, as well as methods for automatically stabilizing a helicopter in hovering mode. In the United States, work is also underway to create an aviation system of anchored radio-acoustic buoys capable of operating for several months.

Magnetometric equipment allows you to detect local anomalies in the strength of the Earth's magnetic field created by the hull of a submarine in the search area. The disadvantages of magnetometers include a short range (300-700 m) and the strong influence of other types of magnetic interference of natural and artificial origin.

Performance characteristics of lowered GAS
Characteristics	GAS type
	195	AN/ AQ S-13
Field of view, deg.	30	360
Range. km	5.5	18
Operating frequencies kHz	9-10	9,25; 10; 10,75
Acoustic power, kW	4.5	5
Pulse duration ms	4-45	3,5: 35
Station weight, kg	Z00	345
Antenna weight, kg	90	84

All US and other NATO anti-submarine aircraft are equipped with AN/ASO-10, AN/ASQ-501 and DHAX-1 magnetometers. the use of which does not depend on sea conditions and time of day. However, they have limited capabilities. Foreign experts are striving to improve the efficiency of magnetometers by increasing their sensitivity and reducing the influence of interference created by the aircraft on which they are installed. To eliminate the influence of interference, compensators are used, which are used in conjunction with magnetometers.
Radar stations are the main means of detecting submarines in difficult weather conditions and at night. Most of them operate in the centimeter range. The detection range of radar stations for submarines on the surface is 90-100 km, under the radar station - 20-25 km, and under a periscope - 2-3 km.
Currently, US anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters are armed with AN/APS-20, AN/APS-55, AN/APS-88, etc. radars.

According to foreign experts, side-view radars are very promising for searching for submarines, since they have a higher resolution, allow viewing a wider band and irradiate the target for a relatively short time, making it difficult to detect an aircraft.

The development of anti-submarine radars of NATO countries is moving along the path of increasing their range and increasing resolution, as well as reducing weight and dimensions.

Infrared means. Anti-submarine aircraft use forward-looking PC stations of the Flir system to detect surface targets at night and detect the temperature signature of a submarine's wake. Foreign naval experts believe that although the temperature increase during the passage of a submarine reaches only 0.005 ° C, the temperature difference between the wake and the sea surface can be detected using an infrared detector. The elevated water temperature persists for some time, which makes it possible to determine the wake of the wake even 5-6 hours after the submarine was in the search area.

The operation of an IR station, which has a passive principle of operation, is not detected by the enemy and is not subject to deliberate interference on his part. The station is relatively simple in design, has small dimensions and weight. However, it works effectively only under favorable meteorological conditions; In rain and fog, its range is significantly reduced. In addition, the infrared station detects a thermal trace when a submarine moves at shallow depths and low speeds, ensuring that the thermal trace reaches the surface. Currently, an AN/AAR-31 type station is installed on anti-submarine aircraft.

The Flir system, according to foreign press reports, is so far installed only on the R-ZS Orion and S-3A Viking anti-submarine aircraft. In combination with other means, it provides reliable detection of surface targets.

Gas analyzing equipment is capable of detecting diesel submarines by air pollution from exhaust gases from diesel installations when the submarine is moving on the surface or when using an RDP device. In this case, searching for a submarine by plane involves taking air samples at altitudes of 90-120 m perpendicular to the wind direction. When a target is detected, the aircraft determines the height of the ceiling of the exhaust trail and then searches at the height of the middle of the trail. American equipment (AN/ASR-2) detects a submarine 3-4 hours after it dives to depth. The English gas analysis equipment "Autolicus" MKZ is capable of determining the location of a submarine traveling under the RDP on the windward side of the aircraft at a distance of about 50 km.

The foreign press reported that equipment was also being developed to detect nuclear submarines by radiation contamination of water.

Foreign Military Review No. 5 1975 pp. 73-77

It is necessary to clarify the situation with this effect once and for all, so that the question of whether it is possible to detect a submerged submarine using surface or airborne radar no longer arises, as well as the desire to call this method “new.”

Techniques for working with information require that all data sources be divided into groups according to the degree of verifiability, after which, if possible, cross-checking is necessary. In our case, the amount of available information is large enough to carry out such a check.

Scientific justification for the possibility of detecting an underwater object using radar.

2. Potter, Various promising unconventional methods for detecting submarines, 1999, .

According to the physics of determining turbulence:

3. George and Tantalus, Measuring mixed ocean current turbulence using synthetic aperture radar, 2012, .

4. Tunali, Bernoulli Hump, created by a submarine, 2015, .

6. Modern Chinese article. Liu and Jin, Mathematical modeling of synthetic aperture radar registration of the wake of a submerged object, 2017, (not available for download).

Of course, knowledge of English is required.

It is worth noting that a really simple search using scientific terminology yields dozens of scientific papers, experiments, companies, etc., related to the detection of underwater objects using radar surveillance of the surface.

It also lists the theoretical basis for what may be behind the effect of anomalies appearing on radar screens. The report lists one theory for the appearance of atmospheric effects over the location of the submarine and four theories for the appearance of anomalies on the surface of the water, and each of them is described as “well-known,” that is, the authors of the report mention them as well-known.

A simple cross-check of the headlines shows that, for example, Jake Tunali, whose work is mentioned in the list above, investigated the very “Bernoulli Hump” mentioned in the 1975 American report. That is, the phenomenon is described both in an old declassified report (superficially) made in the USA, and in an English scientific publication from 2015. Further, looking ahead, we will say that it is the Bernoulli effect that can generate that very “standing wave” that was the subject of research during the Window research project in the USSR in the late 80s. We will return to this later.

What conclusion should we draw from all this? Simple: the effect of anomalies on the surface of the water above a submarine moving in depth has a scientific basis. Or it is necessary to refute the calculations of all the above authors (which, again, looking ahead, is impossible, since they have been tested many times. But an inquisitive reader may well try and refute it).

So, conclusion number one: science not only allows the effect being discussed, it confirms it.

A picture to attract attention. Some (not all!) wave effects generated by a moving submarine, including the so-called. Kelvin perturbations. Details and mathematics are easily found on request at Kelwin Wake. Picture from the website of one of the companies in the American military-industrial complex (you can easily understand what it does)

Now we need to determine the detection of submarines by observing surface anomalies in the radar range. Since everything related to submarine warfare and anti-submarine warfare in the world is carefully kept secret, we must simply answer the question - whether there is documented evidence or not, without plunging into what it is and what it is about.

Everything is simple here - the already mentioned American report was classified until 1988, only military and defense contractors had access to it, it was written “for our own people,” and in the extremely sensitive area of ​​​​anti-submarine defense, and one can assume that it lists false (not incorrect, namely false) data is stupid to say the least. If this document were the only document relating to the topic under discussion, then it could be completely rejected as disinformation on the part of the enemy, but, as we see, it is far from the only one. Accordingly, the question of whether there is documented data on radar detection of submerged submarines must be answered in the affirmative: at least the US Navy has it. You can, of course, build a theory that the scientific articles listed above are correct and the report is a fake, but who would even think of doing this and, most importantly, why?

So, conclusion number two: with a high degree of probability, the US Navy has a lot of documented statistics on the detection of submerged submarines using surface (and air) radars.

Anyone who has been involved in investigations or intelligence activities knows that even undocumented rumors, stories, etc. may matter. At least some of them can be checked and further documented (if you have access to documents). In addition, the very fact of a large number of personal testimonies, even if inaccurate, which more or less similarly describe a certain phenomenon or event, is the so-called. “information trail”, and indicates that, with a high degree of probability, the described phenomenon or event actually took place, in one form or another.

That is, in the undocumented, but similar evidence, we are, in a sense, dealing with the stories of “sages who felt an elephant blindfolded.” They, these evidences, could be challenged, but only if there were no “solid” evidence listed above, supported by documents. And they exist, and are mentioned above.

The original article contained the statements of Lieutenant General Sokerin and Captain First Rank Soldatenkov. In reality, there is many times more such evidence. There is no way to cite them; the format of the article simply does not provide for the placement of such an array of data.

Instead, let's give a certain "sum" - what can be established by assuming that the undocumented evidence is true and creating a short "story" from it. Naturally, it is very difficult to collect a “squeeze” from the stories of US Navy veterans, especially considering the frenzy with which the US Navy is still “showing off.”

Therefore, below the reader’s attention is offered a “squeeze” from what the officers of the USSR and Russian Navy said.

Several decades ago, an incident occurred in the USSR. For the sake of training, the air defense missile system crew “led” a Soviet diesel-electric submarine moving on the surface (this is technically feasible). At a certain moment, a fighter who was sitting at the radar screen and reporting on the movement of the “target” heard in his headphones: “It’s been submerged for fifteen minutes already!” To which he had to answer in surprise: “And I see her...”

This is how the effect became known in the Soviet Union. Around the same years, strange marks on the water began to be detected by new ZGRLS. An analysis of the reports of radar operators and comparison of them with the reports of the crews of Air Force and Navy aircraft located in the same areas showed that in a number of cases, aviation observed strange toroidal or ring signals on the radar screens. The aviators reported this as a radar defect and demanded that it be corrected, because nothing was visually detected on the water.

It is difficult to say who was the first to “merge” data on the position of submarines with statistics on detecting radar anomalies, but since the beginning of the 80s, research on radar search for submarines has, as they say, been given momentum. Presumably, even before this, a successful experiment was carried out to detect its nuclear submarine in the ocean from space (like it was K-14 in 1972), and in 1982, relying on the data obtained during the “analysis” of anomalies and new satellites, space reconnaissance was able to track an American nuclear submarine underwater.

For further development of radar space detection systems for submarines, a flying laboratory was created on the basis of the Tu-134 aircraft, but, unfortunately, this aircraft, together with a group of scientists working on the issue, crashed. In our country this disaster is known, the only thing missing is what kind of modification of the crashed plane it was - Tu-137IK (IK - “measuring complex”), also known as “laboratory plane No. 400”.

Only the following is mentioned.

As official passengers on board the aircraft were specialists who participated in the creation of the submarine tracking system installed on it, including the chief designer:
F. A. Kulev.
V. A. Frolov.
V. P. Kalachev.
V. M. Alekseev.
V. A. Archakov.
V. I. Kharlamov.

In fact, in the USSR, all the leading specialists who worked on the topic along with the only copy of the experimental “board” died simultaneously. This seriously slowed down work on the concept and greatly “distorted” it.

It was only in the mid-80s that work in this direction was restored, now by the Navy MA forces. For obvious reasons, naval pilots could not influence the USSR space program, and their efforts were concentrated on searching using aircraft. The radar of the anti-submarine Tu-142 could not detect surface anomalies, but they were seen by the naval Tu-95, of which there were many in the USSR Navy. Soon the tactics of searching for submarines using radar signals from the surface were perfected. A couple of planes, one Tu-95 and one Tu-142, flew out to search, after which the Tu-95 detected anomalies on the surface, and the Tu-142 immediately checked for the presence of a submarine under the anomaly.

It is not known exactly how frequent “contacts” have become, but in 1986, the author of this method, V. Kravchenko, received the Order of the Red Banner. For this, yes.

Such results already required scientific development, and two scientific research projects (R&D) were launched in the bowels of the naval research institutes. Research project “Window” and research project “Echo”. Both set themselves the task of testing the reality of radar searches for submerged submarines. The work was going hard, the head of the topic was even attacked (repelled) by forces, presumably from an American special group, in order to seize documents on research in Vladivostok, but in the end, the topic “went forward.” According to the program, at least one Be-12 from the naval aviation of the Pacific Fleet was converted and “thrown” to solve real problems.

The result exceeded all possible expectations. The crew of the Be-12 simply SAW the submarines under water. The number of detections increased tenfold, Soviet submariners got the opportunity to play with the Americans the same games that the Americans had previously played with them, for example, restoring lost contact in a few hours, hanging on the Americans’ “tail” for days on end, constantly receiving from aviation data on the tactical situation hundreds of miles around, drive them as you please.

The basis of the method used in the “Window” program was the discovery of a toroidal wave structure, described by the already mentioned A. Semenov, who called it “Standing Wave”, and which, apparently, is generated by the same “Bernoulli Hump”, mentioned as in the American report and in the scientific works of Jake Tunali.

The results obtained were supposed to form the basis of a new search and targeting system, but the USSR soon collapsed, and the leaders of the new Russia had no time for the fleet...

It is worth believing Lieutenant General Sokerin. Most likely, the Americans have moved much further in studying this effect. After all, they did not have a collapse similar to the collapse of the USSR, and most importantly, they could “support” their radar technology with their computer technology, in which they were and are leading.

Soviet pilots were forced to peer at the concentric marks on the radar screens and decide whether it was it or not.

The Americans, having accumulated detection statistics, could well create computer technology and software capable of “filtering” the anomalies generated specifically by the submarine from those that could occur for other reasons (due to a large school of fish, for example. Experiments under radar detection of fish accumulations in the USSR were carried out in Kamchatka in the 70s), and simply display on the screens of the tactical situation the approximate areas where the underwater target is located, so that then you can really just drop a buoy there and check everything.

Actually, something like this happened.

Today, they have refined these methods so much that they no longer even need to have a PLO magnetometer on board the aircraft. The Poseidons produced for the US Navy simply do not have it, it is not needed, submarines are perfectly and accurately detected without it. But on export vehicles with simplified avionics capabilities, the Americans install a magnetometer. The spread of technologies that make it possible to reveal the entire underwater situation over an area the size of the Black Sea in a matter of hours is not in their interests.

The “extraction” from undocumented messages is now complete.

Those who are related to intelligence, naval aviation, the Navy, who fly to intercept Americans from the Aerospace Forces, etc. Competent people can confirm that the US Navy's basic patrol aircraft have moved to medium altitudes. This is a fact. They no longer have to go down to accurately set up a field of buoys, or several buoys - this is left in the early 80s. Now everything seems to be faster and easier...

Such a deluge of information cannot be ignored. A banal mention of the topic “Window” on “Military Review” revealed a lot of people who were well aware of it, studied it in military schools, and searched for submarines using radar methods. Many noted in the comments.

Russian naval aviation pilots not only know about the effect, they study it and use it to the best of their ability. The problem is the extremely outdated search and targeting systems, many times inferior to those that the Americans used in the late 80s.

Junior submarine commanders are often also aware of this problem. Many submarine commanders know about this.

But “several levels higher” the problems begin - those responsible for the development of the fleet, for choosing where to allocate funding, etc. behave as if the described method of detecting submarines simply does not exist, and the boat only needs to be quiet so that it cannot be detected.

What does this mean? The fact that during combat operations, submarines will receive tasks based on the conditions of their undetectability, and based on these same conditions, support for the execution of combat missions will be assigned - aviation, for example.

And they will be able to be detected, and it will not be very difficult.

Is the rest clear?

And we must understand that the capabilities of the basic anti-submarine aircraft of the US Navy are “supported” by satellite reconnaissance. And they also carefully keep this secret. True, sometimes it turns out funny:

New York Times, 05/11/1999

Since the beginning of the space age, most satellites have observed the Earth with cameras that are, in principle, similar to the cameras of any tourist. However, in 1978, NASA's National Aeronautics and Space Administration launched a new satellite that took pictures using radio waves reflected from the planet's surface.

Known as Seasat, this radar satellite saw land and sea in a new way, his photographs revealed narrow lines in the ocean - traces left by the passage of ships and submarines. Somehow we managed to distinguish the signs of deep turbulence from regular foam and sea waves.

Seasat's exploits came to an abrupt end in 1978, when the spacecraft unexpectedly descended after 100 days and the Pentagon became deeply ambivalent about its findings.

Well, of course, the fleet immediately lost interest in its discoveries, but of course. Could they have done anything differently? And of course we will believe them.

More (including new satellites) - , with reference to the original.

I would like to end with a quote from Sergei Gennadyevich Roslyakov, captain of the first rank, former commander of the K-455 nuclear submarine, former commander of a submarine division.

Back in 1985, I could not understand: WHY our nuclear submarine in the Pacific Ocean goes under the propellers of civilian transport for 10 hours at a speed of 15 knots (28 km per hour with a displacement of 5500 tons) and before the communication session IMMEDIATELY sharply to the right at a speed of 5 knots. And above us is Orion-R3s. At first I thought that this was the result of the low-frequency UUV buoys of the US Navy, which were in service with the UUVs (Orion-R3s). But then there were other cases that refuted my opinion. And all this is at sea, where NOBODY will help YOU.
...Americans “see” our nuclear submarines everywhere...

So captain of the first rank S.G. Roslyakov commented on an article where radar detection of submarines was mentioned.

As they say, enough is enough for the smart. And the rest can continue to pretend that everything is fine.

P.S. There are ways to combat the phenomenon and reduce the likelihood of detecting submarines using the indicated method, but, for obvious reasons, no one in their right mind will talk about them. However, we can no longer turn a blind eye to the problem. Time is almost up.

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Noticed osh Y bku Select text and click Ctrl+Enter

Many publications were devoted to the problems of anti-submarine defense on the forum. But they concerned more sonar devices placed on the underwater vehicles themselves or stationary on the seabed. But in addition to this, methods of detecting, tracking and destroying submarines using technical means installed on naval aircraft are widely used. Let's look at how this is done using the example of the Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft, which has the most complete set of technical means and functionality for this.

The Tu-142 anti-submarine aircraft is a monoplane with four turboprop engines, a mid-wing and a single-fin tail. The aircraft's landing gear is tricycle with steerable front wheels.

The airframe of the aircraft consists of a fuselage, a wing, four engine nacelles and empennage. The fuselage is a monocoque type (equipped with a longitudinal set of stringers, a transverse set of frames, with working skin). The rest of the aircraft is attached to the fuselage. The crew cabins are located in its front and rear parts, and the aft cannon installation is located in the rear part. The fuselage length is 46.4 m, the maximum diameter is 2.9 m. A boom for an in-flight refueling system (using the “Cone” system) is installed in the nose. Depending on the distance of the refueling line, an additional intake of 28 or 35 tons of fuel is provided.

To escape the aircraft in the event of an emergency, there is an access hatch located in the front leg niche. It opens with a compressed air valve. At the same time, the front leg of the landing gear is released. The front cabin floor is driven by a hydraulic motor that receives energy from three hydraulic accumulators, ensuring its operation for 100 seconds even if the power supply system on the aircraft fails and all engines stop. Leaving the aft cabin is done through the aft hatch.

To escape the aircraft in the event of a forced landing on water, there are three hatches in the front cabin and a hatch on the left side of the rear cabin. Near the emergency hatches of the front cabin there is a container with two PSN-6A rafts, and next to the emergency hatch of the rear cabin there is a container with a rescue inflatable boat LAS-5M.

At the bottom of the fuselage there are two cargo compartments. The aircraft wing consists of five parts and almost all of it, with the exception of the center section, is a tank caisson consisting of eight compartments (full refueling of the aircraft, including two soft tanks located in the center section, and one in the rear part of the fuselage, up to - 91 T). The wing span is 50 m, the sweep angle along the leading edge is 33.5 degrees. For the wing, they used profiles that had already been tested in operation, in particular on the Tu-95, but they made a “small” change: their toes were bent and pulled down, which improved the aerodynamic quality. Thanks to this, it was possible to significantly reduce the kilometer fuel consumption, and it turned out to be almost the same as on the Tu-95, despite the increase in drag of the aircraft.

The aircraft's power plant consists of four NK-12M turboprop engines designed by N. D. Kuznetsov. The power of each engine is 15,000 equivalent horsepower. pp., they are equipped with two coaxial four-bladed tractor propellers.

Tests have shown that with a take-off weight of 182 tons, the aircraft's flight range (with a load of 5500 kg) is 12,300 km (navigation margin 5% of a refueling). The aircraft's cruising speed is 700-750 km/h.

The Tu-142 is equipped with the Berkut fire alarm system, which has been slightly modified in relation to the aircraft and its equipment. The composition of the system equipment remained almost unchanged, but instead of the TsVM-264, the TsVM-263 was installed; accordingly, some programs and constants contained in the read-only memory have differences.

Unlike the Il-38, only two types of buoys are used as information sensors on the aircraft: RSL-1 and RSL-2. The magnetometer is not installed on the aircraft. The Berkut-95 PPS has connections with speed, altitude, flight course, and gyro-vertical meters, and since the characteristics of the main flight parameter sensors and actuators differ from those used on the Il-38, significant improvements have been made to the electrical connections.

The number of tactical tasks solved automatically has been reduced. The following are left: “Flying to a given area”, “Setting a linear barrier”, “Observing a linear barrier”, “Setting RSL-2 with removal”, “Setting a ring barrier”, “Collecting and processing information from RSL-2”, “ Flight on parallel tacks”, “Torpedo throwing (bombing) according to RSL-2 information”, “Bombing at the RSL-1 transponder beacon”.

It is easy to see that the developers excluded tasks that were not necessary for tactical reasons. Such tasks included everything that was associated with the use of RSL-3 buoys, excluded from the ammunition load; radar search in automatic mode was also not provided for, as archaic. Practice has shown that none of the crews even thought about replacing the failed buoy with a functional one - this task was also excluded.

When testing the PPS on the Tu-142 aircraft, they took into account the experience already accumulated by this time and, without waiting for suggestions from the flight crew, equipped the aircraft with an automatic navigation device ANP-ZV, thereby facilitating the work of the crew and increasing the accuracy of maneuvering, especially when tracking submarines.

Just like on the Il-38, many operations turned out to be very labor-intensive - preparation for a flight in the search mode took 7-8 hours, and only later it was possible to significantly reduce it. Of the many options for loading an aircraft with search and destruction means, and there were more than four dozen of them, the search and strike one was considered the most acceptable (176 RSL-1, 10 RSL-2, two torpedoes of various types). In the search version, 440 or 396 buoys could be hung on the aircraft, which for tactical reasons was completely pointless. The mention of such a number of buoys could only cause delight among less experienced bosses.

The arrival of aircraft with a tactical radius twice the capabilities of the previously adopted Il-38 made it possible to significantly expand the areas of presence of anti-submarine aircraft and enter the North Atlantic Ocean. However, this was associated with the need to overcome the Faroe-Icelandic border, and when flying over it and returning, Tu-142 aircraft flying at high altitudes were regularly intercepted by NATO and British fighter aircraft. The aircraft's activities were repeatedly monitored by the Orion and Nimrod base patrol aircraft, which sometimes caused interference.

The desire to obtain an aircraft with a long range and flight duration ultimately resulted in a loss of quality - on-board search tools were already outdated, and operation was significantly more expensive compared to the Il-38. For this reason, the series of Tu-142 aircraft turned out to be small, and moreover, with the advent of new generation aircraft with more modern Tu-142M search capabilities, the naval aviation command clearly did not know what to do with the Tu-142, and in 1978 they were transferred to the Pacific Fleet aviation, where there was absolutely no need for them.

Thus, by 1978 the Tu-142 aircraft turned out to be unnecessary.

Anti-submarine aircraft Tu-142M

The experience of crews of anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters in various areas of the world's oceans showed that sonar buoys of the sound frequency range with threshold devices became less and less effective due to the decrease in noise of modern submarines and the complexity of classifying contact. This was a consequence of the fact that submarine designers managed to bring the noise level closer to the spectrum of sea noise. Research has shown that to detect low-noise boats, sonar buoys should be used that respond to noise in the range from 2 to 40 hertz (remember that the buoys used by domestic aircraft and helicopters received sound signals in the range from 3 to 10 kHz). Peaks precisely in this range arise, for example, when the propeller blades of a submarine pass through the horizontal and vertical stabilizers located in front of it due to cavitation fluctuations. Protruding parts on the submarine body lead to a disturbance of the flow in the plane of rotation of the propeller, which leads to pulsation of its stop. These forces are periodic and in submarines equipped with five- to seven-blade propellers, they are distributed in the range from 2 to 40 hertz. In some cases, when the city was disrupted, a long-range anti-submarine aircraft was put into service, and on December 6 an order was signed by the USSR Minister of Defense.

The aviation anti-submarine complex includes: the Tu-142M aircraft, the NPN-142M navigation and flight control system, the Korshun-K equipment, the control system for dropping bombs, torpedoes, buoys, mines, the MMS-106 Ladoga magnetometer, the Strela onboard communication system -142M”, hydrological reconnaissance equipment “Nerchinsk”, search and destruction equipment, airborne defense complex “Sayana”. The basic data of the Tu-142M aircraft, including takeoff and landing characteristics, have not undergone significant changes compared to the Tu-142, but there are still some differences: it turned out to be three tons heavier (due to increased fuel filling). However, this did not lead to an increase in flight range and duration due to deterioration in aerodynamics and an increase in flight weight. Therefore, the range remained equal to 12,000 km with a take-off weight of 185 tons. With in-flight refueling, the range increases by 2000 km.

When developing the Tu-142M aircraft, in order to accommodate the equipment, it was necessary to significantly rearrange the front cockpit and, despite the relatively high level of automation, increase the number of crew members to 11 people (two pilots, a ship navigator, a second navigator, a combat navigator, two radiohydroacoustic subsystem operator, on-board communications operator, senior flight engineer, aft cabin operator and gunner). It is easy to see that there was every opportunity to reduce the crew by at least two people, get rid of the aft cannon installation, and reduce the flight weight by about 1500 kg.

The developers of the search and targeting system encountered enormous difficulties. Not everything that came out on paper turned out to be suitable for practical implementation. They had to create a fundamentally new system capable of detecting modern low-noise submarines.

In order to solve the problem, or at least get close to it, four types of buoys, explosive sources of sound energy, a new type of magnetometer, information processing equipment, and much more were developed.

In order to more rationally use the information sensors available on the aircraft, optimally combine the work of operators with the onboard computer complex, and provide the crew with visual information about the air, surface and underwater conditions, tactical situation indicators were installed on the Tu-142M aircraft, including and at the pilots' workplace.

Almost all of these ideas and some others were implemented in the search and targeting system “2 “Korshun-K” (hereinafter it will be simply called “Korshun”).

In combination with other means and systems, it provides: detection of submarines in any position, exchange of information about the situation between aircraft and with the command post, calculation of data and use of means for searching and destroying submarines, automatic or semi-automatic control of the aircraft when solving navigation and tactical problems .

The Korshun search and targeting system includes on-board equipment permanently placed on the aircraft, drop buoys to obtain information about the underwater situation, and ground-based control and testing equipment.

The weak point, or rather, the disadvantage of all previously developed means of searching for submarines, was the lack of devices that reproduce the tactical situation and provide the ability to make more informed decisions. This drawback was eliminated in the Korshun system by introducing into its structure a subsystem for displaying the tactical situation (POTO). POTO uses a pre-compiled program from a set of instructions (binary codes) that are stored in a long-term storage device. The subsystem has two operating modes: displaying information and processing it.

On the screens of the main and auxiliary screens, the situation is displayed in the form of associative symbols, their two-valued forms, vectors and circles characterizing the tactical situation (the location of the aircraft with the speed vector, the location of the buoys, bearings from directional buoys, the location of the submarine and up to six other data). After the end of the display mode, the POTO proceeds to information processing and performs the functions of a digital unicast computer.

To make it easier to work with images and make the system more efficient, the combat control navigator has a photoelectronic pencil (FEC) with a “large crosshair.” The crosshair can move to a certain point (on the tactical situation indicator) and after pressing special buttons the aircraft is automatically brought to a given point,

The processing of information coming from the control panel and all interacting devices of the Korshun PPS is carried out by the on-board computing subsystem (OCS). It continuously calculates the coordinates of the aircraft, buoy splashdown points, and movement elements

The submarine exchanges information with other aircraft through the on-board communication system, issues signals to the navigation and flight control system that provide automatic or semi-automatic flight control, and in the process of solving tactical problems, targeted use of weapons.

The Korshun search and targeting system includes four radio sonobuoys - the main sources of information about the underwater situation, designed to detect submarines and determine their location and elements of movement. Accordingly, the buoys are called RG5-75, RSL-15, RSL-25 and RSL-55A. The first two b/i are intended for searching for submarines, and the second are for clarifying the received contact, determining the location and elements of movement. However, RSL-15 together with MGAB can also be used to clarify the location of the submarine.

The RSL-75 buoy is designed to receive acoustic signals generated by submarines in the infrasound and low audio frequency ranges, convert them into electrical signals and transmit them via radio to the aircraft for subsequent processing.

The weight of the buoy is 9.5 kg, length is 1214 mm, the kit includes 24 buoys. The buoy transmitters operate continuously after splashdown. The RSL-15 buoy provides the reception of acoustic signals, both in the infrasound and audio frequency ranges, as well as signals created by explosive sound sources, with their subsequent conversion and transmission via the buoy-aircraft radio link. The operating frequency range of the sonar receiver of this buoy is from 2 to 5000 Hz. In the active mode (using VIZ), the buoy-radar range and the location of the buoy relative to the aircraft are determined using the rangefinder channel when the radar subsystem is operating, but there is no autonomous transponder beacon on the buoy, and the information channel is used as the rangefinder channel.

The acoustic system of the buoy (hydrophone) in the operating position is a cylinder with a diameter of 80 mm, a length of 1400 mm, consists of six receivers and can be buried to a depth of 20, 150 and 400 m. The duration of the buoy’s operation is up to 2 hours, its weight is 9.5 kg, in the set includes 16 buoys.

As already noted, RSL-15 is used independently or in conjunction with VIZ. In the first case, noise present in the aquatic environment in the frequency range of the buoy is received and transmitted to the aircraft. On board, using NR-P equipment, the spectrum of received signals is analyzed visually in the frequency range from 2 to 6 Hz and aurally in the range up to 5000 Hz. The capabilities of buoys and target classification during visual analysis of the noise spectrum are somewhat worse than with the use of RSL-75 buoys. At the same time, analyzing noise by ear in some cases can provide some benefit.

In the event of an explosion, the VIZ RSL-15 receives and transmits direct signals and signals reflected from the target to the aircraft. In this case, the detection range can be 5-10 km or more. In some cases, this allows us to consider the use of RSL-15 in conjunction with VIZ as a means of primary search for submarines in active mode, especially when operating against low-noise boats.

To receive acoustic signals generated by the boat in the audio frequency range and determine their magnetic bearing with subsequent processing and transmission on board the aircraft, passive directional buoys RSL-25 are used. The antenna of this buoy is a spatial folding array of five separate frames connected to each other using cylindrical hinges. There are strings of 34 acoustic receivers installed in the three middle wings. Antenna weight 7 kg. The acoustic system, under the influence of an electromechanical drive, rotates at a speed of 6-12 rpm, providing an overview of the water area. When a submarine appears in the buoy's coverage area, the noise it creates is perceived by an acoustic antenna, converted into electrical signals, which, after amplification, are transmitted by an information transmitter to the aircraft. A compass device is used to determine the current position of the axis of the acoustic system's radiation pattern. The buoy's rangefinding channel works in conjunction with the aircraft's radar, ensuring the coordinates of the buoy's location relative to the aircraft are determined. The acoustic system of the buoy is buried at 20 or 150 m, the operating time of the buoy is about 40 minutes, the accuracy of determining the target bearing is no more than 3 degrees, the set consists of 10 buoys, weight is 45 kg.

Used in the RSL-55A system, it is a directional aviation buoy. It is designed to detect submerged submarines in active mode, as well as transmit information to determine the position of the buoy relative to the aircraft. In addition, the buoy provides determination of the radial component of the submarine's speed. The moment of hydroacoustic radiation of the buoy is controlled from the aircraft by a special transmitter of control commands.

Upon command, a sound signal is emitted from the aircraft into the surrounding water environment. The signal received from the target is transmitted on board to measure its travel time and Doppler frequency shift. This allows you to determine the range and radial speed of the target relative to the buoy. Information from two or three buoys, combined with knowledge of their location, allows one to determine the location and elements of the movement.

In the absence of a command to emit, the buoy operates as a passive non-directional one. RGB-55A buoys are supplied in sets of 16 pieces. According to the loading options, up to 15 buoys are suspended, operating at four frequencies of sonar channel radiation. The duration of radiation may vary. The operating time of the buoy is up to an hour, the depth of the acoustic system is 20-200 m, the weight of the buoy is 55 kg. Detection range is at least 5 km. All hydroacoustic buoys are equipped with devices for flooding them after their service life has expired. Power sources are practically unified: each buoy is equipped with one or two (on RSL-75, RSL-25) 15-9 batteries - this is a water-activated, disposable current source operating in sea water. The battery is made on the basis of the electrochemical system magnesium-silver chloride. The negative electrode is a rolled sheet of magnesium alloy, the positive electrode is stamped from rolled silver chloride (later cheaper power supplies were made). However, the power of such a power source is not enough to operate the buoy in active mode, so an alkaline nickel-cadmium battery 64NKPL-1.5A is installed in the lowered part of the RGB-55A buoys. The battery consists of 64 cells placed in a metal container.

To search for submarines with RSL-15 buoys in active mode, three types of explosive sound sources (VIS) can be used: MGAB-03, MGAB-LZ and MGAB-SZ (small-sized aerial bombs with a single, linear and spiral charge). To clarify the location of the submarine at distances from the buoy not exceeding the depth of the sea, MGAB-03 with a charge of 200 or 800 g of explosive is used. The last stage of the bomb's fuse is removed when it hits the water.

In shallow water areas with a flat bottom, MGAB-LZ is used, which ensures minimal reverberation interference. A cord 2 m long and weighing 100 g is used as a charge. The charge is removed from the bomb body after splashdown with a stream of water, and it is detonated upon reaching a given depth. Up to 240 MGAB-LZ can be mounted on the aircraft.

In difficult hydrological conditions, as well as in areas with uneven ground relief, MGAB-SZ is used. It has a stabilizing parachute. The bomb charge is a spiral of cord weighing 200 g, with the number of turns up to 40. During the explosion, a series of pulses is created with a frequency of 4 kHz, and their number depends on the number of turns of the spiral.

The detonation depth of all types of VIZ is 25, 150 or 400 m. The Korshun PPS closely interacts with the NPK-142 flight and navigation complex, consisting of two circuits: the main and backup.

The flight system provides the ability to semi-automatically and automatically control the aircraft using various input signals coming from the navigation system and the Korshun control system. The flight system includes the Bort-142 trajectory control system and the AP-15PS autopilot.

The aircraft's armament is divided into bomber, mine-torpedo, special and defensive. Weapon units, in turn, are divided into groups: suspensions (beam, cassette holders); release control and aiming (sight NKPB-7, electric release device ESBR-70, release options device, depth setting unit, etc.); fuze control units; lifting units (bomb winches, cassette holder beams and auxiliary equipment).

Combat drops of all types of anti-submarine search and destruction weapons are carried out automatically based on signals from the on-board computer. In the Tu-142 aircraft complex, the solution to navigation and tactical problems is separated and when flying, for example, to a designated area, only the navigation system is used, and the aircraft’s flight in the tactical area is controlled using the Korshun system.

The Korshun system includes active hydroacoustic buoys and explosive sources of sound energy, so knowledge of the speed of sound propagation in water is very important. To determine it, the aircraft has Nerchinsk equipment. It includes two drop buoys that transmit data on the speed of sound in depth to the aircraft, and the Istra on-board receiving equipment. The signals transmitted by the buoy, after decoding, are recorded using the electrographic method on paper tape,

Emergency dropping of weapons (for explosion or non-explosion) is carried out by the combat navigator and the crew commander. The aircraft's defensive armament consists of a DN-12 aft mount with two AM-23 cannons, a PS-153K optical sight and a VB-153 computer unit. Initial data for firing can be entered into the aiming unit and from the PRS-4 “Krypton” radar.

The increasing role of communications has led to the need to combine them into an on-board communication system (BCS). It provides communication between crew members, two-way communication over the entire frequency range with coastal command posts, ships, aircraft, documentation of all received and transmitted telecode and voice information and AR.

An auxiliary source of information about the underwater situation is the MMS-106 magnetometer. It consists of a magnetically sensitive unit, an orienting system, a measuring channel and other devices necessary to ensure its operation. The magnetically sensitive unit is located on the top of the fin (the location was chosen extremely poorly, since large charges of static electricity accumulate here) under the non-magnetic fairing. The registration console is located in the cockpit.

The solution to a typical anti-submarine task of primary search for submarines can be presented in the following general form. After the aircraft enters the designated search area, it is inspected using radar, and then (this is most often used) RSL-75 buoys are deployed.

When a submarine is detected using RSL-75 buoys, it may become necessary to clarify its location before proceeding to tracking. A preliminary clarification of the area of ​​possible location can be made by placing RSL-1 buoys of the Berkut system or RSL-15 buoys.

The search for submarines can also be carried out using RSL-15 buoys used in conjunction with VIZ, or, which is least expedient and likely, using RSL-55A buoys in active mode. In both the first and second cases, the search is not carried out covertly, which reduces the likelihood of detection. Tracking is carried out by placing arc or linear barriers in the expected directions of submarine movement, and in this case, RSL-15 and RSL-55A buoys can be used.

The transition to destroying a submarine, depending on the specific task, is possible both after tracking it and immediately after detection.

The Tu-142M aircraft began to enter naval aviation in 1979. The first operational experience showed extremely low reliability of the search and sighting system, flight navigation system and search aids. That is, the main weapon for which it was created turned out to be unreliable. Weaknesses of the complex and ideological miscalculations were revealed: significant processing time of information received from buoys, classification of contact by visual comparison of spectrograms (automatic comparison was not provided), directional buoys had very strong side lobes, etc.

The magnetometer caused a lot of trouble: its sensitivity turned out to be significantly lower than specified, the installation location was chosen poorly, to ensure the operation of the magnetometer in flight, the crew had, in accordance with the recommendations, to turn off four of the eight generators on the engines, the hydraulic pump, and some electronic devices.

The first flights on the Tu-142 did not allow us to draw definite conclusions about its capabilities for the simple reason that for almost two years the standard buoys were not used - they were considered secret. After the secrecy was lifted, for another four years no one could objectively evaluate the results obtained during the flight: was a submarine detected or was it a false positive. The reason for this situation is the imperfection of objective control means, and only in 1985, when the Uzor-58 magnetic recorder was installed on several aircraft, the situation more or less became clearer, and significant claims were made to the developers.

Mastering the search and targeting system was associated with great difficulties; the crews had to retrain and move from the ideology of old aircraft to a new one. Although this was not documented, the situation itself suggested that the combat navigator should lead in the tactical area - he has the most information, and the ship commander is responsible for flight safety and solving the problem in accordance with the assignment. In order to carry out training more quickly, they practiced joint training with representatives of research institutes, as well as with test navigators, and sometimes it turned out that the level of training of navigators who had extensive experience in flying the Tu-142 was higher than that of the testers.

In subsequent years, the Korshun-K search and targeting system underwent significant modernization: the range of buoys was reduced, and it became possible to use serial buoys RGB-1A and RGB-2 of the Berkut system, RGB-16 and 26 of the Nashatyr-Jade system. The plane became known as Tu-142MZ.

What can I say in conclusion? The publication “The Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft has been modernized” stated that the Il-38 anti-submarine aircraft was modernized, which significantly increased its effectiveness. The arsenal of the modernized IL-38 contains 9 tons of combat load: torpedoes, anti-submarine bombs, sea mines, rescue containers, sea markers - OMAB-12D naval air bombs. And even anti-ship cruise missiles. The sighting and navigation system installed on it allows the use of Russian Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as APR-3 torpedoes.

In addition, I would once again like to draw attention to the possibility and prospects of using aircraft of a fundamentally new design - the “Pavlov aircraft” - to search and destroy submarines.

Let me briefly remind you that this is a vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft, which has a wing in the form of a rotating axisymmetric disk. During takeoff and landing, the blades extend from the disk, turning the disk-wing into a main rotor. Therefore, an airplane with a disc wing takes off like a helicopter, but then the blades are retracted and in flight the lift is created by the disc wing. This is the first type of subsonic or supersonic VTOL aircraft combining an airplane with a helicopter. The authors call it a discus.

The Pavlov Airplane can fly two to three times faster than a helicopter, reaching speeds of up to 900-1000 kilometers per hour. A very high figure, considering that helicopter pilots are fighting to increase their speed by at least 10-20 kilometers per hour. Disc aircraft will consume two to three times less fuel with a flight range of two to three thousand kilometers (not even all modern carrier-based fighters have such parameters now).

Such an aircraft will be indispensable for local and regional air services, where there are often no airfields with high-quality runways. It will also be in great demand as an individual aircraft, which will give a leap in the development of small aviation. Unfortunately, at the same time it will greatly displace helicopters.

"Pavlov's Airplane" is well suited for the production of combat aircraft that can land on any surface, including the deck of a ship. And for this you will not need to build specialized aircraft carriers, spending a lot of money on it and copying someone else’s strategy. After all, a dozen multifunctional frigates/cruisers with VTOL fighters are more profitable than one aircraft-carrying ship, which can be destroyed by one missile that successfully hits it. These will truly be fundamentally new multifunctional ships and a new concept for building the Navy and conducting combat operations by the fleet.

This concept will also be very useful for aircraft of coastal ships, the problems of which have also been repeatedly covered in the media. Such aircraft will be indispensable for anti-submarine aviation, as well as during rescue operations at sea.

I would especially like to dwell on one very important feature that aircraft of this design can have to search for submarines. It was already said above that this aircraft can take off and land like a helicopter on any surface (I believe, including water), and also have a flight speed from zero to supersonic. But in this case, it is the low speeds that are of interest. While afloat or hovering above the water, the aircraft will be able to release a towed, highly sensitive hose antenna, with which it can then move at a speed acceptable for this mode to ensure monitoring of large areas. And no aircraft of traditional designs can provide such an opportunity. At the same time, the shortcomings of the above-mentioned hydroacoustic buoys will be eliminated to a large extent and the detection range of submarines will significantly increase.

From the above it follows that the “Pavlov Airplane” can become a key link in the design of promising aircraft for a wide variety of purposes, or, as they say now, a unified aviation platform, including for the needs of the Navy.

An invisible ship, capable of suddenly attacking from the most unexpected point - this is exactly how submarines were conceived and remained so until very recently. P.L.'s secrecy especially increased after the advent of nuclear and air-independent power plants (in the 50s of the 20th century). The twentieth century may someday be called the century of submarines. In the 21st century, the submarine fleet will either cease to exist altogether or change in the most radical way.

Mikhail Nikolaev

However, the submarine fleet in its current form is most likely dying. The sea ceases to be a space where ships are able to remain invisible to the enemy. And this change occurred as a result of the emergence of systems that make it possible to track any movements of any large underwater objects.

From noise direction finding systems to complex FOSS

The history of the development of submarines - and their mass construction began in the first quarter of the 20th century - is an illustration of the famous thesis about the rivalry of means of attack and defense. Initially, no means of detecting submerged submarines existed at all. In the surface position, the submarines, due to the design features, had very little visibility. These combat qualities, which made the submarine perhaps the most formidable naval weapon of its time, persisted until 1941. It was then that radar first appeared on anti-submarine aircraft of the British Air Force. He confidently detected submarines on the surface, and the submarines of that time deserved the name not so much underwater as “diving”, because at least half of the combat campaign was forced to go “over water”. The boat detected by the radar did not have time to dive and was almost guaranteed to be destroyed. Almost at the same period - and also by the British - an effective sonar was created, and groups of anti-submarine ships began to confidently localize and destroy submarines underwater. As a result, by the end of the war, the effectiveness of the German submarine fleet was practically reduced to zero.

A sonar station is used to illuminate the submarine. Sonobuoys and a deployed ADS antenna array detect the submarine in multistatic mode. In addition to sonar, the boat can be detected by another three dozen different physical fields and phenomena caused by the actions of the boat. The corresponding sensors monitor changes in the natural background of the environment that are caused by the presence of the ship. For example, as a result of the passage of a boat, the water pressure changes and a wave of increased hydrostatic pressure is formed, which can easily be recorded. Seismic sensors can track the vibrations of the seabed caused by the passage of a submarine (the boat puts pressure on the water, which in turn puts pressure on the seabed). Due to the passage of the boat, the illumination of the underwater bottom, the magnetic field, and the gravitational field of the Earth change. Finally, from a satellite, under certain conditions, you can see the wake of a boat, even if it goes deep underwater. Modern anti-submarine warfare systems use a whole range of search tools - something has to work.

However, with the advent of the nuclear submarine fleet, the possibility of detecting a submarine on the surface disappeared - the boat no longer surfaced during a combat cruise. And finding submarines under water by search and strike groups was extremely troublesome. This became the impetus for the creation of global underwater lighting systems, primarily hydroacoustic ones. At the same time, passive hydroacoustics, or noise direction finding, became the main means of detecting submarines, mainly due to its relative cheapness, technological simplicity and ability to detect targets at long distances. The most impressive noise direction finding system is the famous SOSUS system created by the United States during the Cold War. It consisted of giant fields of acoustic antennas spread out in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In our near North, they were located throughout the Lofoten Basin - from the coast of Norway to the island of Jan Main. After the deployment of the system, the covert passage of Soviet submarines into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans turned out to be practically impossible: submarines were detected at a distance of up to several hundred kilometers.

The submarine (in the center) is detected by a system consisting of an emitter towed by a surface ship and numerous receivers: a towed antenna of a surface ship, a submarine's sonar, sonobuoys and linear antennas laid out on the ground. The coordinates of each FOSS element at each moment in time are known using a satellite positioning system. The work of the ship's formation and FOSS is coordinated using space communications, the AWACS system, and from any element of the formation - a submarine or surface ships - means of destroying a detected enemy boat can be used. The environment system is illuminated from both the underwater and surface parts. To illuminate the surface part, spacecraft, AWACS aircraft and surface ships are used. Comprehensive information about the situation in the combat area is concentrated at command posts located on surface ships and on the shore.

Meanwhile, the nuclear submarine was initially a rather noisy structure. The noise level of the first American nuclear submarines of the Nautilus and Seawolf types was about one hundred decibels. The ship's mechanisms are noisy (engines, pumps, fans, shafts, etc.), the propellers are noisy, the water flowing around the ship is noisy... Reducing noise is the only way to counteract direction-finding detection stations and systems like SOSUS. Noise was reduced, however, for other reasons - for example, to reduce the response radius of proximity fuses of mine-torpedo weapons. Designers honed the geometry of propellers, increased the accuracy of manufacturing shafts and machine parts, provided shock-absorbing fastening systems that dampen vibration (and therefore noise) of mechanisms, and came up with special hull coatings. Since the 70s of the last century, nuclear submarines have reduced their noise by an average of 1 dB every two years. Over the past 19 years alone - from 1990 to the present - the average noise level of US nuclear submarines has decreased tenfold, from 0.1 Pa to 0.01 Pa.

Characteristics of the Virginia-class attack nuclear submarine (SSN-774)
Length: 115 m // Width: 10 m // Submerged displacement: 7900 tons // Submerged speed: more than 25 knots // Dive depth: more than 250 m // Crew: 134 people // Armament: twelve vertical launchers for Tomahawk cruise missiles, four 533-mm torpedo tubes for Mk48 ADCAP torpedoes and Harpoon missiles, Mk 60 CAPTOR mines // Power plant: S9G nuclear reactor (according to some sources, shaft power is 40,000 hp). Today, the US Navy has five boats of this class - Virginia (SSN-774), Texas (SSN-775), Hawaii (SSN-776), North Carolina (SSN-777) and "New Hampshire" (SSN-778).

To illustrate: since the second half of the 20th century, one of the most effective ways to detect submarines has been the use of nuclear submarines, the so-called “hunter boats,” for this purpose. However, nowadays their search performance has dropped to absolutely ridiculous levels. According to data published in the open foreign press, the type 688I SSN 772 Greenville nuclear submarine (built in 1995) detects the Los Angeles type 688 nuclear submarine (built in 1978) at a distance of 10 to 35 km. This is a completely acceptable result. But the modern Virginia (SSN 774, built in 2004) is detected by Greenville at a distance of only 1 to 4 km (according to independent British expert Admiral Palmer). If boats “see” each other only at such distances, then their very maneuvering next to each other becomes mortally dangerous not only for the “victim”, but also for the “hunter”: the risk of an unexpected collision between ships that cannot see each other sharply increases.

Types of submarines

Modern boats come in two types - multi-purpose and strategic. Multi-purpose, as their name implies, perform many tasks, including the task of firing high-precision weapons at enemy territory - long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (LRCBM). Among other tasks, they can also solve anti-submarine tasks: reconnaissance, deployment of open fire protection systems, laying minefields, etc. Multi-purpose boats today are: in the American fleet, nuclear submarines of the Los Angeles (688I) and Virginia (774) type, as well as converted "Ohio" (726−729). In the Russian fleet, these include nuclear submarines of the Nizhny Novgorod (Project 945 A), Bars (Project 971) and Antey (Project 949 A) ​​class.
Strategic submarines are boats with ballistic missiles on board, designed to perform strategic deterrence missions. Boats of this type include the American Ohio and the Russian SSBN Project 667 BDRM, as well as the Dmitry Donskoy (Project 941 Akula) and the Yuri Dolgoruky (Project 955) that is entering service.

(We should separately note that data about the noise of Russian submarines and their detection range that are any close to the truth cannot be seen except under the heading “secret.”)

Sound pressure is a variable excess pressure that occurs in an elastic medium when a sound wave passes through it. Sound pressure level is measured in absolute and relative units. Absolute units are pascals (Pa), one Pa corresponds to a pressure of 1 N/m 2. Relative units are decibels (dB), the sound pressure level L in decibels is equal to 20 logarithms of the ratio of the absolute value of sound pressure P to the threshold value of sound pressure P0, which is 20 μPa.

A sharp decrease in the detection range of low-noise submarines by direction-finding sonars, a revolutionary event from a technological point of view, coincided with revolutionary changes in politics - the collapse of the USSR. At the end of the 20th century, submarines of the Soviet Union (and Russia) actually ceased to be considered as a military threat to the United States and Western Europe. These two circumstances had far-reaching consequences. The United States changed its strategy for waging war and, in particular, the use of naval forces. Instead of a global confrontation with the enemy fleet in the sea and ocean expanses, in local wars and armed conflicts, the main task of the Navy became launching strikes from the outlying seas on enemy territory.